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RESUME
Certains supposent que la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, donc la section
35(1) reconnait les droits existants des peuples autochtones, a complete la
decolonisation du Canada. Par contre, malgre Ie passage d'un quart de siecle,
plusieurs Autochtones estiment que la Cour supreme continue a nier l'existence de
leurs droits. Cette etude examine cette problematique en formulant des definitions
juridiques du « colonialisme » et du « post colonialisme ». Vu Ie remplacement de
l'ideal de «la loi» comme «commande », promu par Ie juriste anglais John Austin
au dernier siecle, par l'ideal du consensus populaire et democratique, nous avons
vecu une changement important dans Ie droit euro-canadien. Mais, selon la theorie
des paradigmes de Thomas Kuhn, la continuation des anciennes habitudes est une
partie normale du processus de changement, qui n'est jamais complete sans
l'emergence de nouveaux modeles et procedures.
Pour determiner la situation de la Cour supreme du Canada par rapport au
processus de decolonisation, la Partie I de cet etude examine Ie fonctionnement
paradigmatique autant que Ie phenomene coloniale, la decolonisation en droit
international et Ie postcolonialisme pour identifier les indicateurs du paradigme
colonial autant que Ie paradigme postcolonial. La Partie II adapte ce cadre
analytique aux raisonnements de la Cour supreme du Canada concernant les droits
autochtones proteges par la article 35(1) de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982.
Cette double analyse coloniale/postcoloniale demontre la persistance des
anciennes habitudes malgre la reconnaissance des ideaux postcoloniaux par la Cour.
Les juges sont conscients des limites institutionnelles qui restreignent leur capacite
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de proteger les droits autochtones, mais plusieurs concepts qui structurent leur
raisonnement perpetuent la dynamique coloniale. Une retlexion approfondie des
juges, des praticiens et des peuples autochtones sur les probU:mes qui decoulent des
changements paradigmatiques doit faciliter la tolerance mutuelle qui est un
prealable aux ententes qui sont necessaires selon les ideaux egalitaires qui sont
partages par tous.
MOTSCLE
AUTODETERMINATION, CATEGORIZATION, DECOLONIZATION,
HAUDENOSAUNEE, HISTOIRE, IMPERIALISME, METAPHOR,
PARADIGME, POSTCOLONIAL, SOUVERAINNETE
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ENGLISH RESUME
Many people believe that Canada became fully decolonized in 1982 with the
"patriation" instituted by the Constitution Act, 1982, whose s.35(1) explicitly
recognized and affirmed "existing Aboriginal and treaty rights". Yet, a quarter
century later, Indigenous critics continue to complain that their rights are being
denied by the Supreme Court of Canada. This study has approached such questions
by drawing on international law to establish legal definitions for "colonialism" and
"postcolonialism". In this optic, it becomes clear that there has been a significant
change in Euro-Canadian norms during the past century. Colonial concepts, like the
English jurist John Austin's definition of "law" as "command" have been
superseded by the ideal of informed, popular consent, yet modes of conduct that are
consistent with the colonial paradigm persist. According to Kuhn's theory of
scientific revolutions this is predictable because changes from one paradigm to
another are normally characterized by intensified assertions of the impugned
orthodoxy and no change is complete until new models and procedures have
emerged to replace established habits.
In order to determine where the Supreme Court of Canada actually stands in
relation to the decolonization process, Part I of this study examines the nature of
paradigmatic function, including the metaphoric construction of language. It then
reviews the colonial phenomenon, the emergence of decolonization in international
law and postcolonialism to define the colonial and postcolonial paradigms in terms
of specific indicia that can be used to classify institutional performance. Part II
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adapts this analytical framework to the specific circumstances of judicial decision
making and applies it to the reasoning of over 60 Supreme Court of Canada cases
concerned with section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
This dual colonial/postcolonial analysis makes it possible to identify some of
the ways in which colonial metaphors and modes of thought have persisted during
the past quarter century despite the Court's firm commitment to postcolonial ideals.
Though the judges themselves are aware of some of the institutional limitations that
constrict their ability to validate Indigenous rights, many of the concepts that
structure their reasoning induce them to perpetuate the colonial paradigm. Further
reflection on the structure of our rational processes and on the problems predictably
associated with paradigm change might make it easier for judges, practitioners and
Indigenous peoples to develop the agreements that are necessary to implement the
egalitarian ideals ascribed to by all.
KEYWORDS:
CATEGORIZATION, DECOLONIZATION, HAUDENOSAUNEE, HISTORY,
IMPERALISM, METAPHOR, PARADIGM, POSTCOLONIAL, SELF-
DETERMINATION, SOVEREIGNTY
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Loi constitutionnelle de 1982
PARTIE II
DROITS DES PEUPLES AUTOCHTONES DU CANADA
Confirmation des
droits existants des
peuples autochtones
Definition de
« Peuples
autochtones du
Canada»
Accords sur des
revendications
territoriales
Egalite de garantie
des droits pour les
deux sexes
35(1) Les droits existants - ancestraux ou issus de traites - des peuples
autochtones du Canada sont reconnus et contirmes. The existing aboriginal
and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples ofCanada are hereby recognized
and affirmed.
(2) Dans la presente loi, « peuples autochtones du Canada» s'entend
notamment des Indiens, des Inuit et des Metis du Canada.
(3) II est entendu que sont compris parmi les droits issus de traites, dont il
est fait mention au paragraphe (1), les droits existants issus d'accords sur des
revendications territoriales ou ceux susceptibles d'etre ainsi acquis.
. (4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and
treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and
female persons.
The Constitution Act, 1982
PART II
RIGHTS OF THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLES OF CANADA
Recognition of
existing aboriginal
and treaty rights 35
Definition of
"aboriginal peoples
of Canada"
Land claims
agreements
Aboriginal and
treaty rights are
guaranteed equally
to both sexes
35(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples ofCanada" includes the Indian, Inuit and
Metis peoples of Canada.
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty rights" includes rights that
now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty
rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female
persons.
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INTRODUCTION
"In light of the evolution of our law following the
passage of the charters and given the growing
recognition that there are many different perspectives -
the aboriginal perspective, for example - I believe that
the era of concealed underlying premises is now over.
In my view, those premises must be brought to the
surface in order to promote consistency in our law and
the integrity of our judicial system."
L'Heureux-Dube J.
2747-3174 Quebec Inc. v. Quebec, 1996. 1
12747-3174 QuebecInc. v. Quebec (Regie des permis d'alcool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919 at [158].
1.
GHOST DANCING and s.35
"In every instance, the Indian posItIOn is fragile
because it ultimately depends on the capacity and
willingness of the majority society to explore
unfamiliar intellectual terrain."z
Charles F. Wilkinson
Wisconsin Law Review, 1991.
This study must begin with a caveat. The process of decolonization is
complex. Some of the underlying premises examined in this work are deeply
enmeshed in our habits of thought and action. This is not an easy afternoon read. It
was written slowly and invites a slow, section by section, approach for reasons that
will become apparent as paradigmatic function is examined in more detail. The
perspective presented here is postcolonial in that it remains highly conscious of the
looming persistence of the ideology that shaped the colonial era. Despite the current
trendiness of "decolonization" and the concept of human equality, the emergence
and success of new models for social behaviour that actually implement these ideals
is by no means assured. This should become clear when the concepts associated
with colonial modes of behaviour and postcolonial ideals are explored in more
detail.
2 Charles F. Wilkinson, "To feel Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing Rights of the Wisconsin
Chippewa," 1991 Wis. 1. Rev. 375 at 378-9 as cited by Robert A.Williams Jr., Linking Arms
Together: American Indian Treaty Visions ofLaw and Peace, 1600 - 1800 (New York: Routledge,
1999) at 134.
3In the field of "law" there has, to date, been substantial reform in the concept
of what constitutes "legal" activity; however, consensus has yet to be reached
concerning the exact parameters of this "new" legality. Colonial mores have been
the norm in many parts of the world since the beginning of written records and by
the end of the 19th century, colonialism had become an all-pervasive influence. It
was the source of Canada's very existence as a state and, as Michael Asch among
others has pointed out, Canada continues to rely on "legal doctrines and political
tenets that follow from colonialist conceptions".3 That is to say, habits of thought
and action that were accepted as part of the natural order of things during the
colonial era persist in all kinds of cultural venues making intercultural violence an
on-going concern, even in this relatively peaceful part of the world. As this study
will demonstrate, postcolonialism remains very much an "ideal to be achieved".
Though the difficulties involved in decolonization are almost universal, the
focus in this work is on the ways in which colonial and postcolonial modes of
thought shape a very narrow part of Canadian legal function: judicial reasoning
about Indigenous rights at the Supreme Court of Canada. The inclusion of
protection for "existing aboriginal and treaty rights" in s.35 of Canada's
Constitution Act, 19824 is examined here as part of the global decolonization
movement that is inviting us all to re-examine established habits of thought and
traditional ways of doing things. This movement is raising many questions. What
do we want to keep? What do we want to avoid?
3 Michael Asch," From Terra Nullius to Affirmation: Reconciling Aboriginal Rights with the
Canadian Constitution" (2002) 17.2 Can. 1. Law & Soc. 23.
4 Constitution Act, 1982 enacted by the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.) 1982 c.ll, Sched. B.
4Canada's Supreme Court is both a conscious and a conscientious participant
in the process of change that is altering Canadian relations with the Indigenous
nations whose existence has been so profoundly compromised by colonial
processes. As Chief Justice Dickson and LaForest J. stated in R. v. Sparrow,
s.35(1) "renounces the old rules of the game" for:
"The new constitutional status of that right enshrined
in s.35(1) suggests that a different approach must be
taken"s
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples has also recognized s.35 as a
"watershed" that separates current understanding from past policies and practices.6
Yet, as indicated by Madam Justice L'Heureux-DuM in the quote at the beginning
of this section, "underlying premises" continue to exert immense social power. As
the paradigm theory applied in this study suggests, they often remain concealed,
raising questions concerning how we can be certain that we have really left the past
behind to become what might be described as "postcolonial".
According to the Chinese Classics (ca. 500 B.C.), change is a constane and
this is certainly not the first time that people have believed, for better or for worse,
that they were living at the threshold of a new age. Just over a century ago, when all
but a few last bands of "Indians" had been confined to reservations, the Ghost
5 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1105 citing Noel Lyon, "An Essay on Constitutional
Interpretation" (1988), 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 95.
6 Rene Dussault and Georges Erasmus co-chairs: Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP,
1993), Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government and the Constitution
(Ottawa:Minister of Supply and Services. 1993) at 29.
7 Z.D. Sung ed. The Text of the Yi King (and its appendices) Chinese Original with English
Translation (Shanghai: 1935 reprinted Taiwan: Chung Hwa publications, 1976).
5Dance swept through the shattered remains of the Indigenous world.8 Paiute and
Christian beliefs blended in the prophesies of Tavibo and Wovoka who predicted
that the "white people" and their culture would soon be destroyed by a series of
cataclysms. They envisioned the land restored to its former state. A new layer of
earth would be laid down so the trees and grasses would grow strong as they had
before. Dead ancestors and relatives would return to live among them. The sick
would be made well and once again there would be an abundance of pine nuts, fish
and game.
Their vision was popular. Though it made no inroads among the Navaho,
who found the very idea of ghosts offensive9, it spread rapidly to other nations. The
Indigenous peoples were grieving. Many were starving. According to current
scholarship, colonization did indeed change the land itself. lO The process, which
included the introduction of new diseases, is estimated to have cost the original
inhabitants well over 90% of their population. I I In the Sioux version of Ghost
Dance lore, the renewed land that they longed for would be covered with immense
herds of buffalo and fine ponies. They defied orders to remain on the reservations
that had been assigned to them by the colonial American regime and tried to speed
8 Canadian Indian agents were warned to watch for signs of the Ghost Dance but nothing came to
their attention. E. Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of
Indian Affairs in Canada (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 1986) at 165.
9 Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Introduction" to James Mooney, The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux
Outbreak of1890 (University of Chicago Press, 1965 reprint of the Fourteenth Annual Report ofthe
Bureau of Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, Part II (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1896) at viii.
IO William Cronon, Changes in the Land, Indians, Colonists, and the &ology ofNew England (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1983).
II Olive Patricia Dickason, Canada's First Nations: A History ofthe Founding Peoples from Earliest
Times 2nd ed.(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 8; Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and
Steel: The Fates ofHuman Societies (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. 1999 © 1997) at 211;
6the renewal process by joining hands to dance in circles for hours and days on end,
not missing a step when some of their members collapsed from exhaustion into
visions of a better world, the old world their ancestors had known. The dancers wore
"ghost shirts" decorated with sacred symbols said to make them impenetrable to
bullets. 12
Beliefs of this kind were not unique. The 1890's also hosted invulnerability
rituals among the "Boxers" in China who burned churches, destroyed foreign
schools, dug up railway tracks and imagined they had become immune to Western
guns and bayonets. 13 Similar responses have been noted on other frontiers of
colonialism and cultural collision, leading to the identification of parallels between
the Ghost Dance and such diverse movements as the Maji Maji Rebellion in Africa,
the Melanesian cargo cult and even Spanish Carlists. 14
Not everyone who participated in or supported invulnerability rites believed
in the literal sense. 15 On the material plane, the historical record provides plenty of
evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of bullets against Ghost Dancers and
Charles C.Mann, "1491" The Atlantic Monthly (March 2002)
http:/www.theatlantic.com/2002/03/mann.htm.
12 See account of George Sword in Mooney, Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of1890
at 42.
13 Dun J. Li, The Ageless Chinese (New York: Scribners, 1972) at 428-30; Joseph W. Esherick, The
Origins ofthe Boxer Uprising (University of California Pres, 1987) at 54-59.
14 "Ghost Dance", http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilGhost dance (3/17/06).
15 A teacher on the Pine Ridge reservation said one 1890 dancer described his vision as "A big lie".
Mooney, Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of1890 at 181.
15 Mooney, Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of1890 at 8 at n. 1.
15 He was considered the leader of a reserve that opposed "authority". The legal grounds for his arrest
were not mentioned. Mooney, Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of1890 at 93.
15 Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog's Case: American Indian Sovereignty, Tribal Law, and United
States Law in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 180.
15 Mooney, Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of1890 at 119.
15 Ibid at 120.
7Boxers alike. On December 29th, 1890, some 200 dancers were mowed down within
minutes by machine guns at Wounded Knee, giving this place an enduring symbolic
significance. For the settlers it marked the end of an era. 16 But was it? On the
conceptual level, the Ghost Dancers' vision rings true. Guns may be able to make
people obey, but they cannot change their minds and this may be the real meaning
of the invulnerability rites. Eighty five years later, when the descendants of the first
Ghost Dancers were once again under siege, surrounded by armies, with helicopters
flying over-head, the Ghost Dance was revived in response to another set of events
that were catastrophic for those who found themselves targeted. 17
If hysteria characterizes such encounters, it is certainly not confined to one
side of the cultural divide. At the original Wounded Knee, the violence broke loose
while members of the U.S. 7th Cavalry were searching tents for weapons and
moving among seated Sioux who had surrendered the previous day. The medicine
man Yellow Bird mingled with the crowd, blowing on an eagle-bone whistle.
Tensions were high and it is not certain what happened next. Perhaps a soldier tried
to look under a young warrior's blanket. Some thought Yellow Bird gave a signal.
A shot rang out, but whose was it? The soldiers opened fire. They had four
Hotchkiss machine guns. Their first volley left about 200 "Indians" and 60 soldiers
lying on the ground, dead or wounded and the killing did not end there. The cavalry
pursued fleeing women and children whose bodies, were found up to two miles
from the scene. The final death toll is uncertain; but, it is estimated that 300 people
16 Ibid, "Anthony F.e. Wallace, "Introduction" in Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux
Outbreak of1890 at vii.
8lost their lives. All of the 50 or so U.S. casualties are believed to have been victims
of "friendly fire". There were many women, children and old people among the
dead "Indians" who were buried in a mass grave. Yet, according to James Mooney,
who reviewed the official records and survivor's reports when he investigated for
the Bureau of American Ethnology in the 1890's, "when the sun rose on Wounded
Knee on the fatal morning of December 29th, 1890, no trouble was anticipated or
premeditated by either Indians or troops".18
So what happened? Why did those soldiers chase and kill women who were
fleeing with infants in their arms? And why was an army called to suppress the
dancing to begin with? Mooney saw the Ghost Dance as an adaptive response to
poverty and oppression. 19 According to his investigation, it had begun as a peaceful
movement. Even though the U.S. government was reneging on promises to provide
adequate food rations in return for lost territory, Wovoka advised his followers to
co-operate with the settlers until the day of salvation came. But the refusal of the
dancers to return to their reservations made inexperienced Indian Agents nervous
and Eastern newspapers were "teeming with rumours of uprisings and massacres".2°
That is why the troops were sent. The agents at the "central point of the
disturbance" had not felt threatened. They were aware of the dancing, but ignored
it.21 The fear and craziness that erupted at Wounded Knee was fuelled by the
17 Mary Crow Dog and Richard Erdoes, Lakota Woman ( New York: Harper Perennial, 1991) at
148; Leonard Crow Dog and Richard Erdoes, Crow Dog: Four Generations ofSioux Medicine Men
(New York: HarperPerennial, 1996) at 126 ;
18 Mooney, Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of1890 at 119.
19 Ibid, Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Introduction" to Mooney, The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux
Outbreak of1890 at ix.
20 Ibid at ll. 1.
21 Ibid
9illusions and fantasies of strangers and, perhaps, by a sense of guilt. What would
you do if someone was taking your land? That's why young men were sent west to
find glory fighting "Indian wars".22 The Sioux had a more realistic understanding of
their situation. They had already surrendered before they were massacred. They
were sitting under a white flag.
Wounded Knee neither pioneered nor concluded the use of machine guns
against Indigenous peoples and this phenomenon was not confined to colonization
as practiced south of the current Canada/U.S. border. Gatling guns had already been
fired in 1885 against the Metis at Batoche in what is now Canada.23 Nor did the
massacre eliminate the inter-cultural differences mourned by the Ghost Dancers on
the conceptual level. In Sakej Henderson's view, Eurocentric writers have
misunderstood the Ghost Dance which was really a vision about how to resist
colonialism. It emphasized the importance of ecology and was designed to release
the spirits contained in the old rites and ceremonies and restore traditional
consciousness. European thought is the shadowy twin of the trickster, appearing in
many guises to justify oppression and domination with ever changing creativity. 24
However the inter-cultural relationship is envisioned, it is obvious that
Indigenous peoples have continued to see things from their own perspectives while
the settler states have continued to use force of one kind or another against them in a
22 There have been many reflections on settler conceptualizations of Indigenous peoples. See ego
Olive Patricia. Dickason, Le Mythe du Sauvage trans. Jude Des Chenes [The Myth of the Savage
(University of Alberta Press, 1984)] (Sillery, Quebec Septentrion, 1993); Sarah Carter, Capturing
Women: The Manipulation of Cultural Imagery in Canada's Prairie West (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1997)..
23 See ego Dickason, Canada's First Nations at 284.
24 James (Sakej) Youngblood Henderson, "Postcolonial Ghost Dancing: Diagnosing European
Colonialism" in Marie Battiste ed. Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision (University of British
Columbia Press, 2000) 57 at 58-9.
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deadly dance. Notwithstanding the declaration of protection for "aboriginal and
treaty rights" contained in s.35 of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982, the lOath
anniversary of Wounded Knee was marked by the Oka Crisis of 1990. It is not at all
reassuring to know that this time there was only one direct casualty - Corporal
Marcel Lemay of the Surete du Quebec who, true to form, may well have been
killed by a stray bullet fired by his fellow officers.25 "Indians" were targeted in a
full-fledged military operation and elements of the genocidal pursuit at Wounded
Knee were replicated. The gun battle that took Lemay's life began when police
fired tear gas and concussion grenades at women and young children.26 Bullets
rained down around a two year-old on a tricycle.27 Later that summer, the police
allowed an angry, stone-throwing mob to attack a cavalcade organized to take
babies, children and disabled elderly Kahnawake residents out of their village that
was literally being held under siege by the army.28 At the end of the stand-off,
fourteen year-old Waneek Hom Miller was stabbed an inch from her heart by a
Canadian soldier using an army bayonet at a time when she was leading her four
year-old sister and other children away from the barricades in the Pines of
Kanesatake.29 She was not the only person to be physically assaulted by uniformed
25 The .223 calibre steel-tipped "full metal jacket" bullet that slipped behind his protective vest may
have ricocheted off a tree. The police used the same calibre, but did "not normally" use that type.
The gun that fired it was never identified. Geoffrey York, Loreen Pindera, People ofthe Pines: The
Warriors and the Legacy ofaka, (Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1991) at 40.
26 Ibid. at 34.
27 Craig Mac1aine, Michael Baxendale, This Land is Our Land: The Mohawk Revolt at aka
(Montreal: Optimum Publishing International, 1990) at 19.
28 "Oka Crisis - Repercussions" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oka Crisis (2/7/06); Alanis
Obomsawin, Rocks at Whiskey Trench (National Film Board of Canada, 2000)
29 Personal communications Kahntinetha Horn and Waneek Horn-Miller. See also York, Pindera,
People of the Pines at 399; Donna Goodleaf, Entering the Warzone: A Mohawk Perspective on
Resisting Invasions (Penticton, B.C.: Theytus Books, 1996) at 109; "Canada's Team, water polo:
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representatives of the colonial state. Long after the "crisis" was over, police in the
area continued to pursue "Indians", stopping them for trivialities and subjecting
them to brutal and illegal treatment.30
Did the inconvenience caused by the Indigenous blockade of the Mercier
Bridge merit such life-threatening behaviour? The bridge itself was built on land
removed from the Kahnawake reserve through questionable legal practices which
have yet to be redressed.3 ! Why wasn't the original dispute concerning the
expropriation of a Kanesatake cemetery for a golf course resolved, or at least
presented for judicial consideration, before the situation degenerated in this way?
The parallels between Oka and Wounded Knee are disturbing and there have been
several similar crises since then. The formal recognition and affirmation of "existing
aboriginal and treaty rights" in s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 has been in place
for almost a quarter century and there have been radical changes in official policy.
Yet confrontations with Indigenous peoples continue to erupt following a familiar
choreography with displays of gun-wielding state forces moving in on unarmed
Indigenous protesters who very often include women with young children. Even
when the legal issues underlying these scenes do get to court, Indigenous people
have little confidence that justice will prevail. As stated by Kenneth Deer, the editor
of Kahnawake's Eastern Door newspaper whose diplomatic skill is reflected in his
selection as chair of the Indigenous Forum at the United Nations, "Natives have lost
Their Goal is Gold" Time, Canadian edition, (11 Sept. 2000) 60 at 61; Dave Stubbs, "Sweet dreams
are made of this" The [Montreal] Gazette ( 9 September 2000) T3.
30 See ego Maclaine, Baxendale, This Land is Our Land at 62; Obomsawin, Rocks at Whiskey
Trench.
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far more cases than they have won, and some of these losses reek of bias, racism
and discrimination".32
The persistence of this pattern of behaviour stems in part from the depth of
the cultural chasm involved. Both sides seek "law and order" but the law they
invoke and the order they aspire to is as radically different today as it was at first
contact. According to the traditions of those belonging to the Haudenosaunee or
"Iroquois Confederacy" that began with the union of five nations including the
"Mohawks" of the Oka Crisis, this difference was identified by their ancestors when
European settlers began to move into their area. As recounted by
Dayhawtgawgawdoes (Chief Irving Powless Jr.), they made an agreement with the
Dutch in 1613 to live together peacefully like brothers, respecting each other's
autonomy.33 The same principles of inter-cultural co-existence were negotiated with
their successors and, during the first centuries following contact when Indigenous
alliances were important to Europeans in their quest to further their commercial and
military ambitions, they were symbolized by the Covenant Chain which was
extended into the Great Lakes region and renewed periodically by the British until
1858.34
31 Kahnawake has been launching formal complaints about the misappropriation of their land since at
least 1750. Mohawk Council of Kahnawake, "Seigneury of Sault S1. Louis" 2nd ed.(Seigneury of
Sault S1. Louis Office), www.kahnawake.com. 2004/2005).
32 Kenneth Deer, "Caledonia's Mohawks have plenty of reasons to mistrust the law" The [Montreal]
Gazette (25 April, 2006) A 23; Cheryl Cornacchia, "Mohawk Leader slams Ottawa's about-face",
The [Montreal]Gazette (6 July, 2006) A7.
33 Chief Irving Powless Jr. "Treaty Making" in G. Peter Jemison & Anna M. Schein eds. Treaty of
Canandaigua 1794: 200 Years ofTreaty Relations between the Iroquois Confederacy and the United
States (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Clear Light Publishers, 2000) 15 at 21 et seq. See also Rene Dussault
and Georges Erasmus co-chairs: Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, v.l Looking forward,
looking back (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services. 1996) at 123.
34 Mark D. Walters "The "Golden Thread" of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and
Under the Constitution Act, 1982" (1999) 44 McGill L. 1. 711.
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The need to reaffirm or "polish" the Covenant Chain so as to avoid
intercultural misunderstandings is well documented. Sir William Johnson, who was
Britain's Superintendant of Indian Affairs for the region that came to include
Canada following the conquest of Quebec, found that the treaties he negotiated with
Britain's "Indian" allies were often misunderstood by his countrymen. They tended
to presume the Indigenous peoples had become British subjects though, as Johnson
pointed out: "no Nation of Indians have any word which can express, or convey the
Idea of Subjection.,,35
During the 19th century, as their numbers increased and as their need for
Indigenous alliances declined, members of the in-migrating culture became so
bedazzled by the myths that justified their colonial expansion that they generally
overlooked the independent status of Indigenous peoples.36 To emphasize the
autonomy that is implicit in the Covenant Chain relationship, the Haudenosaunee
increasingly emphasized their political independence using a wampum belt known
as the "Two Row Wampum".37
35 Ibid. citing Johnson to Gage (31 October 1764) in J. Sullivan ed. The Papers of Sir William
Johnson vol. 11 (Albany: State University of New York, 1921 - 1965) at 923-27.
36 See ego P.G. McHugh, "Tales of Constitutional Origin and Crown Sovereignty in New Zealand"
[2002] U.T.LJ. 69; Bruce G. Trigger, "The Historian's Indian: Native Americans in Canadian
Historical Writing from Charlevoix to the Present" (1986) 67.3 Can. Hist. Rev. 315; Bruce G.,
Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic Age" Reconsidered (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1985).
37 See Powless, "Treaty Making" 15 at 22; Mark Walters, "Brightening the Covenant Chain:
Aboriginal Treaty Meanings in Law and History after Marshall" (2001) 24.2 Dal. 1. J. 75 at n. 19;
Erasmus, Dussault, (RCAP, 1996) Looking forward, Looking back at 123. It is sometimes called
"Guswentah" or "kaswentah" but the word may be a general word for "wampum belt". Darren
Bonaparte "The Two Row Wampum Belt: An Akwesasne Tradition of the Vessel and Canoe" The
Wampum Chronicles, http://www.wampumchronicles.com (4/22.2007). According to Walters, there
is a possibility that a Two Row belt was given in 1664. Walters, "Brightening the Covenant Chain"
at 81 citing E.B.O'Caliaghan, ed. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State ofNew
York (Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1865-1861)
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Fig. 1 Two Row Wampum38
It shows two parallel rows of purple shell beads on a ground of white. According to
Elizabeth Tooker, a belt of this description was given to the Commission settling the
Canada-U.S. Boundary in 1789 to show that, following the American separation
from Britain, the "Indians" had "two roads offered to them".39 However, since the
last half of the nineteenth century the belt has been used to symbolize Indigenous
independence from colonial jurisdiction. According to an 1890 petition sent to the
Governor General of Canada by "Chief Isaac Hill" and signed by more than 50
"Chiefs" and "Warriors", it was the British who supplied the metaphor of two
vessels - the British ship and the birch bark canoe - travelling on separate paths on
the same river without interfering with each other.4o Levi General Deskaheh took a
38 Elisabeth Tooker, "A Note on the Return of Eleven Wampum Belts to the Six Nations Iroquois
Confederacy on Grand River, Canada" (1998) 45.2 Ethnohistory 219 at 231.
39 Tooker "A Note on the Return of Eleven Wampum Belts" at 230.
40 Dingman to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs (19 May, 1890) PAC RGlO v.2284
transcribed from Sally M. Weaver, Iroquois Politics, 1847-1940 (Canada Council and The National
Museum of Man, Ottawa, 1975) [unpublished, Doris Lewis Rare Book Room, University of
Waterloo, Ontario] at 278.
The vessel symbolism was referred to in relation to a different wampum belt by royaner John
Smoke Johnson in 1870. Kathryn V. Muller, "The Two "Mystery" Belts of Grand River: A
Bibliography of the Two Row Wampum and the Friendship Belt" (2007) 31.1 Am. Indian Quarterly,
129 at 139 ; Kathryn V. Muller "Evolution et renouvellement du wampum adeux voies" in Alain
Beaulieu et Maxime Gohier eds. La recherche relative aux Autochtones: Perspectives historiques et
contemporaines (Montreal, Chaire de Recherche du Canada sur la question territoriale autochtone,
2005) 159.
Some Western scholars seem to think that sketchy documentary evidence suggesting that this
interpretation of the two row imagery may be only a century old affects the validity of the rights
represented. See Muller, "The Two "Mystery" Belts of Grand River"; Muller "Evolution et
renouvellement du wampum a deux voies" 159 or commentary of Bonaparte "The Two Row
15
copy of the Two Row Wampum with him to Europe when the Six Nations applied
for membership in the League ofNations41 and the symbolism was referred to again
in representations made to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.42
This perception of separate cultural paths is generally shared by specialists in
Indigenous relations during the colonial era who have found they must struggle with
a variety of intercultural misunderstandings in their attempts to interpret historical
evidence and communicate their findings to non-specialist audiences. The
Haudenosaunee, for example, used the metaphor of "brothers" to structure their
relationship with the Dutch and English, while the Governor of New France insisted
on referring to Indigenous peoples as his "children", assuming a right to subordinate
them to his will in keeping with absolutist Catholic dogma.43 Gilles Havard has
pointed out that acceptance of the colonizer's choice of terminology in a few
instances by some Indigenous peoples cannot be taken as a sign of political
submission because fathers in their cultures did not exercise authority over their
sons.44 Moreover, as Michel Morin has noted, the idea of an ally's submission and
Wampum Belt". However, the principle is implicit to the treaty-making process that characterized
early relations. It is also well established in international law. See ego Patrick Dallier and Alain
Pellet, Nguyen Quoc Dinh Droit International Public, 6e ed. (Paris: L.D.G.J. 1999) at para 279.
41 See photo in "The Rights of the Six Nations: Canadian Indian Chiefs Mission to the King" p.227,
probably ofa magazine called Canada. PAC RGIO v.2285. File 57 169-1B Pt.3.
42 Erasmus, Dussault, (RCAP, 1996) Lookingforward, Looking back at 123.
43 See also Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes
Region, 1650 - 1850 (Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 84.
44 Gilles Havard, Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott trans., The Great Peace of Montreal: French-
Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century (Montreal: McGill-Queen, 2001) at 29-30. See also
ego Eleanor Burke Leacock, Myths of Male Dominance: Collected Articles on Women Cross-
Culturally (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981). See also Alain Beaulieu, "Les guaranties d'un
traite disparu: Ie traite d'Oswagatchie, 20 aOllt 1760" (2000) 34 R.J. T. 329.
16
obedience to a monarch was perfectly compatible with continued independence at
the internationalleve1 according to the European thinking of that era.45
Yet the political separation that can be accounted for by these diverse
approaches to the inter-cultural encounters of that era could not be maintained at the
ecological level. As William Cronon has shown, the importation of European
behavioral patterns changed the very ecology of New England in scientifically
verifiable ways46, validating the Ghost Dancers' perception that the land they once
knew had been "spoiled". Indigenous concepts of government, of human relations
with the environment, as well as with each other and with other people were, and
may still remain, radically different from those of the settlers both then and now.
As a consequence, early treaties did not necessarily represent a meeting of minds
for, as Cronn noted: "Indians, at least in the beginning, thought they were selling
one thing and the English thought they were buying another.,,47
A similar dynamic has been identified in relation to the numbered treaties in
the Canadian West.48 Rupert Ross, who worked in the justice system of northern
Ontario, drew on Ghost Dance imagery to describe "the immense gulf that separates
Native from other Canadian cultures".49 As he noted, the belief found in many
hunter-gatherer societies that there is a spiritual plane lying parallel to and
45 Michel Morin, L 'Usurpation de la souverainete autochtone: Le cas des peuples de la Nouvelle-
France et des colonies anglais de I 'Amerique du Nord (Montreal, Boreal, 1997) at 67.
46 Cronon, Changes in the Land.
47Cronon, Changes in the Land at 70.
48 See ego Walter Hildebrandt, Dorothy First Rider, Sarah Carter, The True Spirit and Original Intent
of Treaty 7 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996); SharonVenne, Our Elders
Understand Our Rights: Evolving International Law Regarding Indigenous Peoples (Penticton, B.C.:
Theytus Books, 1998).
49 Rupert Ross, Dancing with a Ghost: Exploring Indian Reality (Markham, Ontario: Octopus
Publishing Group, Butterworths, 1992), back cover.
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interacting with the physical one is difficult to reconcile with the assumptions
underlying his professional training as a lawyer.50 In the course of his work, he
learned that traditional Ojibway have a prohibition against emotional indulgence
that prevents them from talking or even thinking about personal confusion and
turmoil.5! Our very use of a judicial system to deal with social conflict is a
culturally determined response. Instead of focusing on what was done in the past,
the Ojibway concentrate on healing the personal or interpersonal dysfunctions that
caused the problem to begin with.52 Because of this, and because of the emphasis
they place on consensual decision-making, many aspects of Canada's adversarial
justice system appear inappropriate in their eyes. 53
This cultural incompatibility is not always recognized or understood by
members of the dominant culture, though it is well known among Indigenous
peoples and Ross reported seeing the following sentence written on a blackboard in
the band hall of the Weagamow Lake Reserve, 380 air miles north of Thunder Bay
Ontario:
"I believe you understand what you think I said, but
I'm not sure you realize that what you heard is not
what I meant.,,54
This statement encapsulates a communication problem that can be found within as
well as between cultures.55 Human experience changes, and with it our capacity to
50 Ib id. at xxvii.
51 Ibid. at 32.
52 Ibid. at 46.
53 Ibid. at 8.
54 Ibid. at 5.
55 See ego Deborah Tannen ed. Framing in Discourse (New York: Oxford University Press. 1993);
Deborah Tannen, That's Not What I Meant! How Conversational Style Makes or Breaks Your
Relations with Others (New York: Ballantine, 1986).
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know and understand so there are intergenerational as well as inter-cultural
misunderstandings.
When the 1991 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples examined the
relationship between Canada and the Indigenous nations, it divided the past into
four different historical eras. During the first, people lived in "Separate Worlds".
Following contact, cultural and political differences were respected so relations in
the second phase were characterized by "Co-operation" on matters of mutual
concern. By the end of the 1700's, immigrants began to outnumber the surviving
Indigenous peoples and the focus of the colonial economy shifted from fur trading
to farming. This led to a third period characterized by "Displacement and
Assimilation" effected through state interventions in Indigenous affairs including
forced relocations, removal of children to residential schools and the outlawing of
Indigenous cultural practices. Faced with the "manifest failure" of this policy, and
encouraged both by sympathetic public opinion and by developments in
international law, the Royal Commission posited that we have now entered a fourth
era of "Negotiation and Renewal", characterized by dialogue and consultation.56
The Royal Commission's perspective on the changing character of inter-
cultural relations is consistent with the earlier work of the historian Bruce Trigger,
who found that the Indigenous presence was simply ignored once the in-migrating
settler population became a majority. Events were recorded and policies developed
as if the First Nations no longer existed.57 As part of the Canadian government's
56 Erasmus, Dussault (RCAP, 1996), Looking Forward, Looking Back at 37-40.
57 Bruce G. Trigger, "The Historian's Indian: Native Americans in Canadian Historical Writing from
Charlevoix to the Present" (1986) 67.3 Canadian Historical Review 315; Natives and Newcomers:
Canada's "Heroic Age" Reconsidered (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985).
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response to the Oka Crisis, both the mandate and the composition of the Royal
Commission itself seemed to support the view that a new stage had begun. In that
case at least, some Indigenous people were invited to sit at the table on conditions of
parity and a precedent was set by appointing joint chairs and a balanced panel
representing both Indigenous and settler society.58
As will become evident in the discussion that follows, the renewed sense of
partnership announced by the Royal Commission has been embraced by the
Supreme Court of Canada. Yet, a wide gulf remains between Indigenous experience
and the perceptions of the Court, which may be attributable in part to the lack of
Indigenous representation on the panel. Beverley McLachlin, the Court's Chief
Justice, has, for example, stated that this is "a successful pluralistic country" that
"has no colonial past ... and is not a threat to anyone".59 For those who have recently
found themselves targeted by guns because of their beliefs or as a result of
jurisdictional disagreements, statements of this kind may seem as bewildering and
strange as the Ghost Dance must seem to Canadian judges. The conventional
reliance on evidence and proof that the Chief Justice has staunchly defended in
other circumstances seems to have vanished into thin air, recalling both the
nineteenth century habit of ignoring Indigenous peoples and the emotional
prohibitions ofthe Ojibway.
58 The commissioners were Rene Dussault, Georges Erasmus, Paul L.A.H. Chartrand, J. Peter
Meekison, Viola Marie Robinson, Mary Sillet and Bertha Wilson.
59 Beverley McLachlin P.c., "Globalization, Identity and Citizenship", (Ottawa, Ontario: ADM
Forum, 26 Oct. 2004) http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/judges/speeches (6/11/2006).
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There is certainly plenty of evidence to suggest that Indigenous people
continue to feel threatened60 and perhaps it is no coincidence that challenges to the
Canadian state often involve Mohawks who evidently do not share Ojibway
sensibilities. During her 2004 campaign for leadership of the Assembly of First
Nations, Roberta Jamieson declared that Canada was founded on colonial practices,
stating that "Racism is part of Canada's historical heritage".61 Taiaiake Alfred has
likewise insisted that "Indigenous people are seeking to transcend the history of pain
and loss that began with the coming of Europeans into our world".62 The tragic
effects of this history are everywhere apparent. The Royal Commission itself found
the suicide rate among Indigenous youth so high that it issued a preliminary report
on the topic before publishing its main findings.63 Indigenous people are starkly
over represented in Canadian jails64 and even basic nutrition is a problem despite the
high standard of living enjoyed by Canadians in general. As acknowledged in 2006
by out-going Prime Minister Paul Martin, "The gaps in health care and education, in
housing, in drinking water between aboriginal Canadians and the rest of Canadians
60 See for example Mohawk Nation News, http://www.mohawknationnews.com.
61 See ego The [Montreal] Gazette (22 March, 2004). The quote was not reported and comes from my
own notes of the 2004 Indigenous Bar Association Conference in Montreal.
62 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power and Righteousness: an indigenous manifesto (Don Mills, Ontario:
Oxford University Press, 1999) at xi.
63 The overall Aboriginal suicide rate was two to three times higher than Canada's average, five to
six times higher among youth and rising. Erasmus, Dussault, (RCAP, 1994), Choosing Life: special
report on suicide among Aboriginal people (Choisir la vie).
64 At about 2% of the population, Natives make up 10% in federal prisons for men and 13% for
women. In Saskatchewan and Manitoba, where they are 6 - 7% of the population, they provide 46-
60% of prison admissions. Erasmus, Dussault (RCAP), Bridging the Cultural Divide: Report on
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada.
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is simply unacceptable".65 Drinking water! In this land of lakes, even that is no
longer assured for those of Indigenous ancestry.
In 1996, as the Royal Commission completed its work, confrontations were
taking place between state forces and Indigenous people at Ipperwash, Ontario and
Gustafson Lake, British Columbia.66 At Ipperwash, which concerned a well founded
land claim, Dudley George, an unarmed Anishinabe protester, was shot and killed
by a police officer67. Despite innumerable positive initiatives now underway, the
decade since then has been marked by several more conflicts. Armed force was
used against the people of Burnt Church in a fishing dispute that erupted following
the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Marshall. 68 There was scandal in Saskatchewan
when the public discovered the police had been dumping Indigenous youths outside
the city of Saskatoon in winter without adequate clothing, leading to their deaths
from exposure.69 Canada came to Amnesty International's attention because of its
failure to investigate the disappearance of over 500 Indigenous women despite
strong evidence that many had fallen victim to foul play.7o The Royal Commission
found that the over-representation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice
system was so alarming that it issued a preliminary report on this situation as well. 71
65 Elizabeth Thompson, "'Let the government hear from Canadians'" The [Montreal] Gazette, (2
June, 2006) AI0.
66 Erasmus, Dussault, (RCAP,1996), Lookingforward, looking back at 2.
67 See R. v.Deane, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 279.
68R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456. (Marshall I)
69See ego Justice D.H. Wright, Commissioner, Commission of Inquiry Into Matters Relating to the
Death ofNeil Stonechild, http://www.stonechildinguiry.ca (7/18/05)
70 "Canada: Stolen sisters - A human rights response to discrimination and violence against
Indigenous women in Canada" AMR 20/03/2004. See http://www.amnesty.ca. ( 5/5/05)
71 Erasmus, Dussault, (RCAP), Bridging the Cultural Divide: Report on Aboriginal People and
Criminal Justice in Canada (Canada: Minister of Supply and Services, 1995).
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Yet the percentage of Indigenous people in federal pnsons is reported to have
increased 22% between 1996 and 2004. 72
It is apparent that old patterns of interaction persist in direct contradiction to
the innovation represented by the Royal Commission. The cynicism felt by many
indigenous peoples can be seen in Patricia Monture-Angus' allegation that "Every
oppression that has been foisted on Aboriginal people in the history of Canada has
been implemented through law".73 From their perspective, things do not seem to be
changing. During the first half of 2006, as the Ipperwash Inquiry into the killing of
Dudley George continued, Kanesatake residents were convicted for protesting the
replacement of their police force by a heavily armed militia financed by Canada.74
A few weeks later, Ontario police at Caledonia attempted to use force to evict
members of the Six Nations who had reclaimed a tract of land from a housing
developer on the grounds that it had been illegally taken. 75 The Six Nations had
been attempting for two centuries to negotiate restitution for the misappropriation of
this land and recent, much publicized, land claims initiatives had resulted, once
again, in nothing. In May 2007, people at Tyendanega blocked the rail line that
passes through their land between Montreal and Toronto to publicize on-going
72 Janice Tibbetts, "Watchdog slams prison system", The [Montreal]Gazette (17 Oct., 2006) A12;
Remi Savard, "Les peuples americains et Ie systeme judicaire canadien: Speleologie d'un trou de
memoire" (2002) Can. J L. & Soc. 123
73 Patricia Monture-Angus, Thunder in my Soul: A Mohawk Woman Speaks (Halifax: Fernwood
Publishing, 1995) at 67.
74 See ego Jeff Heinrich, "Judge throws book at Mohawk rioters", The [Montreal]Gazette (21 Jan.,
2006) A 9; Andre Beauvais, "La police la mieux equipee du Quebec" Le Journal de Montreal (31
Jan. 2006).
75 See ego Canwest News Service/Canadian Press "Police Raid pours fire on protest" The[Montreal]
Gazette (21 Apr., 2006) AI. For on-going Indigenous commentary see ego Mohawk Nation News,
http://www.mohawknationnews.com.
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abuse of their rights and a national day of protest is planned for June 29th.76 As
Taiaiake Alfred has pointed out, "post-colonial promises" are not enough.
Indigenous people are not convinced that there has been a real change for they are
faced with an ever-present risk of "redefining without reforming".77
This divergence of opinion raises the questions examined in this work:
l) How can we tell that the goal of inter-cultural reconciliation has
been reached?
In other words:
2) Is Canada "postcolonial"?
i) If so, how can we prove it?
ii) If not, what reforms are needed?
As far as the Supreme Court of Canada is concerned:
3) What is its role in relation to this issue?
i) Has the Court contributed to the reconciliation process?
Or
ii) Is the Court creating a new form of colonization of the kind
that critics like Taiaiake Alfred fear?
As L'Heureux-Dube J. has pointed out, it is no longer possible to assume
that anything said or written has a "plain meaning". The "integrity of our judicial
system" can only be upheld if communications are considered in context so they can
be given an "informed interpretation".78 What follows is accordingly a
contextualization. It applies paradigmatic theory in an attempt to cast some light on
the legal reorientation represented by the recognition of "aboriginal and treaty
rights" in s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Colonial and postcolonial modes of
76 After taking over a quarry on disputed land, the people of Tyendanega found it was being used for
illegal dumping of toxic waste. The presence of the railroad is also in dispute. The railroad responded
with a lawsuit for disruption of its business. "Indigenous People Block Mega Yard Sale: Railroad
Companies Fuel Hysteria" Mohawk Nation News (17 May, 2007).
77 Alfred, Peace, Power and Righteousness at xiii.
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thought are investigated along with internationally agreed upon legal standards for
assessing decolonization in order to define the old colonial paradigm that we are
attempting to leave behind and clarify the legal and social vision represented by the
postcolonial ideal. The application of these templates to Supreme Court of Canada
cases decided following the enactment of s.35 makes it possible to see that the
problems we face resemble those commonly associated with changes in conceptual
frames of reference.
The task of negotiating this ideological change in a way that bridges the
cultural divide between Indigenous peoples and Canadian administrative practices is
complex and fraught with ambiguities. This work is accordingly presented III
stages. The introductory section continues with an overview of the shift III
perspectives created by the emerging international emphasis on egalitarian values.
It identifies some of the changes that crystallized during the twentieth century to
inspire the questions that now engage our interest. The basic terms and conventions
used in this analysis and some of the ambiguities that surround them are also
outlined.
Part I sets out the analytical framework applied in Part II. Chapter 2 reviews
Kuhn's theory of paradigmatic change as understood for the purposes of this study.
It also introduces recent findings concerning human cognitive function that confirm
Kuhn's concept of the structure of human knowledge, providing new insights into
the way paradigms are reflected in the categorical definitions that govern judicial
texts. Chapter 3 summarizes prominent opinions on colonialism and postcolonialism
as informed by the emergence of the international decolonization movement. This
78 2747-3174 Quebec Inc. at [152 - 9].
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has been used to create a profile of the two major paradigms applied in this study.
The resulting analytical framework is broadly defined and could be applied in many
other contexts.
Part II has adapted this conceptual model to present a case study of judicial
reasoning concerning Indigenous rights at the Supreme Court of Canada following
the constitutional entrenchment of "aboriginal and treaty rights" in the Constitution
Act, 1982. Using the paradigmatic theory described in Part I, it was possible to
demonstrate the deeply rooted character of some aspects of the colonial paradigm.
The intense deconstruction produced when colonial and postcolonial indicia are
considered simultaneously has made it possible to identify the persistence of
cultural habits of thought that are founded on discarded norms as well as areas in
which postcolonial modes of thought are gaining a foothold. The study concludes
with some observations concerning the new role that the Court is defining for itself.
According to the linguistic evidence reviewed in Part I, Madam Justice
L'Heureux-DuM's belief that "the era of concealed underlying premises is now
over,,79 is an impossible dream. However, her call for an examination of such
premises captures the spirit of the legal reform that is beginning to emerge. In
keeping with this modern mandate, the aim of this work is to stimulate reflection,
identify trends and gain a better understanding of the Court's challenges and
accomplishments related to the complex task presented by the decolonization
process.
79 Ibid.
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1.1 The Twentieth Century Shift to Egalitarian Values
"The effective expansion of democracy...presupposes
a critical self-examination, ... "
Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic,
Stanford University,
September 29, 1994.80
As a study of Indigenous rights in relation to Canada, this work joins
hundreds of others which present so many conflicting points of view that it is
difficult to phrase the discussion in a way that is acceptable for all of the audiences
concerned. The assumptions that people make concerning what is "right" and how
this should be determined can differ dramatically. Most judges are familiar with this
phenomenon for they are confronted with it on a daily basis. According to the
paradigmatic theory that will be examined in the next section, the goal of
reconciling discordant points of view is simply unattainable in some instances. The
mis-matched frames of reference that fuel legal disputes are typically products of
divergent experiences, assumptions and aspirations. This problem is particularly
acute when dealing with Indigenous rights. Inter-cultural misconceptions add an
element of confusion to governmental duties and court-ordered solutions skate
precariously over complex questions that might never be definitively resolved: What
is "Canada"? How was it constituted? Who and what is "Indigenous"? Or
"aboriginal"? Or "Indian"? What kinds of rights do these social categories entail?
80 Vaclav Havel, "Democracy's Forgotten Dimension" (1995) 31: I Stanford J. Int'! L. I at 12. As
president of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Havel presided over the consensual division of the country into the
Czech and Slovak republics.
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Who should decide? And how? What is the proper relationship between Canada
and the members of these controversial classes of people?
The incendiary nature of such questions is fueled, in part, by a major shift in
the legal and moral paradigms that motivate "reasonable" men and women. Because
of this transformation, concepts whose meaning seems deceptively self-evident to
some may appear hopelessly confused to others. The origins of this ill defined
movement are multifaceted and deeply rooted. Driven by the collective
consequences of individual thoughts and perceptions, they have been traced to the
demise of feudalism81 and entwine with the emergence of modem notions of
nationhood and democracy.82
There are many ways to understand what has been happening and the result,
for many, has been a re-orientation in the concept of "law" itself. That is to say,
consciously or unconsciously, many of us are engaged in the process of rethinking,
not only the rules that are generally considered to be binding, but also our sense of
community and of the means by which community "custom" and "consensus" are
identified. As seen in the L'Heureux-DuM quote at the beginning of this chapter,
recognition that points of view may legitimately vary is growing. This is an
important element in the transformation we are experiencing, for it is no longer
acceptable to assume that there is only one "correct" opinion.
As the recurring confrontations between modem states and Indigenous
societies referred to at the beginning of this work suggest, colonial habits remain
81 See ego Robert A. Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of
Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
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deeply embedded in cultural practice. Yet, the social activity that constitutes "legal"
function has already undergone dramatic reform. At the 19th century height of
colonialism, the concepts of legitimacy and social stability asserted by the dominant
state actors were founded, consciously and without apology, on the use of force. In
1832, the English jurist John Austin defined "laws" as "commands" and his
characterization was broadly accepted - at least by those engaged in the colonial
enterprise.83 Even communism was to call for a "dictatorship of the proletariat".84
Today, by contrast, human equality is considered primordial. The command
model per se has not been explicitly rejected. Despite the rising populatity of
alternate methods of dispute resolution, court orders and other institutions
consistent with its tenets continue in use. However, the rationale for using such
procedures has shifted. The equality of all men and women is now so firmly rooted
in both domestic and international discourse that it has grown into a generally
accepted moral imperative. As majestically articulated in 1948 by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, international organizations now aim at achieving
effective protection for "the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family".85 In other words, the notions ofliberty, equality
and fraternity popularized by the slogans of the American, French and Communist
revolutions have become so firmly rooted that they have called previously accepted
82 Re. the emergence of "British" nationality see Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-
1837 (London: Random House, 1992); Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600 -1850 (New
York: Anchor Books, 2002).
83 John Austin, The Province ofJurisprudence Determined etc (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1955 reprint of 1832) at 1.
84 This much discussed term was coined by Karl Marx to describe the transition to communist society
he envisioned. http://en.wikipedia.org (08/07/2006).
85 Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights A.G. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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social practices into question. Equality raises questions concerning how and when
command may be considered legitimate. It suggests that it is inherently incorrect for
one person to force their will upon another and, at both personal and national levels,
actions once accepted as part of the natural order of things are now seen as
atrocities. In effect, egalitarian values have come to eclipse the capacity to enforce
as the conceptual focus for "law" and social order so, in the legal scheme of things,
might - or the capacity to invade and conquer - no longer makes right.86
This shift in moral orientation is leading scholars everywhere to re-examine
institutional history and the ways in which modern states were legally and socially
constituted. Now that armies are no longer deemed essential to secure a state's
survival, military prowess and the capacity to dominate fail to provide a sufficient
explanation for the process of social genesis. Egalitarian mores are encouraging
researchers to challenge culturally defined assumptions and some are beginning to
realize that, as Linda Colley has pointed out, an "almost entirely male
establishment of imperial historians" expunged many significant events from
conventional and current narratives of empire.87
More nuanced perspectives on the past are now being constructed by
examining what happened to those who lost III battle or became socially
marginalized through other means. As new analytical paradigms are applied, the
experiences, opinions and responses of the poor, of indentured servants, of natives,
slaves, women and others whose interests were previously ignored have come to be
86 This generalization is not meant to forclose analysis of current American militarism or of the
sophisticated rationales employed by regimes like Imperial China and the British monarchy that
became stable and endured after initial conquests.
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considered relevant.88 The "imperialism" that was once glorified by Britain and
other aggressive cultures has lost its luster. Britain itself has abandoned its
"Empire", turning its attention to co-operation with its neighbours in the European
Union. Many of the colonized have moved to Britain and become integrated in
English society, changing the audience for social commentary and the character of
public discourse. Some British historians now refer to their former imperial success
as an "intrusion" on other parts of the world.89 Old stereotypes are being rejected
leading a generation educated to believe that England was the "home of democracy"
to produce works like the Democratic Audit of the United Kingdom which
demonstrates serious deficiencies in English practice when measured against
internationally recognized standards.9o The present study might be seen as part of
this trend that asks us all to question our heritage and rethink what we are doing.
1.1.1 Changing Canadian Concepts of Legality and Identity
The process of social re-evaluation that has been taking place has been
accompanied by a change in the conception of "law" among Western legal
philosophers. The progression of works from Kelsen to Dworkin reflects the
transition from a model founded on constraint to one that is conceived as a process
87 See ego Colley, Captives at 33 n.68 though other cultures have long been concerned with historical
bias. See ego China.
88 This is reflected in the bibliography to this work which might otherwise seem ecc1ectic.
89 See ego Colley, Captives
90 Stuart Weir, David Beetham, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain: The Democratic
Audit of the United Kingdom (London: Routledge, 1999), 23. See also Elizabeth Wicks, The
Evolution of a Constitution: Eight Key Moments in British Constitutional History (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2006).
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involving the constant revision of social consensus.91 Because of this philosophical
reorientation, popular movements for emancipation are no longer seen as
"insubordination". In some circles at least, they are now understood as natural
responses to oppression. Instead of being confronted by armies with guns, their
leaders or spokespersons are increasingly invited to international negotiating tables
where internationally determined norms apply. Judges have never been more
important. The battles that were once declared by cavalry charge and cannon shot
are now announced by the filing of court documents. As we struggle to free
ourselves from the grasp of hegemonic determinism, new modes of thought are
gaining momentum, past policies are being repudiated, voices that were once
ignored are being listened to and new states are consolidating their position in a
globalized economy.
Canada's situation in this emerging context remains somewhat ambiguous.
Unlike many countries struggling to escape their colonial heritage, Canada does not
have an independence day. It has never formally severed its ties to a past whose
practices now make people profoundly uncomfortable. Indeed, in the 1998
Reference re Succession of Quebec, the Supreme Court declared that Canada's
constitution was founded on "an historical lineage stretching back through the
ages".92 This may reflect what William R. Lederman has described as a
constitutional habit of relying on "new rules developed by custom, usage and
91 See ego Pierre Noreau, "Comment la legislation est-elle possible? Objectivation et subjectivation
du lien social" (2001) 47 McGill L. J 195 at211.
92 Reference re Succession ofQuebec, S.C.C. [1998] 2 S.C.R.217 at [49].
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convention as sources of law".93 The application of this backwards looking
methodology is often interpreted as a source of social stability. Yet the concept of
"new...custom" is confusing. It induces both the judiciary and governmental
institutions to seek legitimacy in precedents established during the colonial era. In
some eyes at least, this suggests ambivalence with regard to the social reordering
now taking place. Even such well intended initiatives as the settlement of
Indigenous land claims are seen, by some, as an extension, rather than a revocation,
of the colonial ethos and commentators like Taiaiake Alfred have gone so far as to
claim that the process is forcing the original inhabitants of the land to "justify their
existence to a crude hoard of refugees from another continent".94
The conceptual rift created by Canada's reluctance to repudiate the imperial
past may be easier to identify when we consider the social and philosophical
evolution that has taken place SInce the "Dominion" was first constituted by
Britain's parliament in 1867.95 In practice, the protocols that order governmental
function in Canada are products of the the 19th century - a time whose social
assumptions appear shocking by current standards. When Canada was formally
accorded "dominion" status by the British in 1867, the dominant European powers
saw success at colonizing others as a virtue. Indigenous rights were routinely
ignored. In 1885, the Treaty of Berlin unabashedly proclaimed rules for taking
possession of Africa, formulated at a conference where there had been no
93 William R. Lederman, "Canadian Constitutional Amending Procedures: 1867-1982" (1984) 32
Am. J. Compo L. 339 at 341 citing Kelsen, General Theory ofLaw and State 117 (1949) at 340.
94 Alfred, Peace, Power and Righteousness at 58.
95 British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict.c.3 (U.K.) (renamed the Constitution Act, 1867 by the
Constitution Act, 1982): Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.) R.S.C. 1985 Appendix 11, No.5.
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representation what so ever of the African peoples.96 By the tum of the last century,
foreign administrations claimed authority over most of Africa, America and Asia,
including India and all of China's major ports.97 When World War I erupted, war
was considered part of the natural order of things. "Britannia ruled the waves,,98
and, from the British perspective at least, "The sun never set on the British
Empire".99
The concept of "Canada" was radically different at that time. In legal terms,
Britain defined what it called the "Dominion of Canada" as a "colony". 100 Indeed,
Britain's "Dominions" functioned as colonies in the biological sense of the word for
emigration to Canada, Australia, New Zealand or South Africa was regarded as a
solution to Britain's unemployment problems. 101 The majority of the population
that migrated to Canada at this time accepted their role as active supporters of and
participants in British over-lordship. They worked for companies with names like
Dominion Bridge and Imperial Tobacco. Some of the defeated French were also
induced to participate in this vision of an imperial world and in 1909 Prime Minister
Wilfrid Laurier, declared:
96 Participants were Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Norway, Turkey and the United States. See
http://www.wikipedia.org/wikilBeriin conference.
97 China itself was an empire, colonized in the 1600's by the invading Manchus who established the
Qing dynasty. Li, Ageless Chinese. Most Latin American states gained independence from Europe
during the 1800's, however control remained predominantly in the hands of European colonizers.
98 The poem "Rule Britannia" by James Thomson (1700-48) was put to music by Thomase Augustine
Arne (ca. 1740) and became an unofficial national anthem. "Rule Britannia!"
http://www.britannia.com.(4/24/2007) Germany's Navy Law of 1900 and its construction of 13 battle
ships by 1914 threw Britain into a panic. Oscar Douglas Skelton, The Life and Letters ofSir Wilfrid
Laurier vol. 2 (London, Oxford University Press, 1922) at 317.
99 See ego reproduction of 1913 school text in Colley, Captive at 372.
100 A "colony" was "any part of his Majesty's dominions exclusive of the British Islands and of
British India". Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed.) vol.l0
(London: Butterworths, 1996) at para 856. Note also the BNA. Act s. 132.
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"We are British subjects; Canada is one of the
daughter nations of the Empire, and we realize to the
full the rights and obligations which are involved in
that proud title ... ,,102
These rights were not egalitarian in the modem sense of the word. Despite
Laurier's use of female imagery, Canadian government in his day was conducted
exclusively by property-owning males. 103 Queen Victoria, to whom these men had
sworn allegiance for sixty years, had been only a titular head of state. Women in the
colonizing society were routinely excluded from public life, denied even the right to
vote - along with "Indians", Chinese and men without significant material assets. It
was not until after World War I that Britain extended "universal suffrage" to men
over 21 and women over 30, eventually equalizing gendered voting rights in
1928.104 In Canada, on-going doubts concerning women's capacity to exercise full
legal personality were finally resolved the following year when the Privy Council in
England declared in Edwards v. A.G. Canada l05 that the constitution was a "living
tree" that could grow as circumstances required. It was accordingly determined that
women were "persons" capable of sitting in Canada's Senate. 106
However, this celebrated affirmation of women's personhood had little, if
any, effect on the status of the people defined, under Canadian law, as "Indians".
IOJ See ego Canadian Annual Review, 1920 at 244-245.
102 Skelton, The Life and Letters ofSir Wilfrid Laurier at 321. By contrast, Henri Bourassa.(1868-
1992) opposed political dependence on Britain or the United States, founding the Nationalist League
and the newspaper Le Devoir to promote autonomy within the British Empire. http://en.wikipedia.org
(12/18/2007)
103 Re women's status in Canada in the 1920's see ego Constance Backhouse, "Attentat ala dignite du
Parlement" Viol dans l'enceinte de la Chambre des commmmunes, Ottawa 1929" (2001-2) 33 R.D.
Ottawa 95 at 98.
104 Weir, Beetham, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain at 24.
105 Edwards v. A.G. Canada [1930] A.C. 124 [1929]; 3 W.W.R. 479 [1930]; 1 D.L.R. 98 (P.C.).
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were assigned four seats of their own in New Zealand's parliament in 1868 107,
"Indians" have never been accorded separate representation in the parliaments of
Canada or any of its provinces. Though the British routinely founded their claims to
sovereignty over Indigenous land on treaty processes, the "Indians" did not
participate in the decision to found the Canadian federation. The position of the
Indigenous peoples in the "Dominion of Canada" was determined exclusively by
British colonists who relied on their own interpretations of both the treaties and the
unilateral declaration in s.91(24) of the British North America Act that "Indians and
lands belonging to the Indians" fell under the "exclusive Legislative Authority of
the Parliament of Canada".108
Having been schooled in a command model of legality, the settlers read the
wording of the B.NA. Act as a right to legislate for Indians. Though a full discussion
of the colonial evolution of the concept of "sovereignty" is beyond the scope of this
work, it might be noted that Canadian interpretations of the B.NA. Act were
consistent with the changes in British concepts of their jurisdictional authority that
accompanied their imperial expansion. As early as 1803, an imperial statute
authorized the courts of Upper and Lower Canada to judge crimes committed
106 British women previously exercised several sorts of political rights according to the cases cited in
Edwards. See Li Xiu Woo, "The Cracked Mirror: How 'Judicial Notice' Beat Historic Evidence in
the 19th Century Decline in Women's Constitutional Rights" (1994) 52.3 The Advocate 347.
107 www.nzhistory.net.nzlGallery/parl-hist/tereo.html(14June2005).This was granted following
Maori military attacks that posed a "serious threat to European dominance". James Belich, The
Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conjlict: The Maori. The British, and the New Zealand Wars
(Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 1989 reprint of The New Zealand Wars and the
Victorian Interpretation ofRacial Conjlict(Auckland University Press, 1986) at 253.
108 Darlene Johnston, The Taking ofIndian Lands in Canada: Consent or Coercion? (University of
Saskatchewan, Native Law Centre, 1989) at 63.
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outside their recognized territories. 109 The presumption that Indigenous opinion was
irrelevant to the formation of legality intensified over time and by 1876 the first
consolidated "Indian Act" specifically defined a "person" as "an individual other
than an Indian". 11 0
Significantly enough, this British North American legislation was neither
discussed nor explained during the negotiations for the numbered treaties that paved
the way for the west-ward expansion of the Canadian state. Like other nations, the
Indigenous peoples assumed that British law applied only to British subjects. The
Indian Act was entirely a product of foreign institutions and the "Indians" had not
participated in its formulation. When they learned of its existence, they registered
many protests, but their attempts to prevent Indian Agents and other Canadian
officials from encroaching on what they considered to be their traditional
jurisdictions generally failed. As a consequence of this political exclusion, their
assets were appropriated, their traditional governments were deposed, their customs
were outlawed, their children were taken from them for education in residential
schools run by the colonial government and they were even prohibited from leaving
their reserves without an Indian Agent's permission. III
109 Morin, L 'Usurpation de la souverainete autochtone, citing An Act for extending the Jurisdiction
ofthe Courts ofJustice in the Provinces ofLower and Upper Canada, to the Trial and Punishment of
Persons guilty of Crimes and Offenses within certain Parts of North America adjoining to the
Provinces, 1803 (U.K.), 43 Geo. III c.128. The reasons for this enactment merit further investigation,
taking account of the British desire to regain jurisdiction over rebel Americans who were former
subjects.
110 Indian Act, J876, S.C. 1876, c.18 (39 Viet.) s.12.
III Re effects of these measures see Jean Goodwill, Norma Siuman, John Tootoosis (Pemmican
Publications, 1984). See also Li Xiu Woo (Grace Emma Slykhuis) Canada v. The Haudenosaunee
(Iroquois) Corifederacy at the League of Nations: Two Quests for Independence (LLM 2000,
Universite du Quebec aMontreal)[unpublished]
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It was not until 1951 - two decades after the affirmation of women's
personhood - that the exclusion of "Indians" from the definition of a "person" was
removed from Canada's Indian Act. Il2 It is, perhaps, no coincidence that this
coincided with the passage at the United Nations of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide.- 1l3 Yet, it was not until 1960
that some semblance of Indigenous personhood was resurrected through the
establishment of the right of "Indians" to vote in Canadian federal elections.1l4
These reforms are not as magnanimous as they might initially seem because they
simply presumed Indigenous inclusion in Canada and they were put into effect
without obtaining the consent of the peoples concerned. As explained in s.3.2
below, this violated current standards in international law and, unlike the Edwards
decision, the reforms are not generally celebrated by the intended beneficiaries.
As the cases concerning Indigenous rights that are examined in Part II
demonstrate, this ambiguous legacy still rankles among Indigenous people. They
have objected vociferously to externally imposed legislation generation after
generation after generation, yet Canada continues to rely on the Indian Act to
regulate its relationship with the people it defines as "Indians". The contradictions
involved in conducting negotiations through band councils instituted under
legislation whose legitimacy has been rejected by many of those to whom it is
112 This was not because ofIndiginous ignorance of the Act. See ego John J. Borrows, "A Genealogy
of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and First Nations Self-Governments" (1992) 30:2 Osgoode Hall 1. 1.
291 at 339.
113 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, V.N.T.S. No. 1021,
vol.78 (1951).
114 S.C. 1960, c.39. There had been voting rights for some at the time of John A. MacDonald, but
some see voting as acceptance of colonization so the implications of this "liberalization" remain
highly controversial.
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applied has thus far been ignored. The ambiguity of this situation is exacerbated by
the constitutional importance still placed on the colonially inspired British North
America Act, which was simply renamed in 1982 to become the "Constitution Act,
1867" in a process that, once again, involved no formal participation by any
Indigenous representatives. I 15 It was, significantly enough, not until after the new
constitutional regime was implemented that some "Aboriginal leaders" were invited
to sit at the table as equals to provincial "first ministers". 116
Though anachronistic elements of this kind continue to trouble Canadian
relations with the Indigenous nations, the conceptual re-ordering that has taken
place since the initial constitution of the Dominion of Canada has been dramatic. In
Indigenous contexts, analysts often overlook the fact that even the British men who
owned enough property to run for parliament lacked full legal autonomy until well
into the 20th century. The colonies that united to make Canada were initially ruled
by imperial governors. The concept of "responsible govemment"ll7 through
elected legislatures was only instituted a few short years before Canadian
confederation which, in itself, did nothing to alter the country's function as an arm
of the British Empire. Except for relations with the Indigenous nations, Canada's
foreign affairs, including relations with the United States, remained in Britain's full
control. It was not until 1923 that Canada signed its first treaty - the Halibut Treaty
115 Goodwill, Sluman, John Tootoosis at 228-233.
116 Erasmus, Dussault, (RCAP, 1996), Lookingforward, looking back at 208.
Jl7 "Responsible government", which makes the executive responsible to an elected assembly, was
achieved by the united province of Canada (Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia and New Brunswick
in 1848, P.E.I. in 1851, Newfoundland in 1855, British Columbia in 1872 and Manitoba, Alberta and
Saskatchewan at the time of their creations. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 2nd ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 191. It was suspended in Newfoundland from 1933 until it joined
Canada.
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- all be it with Britain's help.l18 The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 still
calls on Canada to "promote the Interests of the British Empire" and s.132 still
defines "Treaty Obligations" in terms of this country's status as "Part of the British
Empire,,119 even though the British themselves seem almost to have forgotten their
. . I 120Impena past.
As far as the anglophone majority in Canada was concerned, subservience to
Britain was acceptable - even desirable. 121 Most were born British subjects.
Canada's British identity was commonly considered a protection from the American
brand of liberty with its tendency to degenerate into gun-slinging shoot-outs.
Inclusion in the British Empire provided access to a system of justice that was seen
as a bulwark against the aggressive ambitions of the colonial rebels south of the
border who assumed they would eventually control most of North America. 122
Though Canadians had no vote in Britain's parliament, they were British subjects,
backed and protected by Britain's imperial might. As we have seen, even prominent
francophones, like Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, identified with "the Empire"
and this British orientation shaped the character of public debate. The ideal of
republican independence seemed so traitorously American that it was rarely
discussed. "Colonialists" supported subordination to Britain in return for protection
118 Walter A. Riddell, Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy 1917-1939 (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1962).
119 Thanks to gkizitanamogk for pointing this out.
120 Current accounts of British constitutional history may entirely omit any reference to colonial
involvement. See ego Wicks, The Evolution ofa Constitution.
121 See ego William Renwick Riddell, The Constitution of Canada in its History and Practical
Working (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917); Sara Jeanette Duncan, The Imperialist
(Toronto, Copp Clark, 1904 reprinted McClelland and Stewart, 1971); Christine Mander, Emily
Murphy: Rebel (Toronto: Simon and Pierre, 1985).
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without military obligation. "Imperialists" sought a more active role for Canada in
Britain's colonial ventures and the "Canadian Nationalist League" founded in 1903,
focused - not on independent statehood - but rather on promoting French civilization
in America to counter "Imperialist" exaltation of the "Anglo-Saxon race". 123
The "Rule Britannia" mentality they confronted, which was not so far
removed from American jingoism, was firmly entrenched as can be seen in an 1849
editorial in the Montreal Gazette which declared:
"One race or the other must assert its supremacy.
Which shall it be? ..The Anglo-Saxon which, like the
roll of a mighty ocean, is sweeping over the continent?
Is it that energetic powerful and sleepless race that is
to pale before the rushlight of an insignificant French
nationality in a comer of Canada?"124
The Indigenous peoples had become invisible in such conceptualizations. Yet, as
the discussion concerning concepts of social order in section 5.1 below indicates,
assumptions of this kind concerning the "need" for supremacy conflicted profoundly
with many Indigenous beliefs concerning what is required to establish social order.
In this context, anyone with ideas approximating late 20th century notions of
independent Canadian nationalism was left in the shadows. Most Canadians did not
want full autonomy of the kind Indigenous peoples assumed they already had.
Laurier, like most ofhis contemporaries, thought in terms of empire. Though he was
to struggle with the issue of Canadian identity throughout his prime ministerial
122 See ego Benjamin Franklin, "The Rattle Snake as a Symbol ofAmerica" (The Pennsylvania
Journal (27 Dec. 1775) in J.A. Leo Lemay ed. Writings (New York: Library of America, 1987) at
746.
123 Skelton, The Life and Letters ofSir Wilfrid Laurier at 309-313. See also Duncan, The Imperialist.
124 "Exhibition area will feature former Parliament's foundations", The [Montreal]Gazette (27 June,
2006). See also Thompson, "Rule Britannia"; Duncan, "The Imperialist" at 195, 216, 227 or the
literary works ofDuncan Campbell Scott.
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career, his declaration that "Canada is a nation... and freedom is its nationality" was
not a proclamation of full state autonomy in the modem sense of the word for it
concluded with the prediction that "in a few years the earth will be encircled by a
series of independent nations, recognizing the suzerainty of England". 125 In 1909,
he even went so far as to declare:
"I have no hesitation in saying that the supremacy of
the British Empire is absolutely essential, not only to
the maintenance of the Empire but to the civilization of
the world.,,126
Less than a hundred years later, Laurier's prediction seems absurdly and
extravagantly misdirected. Time has definitively proven that he was wrong. Even in
Britain, the British Empire has all but been forgotten along with many elements of
the imperial paradigm that structured its existence. 127 Dozens of independent states
in Asia, Africa and Latin America have emerged through the process of
decolonization to take seats on a parity with others in organizations like the United
Nations. International air travel has broadened the Euro-American concept of
"civilization", war has become technically illegal and, even though combat of one
kind or another continues to erupt, military conduct is critically scrutinized by a
wary public. New expectations concerning proper governmental function have taken
root and ritual declarations of human equality routinely preface international
covenants and conventions. In this context, "Britain" herself has changed. 128
/25 Skelton, The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 72; R.S. Jenkins, Canadian Civics,
Saskatchewan Edition (Toronto: The Copp, Clark Company, Limited, 1919) at 5; Riddell,
Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy 1917-1939 at xxxvi.
126 Skelton, The Life and Letters ofSir Wilfrid Laurier at 322.
127 See ego the description of "the Crown" in Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada at 215.
128 There is no consensus concerning exactly what "proper governmental function" is. As one
example of a virtually inexhaustible supply of popular academic literature on this topic see ego
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Scotland, Wales and Ireland have established their own legislatures and "subject"
status, whose origins predate William the Conqueror's assertion of Norman
sovereignty in 1066, has been legally retired. This became official in Britain as of
January 1st, 1983 129 and Canadians barely noticed. They had already become
"citizens" in 1947130 and there was very little public comment on this loss of the
status that was so proudly flaunted by Sir. Wilfrid Laurier just a few decades earlier.
In keeping with international trends, Canadians now consider human
equality to be a basic regulatory norm. No prime minister today would dream of
depicting this country as a dutiful daughter hiding behind Britain's skirts. Most
Canadian lawyers are unfamiliar with the law that defined Britain's imperial
monarchy and "subject status" is not even mentioned in the leading constitutional
texts. 131 Universal adult suffrage is now taken for granted and the Constitution Act,
1982 has formally abolished distinctions of any kind, including those based on
"race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or religious
origin, property, birth or other status".132 The United States and Britain remain
giants, dominating the Anglophone social tradition to which Canada belongs, but
many of their own citizens now reject the legitimacy of armed interventions. 133 The
Steven Yates "Thomas S. Kuhn, the Culture War and the Idea of Secession"
http://www.lewrockwell.com/yates/yates2.html (lO/l2/04) This paper, which lacks knowledge of
British and international legal history, uses Kuhn's theory of paradigms to support conservative
philosophy associated with the American south.
129 British Nationality Act, 1981 (U.K.), 1981, c.61. See also Lord Hailsham of S1. Marylebone,
Halsbury's Laws o/England (4th ed.) vo1.4(2) (London: Butterworths, 1992) at para.3.
130 Canadian Citizenship Act S.C. 1946 c.1S.
13l See ego Hogg, Constitutional Law o/Canada.
132 Constitution Act, 1982 s.lS; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2.
mEg. Some propose prosecution of Prime Minister Tony Blair and President George Bush
concerning the war in Iraq. Similarly, when Israel bombed civilians in Lebanon, Louise Arbour
suggested that some Israeli generals might be charged with "personal criminal responsibility".
Harvard law professor Alan M. Dershowitz's derisive commentary reveals substantial disagreement
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grand colonial project of the past has become an embarrassment. Some of its
elements have even been defined as "crimes against humanity". 134
In keeping with the foregoing considerations, the analysis that follows IS
based on the following assumptions:
*********************************************************************
1st Introductory premise:
The concept of law is in the process of changing from a command
model to one founded on human equality.
*********************************************************************
2nd Introductory premise:
Canadians once saw themselves as part of the British Empire,
but now consider themselves to be an independent state.
*********************************************************************
1.1.2 Canada's Stance on Decolonization
In accord with the conceptual evolution that marked the 20th century, Canada
no longer promotes itself in colonial terms. As stated by McLachlin C.J., "Respect
for the inherent dignity and equality of human beings, tolerance of difference, and
democratic freedoms" are considered "part of the social fabric of Canada". 135 This
country was among the first to ratify the Charter ofthe United Nations in 1945 with
its preliminary declaration of human equality. 136 The idea that Canada's
constitution must accommodate Indigenous beliefs and customs as well as those of
the immigrant settlers has become official doctrine. Domestic legislation has
concerning just what, exactly international legality requires. Alan Dershowitz, "Arbour must go: Her
absurd comments were harmful to democracies fighting terrorism" The [Montreal}Gazette (22 July,
2006) B7.
134 See eg', the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, U.N.T.S.
No. 1021, vol. 78 (1951) p.277,
135 McLachlin, "Globalization, Identity and Citizenship".
136 Charter of the United Nations [1945] R.T. Can. 7. William A. Schabas, "Canada and the
Adoption of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights" 43 Mcgill L.J. 403.
45
undergone a succession of amendments paralleling developments in international
law and it is generally assumed that Canada's treatment of "the aboriginal
population" stands in a "distinguished position" compared to other states. 13? In
effect, many Canadians share McLachlin C.J.'s view that:
"among the many pluralistic communities around the
world, Canada emerges as the one with the greatest
capacity to lead others in recognizing diversity as a
blessing, and an opportunity.,,138
However, as the introduction to this work suggests, considerable tension remains
between declared Canadian ideals and actual practice. In May 2006, Canada's
representative at the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
declared that it was his Government's position that "indigenous peoples should be
included in decision - and policy-making that affect them". 139 Yet one month later
Canada was the only country other than Russia to vote against the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 14o This apparent contradiction
might be attributed to new instructions from the recently elected Conservative
governmentl41 except inconsistency has been a recurrent characteristic of Canadian
"Indian" and international human rights policy. 142
137 Jack Woodward, Native Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) ch.2, s. C.
138 McLachlin, "Globalization, Identity and Citizenship".
139 United Nations Economic and Social Council HR/4891 "Role of Governments in Advancing
Indigenous Rights Focus as Debate Continues in United Nations Forum"
http://www.un.org/NewslPress/docs/20061hr4891.doc.htm
140 Cheryl Cornacchia, "Mohawk Leader slams Ottawa's about-face", The [Montreal]Gazette (6 July,
2006) A7.
141 Stephen Harper was elected on January 23,2006.
142 "The Canadian Government misled both domestic and international public opinion by concealing
its substantive opposition to the Declaration behind procedural arguments" Schabas, "Canada and
the Adoption of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights" at 403.
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Indigenous peoples remain so invisible to many Canadian decision makers
that the extension of formal equality to all those classed as "Indians" or "aboriginal"
seems generally to have arisen as a legislative afterthought. It was not until six
years after Canada ratified the United Nations Charter that the Indian Act was
revised to delete the sub-human definition of an "Indian" along with some measures
explicitly prohibiting Indigenous cultural and religious practices. 143 Though some
"Indians" had been allowed to vote for a brief period when John A. MacDonald
was Prime Minister, the federal franchise for "Indians" was not reinstated until
1960.144 Likewise, despite Canada's ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights145 in 1976, it was, once again, not until six years later that
"aboriginal and treaty rights" were formally entrenched in s.35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982.146 And, even though the 1991 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
referred to the Indigenous nations as "Partners in Confederation,,147, the institutional
reforms required to tum this vision into a practical reality have not been instituted.
With the exception of Nunavut where a large proportion of the population remains
Indigenous 148, there is no jurisdiction in Canada that allows Indigenous
representation on a par with that enjoyed by the successors of the founding
143 Indian Act S.C. 1951, c. 29. Arts 2 to 84 of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c.98 were abrogated by
s.123 (2).
144 Canada Elections Act S.C. 1960, c.39. As far a colonialism is concerned, this was a very
ambiguous event. It arguably annexed Indigenous peoples as citizens without their consent as may
also be argued reo the temporary voting rights accorded to some Indigenous peoples at the time of
John A. MacDonald.
145 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [1976] R.T. Can. 47.
146 Constitution Act, 1982.
147 Erasmsu, Dussault, (RCAP, 1993), Partners in Confederation.
148 http://www.gov.nu.ca.
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colonies. I49 Indeed, as far as some Indigenous nations are concerned, such a move
would be interpreted as the last nail in the colonial coffin that enshrouds their right
to equal treatment as autonomous nations. ISO The difficulties involved in ensuring
that domestic laws conform to Canada's international commitments remain complex
and fraught with uncertainty.
Other problems created by the move to uphold an egalitarian concept of
legality are reflected in the struggle Canadian jurists face when attempting to define
the implications of some of these belated changes. Their task has been exacerbated
by a general public failure - or refusal - to understand and explicitly reject
colonialism per se. Outside Indigenous circles, the integrity of existing institutions
tends to be taken for granted. Maps, geographic boundaries, and social structures
established according to colonial habit and custom remain firmly entrenched.
"Decolonization" is not a common topic of discussion as it has been in many third-
world countries and there has been no "consciousness raising"ISI comparable to that
produced by the women's movement.
By the end of the 20th century the internationally inspired field of "post-
colonial studies", which encourages re-examination of the colonial past and its
residual effects, had begun to infiltrate some university departments; however, there
has been little systematic reassessment of institutional performance against currently
149 Manitoba initially represented the Metis, but an influx of settlers from the east soon turned them
into a minority. Donatien Fremont, Solange Lavigne trans. The Secretaries of Louis Riel (Prince
Albert, Sask. La Societe Canadienne Fran9aise, 1985) ch.8.
150 For some background on the reasons for this stance among the Kanionkehaka or Mohawk see
Woo, Canada v. The Haudenosaunee or Grace Li Xiu Woo, "Canada's Forgotten Founders: The
Modern Significance of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Application for Membership in the League of
Nations" (2003) 1 Journal of Law, Social Justice and Global Development
http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/isues/2003-1.
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agreed upon standards. 152 Indeed, as the persistence of Oka-type confrontations
suggests, serious conceptual chasms continue to trouble modern initiatives to reform
state relations with Indigenous peoples. Radical inter-cultural differences remain
between notions of "sovereignty", of "government", of who "speaks the law" and
of how a "legal" course of action is socially constructed. 153 Colonialism sits like the
proverbial elephant in the alcoholic's living room. 154 Everybody knows something
is there, but even when publicly mentioned by people like Roberta Jamieson, it
tends to be ignored. 155 As a result, problems raised by the transition to postcolonial
norms are not articulated as such.
This failure to address the fundamental nature of the changes that have been
taking place in both public expectation and international norms contributes to the
confusion surrounding governmental relations with Indigenous peoples,
accentuating the importance of the judicial role in general and of the Supreme Court
in particular.
*****************************************************************************
3nd Introductory premise:
Canada has not formally recognized the need to decolonize or to reform
existing practices in accord with recent changes in the concept of legality.
*****************************************************************************
151 The term was coined in the 1950's by American radical feminists seeking to make people aware
of systemic gender discrimination. http://en.wikipedia.org (08/07/2006).
152 By contrast, see Weir, Beetham, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain at 4.
153 See ego Cronon, Changes in the Land, ch.4; Erasmus, Dussault, (RCAP,1996), Lookingforward,
looking back at 2.
154 The metaphor evokes an obvious problem that is ignored. http://en.wikipedia.org (08/07/2006).
155 Despite a half-page report on her speech at the Indigenous Bar Association in 2004, Jamieson's
comments on colonialism were not mentioned. The [Montreal}Gazette (22 March, 2004).
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1. 2 Terms and Conventions
Because this analysis must bring together many points of view, it raises
questions concerning several common conventions. The debates they reflect, must
be kept in mind from the outset, even if some of the underlying ideological concerns
they raise cannot be resolved. The variety of meanings associated with key concepts
like "law", "history", "sovereignty", "land title" and "government" cannot be fully
explored in a single work, though their socially constructed character must be kept
in mind in the analysis that follows. The definitions of many words that must be
used in this discussion have political connotations, as some readers will already
know. The same might even be said for subtleties associated with the choice of
punctuation. The following is a preliminary explanation of my choices with regard
to some stylistic matters.
1.2.1 Honorific Titles
A major stylistic concern involves the identification of the judges whose
decisions are examined in depth in Part II. In this work, they are primarily identified
by name, unencumbered by title unless required by the context to distinguish them
from other commentators. ego "McLachlin" rather than "McLachlin c.l." or "The
Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Chief Justice of Canada". No
disrespect is intended by this abbreviated usage. The focus of this analysis is on the
integrity of the reasoning considered and on the persistence of paradigms. As
discussed in s.2.3 below, the findings of cognitive theorists whose research has
provided an explanation for paradigmatic function, indicate that rationality is
inescapably embodied and personal. According to the egalitarian norms, whose
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implementation is being investigated, social status is less important that the
derivation and structural validity of the reasoning presented. Any changes in the
persuasive effect of a particular judge's reasoning that may be caused by accession
to the status of Chief Justice are thus peripheral to the core question under
consideration. For these reasons, it is unnecessary to remind the reader of the status
of the judge at the time a statement was made. The omission of cluttering honorific
titles is intended to enhance rather than diminish respect for the principles the Court
has been attempting to promote and for the judges' specialized expertise in this
regard.
1.2.2 Quotations, Citations and Hyphenation
To emphasize the personal and idiosyncratic character of the interpretation
of any word, I have used full quotation marks (" ") rather than the single quotation
marks (' ') conventionally used when discussing the meaning of a word. Case
names are presented in italics in accord with existing convention. The cases studied
in Part II are referred to primarily by identifying word or phrase. ego "Guerin"
instead "Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335". Spot cites and full
identification of the case concerned are left to the foot notes. This, again, is to avoid
clutter and facilitate focus. The cases analyzed for Part II and the version used are
listed in Appendix 1.
This study required a great number of spot references to cases that span the
recent advent of internet publication of court judgements, which now use numbered
paragraphs. I have used conventional page references for the older cases published
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in printed form. The courts themselves have switched to using paragraph references
and I have identified these with square brackets [45] when the numbering is
officially supplied. I have used sculpted brackets {45} to identify the page number
when the electronic version identifies neither page nor paragraph numbers. The
footnotes have followed the model profided by the Canadian Guide to Uniform
Legal Citation (4th ed.).
Quotations that are the object of reflection and comment are set apart by
indentation even if very short. Though quotation marks are conventionally omitted
when a quote is indented, I have used both methods in conjunction because the
current convention of omitting quotation marks on indented quotes often makes it
difficult or impossible to tell where the cited material ends and the textual
commentary resumes, especially in electronic versions of text.
Though there seems to be a debate among those who would distinguish the
hyphenated "post-colonial" from "postcolonial"ls6 such pedantry seems tied to
authoritarian habit and, as Henderson has pointed out, positivistic debates
concerning what, precisely, to place in a dictionary are anathema to Indigenous
lawyers and scholars who are more concerned with finding effective remedies to
relieve suffering. ls7 In keeping with this sentiment, there was no particular
philosophy governing my preference for the unhyphenated term "postcolonial". As
the text that follows demonstrates, I use this term in the sense described by
Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, as part of a study of "the effects of colonization on
156 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffm, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts (London:
Routledge, 2000) at 186.
157 James (Sakej) Youngblood Henderson, "Postcolonial Indigenous Legal Consciousness" (2002) 1
Indigenous L. 1. 1 at 13.
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cultures and societies,,158, assuming a broad definition of "colonialism" that is not
limited to past European practices.
1.2.3 Indigenous, "Indian", First Nations or Aboriginal?
The original inhabitants of the land, whose rights lie at the core of this study,
have been identified by a number of different terms reflecting the complexity of the
definitional and jurisdictional questions that surround their status. 159 As might be
expected in a time of paradigmatic change (see s.2.1 below), the field is so chaotic
that it is even attracting the invention of new terminology. For example, Gerald
Vizenor, who is a Minneapolis mix of European and Anishinaabe heritage, coined
the term "postindian" to emphasize that "we are long past the colonial invention of
the indian".160 Meanwhile Patrick Glenn has disproven this theory by drawing on
European stereotypes for the word "chthonic" to describe people who "live in close
harmony with the earth".161 Like all definitional categories, every innovation and
every perpetuation of outmoded terminology or perspectives has its limitations. 162
158 Ibid.
159 See ego Paul L. A. H. Chartrand ed., Who are Canada's Aboriginal Peoples? Recognition,
Definition and Jurisdiction (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2002).
160 Gerald Vizenor & A. Robert Lee, Postindian Conversations (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1999) at 84.
161 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions ofthe World.·Sustainable Diversity in Law (Oxford University
Press, 2000) at 59-60. See also Gordon Woodman, "The Chthonic Legal Tradition - or Everything
that is Not Something Else" (2006) 1:1 J. Compo L. 123.
162 Vizenor's invented vocabulary is structured on his personal experience and the passing fads of
university debate (eg. "postrnodernism" etc). Because it does not always draw on the root meanings
of words, it lacks general accessibility so his meaning cannot be discerned without reading his work
and some of the debates of his specific era. (Note also "survivance for "survival" plus "resistance" in
Postindian Conversations, 79, 193.)
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The term of preference in this work is "Indigenous", which literally means
"in born,,163, stressing the fact of pre-colonial ties to the land. This word is said to
have gained popularity in the 1970's during the rise of the American Indian
Movement (AIM) and the Canadian Indian Brotherhood. 164 However a non-
governmental organization called the Commission des Indigenes was already
lobbying in Europe on behalf of Indigenous peoples at the time of the League of
Nations. 165 "Indigenous" remains the term of preference at the United Nations in
discussions concerning the original inhabitants of geographic regions now confined
by modern state boundaries. 166 Many other states share aspects of the Indigenous
complexity that confronts Canada and I have chosen to use the term that is applied
at the international level because I support the premise that it would be beneficial
for everyone to accord Indigenous peoples an equal voice in matters that concern
them and a place at international negotiating tables.
The choice of words used to identify Indigenous peoples and their issues
imports a number of ambiguous political considerations. Some of the concepts
associated with the resulting debates are considered in more detail in s.3.2 below.
The people referred to as "Indigenous" in international venues have been classified
as "aborigines", "Indians" or "natives" by colonial governments and recently they
163 See J.B. Sykes ed. The Concise Oxford Dictionary ofCurrent English 7th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon,
1982) s. v. "indigenous".
164 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (Dunedin,
University of Otago Press, 1999) at 7.
165 See ego Woo, Canada v. The Haudenosaunee.
166 See ego Convention No 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,
International Labour Office, Official Bulletin, vol.72, series A, No.2 (1989) s. l(b). However, usage
may be changing, in French at least. The "Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues", called "Foro
Permanente para las Cuestiones Indigenas" in Spanish, is also called "L'Instance permanente des
nations Unies sur les questions autochtones": http://www.un.orglesa/socdev/unpfii/
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have been identified as "First Nations" in Canada. Yet they have been, and
continue to be, denied the right to represent themselves on a parity with other
"nations" in international fora or with the two "founding nations" in Canada. This
has led some to associate the term "Indigenous" with "the unfinished business of
decolonization."167 The word "Indigenous" is accordingly associated with
fundamental questions concerning the meaning of concepts like "self-
determination" and "environmental protection" or even of "sovereignty" and
"nationality". I have capitalized the word in this work to highlight its conceptual
similarities with, and differences from, the word "Europe" which remains
mysteriously undefined in popular dictionaries like Oxford and Larousse. 168 As the
examination that follows will attempt to demonstrate, "Indigenous" is a culturally
defined concept whose meanings are coloured by the colonial dynamic that created
the need to define "Indigenous rights" in the first place.
The word "Indian" is legally defined in s. 2 of Canada's Indian Act169 as:
" ... a person who pursuant to this Act is registered as
an Indian or is entitled to be registered as an Indian".
Entitlement to be registered as an "Indian" is defined in s.6 of the Act and
ultimately depends on having "Indian blood". The administrative importance of this
word that ignores Indigenous political organization ensures its continued use,
despite wide recognition that it refers to an artificially created "other" that would
not exist were it not for the colonial phenomenon. I have placed the word "Indian"
167 Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies at 7 citing "Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice" at.5.
168 See ego Sykes, The Concise Oxford Dictionary.
169 Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c.I-5.
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in quotation marks to emphasize the fact that it represents an externally imposed
identity. 170
The broader term "aboriginal peoples of Canada" is closer to the concept of
"Indigenous" and is defined in s. 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 as including
"the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada". Many Indigenous people believe
"Aboriginal" should be capitalized to signify equal respect with Europeans and it
was capitalized by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. However, the
word has not been capitalized in Canadian legislation and capitalization has only
been used sporadically by the Supreme Court of Canada. l71 I have used the
capitalized versions except in quotes where the original usage is retained. However,
as explained above, I have given preference to "Indigenous" in accord with
international attempts to develop a more neutral perspective on human rights that
respects the conceptual categories used by both Indigneous peoples and
multinational states.
1.2.4 "Canada"
As a product of colonialism, "Canada" has assumed sovereignty over a
great diversity of Indigenous peoples and their ancestral lands. Indeed, Canadian
170 For a discussion of why others have done the same see Thomas C. Parkhill, Weaving Ourselves
into the Land: Charles Godfrey Leland, "Indians, and the Study of Native American Religions
(Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1997) at 5.
171 The first judgments in Part II used "Indian" to signify Indigenous peoples switching to
"aboriginal" once s.35 became a focus of analysis. Several judges reverted to using "Indian",
especially when their reasoning involved status under Canada's Indian Act. "Indian" was not always
capitalized. See ego Bastarache in Paul v. B. C.(Forest Appeals Commission) at [12]. "Metis" was
capitalized in R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207. Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and
Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 was the first to capitalize "Aboriginal", though capitalization
was not used in Lovelace v. Ontario or Mitchell, except in a quote of the Royal Commission used by
Binnie. See Mitchell v. MN.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, [130]. McLachlin capitalized in Haida Nation
v. British Columbia and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia but not in R. V.
Marshall/Bernard.
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identity cannot be asserted without dealing, in one way or another, with the fact of
Indigenous existence. The term "Canadian" itself seems to have been coined by
Europeans to refer to the Indigenous people they met when they first crossed the
ocean and ventured down the river now named "St Lawrence". The etymology of
the word "Canada" is surrounded by uncertainty, but the first known written
European record of this word is found in Jacques Cartier's journal of his second
voyage. One of Donaconna's sons who had been taken to St. Malo announced their
approach to "Canada" as they were nearing what is now Quebec City and, though
early maps applied the word to inland regions, it is now believed to be derived from
the Huron/Iroquoian term "kanata" meaning "village".172
"Canadians" seem to have been Indigenous people.
Thus the first
In time, as divergent experience estranged the children of French settlers
from the customs of their European cousins, they too were called "Canadians".
Many expected Indigenous people to either die out or assimilate and those who
retained Indigenous mores were officially referred to as "sauvages".173 After the
French colonists were conquered by the British and the Americans rebelled to form
independent "states", Canadian identity expanded with the extension of British
dominion to the Pacific coast and geographic maps were coloured to signify the
unity of the British empire. Some semblance of earlier notions persisted in Quebec,
as seen in the agenda of the "Canadian Nationalist League" referred to above or in
the name of the "Montreal Canadiens" hockey team.
172 Communication from the National Archives of Canada. British graphic artists in the 18th c. often
depicted American colonists as Indians. Colley, Captives at 215 n.68.
173 French titles for the several Indian Acts used variations of "Acte des sauvages" or "Loi des
Sauvages" until the 1927 "Loi des Indiens".
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With the rise of Quebec separatism in the latter half of the twentieth century,
references to "Canada" have been used increasingly to differentiate the interests of
the federal state from those of the provinces. Like the descendents of the original
"kana-diens", many Quebecois no longer think of themselves as "Canadians". And
so, despite its indigenous roots, Canadian identity has an itinerant quality, recalling
the migratory herding practices represented by "la Canada" on the Iberian peninsula
- a meaning which may well have migrated to these shores in the colloquial world
of the Basque fishermen who arrived before Cartier planted his flag, for they had
developed the custom of dropping off sheep carried from Europe to graze and grow
fat while they were out fishing. 174
Today Canada is defined by the territorial boundaries drawn on a map and
the jurisdiction of Canadian courts is essentially defined in geographic terms.
Etymologically Canada's identity has transformed gradually from an Indigenous
origin through French colonization and British capture into an independent
transcontinental "state" that continues to depend on the immigration of people from
all around the world to settle on and develop vast tracts of land to the north and west
displacing whoever was living there. The Indigenous sense of being pushed out
continues in the internet rumour that "Canadian" is really a Mohawk word derived
from kanata, meaning "village" and satiens meaning "to sit down" to produce a
word meaning "those who sit in our village" or "squatters". 175
174 Animals were still being raised this way in northern Newfoundland in the early 1970's. I have not
investigated the possible existence of memoirs left by Portuguese or Basque fishermen. I have been
told some exist, though possibly only for New England.
175Topic: "KKKanada Day" http://www.wasase.org/forum/viewtopic.php ?t+156 (7/14/05)
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1.2.5 Decolonization and Constitutional "Patriation"
"Decolonization", as discussed in more detail in s.3.2 below, is a concern of
international law and the move to apply international frames of reference to the
Canadian situation represents a radical reorientation from the initial "nation
building" process that was flagrantly colonial in character. Though the "Dominion
of Canada" was once legally defined by Britain as a "colony,,176, Canada's
membership in the United Nations assures its recognition under current international
law as a "state". However, no one seems sure when or how the tide of public
opinion turned. The confusion surrounding the status of the Indigenous peoples in
relation to Canada is complicated by controversies associated with the
decolonization of Canada itself. 177 It was not until April 17th, 1982 that Canada
assumed authority to amend its own constitution. This was formally effected when
Queen Elizabeth II of England declared that an act of the British parliament called
the "Canada Act, 1982,,178 had come into force. The Canada Act 1982179 formally
states that:
"No Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom
passed after the Constitution Act, 1982 comes into
force shall extend to Canada as part of its law.,,180
Opinions differ concerning whether or not this "patriation" of the constitution
instituted constitutional autonomy.181 For some, the event marked the formal end of
British imperial authority over Canada. For others it signified Canada's assumption
176 A "colony" was "any part of his Majesty's dominions exclusive of the British Islands and of
British India". Halsbury's Laws ojEngland(4tl1) vol 10, 856. Note also the B.N.A. Act s. 132.
177 See ego Lederman, "Canadian Constitutional Amending Procedures", 341.
178 Canada Act 1982, U.K., 1982, c.ll.
179 Ibid..
180 Ibid. s. 2.
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of full constitutional authority. As Peter W. Hogg has pointed out, this interpretative
uncertainty is related to the fact that the word "patriate" is not defined in the Oxford
English dictionary.182 Nor is it listed by Larousse. 183 Its closest English equivalent
is "repatriate". However, as Hogg noted, the British North America Act, that
originally constituted the "Dominion of Canada" was not a Canadian act so the
constitution could not be "restored" to Canada. 184
Since French is one of Canada's official languages, "patriation" may draw its
meaning instead from the word "patrie". "Repatriate" and "patrie" share the Latin
root patria which means "native land". "Patrie" is defined by Larousse as:
"Communaute politique d'individus vivant sur Ie
meme sol et lies par un sentiment d'appartenance aune
meme collectivite".185
"Rapatrier" is defined as:
"Faire revenir des personnes, des biens, des capitaux
dans leurs pays d'origine."186
Most Canadians would probably agree that they are part of:
"A political community of individuals who live on the
same territory and are bound by a feeling of belonging
to the same group.,,187
Nevertheless, their ancestors are not "native" to the territory with which they now
identify and their use of this vocabulaty implies a denial of their European origins.
Moreover, many Indigneous people over whom Canada claims jurisdiction have
181 Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada at 44.
182 Ibid.
183 Patrice Maubourguet ed., Le Petit Larousse illustre, 1996 (Paris, Larousse, 1995).
184 Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada at 44.
185 Maubourguet, Le Petit Larousse illustre s. v. "patrie".
186 Maubourguet, Le Petit Larousse illustre s.v. "rapatrier".
187 My translation.
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never felt that they belonged to the same group as the immigrants. For some, at
least" the event referred to as "patriation" is just another insulting attempt to
validate the massive land-grab that displaced their ancestors. Rather than marking
the end of the colonial era, this "patriation" that severs the immigrant population's
legal tie to Britain looks to them like an attempt to declare the colonization process
complete. As such, the Canada Act, 1982 directly violates the principle represented
by the Two Row Wampum. 188 Many Indigneous peoples filed legal challenges to
prevent "patriation,,189, while others insisted that the very act of arguing their cases
in British courts instead of negotiating on a nation to nation basis amounted to
colonial submission. The concept of "patriation" is accordingly riddled with
controversy from several directions.
1.2.6 Ethnocentrism and "Law"
The patriation controversies are related to controversies both in the legal
profession and in the social sciences concerning the definition of "law" itself.
Though a direct exploration of the impact of decoIonization on the perception and
definition of "law" is beyond the scope of this study, it should be noted that the use
of judicial procedure to interpret Canada's constitution is one element of a very
culturally specific conception. As Noreau has pointed out, legal practices may be
seen as developing through an interplay between interpretations that take place
within the subjective frameworks that are internal to a legal system and those that
objectifY social relations by examining cultural phenomena, like "law",
188 For reflections based on this perspective see Taiaiake Alfred or Mohawk Nation News.
189 Erasmsu, Dussault, (RCAP,l996), Lookingforward, looking back at 206.
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externally.190 From this perspective, the former is the province of "law", while the
later is the concern of the social sciences. However, the rising importance of
international law has added a dimension that is, to some extent, external to
traditional domestic Canadian formulations.
To date, the majority of Canadian legal scholars have continued to write
from an internal cultural point of view that either implicitly or explicitly ignores
both international and Indigenous perspectives on legality even when "aboriginal
law" is the subject of discussion. 191 The focus of this study is on Supreme Court
judicial reasoning so an analysis of the work of these authors is beyond its scope;
however, the depth of the conceptual differences that must be bridged to create
common frames of reference that are intelligible according to the traditions of this
audience as well as thoses of Indigenous peoples should not be underestimated. For
example, monotheism was incorporated in the preamble to the Constitution Act,
190 Noreau, "Comment la legislation est-elle possible?".
191 In order to gain accreditation in Western universities, scholars from colonized cultures may feel
constrained to adopt the colonizers point of view, writing as if the only significant actors or
progenitors of "law" were Europeans and omitting the significant contributions of non Europeans
like Levi General Deskaheh and Gandhi. (See s.3.1 below.) See ego Chidi Oguamanam, "Indigenous
Peoples and International Law: The Making of a Regime" (2004) 30 Queen's L.J 348. Whether
sympathetic to Indigenous rights or not, prominent works written from an internal Canadian
perspective that excludes international law and/or Indigenous conceptions of legality include Alan
C.Cairns, Tom Flanagan and Dan Russell, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000); Gordon Christie, "Justifying Principles of
Treaty Interpretation" (2000) 26 Queen's L.J 143; Tom Flannagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts
(Montreal: Queen's McGill University Press, 2000); Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada
2nd ed.(Toronto: Carswell, 1985); Thomas Isaac, Aboriginal Title (University of Saskatchewan,
Native Law Centre, 2006); Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A critical analysis of its
fundamental problems (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1950); Will Kymlicka, Finding Our Way:
Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford, 1998); William R. Lederman,
"Canadian Constitutional Amending Procedures: 1867-1982" (1984) 32 American Jo. Compo Law,
339; Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Patrick
Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2001); James I Reynolds, A Breach ofDuty: Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples (
Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2005). Brian Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66
Canadian Bar Review 727; Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, as
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1982192 which depicts "God" as the source of "law" in a way that accords with the
Christian story of Moses and the Ten Commandmants,193 whereas "law" is seen as a
product of comprehensive popular discussion in the tradition of the Haudenosaunee
or "Iroquois Confederacy".194
As the analysis that follows demonstrates, differing assumptions concerning
the sources of legality are related to differing assumptions concerning what
constitutes social order itself, raising serious problems of commensurability. 195 Not
surprisingly, questions concerning how Canadian legality is defined abound in
Indigenous circles. Studies seeking to explain Indigenous perspectives on "law" or
integrate them with Canadian perspectives have proliferated in the last couple of
decades, though they tend to be marginalized in a category labeled "Aboriginal
Studies" instead of being integrated into mainstream understanding of historical and
legal development. 196
Affected by the Crown's Acquisition of their Territories. ( D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1979
repro Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979).
192 "Whereas Canada is founded on principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of
law".
193 Harold E. Monser ed., The Cross-Reference Bible, American Standard Edition of the Revised
Bible.(New York: The Cross-Reference Bible Company, 1910), Exodus 20.
194 A.C. Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations or the Iroquois Book of the Great Law
[originally New York State Museum Bulletin: 184 (Albany:University of the State of New York,
1916)] (Ohsweken, Ontario: Iroqrafts, 1991) at 98-100; Karoniaktajeh (Louis Hall), Mohawk trans.
and Kahn-Tineta Hom, English trans. Gayanerekowa: The Constitution ofthe Iroquois Confederacy,
(Kahnawake, Mohawk Territory:Owera International, 1993) owera@cyberglobe.net.
195 Re difficulties defining or comparing "law" seeeg. Daniel Mockle, "A propos de definitions du
droit" (1991) 6 CJLSIRCDS 181; Andrew Halpin, "Glenn's Legal Traditions of the World: Some
Broader Philosophical Issues" (2006) 1: 1J. Compo L. 116 at 119.
196 Works that have begun to explore various Indigenous legal perspectives in Canada include
Howard Adams, A Tortured People: The Politics ofColonization (Penticton, B.C. : Theytus Books,
1995); Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power and Righteousness: an indigenous manifesto (Don Mills,
Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1999); Michael Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in
Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference" (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997);
Russel Lawrence Barsh and James (Sakej) Youngblood Henderson, "The Supreme Court's Van der
Peet Trilogy: NaIve Imperialism and Ropes of Sand" (1997) McGill L. J. 993; Richard H. Bartlett,
"Citizens Minus: Indians and the Right to Vote" (1979) 44 Sask. L. Rev. 163; Marie Battiste ed.,
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"Introduction: Unfolding the Lessons of Colonization" in Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision
(University of British Columbia Press, 2000); Catherine Bell, David Kahane eds., Intercultural
Dispute Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 2004); Lucy Bell,
"Kwakwaka'awkw Laws and Perspectives Regarding Property" (2006) 5 Indigenous 1. J. 119;
Darren Bonaparte, Creation & Confederation: The Living History of the Iroquois (Ahkwesahsne
Mohawk Territory: The Wampum Chronicles, 2006); John Borrows, & Leonard I. Rotman,
Aboriginal Legal Issues: Cases, Materials &Commentary (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988); John
Borrows, "Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History and Self-
Government" in Michael Asch ed. Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law,
Equality, and Respectfor Difference" (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997); Paul L. A. H., Chartrand ed.,
Who are Canada's Aboriginal Peoples? Recognition, Definition and Jurisdiction (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing, 2002); Gordon Christie, "Delgamuukw and the protection of Aboriginal Land Interests"
(2000-2001) 32 Ottawa 1. Rev. 85; Gordon Christie, "Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the
Canadian State by Alan C. Cairn, Book Review" (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 189; Kenneth Deer,
"The Failure of International Law to Assist Aboriginal Peoples" in Andrea P. Morrison ed Justice for
Natives: Searching for Common Ground (Montreal:Aboriginal Law Association of McGill
University, 1994) at 99; Claude Denis, We are Not You: First Nations and Canadian Modernity
(Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1997); Dan Ennis, "Marshall decision validates the
traditional form of Indian governance: Sharing our Wabanaki Perspective", http://www.unb.ca
(2/17/06); Victoria Freeman, Distant Relations: How My Ancestors Colonized North America
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2000); Sydney L. Harring, White Man's Law: Native People in
Nineteenth-Century Canadian Jurisprudence (University of Toronto Press, 1998); HARRIS, Heather,
Remembering 12,000 Years ofHistory: Oral History, Indigenous Knowledge and Ways ofKnowing
in Northwestern North America [unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Anthropology, University
of Alberta, 2003]; Gilles Havard, Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott trans., The Great Peace of
Montreal: French-Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century (Montreal: McGill-Queen, 200 I);
James (Sakej) Youngblood Henderson, "Postcolonial Indigenous Legal Consciousness" (2002) I
Indigenous 1. J. I; James (Sakej) Youngblood Henderson, "Postcolonial Ghost Dancing:
Diagnosing European Colonialism" in Marie Battiste, Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision
(University of British Columbia Press, 2000), 57; Sakej Henderson,. "Mikmaw Tenure in Atlantic
Canada" (1995) Dal. L.J. 194; Walter Hildebrandt, Dorothy First Rider, Sarah Carter, The True Spirit
and Original Intent of Treaty 7 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996); Richard Hill,
"Continuity of Haudenosaunee Government" in Jose Barreiro ed. Indian Roots of American
Democracy (Ithaca, New York: Akwe:kon Press, Cornell University, 1992), 166; Kahntineta Hom,
Traditional Culture and Community Competition: An Analysis of the On-Going Struggle Between
the Great Law and the Handsome Lake Code (MA thesis, Canadian Studies, Carleton University,
I997)[unpublished]; Kahente Hom-Miller, The Emergence of the Warrior Flag: A symbol of
Indigenous unification and impetus to assertion of identity and rights commencing in the
Kanienkehaka community of Kahnawake (M.A. anthropology, Concordia University, 2003)
[unpublished]; Shin Imai, "Sound Science, Careful Policy Analysis, and Ongoing Relationships:
Integrating Litigation and Negotiation in Aboriginal Lands and Resources Disputes" (2003) 41
Osgoode Hall L.J. 587; Beverley Jacobs, International Law/The Great Law ofPeace (LL.M. thesis,
College of Law, University of Saskatchewan, 2000) [unpublished]; MyUme Jaccoud, "La Justice
penale et les Autochtones: D'une justice impose au transfert de pouvoirs" (2000) Can. J. 1. & Soc.
107; Darlene Johnston, The Taking ofIndian Lands in Canada: Consent or Coercion? (University of
Saskatchewan, Native Law Centre, 1989); Darlene M. Johnston, "The Quest of the Six Nations
Confederacy for Self-Determination" (1986) 44.1 U T. Fac.L.Rev.l; Laurence J. Kirmayer, Cecile
Rousseau, Myrna Lashley, "The Place of Culture in Forensic Psychiatry" (2007) 35 J Am Acad
Psychiatry Law, 98; Wanda D. McCaslin, ed., Justice as Healing: Indigenous Ways (St. Paul,
Minnesota: Living Justice Press, 2005); P.G. McHugh, "The Common-Law Status of Colonies and
Aboriginal "Rights": How Lawyers and Historians Treat the Past" (1998) 61 Sask.L. Rev., 393; Kent
McNeil, Emerging Justice: Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon:
Native Law Centre,University of Saskatchewan, 2001); Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and
the Constitution ofCanada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 200 I); Patricia Monture-Angus,
Thunder in my Soul: A Mohawk Woman Speaks (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1995), Michel
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From Taiaiake Alfred's perspective, as set out in a paper prepared for the
Ipperwash Inquiry, Indigenous communities are divided between "those people who
embrace a colonized identity and accept the legitimacy of Canadian authority and
those who remain rooted in an authentic indigenous identity and assert the authority
of their nation".197 A study founded on the principle of human equality must take
these multiple perspectives into account. I have accordingly attempted to present
Morin, L 'Usurpation de la souverainete autochtone : Le cas des peuples de la Nouvelle- France et
des colonies anglais de ['Amerique du Nord (Montreal: Boreal, 1997); Andrea P. Morrison ed.,
Justice for Natives: Searching for Common Ground (Montreal, Quebec: Aboriginal Law Association
of McGill University, 1994); Bradford W. Morse, "Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Government and
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Pamajewon" (1997) 42 McGill L. J. 1011; Val, Napoleon,
"Extinction by Number: Colonialism Made Easy" (2001) 16:1 Can. J. L. & Soc. 113; James I
Reynolds, A Breach of Duty: Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples ( Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing, 2005) ; Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Long-house: The Peoples of the Iroquois
League in the Era ofEuropean Colonization (Williamsburg, Virginia: University of North Carolina
Press, 1992); Robin Ridington, "Fieldwork in Courtroom 53: A Witness to Delgamuukw" in Frank
Cassidy ed. Aboriginal Title in British Columbia: Delgamuukw v. The Queen (Lantzville: Oolichan
Press, 1992),206; Rupert Ross, Returning to the Teachings: Exploring Aboriginal Justice (Toronto:
Penguin Books, 1996); Leonard Rotman, "Creating a Still-Life Out of Dynamic Objects: Rights
Reductionism at the Supreme Court of Canada" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 1; Douglas Sanders,
"Remembering Deskaheh: Indigenous Peoples and International Law" in International Human
Rights Law: Theory and Practice, Irwin Cotler and F. Pearl Eliadis eds.(Montreal: The Canadian
Human Rights Foundation, 1992), 485; Julie-Rachel Savard, "L'integration des Autochtones au
regime seigneurial canadien: une approche renouvelee en histoire des Amerindiens" in Alain
Beaulieu et Maxime Gohier eds. La recherche relative aux Autochtones : Perspectives historiques et
contemporaines (Montreal, Chaire de Recherche du Canada sur la question territoriale autochtone,
2005), 169; Remi Savard, "Les peuples americains et Ie systeme judicaire canadien: Speleologie
d'un trou de memoire" (2002) 17:2 Can. J. L. & Soc. 123; Brian Slattery, "The Hidden
Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada"(1984) 32 A.J.Comp.L. 361 ; Jacob Thomas, "The Great
Law Takes a Long Time to Understand" in Jose Barreiro Indian Roots of American Democracy
(Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University, Akwe:Kon Press, 1992), 43; Ruth Thompson, ed. The Rights of
Indigenous Peoples in International Law: Selected Essays on Self-Determination (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1987); M. E.,Turpel-Lafond, "Some Thoughts on
Inclusion and Innovation in the Saskatchewan Justice System" (2005) 68 Sask. L.R. 293. Robert
Vachon, "Au-dela de I'universalisation et de I'interculturalisation des droits de I'homme, du droit et
de I'order negocie" (Sept, 2000) Bulletin de Liaison d'Anthropologie Juridique de Paris; Sharon
Helen Venne, Our Elders Understand Our Rights: Evolving International Law Regarding Indigenous
Peoples (Penticton, B.C.: Theytus Books, 1998) ; James B. Waldram., Revenge ofthe Windigo: The
Construction of the Mind and Mental Health ofNorth American Aboriginal Peoples (University of
Toronto Press, 2004); Mark Walters, "Brightening the Covenant Chain: Aboriginal Treaty Meanings
in Law and History after Marshall" (2001) 24.2 Dal. L. J. 75; Richard White, The Middle Ground:
Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge University Press,
1991); William C. Wicken,Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land and Donald Marshall Junior
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).
197 Taiaiake Alfred, Lana Lowe, "Warrior Societies in Contemporary Indigenous Communities: A
background paper for the Ipperwash Inquiry" May 2005.
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this material in a way that remains aware of the complex problems associated with
defining who and what is internal or external. For example, is Alfred suggesting that
"authentic indigenous identity" can only be asserted through the assertion of
separate nationhood? How does one define a "nation" in this context? And how can
one identify what is "authentic" - or "legal"? Because this study is based on
paradigmatic theory, it does not attempt to provide a definitive answer to some of
the questions such statements raise. It focuses instead on identifying the frames of
reference used in specific pieces of legal reasoning and examining how we can
distinguish "colonizing" solutions from "postcolonial" approaches.
Since this analysis relies on a capacity to identify culturally based
presuppositions, it is worth noting that the ethno-cultural composition of Canada has
altered dramatically during the past few decades. The Anglo/French divide that
characterized Canadian politics during the 19th and 20th centuries has become
blurred with the incorporation of people from other parts of the world in the social
fabric however we believe it has been woven. Many come from countries that have
struggled ardently against European colonization. Yet decolonization is not a
common topic of discussion in Canada. Perhaps immigration turns everyone into a
tacit colonizer. Many recent immigrants have been displaced in their lands of origin
and perhaps this generates a desperate need to belong somewhere, making them
overly concerned with "fitting in". Perhaps both. One of the aims of this study is to
increase awareness of the ways in which the paradigms we use shape what we know
and see, including our notions of history. What are the historical roots of
Indigenous complaints? How do we intend to deal with them? Who are "we" and
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what are the implications of what happened to them for us all? The answers to some
of these questions are political. Others affect the internal functioning of the legal
system. The distinctions are not carved in stone.
1.2.7 Constitutional and Aboriginal Rights
Despite the major obstacle that this interpretative problem presents, most
would agree that the "patriation" of the constitution marks a significant turning
point in Canadian legal history. The Constitution Act, 198i98 includes two
significant features as far as Indigenous status is concerned: The first is the
affirmation of "existing aboriginal and treaty rights" in s.35, accompanied by the
stipulation in s.25 of the Charter ofRights and Freedoms that:
"The guarantee in this Charter shall not be construed
so as to abrogate or derogate from aboriginal, treaty or
other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal
peoples of Canada".
The second is the Charter ofRights and Freedoms itself, with its declaration in s.15
that: "Every individual is equal before and under the law". Precedents for both of
these principles can be found in existing English common law, yet some might
consider them to be the very lynch pin of Canadian decolonization. The concept of
equality and the meaning of "aboriginal and treaty rights" have both become the
focus of much litigation and intense debate. Their incorporation in the Constitution
Act, 1982 provides a culturally sanctioned framework for discussion. It is,
accordingly, on this basis that this study considers what it means, in a legal sense, to
become "postcolonial". What is the role of the judiciary in the decolonization
process? Do Canadian judges act as the cutting edge of social change, usurping the
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role of parliament as critics of judicial activism might claim? Or are they a tool of
colonization as others allege? The overall aim of this study is to provide some
insight into the challenges faced by the Supreme Court of Canada as a participant in
the process of paradigmatic change represented by decolonization.
198 Constitution Act, 1982.
PART I
THE LAW and ORDER of PARADIGMS
"A paradigm can .. .insulate the community from those
socially important problems that are not reductible to
the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in
terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the
d· 1· ,,199para Igm supp les
Thomas Kuhn
The Structure ofScientific Revolutions
199 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions (3'd ed.) (London: University of Chicago
Press, 1996 © 1962) at 37.
2.
CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES
"Truth is always relative to a conceptual system." I
George Lakoff, Mark Johnson,
Metaphors We Live By, 1980.
The decoIonization process that implicitly involves the Supreme Court of Canada
IS a formidable venture involving all kinds of people and cultural practices on an
international scale. It is changing the way we see each other as human beings, leading to
the rejection of stereotypes and conceptual habits that prevailed during the colonial age.
Todarov, for example, has noted that Columbus assumed the fIrst people he met after
crossing the Atlantic Ocean were less than human because they were naked.2 He thought
they were naIve because they were generous and cowardly because they had no weapons
and avoided conflict. Yet the troops Columbus left on the island he called Hispaniola had
all been killed when he returned a year later.3
The misfIt between colonial and Indigenous paradigms was evident from the
outset; however, there is also a tendency for cultures that come into contact to
I George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (University of Chicago Press, 1980,2003.) at 185.
2 Tzvetan Todorov, Richard Howard trans. The Conquest ofAmerica: The question ofthe other (New York:
Harper and Row, 1982) at 35.
3 Ibid. at 40.
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hybridize.203 As humans, we learn by copying each other and some believe that
members of the colonial cultures are slowly being seduced into accepting
Indigenous ways. As Paula Gunn Allen has pointed out, layers of clothing have
disappeared, social welfare has become a major state concern and disarmament is
widely accepted as a modem necessity.204 In other words, old taboos and patterns of
reasoning have been abandoned, leading people to scorn behaviour that was once
considered socially acceptable, while new inhibitions and prohibitions are
developing to take their place.
The legal and governmental protocols that govern the postcolonial legality
that is beginning to emerge have not been defined in detail, yet they are of great
concern to those who advocate for others as well as for the judges charged with
resolving conflicting points of view. As Gerald P. Lopez has pointed out, successful
advocacy, whether in a court room or with the person standing next to you in line at
the grocery store depends upon an understanding of prevailing social norms.20S A
lawyer's role is to act as a story teller. As the representative of a party involved
with a system of laws and social expectations the advocate attempts to translate the
client's desires into an account that will be believed and respected by those who
have power over the outcome. Whether acting for a government, a corporation, a
plaintiff or an individual accused of a crime - or even when engaged in day to day
street-level negotiations - an advocate re-presents the client, first to themselves, then
to the world. Both the lawyer and the ultimate decision-maker function within a
203 Ibid. or Homi K. Bhabha, "Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority
under a Tree Outside new Delhi, May 1817" (Autumn, 1985) Critical Inquiry, 144 at 156.
204 Paula Gunn Allen. The Sacred Hoop: Recovering the Feminine in American Indian Traditions
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1986, 1992).
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social meaning-making process, attempting to arrange the chaos of the parties
conflicting feelings, thoughts and wishes so they fit a conceptual framework that
will be persuasive. And this is no less true for a judge whose reasoning may be
appealed to a higher court or annulled by legislative reform after intense public
discussion.
Since the foundation of legitimacy has changed, or is in the process of
changing, legal actors today face complex questions concerning what kind of story
line to use. Decolonization calls for a transition from one conceptual framework to
another. Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions offers some insight into
the challenges presented by changes of this magnitude, offering both an explanation
of the function of "paradigms" and a description of the process through which they
change. His observations have, as a whole, been confirmed, explained and
elaborated upon by findings in other fields which, in turn, are altering both our
social expectations and our understanding of human cognition. Before proceeding
with the task of defining the models for colonial and postcolonial social ordering
that will be applied to the judicial reasoning examined in Part II, the first section of
this study will review Kuhn's paradigmatic theory and some of its implications with
regard to judicial function.
205 Gerald P. Lopez, "Lay Lawyering" (1984) 32:1 UC.L.A. L. Rev. 1 at 3.
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2.1 Kuhn's Theory of Paradigmatic Change
"Failure of existing rules is the prelude to a search for
new ones.,,206
Thomas Kuhn
The Structure ofScientific Revolutions,
1962
Despite its all pervasive effect on political life in general, the twentieth century
reorientation in the concept of legality described above is rarely identified as such.
According to Thomas Kuhn's theory of paradigmatic change, this failure to
acknowledge what has been happening is entirely predictable. When we see the
world through the lens of a new cognitive model, we do not see revolutions but
rather "contributions to knowledge,,207 or, in the case of legal evolution, "progress in
human rights" reflecting, as it were, a metaphoric journey towards social
enlightenment208.
Kuhn developed his theory of paradigmatic function while studying the history
of scientific thought. Drawing on the observations of researchers in a number of
fields, he noticed that scientific knowledge was not the product of a simple
206 Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions at 68.
207 Ibid. at 136.
208 See ego Lakoff, Johnson, Metaphors We Live By. There is an emerging body of work concerning
the effect of metaphors on legal reasoning. See ego Bernard J. Hibbitts, "Making Sense of
Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse" (1994) 16
Cardoso L. Rev. 229; Jonnette Watson Hamilton, "The Use of Metaphor and Narrative To Construct
Gendered Hysteria In the Courts" (2002) 1 JL.& Equality, 155; Jennifer Nedelsky, "Embodied
diversity and the Challenges to Law" (1997) 42 McGill L. J 91; Jennifer Nedelsky, "Law,
Boundaries, and the Bounded Self', (1990) 30 Representations 162; Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in
the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind (University of Chicago Press, 2001); Steven L. Winter "The
"Power" Thing" (1996) 82:5 Virginia L. Rev. 744; Steven L. Winter, "Death is the Mother of
Metaphor" (1992) 105:726 Harvard L. Rev. 745; Steven L. Winter, "The Metaphor of Standing and
the Problem ofSelf-Govemance" (1988) 40 Stanford L. R. 1371.
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cumulative process as suggested by standard text books. Discoveries appear,
instead, to have an episodic quality. According to Kuhn, knowledge is tacitly
embedded in shared examples?09 Significant insights are made following an
accumulation of discrepant information that leads to rejection of old models and
acceptance ofnew cognitive ideals, which he referred to as "paradigms".
Kuhn described the function of paradigms by comparing them to common law
precedents or to the use of grammatical exemplars like amo, amas, amat to teach
the declension of Latin verbs.210 As he later explained in response to some of his
critics, his theory employs the word "paradigm" in two different senses, referring on
one hand to "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared
by the members of a given community", and on the other to "the concrete...models
or examples [which] replace explicit rules" to solve the intellectual questions raised
in a given field?l1 As will be demonstrated in the analysis of Supreme Court
reasoning concerning "aboriginal rights" in Part II of this work, paradigmatic theory
and paradigmatic practice do not always coincide.
2.1.1 The Importance of Shared Paradigms
While studying the development of scientific knowledge, Kuhn noted that
without a shared paradigm, any area of investigation tends to appear chaotic.
Research proceeds on the basis of conflicting parameters and assumptions making it
209 Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions at 175.
210 Ibid. at 23.
211 Ibid. at 175. When applied to legal matters, Dworkin or Kelsen's concepts of "law" might be seen
as examples of philosophical paradigms, while British monarchy, American republicanism and the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy might be seen as models for practice.
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difficult to co-relate findings. 212 An effective scientific paradigm makes it possible
to see order in this confusion, even though it need not explain all of the facts that
have been established. As Kuhn insisted, paradigms are models, not sets of shared
rules. Drawing on Wittgenstein's analysis, he pointed out that in most circumstances
we can identify a "chair" or a "leaf' without bothering to define all of the attributes
that are necessary and sufficient to constitute their identities.2 13 Like Hart's concept
of core and penumbral meaning in legal interpretation, paradigms guide and regulate
science without establishing absolute rules and boundaries.214 Indeed, since science
consist of "puzzle solving", effective paradigms will not only provide a plausible
explanation for phenomena that may previously have appeared anomalous, they will
also be open ended enough to indicate problems that require further investigation.215
2.1.2. "Normal" Research
Kuhn identified two types of research which he referred to as "normal" and
"revolutionary" science. What he described as "normal science" operates within an
established paradigm, seeking to increase the match between observations of nature
and pre-set norms. Without a paradigm, all facts seem equally relevant. Information
gathering is random and diverse, creating a morass of irrelevant detail and omitting
"fi b . 216slgm lcant 0 servatlOns.
Once a paradigm is established, phenomena that do not fit its requirements tend
to be ignored, however, commitment to the frame of reference it offers frees
212 Ibid. at 83.
213 Ibid. at 44.
214 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw 2"d ed.(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994 © 1961). For discussion,
see also Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 196-7.
215 Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions at 36-37 and 10.
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scientists from provmg fundamental principles that have been accepted by
specialists in their field. This allows them to concentrate on solving the particular
sorts of problems posed by the new perspective. For example, once Dalton's atomic
theory gained general acceptance, alloys were seen as chemical compounds rather
than physical mixtures. This led to rapid advancements in the field of chemistry.
The application of chemical norms lead in short order to the discovery of several
new elements and the development of a better capacity to predict the results of
certain interactions?17
As Kuhn himself observed, this phenomenon parallels the use of precedent
in common law legal practice. The "rule of law" might thus be seen as functioning
"normally" through the characterization of events according to pre-determined
criteria which may have been codified either by previous judgements or in
legislation.
2.1.2.1 The Importance of Anomalies
The type of research that Kuhn called "normal science" tends to ignore
questions that may be socially important or central to other fields of inquiry.
"Normal science" concentrates only on the facts that are significant in relation to the
pre-conceived point of view represented by the governing paradigm. In the field of
law an example of this might be seen in the assertion of governing constitutional
principles that defend human rights while ignoring the fact that existing laws
exclude some people from the definition of a "person".
216 Ibid at 15-17.
217 Ibid, at 130 and 200.
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Most of the anomalies discovered during this process are applied to improving
articulation of the relevant theory. However, when unassimilated anomalies
accumulate, a state of crisis develops. The fundamental generalizations of the
paradigm are called into question, especially if they inhibit practical applications
which may be important in other disciplines. As discrepant information collects, the
field appears increasingly chaotic until it begins to resemble its pre-paradigm state.
2.1.2.2 Paradigmatic Persistence
Despite the development of chaotic conditions, scientists never denounce the
paradigm that led to the crisis unless there is a new paradigm to take its place. To do
so would be a rejection of science itself.218 In terms of Kuhn's theory, "aboriginal
law" in Canada may be experiencing a crisis of this nature provoked by the
emergence of egalitarian norms during the twentieth century and the implementation
of s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Old ways of looking at things, such as the
exclusion of Indigenous people from the definition of a "person", have been
abandoned, yet attempts to organize relations on the basis of the old paradigm
persist in the name of maintaining the "rule of law". According to Kuhn, people
typically respond to chaotic conditions by asserting the old paradigm with renewed
vigour.219 This may explain why police and other government agents sometimes
engage in behaviour that could only be justified under the old paradigm, such as the
abandonment of Indigenous youth in freezing weather or the failure to investigate
the disappearance of missing women.
218 Ibid at 77-9.
219 Ibid at 86-7. See also Peter Stuber, "Legal Reasoning after Post-Modem Critiques of Reason"
(1997) 3 Legal Writing 21.
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2.1.3 "Revolutionary" Research
As Kuhn noted, when anomalies that cannot be explained by the prevailing
paradigm become sufficiently disturbing, the nature of scientific investigation
changes. Much like the work of appellate courts, the extraordinary research
involved in what he called "revolutionary science" attempts to create a new
framework by defining and isolating the discordant information that has
accumulated, by pushing the rules of normal science harder and by drawing on
philosophical analysis to generate and test speculative new theories?20
The differences between Kuhn's concepts of normal and revolutionary science
seem to parallel the differences between legal and political questions in some
respects. Changes in scientific paradigms, like political revolutions, involve the
confrontation of a conservative establishment with one or more alternatives,
concluding with the adoption of new regimes and practices. 221 The inventors of
new paradigms are often very young, or new to the field so they have little
commitment to prior practice and tradition?22 And, since each group uses its own
paradigm to argue in its defence, differences are both necessary and
irreconcilable?23 Paradigm change, whether in science, politics or the court, is
frequently characterized by heated argument.
2.1.3.1 The Emergence of a New Paradigm
The emergence of a new paradigm alters the way researchers see the world and
the conceptual rifts that found paradigmatic debate arise in part because traditional
220 Ibid
221 Ibid, at 9.
222 Ibid, at 90.
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and reform camps share much of the same information. The ability to understand in
terms of a new paradigm may come into operation instantaneously, like the switch
in perception demonstrated by Gestalt images in which identical marks on a piece of
paper may appear either as a bird or an antelope.224
Yet, as practice based on a new paradigm accumulates, the switch may become
irreversible. What a person perceives depends upon previous visual and conceptual
experience and once we have been trained to see things in a particular way it is
difficult to change. Just as those raised using miles and imperial measures have
difficulty understanding distance in kilometres and weight in kilograms, so too those
trained in a particular paradigm tend to perceive the world exclusively in terms of
that frame of reference. Thus, the cartographer habitually interprets the lines on a
map as terrain and the physicist sees the confused and broken markings in a bubble
photograph as an image of sub-nuclear events.225
2.1.3.2 Misperceptions
The inferences made by those with the relevant education may become so
automatic and habitual that they induce misperception. Psychologists have
accordingly demonstrated that people tend not to notice a black four of hearts or a
red six of spades slipped into an otherwise normal deck of cards.226 According to
Kuhn, psychological phenomena of this kind help explain why the process of
paradigm change tends to be slow and muddled. The effect of habit is so strong that
223 Ibid, at 103.
224 Ibid. at 85.
225 Ib id. at 111.
226 Ibid. at 63 citing Bruner, Postman, "On the Perception ofIncongruity".
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a new paradigm may not be established until an older generation of practitioners has
retired.
For those functioning under a new paradigm, however, former modes of thought
may seem incomprehensible. Youth today, for example, have difficulty imagining
the impact of Rosa Parks' refusal to move to the back of the bus in Montgomery
Alabama on December 1st 1955.127 However, it took the U.S. Supreme Court to
strike down the municipal ordinance under which Mrs. Parks was fined and it has
taken the American desegregation movement a good half century to reach a point
where the U.S. Senate is preparing to admit that the lynching of blacks, once
common in the American south, amounted to a holocaust.128
2.1.4 The Resumption of "Normal" Reasoning
Just as legislative and judicial recognition of racial equality or the legal
personhood of women changed political fights into legal rights, so too general
acceptance of a new paradigm by the specialists in a field allows what Kuhn called
"normal" science to resume. Experts in disciplines once held to be of central
importance may suddenly find themselves marginalized. Their work may even
become completely irrelevant. The emphasis now placed on human equality has,
for example, made attempts to define racial difference as obsolete as the slide-rule
in the age of pocket calculators.
227" Rosa Parks Biography", http://www.achievement.orgl (6/20/05).
228 See ego Sheldon Alberts, "Race-Murder Trial May Lay Ghosts to Rest" CANWEST News Service;
Avis Thomas-Lester, Washington Post "U.S. Senate to say sorry for 'American Holocaust"'The
[Montreal] Gazette (12 June, 2005) INl - IN3.
80
2.1.4.1 The Re-writing of History
To remain effective as pedagogic tools, textbooks must be re-written in the
language of the new theory after each paradigmatic revolution. Explanations based
on discarded perspectives are omitted, as are references to facts that are not relevant
to current models of thought.229 Students are not required to master outmoded
paradigms and so this backwards re-writing of the past creates the impression that
science, law or history develops in a cumulative and linear manner.230 This may
explain why Canada's former identity as part of the British empire tends to be
overlooked despite the vestigial signs that remain in the much studied Constitution
Act, 1867. Current generations educated according to modem international
paradigms interpret the past as if Canada's evolution into the form known today is
the culmination of an inevitable progression of events.
2.1.4.2 The Persistence of Unicorns
Though new paradigms produce new areas of selective blindness, discredited
assumptions may continue to function in limited circumstances. Just as Canadian
women found that eligibility for Senate appointment did not ensure equal treatment
in all areas of social practice, so too, Newtonian physics that treat mass as a constant
continue to be applied in certain contexts despite general acceptance of Einstein's
theory that mass may be converted into energy?31 Similarly, modem architects and
builders continue to design houses as if the earth was flat because the adjustments
required to accommodate the earth's curvature are just too minimal to be relevant.
229 See ego Wicks, The Evolution of a Constitution, which recounts English constitutional history
from 1688 until joining the European Community without mention ofthe British empire.
230 Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions at 137-8.
231 Ibid. at 102.
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Inconsistent paradigms can, accordingly coexist for centuries, particularly when the
practices and habits of thought established according to rejected paradigms are
reinforced through continued use.
2.1.5 Summary
Decolonization involves a process of paradigm change. Kuhn's theory is useful
for understanding this process because it predicts the kinds of problems that might
be expected and suggests an analytical methodology. Because this study applies an
unconventional framework in an attempt to explain anomalies that have
accumulated according to "normal" legal analysis, it would be classified as
"revolutionary research" by Kuhn.
**************************************************************************
According to Kuhn's theory, paradigms serve as models:
-They govern which information people focus on.
-People fail to perceive evidence that disturbs the paradigm's coherence.
-"Normal" practice refines the model that structures current understanding.
-Periods of revolutionary change are characterized by:
-attention to evidence that cannot be explained by the existing paradigm,
-harder assertion of the rules governing established frames of reference,
- philosophical analysis to generate new perspectives, and
- a chaotic proliferation of alternative theories vying for acceptance.
-An old paradigm will continue in use until a new model emerges to replace it.
-Ability to understand a new paradigm may occur suddenly, like a switch
-A paradigm has changed when:
-new modes of thought are generally accepted,
-text books have been rewritten, and
-practices have changed.
-Practices based on a rejected paradigm may continue in specific circumstances
****************************************************************************
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2.2 Paradigms and Cognitive Categories
"Poets are the unacknowledged rulers of the world.,,232
Percy Bysshe Shelley
A Defense ofPoetry
" the term "culture" as it is used in the English
language may not find a perfect parallel in certain
aboriginal languages."
Bastarache J. S.C.C.
R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, 2006.
Paradigmatic theory may be applied to legal practice and judicial function in
several ways. However, there is one significant difference between law and the
science Kuhn studied. Law is concerned with how people believe things should
work, whereas science is dedicated to understanding how things work in practice.
The two applications intersect because, as Steven L. Winter has pointed out, law,
like poetry and music - or the science Kuhn studied - is a product of human
cognition?33 Like science, it functions only through our mental thought processes
and so some of the findings that have been made concerning how these work can
improve our understanding of legal reasoning, of the function of law in society and
ultimately of what exactly is involved in major legal paradigm changes like the
transition from colonialism to post-colonialism or from a command model of
legality to one based on human equality.
232 Cited by Winter, "Death is the Mother of Metaphor" at 750.
233 Ibid at 748.
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2.2.1 Theories of Cognition
Kuhn based significant elements of his theory on research concerning human
cognitive function such as the experiment demonstrating the misperception of black
hearts and red spades placed in an ordinary deck of cards. His theory has, in its
tum, inspired subsequent work in this and related fields. 234 Some of these
developments must be taken into account if legal practice is to maintain a coherent
relationship with other disciplines such as medicine, education and social work.
Although understanding of human thought processes is considered to be in its
infancy, mechanical models of intelligence that led to theories like the popular 19th
century study of phrenology have long been discredited. In effect, it is now known
that the brain does not store knowledge in particular cells as if it were a computer
chip where information can be encoded in discrete locations.235 It seems that our
thoughts and memories are preserved through complex networks of neurons whose
electro-chemical patterns of interaction are strengthened each time they are
reproduced.236 Like paths worn through a field, past actions can direct future
movements. The function of this patterning is predominantly instant, automatic and
subconscious. In keeping with Kuhn's observation that the proponents of conflicting
scientific theories are often unaware of the assumptions that structure their
234 See ego Lakoff, Johnson, Metaphors We Live By; George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous
Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind (University of Chicago Press, 1987); Winter, A
Clearing in the Forest. '
235 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 28.
236 Ibid.
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reasonmg, researchers now attribute 95 percent of our thought processes to the
. . . 237
cogmtIve unconscIOus.
2.2.1.1 Prototypes and Embodied Metaphors
Some of the implications of Kuhn's theory and related research merit
consideration as we attempt to understand judicial reasoning and other
manifestations of human thought processes. Laurence Kirmayer has pointed out that
language is now believed to be "grounded in bodily experience" that provides
common referents for our verbal lexicons.238 According to the "embodied theory"
developed by linguists like Lakoff, we structure our knowledge around "idealized
cognitive models" which become biologically encoded in metaphoric reference to
memories of an array of physiological sensations including hot and cold, balance,
direction, hard and soft, up and down, fear, elation, dejection etc. 239
A "metaphor", as defined by the Oxford Dictionary, occurs when one thing or
state is imagined in terms of another. For example, a "glaring error" is one that
stands out and creates discomfort like a strong light.24o The error is compared to a
bright light, though it is not a light. It is thus understood by analogy to visual
perception. According to embodied theory, comparative explanations of this kind
function through the use of multisensory electro-chemical pathways established in
the brain by previous experiences and used to both metabolize and shape
237 George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to
Western Thought (New York, Basic Books, Perseus Books Group, 1999) at 13.
238 Laurence J. Kirmayer, "The Body's Insistence on Meaning: Metaphor as Presentation and
Representation in Illness Experience" 6:4 Medical Anthropology Quarterly 323 at 324.
239 Lakoff, Johnson, Metaphors We Live By at 261. See also Bipin Indurkhya, "Rationality and
reasoning with metaphors", (2007) 25 New Ideas in Psychology 16.
240 See Sykes, The Concise Oxford Dictionary s. v. "metaphor". Note my complementary use of the
spacial metaphor represented by "stand out" in this explanation.
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understanding of new concepts or stimuli. Cognitive linguists, like Lakoff, thus
describe a metaphor as "the mapping of a target domain on to a source domain".241
2.2.1.2 Abstract Ideas and the Sensation of Knowledge
This mapping theory is consistent with the observation that even abstract
ideas are understood in terms of primary sensual experience.242 We may, for
example, refer to "knowing" as "seeing" saying things like "I see what you
mean,,243 or in terms of tactile and motor skills when we say "I can't grasp your
meaning". In effect, the word "imagined" used in the Oxford explanation of a
metaphor draws on an analogy to "images" or visual perception, invoking the
metaphoric inference that KNOWING IS SEEING. The tactile metaphor, on the
other hand, suggests that TO UNDERSTAND IS TO GRASP. Both the visual
metaphor and the tactile metaphor rely, in turn, on the representation that IDEAS
ARE OBJECTS that can be seen or touched. (Can you get what I am saying? Can
you go and fetch it as if it were an object?)
Research into linguistic development in children has suggested that
comprehension of abstract metaphors of this kind develops out of situations in
which meaning is conflated. "I see what's in the box" means "I know what's in the
box" and it is only later that a child can differentiate the conceptual domains of
241 Lakoff, Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh at 57-8..
242 Lakoff and Johnson focus in particular on Johnson's "theory of conflation", Grady's "theory of
primary metaphor", Narayan's "neural theory of metaphor" and Fauconnier and Turner's "theory of
conceptual blending". Lakoff, Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh at 46.
243 Lakoff, Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh at 48.
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seeing and knowing to make sentences like "I can see what you mean", which do
not involve literal sight.244
Some believe that the choice of sensory focus in the metaphors we use may
have implications of which we are only peripherally aware. Bernard J. Hibbitts has
suggested that American legal discourse is shifting from the visual metaphors
associated with the culturally exclusive character of literacy and represented by
phrases like "observing the law", "colour of title" and "black-letter law" to aural
concepts related to "voice", "hearing", "silencing" ,"conversation" and "dialogue",
which seem to be favoured by women and those who have been culturally
marginalized245. Gerald Postema, by contrast, has explored similarities between
legal reasoning and musical themes?46 Musings of this kind that dance on the edge
of established assumption is fully consistent with the quest for new models that
Kuhn has associated with paradigm change.
2.2.1.3 The Metaphoric Definition of Categories
The theory that language consists of metaphors that "embody" sensual
experience coincides with Kuhn's observation that scientists reason from prototypes
that shape their perception of the world?47 The words we use both categorize and
edit our experience in ways that create areas of blindness even as they facilitate the
244 Ibid. at 48 and 54-55.
245 Bernard 1. Hibbitts, "Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of
American Legal Discourse" (1994) 16 Cardoso 1. Rev.229.
246 Gerald J. Postema, "Melody and Law's Mindfulness of time" [unpublished revision of "Law's
Melody: Time and the Normativity of Law" presented to 2l st.IVR World congress, Lund, Sweden.]
247 Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions at Ill.
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construction of knowledge. Lakoff's theories and those of Kuhn both demand that
we pause to consider just how it is that we know what we think we know.
As Lakoff has pointed out, one of the most basic metaphors that we use - in
English at least - conceptualizes categories as containers in which ideas, understood
as objects, may be placed. We ask, for example, whether tomatoes are in the fruit or
vegetable category.248 This is the same pattern of reason that we apply when we
when we say that "property is (or is not) a constitutionally protected right". There is
a tendency to assume first that everything must be either in the category or outside
it249 - "P or not P"- and secondly that all members of a category share the same
characteristics. Yet on the conceptual level we do not actually structure the
categories we use in this way.250 Indeed, as any legal practitioner knows, reality is
not at all easy to contain.
2.2.1.4 Actual Definition of Categories
Our perceptions vary and, as a consequence, so do the ways in which we
structure the categories we use. As experts in taxonomy have discovered, even when
they agree about which classificatory criteria apply, it is impossible to fit everything
within the boundaries they establish. Even the zebras and fish that inhabit children's
story books prove difficult to define at the scientific leve1.251 There are, as it
happens, organisms that are so interdependent that the decision to class them as one
entity or two, or as parasite or prey, depends entirely upon the part of their life cycle
248 Lakoff, Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh at 51.
249 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest; Stuber, "Legal Reasoning after Post-Modem Critiques of
Reason".
250 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 161, 166.
251 Ibid. at 119.
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chosen and the characteristics used to define the categories imposed.252 This
problem is quite familiar to jurists. H.L.A. Hart's famous discussion concerning
whether a prohibition against "vehicles" in a park extends to airplanes and toy cars
deals with this exact phenomenon.253 No matter how carefully a state attempts to
codify "the law", glosses, commentaries and discussions inevitably appear.
Paradigm theory has provided an explanation for this phenomenon. In effect,
concepts can exist in multiple categories at once and categories do not function like
containers.254 They are shaped, instead, around prototypes, which, as Kuhn pointed
out, serve as models through a gestalt type of process that allows the brain to
interpret the same bundle of data through differing conceptual frameworks.255 Thus,
even though a typical example of a "chair" may be a seat with four legs, rockers and
large bean bags may also be classed as "chairs". Conversely, people do not think of
the Pope as a "bachelor" even though he, like James Bond, is an "unmarried
man".256 Other considerations, including the religious doctrine of celibacy, exclude
the Pope from a category he might otherwise be expected to fit. An understanding of
the ways in which prototypes function can accordingly offer crucial insights into
law as a social regulatory mechanism and the importance of categories in the
development of legal reasoning.
252 In the Bay of Naples, neither the medusa nor the nudibranch can survive without the other.
Though both reproduce independently, the jellyfish that appears as a parasite on the sea slug at one
stage in their relationship, got there through being canibalized by the slug in its larval state. Lewis
Thomas, The Medusa and the Snail: More Notes ofa Biology Watcher (London: Viking Press, 1979)
ch.l. Re taxanomic models see Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 113.
253 H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1958) 71 Harv. 1. Rev. 593 at
606-15. See also Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 197.
254 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 161,166.
255 Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions at 85.
256 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 70.
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2.2.2 Category Formation
Researchers have determined that the most fundamental level of understanding
is not the most general level. The models that govern our thoughts are generated,
instead, on the basis of initial experience. In effect, one cannot imagine a plant, a
toy or an animal without thinking of a specific member of the category which serves
as a prototype or metaphor for the class as a whole.257 Thus, both general and
specific concepts tend to be known in terms of the original exemplar.
As represented by Lakoff, the relationship between types of categories may be
seen as follows:
SUPERORDINATE:
BASIC LEVEL:
SUBORDINATE:
ANIMAL
DOG
RETREIVER
FURNITURE
CHAIR
ROCKER.258
When interpreting this table it is important to remember that the mental image
governing a category does not necessarily fit all of its members. The prototypical
chair may very well be a common kitchen chair, but beanbags and platform rockers
are still recognized as "chairs" even though they have no legs. A chair is a seat you
may sit on, but where you may sit may be defined in a number of different ways.
Unless you are the monarch, you may not sit on the throne, but it is still a chair.
Moreover, because of the gestalt orientation used to conceptualize categories, there
is, as Kuhn pointed out, no need to define a "chair" in order to identify one.
Super-ordinate categories tend to be particularly fuzzy. Thus, for example,
the word "animal" may include whales, hamsters, giraffes and panthers as well as
dogs, snakes and centipedes, while "furniture" could incorporate washstands,
257 Ibid at 24-7.
258 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Thing at 46.
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mirrors, curtains and shrines as well all kinds of chairs from beanbags to church
pews.zS9 In keeping with the variety of human experience, the concept governing at
the basic levels of understanding may differ substantially from one culture to the
next. Thus, igloos, log cabins, suburban bungalows and plate-glass high-rises may
all be seen as typical "houses" - depending on whose social and cultural context is
called upon.
2.2.2.1 Preferred Categorical Models
In keeping with the prototype-focused way in which categories are actually
constructed some category members are generally seen as better representatives than
others.z6o Thus, robins and sparrows are considered to be typical birds, whereas
owls and eagles or penguins are not.261 This phenomenon is believed to reflect the
way we construct knowledge at the neurological level.
Prototypes tend to be based on experience and researchers have discovered that
some are widely shared. For example, prototypical colours reflect the performance
of colour perceiving neurons. Thus red and blue are usually seen as prototypical
colours. Turquoise and lavender are not. Even speakers of different languages with
different colour categories and cultural experience tend to choose the same hues as
prototypes. The Tarahumara have only one term to cover the shades in the spectrum
that English speakers call "blue" and "green"; however, they typically choose focal
259 Ibid.; Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 92-97.
260 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, at 161, 166.
261 Winter, "The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance" at 1385; Lakoff,
Johnson, Metaphors We Live By at 71 ; Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 40-46
discussing the research ofEleanor Roasch.
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blue or focal green rather than turquoise as the best representative of their combined
category.262
Frequency of encounter may also affect the establishment of some prototypes.
Robins and sparrows may have become prototypical "birds" because they are more
commonly seen than owls or flamingos. Prototype effects have even been found in
the field of mathematics where single digit numbers are consistently rated as better
examples of odd numbers than those with two or more figures?63
2.2.2.2 Prototypes and Learning
Children learn the category membership of prototypical examples first - or
perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the examples children learn first serve
as prototypes. In any event, their paradigmatic function seems crucial to learning.264
When asked to name things that belong to categories, people tend to list culturally
accepted prototypes and when asked to judge the truth of a statement like "A
chicken is a bird", response time is quicker when a prototype is used.265 However,
prototypes also generate misinformation because there is a tendency to assume that
all members of a category share all of the prototype's characteristics.266
2.2.2.3 Cultural Variations
The role played by experience in developing prototypical status explains why
prototypes vary from culture to culture and from person to person. Thus, as Hart
was at pains to point out, a regulation that may seem perfectly plain to most people
262 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 79.
263 Ibid. at 78.
264 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 46.
265 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 78.
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when considering a car or truck becomes ambiguous when applied to other objects
that may also be classed as "vehicles". Qualifying adjectives are accordingly used to
indicate when the prototypical ideal that represents a category as understood in a
particular culture is not met.267
The capacity of language to reinforce culturally defined stereotypes has been
widely commented upon in recent works concerning race relations and gender roles.
We thus have stepmothers, foster mothers and biological mothers, not to mention
Chinese Canadians, Black Americans and Aboriginal law - just as we have pale
blue and olive green.
2.2.3 Conceptual Errors
Our reliance on "idealized cognitive models" that are highly variable and
culturally specific leads to a variety of common conceptual errors.268
2.2.3.1 Conjunction and Conflation
Cognitive researchers have found that causation is often conceived in terms of
correlation. When A happens in conjunction with B, we tend to assume that A is the
cause of B on the basis of extensive experience of this kind. A glass is tipped, the
water spills. You fall, you hurt your knee. Conjunction is conflated with causality
because of our initial experience of the world. Conjunction errors can be used for
politically manipulative purposes. When Senator Robert Dole pointed out that
266 Ibid at 92-97.
267 Winter, "The Metaphor of Standing" at 1385
268 The term "idealized cognitive model" is taken from the research of George Lakoff. Winter, A
Clearing in the Forest at 86-9. For a demonstration of the effect of cognitive models on an ordinary
action (catching a cab in New York) see Lopez, "Lay Lawyering".
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teenage drug use rose 104% during Clinton's term of office, the implication was that
Clinton was at fault even though there was no evidence of a causal connection.269
Similar errors arise from the tendency to generalize from prototypes. People
assume that all of the characteristics associated with a prototype are likely to be
present. Using examples taken from the research of Tversky and Kahneman, Winter
has pointed out that the probability that 1000 people in California will be killed in a
flood caused by an earthquake is necessarily lower than the likelihood of 1000
deaths in a flood of any kind. Yet California is so strongly associated with
earthquakes that research subjects consistently rate the probability of the earthquake
related disaster higher than the probability of 1000 deaths in a flood. Similarly,
people are able to recognize that the probability that a person is either a bank teller
OR a feminist is higher than the probability that they are both. Yet, when the
question is asked concerning a woman described as being both a philosophy major
and a student activist, even graduate students with special training in logic succumb
to culturally coloured ideals and judge it more likely that she is a "feminist
bankteller" than simply a bankteller.27o Conjunction errors which arise from
previously established mental prototypes have broad social consequences and they
are insidiously difficult to escape.
2.2.3.2 Stereotyping
When these phenomena function at a collective level, their effects can be
devastating. One emblematic example of this type of dysfunction was offered by
the 1986 experience of three young "black" men who were stranded after their car
269Lakoff, Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh at 218.
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stalled in the "white" neighbourhood of Howard Beach, New York. While
considering what to do, they went for a pizza, but in an area where the prevailing
stereotype saw "black" youth as criminals, their mere presence raised suspicion. The
police were called, but there were no grounds for arrest. After the young men left
the restaurant, they were chased and beaten by a gang of local teenagers. One of the
stranded men was permanently blinded in one eye. Another died after being struck
by a car while trying to escape his pursuers. When the victims sued, the general
attitude in the community was "We ain't raciaL.We just don't want to get
robbed".271 The legitimacy of such thinking was taken so much for granted that the
apparent problem of gang violence in Howard Beach was overlooked in the media
as attorneys for the victims fended off questions from reporters who suggested they
were making "too much" of the case.272
As the Indigenous experience in Canada has demonstrated, dysfunctional
reasoning of this kind is by no means rare. Charles L. Lawrence III has pointed out
that the sub-conscious level at which stereotypical points of view function merits
close attention, particularly with regard to racial identification.273 Despite
constitutional affirmation of equality rights, and the failure of scientists to identify
empirically sound criteria for defining racial categories, racism remains rampant.274
270 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 92-97.
271 Patricia Williams, "Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
Law's Response to Racism"( 1987) 42:93 U Miami L. Rev. 127 at 137 citing Village Voice, Jan.6,
1987, at 16, coLI.
272 Ibid at 138 nAO.
273 Charles R. Lawrence III, "The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism" (1987) 39:297 Stanford L. Rev. 317 at 337.
m See ego Ritchie Witzig, "The Medicalization of Race: Scientific Legitimation of a Flawed Social
construct" (1996) 125 Annals of Internal Medicine 675; Michael J.Bamshad, Steve E.Qlson. "Does
Race Exist?" 289.6 Scientific American (Dec. 2003) 78. In biology, species membership is defined
95
Its manifestations range from medical misdiagnoses275 and racial profiling by police
to the patronizing comments of well-meaning liberals who tell their racially
identified friends about how they do not think of them as "Negros", "Indians" or
"Jews".276 This cognitive dysfunction also works in the other direction, causing
great angst for people with light colouring born into contexts where dark prototypes
prevai1.277 As Patricia Williams has stated with regard to its tragic manifestations in
the United States, "there is no blame among the living for the dimensions of this
historic crime". Yet the "psychic obliteration" caused by hyphenated identities and
the perception that some people do not fit the dominant prototype of humanness
"lives on as a factor in shaping relations, not just between blacks and whites, or
blacks and blacks, but also between whites and whites".278
2.2.4 Alternate Systems of Categorization
Despite the power of first impressions that may become embedded in social
habit and neural chemistry, we have a remarkable capacity to learn and to develop
alternate paradigms. Kuhn was a professor of linguistics and philosophy at the
Massachussetts Institute of Technology and one of his achievements has been to
raise awareness of the relativity of knowledge. As he pointed out, people within a
discipline learn by analogy through "time-tested and group-licensed ways of seeing
by the ability to interbreed. Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Thing at 36. The problem appears
related to general misconceptions concerning the nature of categories.
275 Witzig, "The Medicalization of Race", ibid.
276 For discussion see Lawrence, "Unconscious Racism" at 341.
277 The issue seemed to crop up in one form or another every year that I taught in the Program of
Legal Studies for Native People in Saskatoon, yet light colouring reportedly occurred in some groups
prior to known contact. e.g.Mi-cou-chusta-con and Shaw-wish-ti-con, two full blooded Cree brothers
with pale skin and red and blond hair respectively, lived on the Saskatchewan River in the mid
1800's. Mary Weekes, The Last Buffalo Hunter (Saskatoon, Fifth House Publishers,1994 reprint of
1939) at 53.
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things".279 The fact that we can develop alternate models for interpreting experience
and structuring what we know is graphically reflected in the multiplicity of
languages that have developed over time and across varying geographies.
Professionals charged with translating concepts from one language to another
are well aware of the types of problems that may arise because concepts that seem
natural and ubiquitous from the perspective of one social and linguistic paradigm
may be absent or differently conceived in another.28o The previously mentioned
Tarahumara placement of blue and green in the same colour category is one striking
example that is relatively easy to cope with281 , as are similar conceptual distinctions
that get lost in translation like the French attribution of masculine and feminine
gender to objects.
Other types of inter-linguistic conceptual mismatch may be more challenging.
For example, according to Lakof, Dyirbal has four basic linguistic categories: Bayi:
human males, Balan: human females, Balam: edible plants and Bala: everything
else.282 Some languages have no adjectives at all. Igbo has only eight and Hausa
twelve.283 According to Sakej Henderson, Mi'qmak makes little use of nouns. 284
The spatial orientation, which makes us think of things as having a front and back is
applied in English so the front of a bush is the side facing the speaker. In Hausa, by
contrast, the "front" is the side facing away, as if the speaker and the bush were
278 Williams, "Spirit-Murdering the Messenger" at 139.
279 Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions at 189.
280 See ego Li, Ageless Chinese at 126.
281 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 79.
282 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 99.
283 These are said to correspond to basic descriptive categories found in other languages: big-small,
white- black, young-old, hard-soft etc Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 290.
284 Ibid at 110.
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looking in the same direction.285 Mixtec speakers have no words that correspond to
the English on, over, under etc. Instead, they employ a complex system of
conventional metaphors that project body parts on to objects. "He is on top of the
mountain" is expressed by the equivalent of "He is located mountain's head". I am
sitting on the branch of the tree" becomes "I am sitting tree's arm", and so forth.286
Other linguistic structural differences are more subtle. Ojibway speakers who are
asked how they got to a party are inclined to answer "I started to come" or "I got
into a car" emphasizing the embarkation stage of a journey in a way that seems
quaint or nonsensical to English speakers who would more likely say "I drove".287
Inter-Cultural translation problems are further exacerbated by the lack of gender
based pronouns (like he, she and it) in many Aboriginallanguages.288
According to Rupert Ross the differences between Native American and
European linguistic perspectives are like opposite sides of Einstein's equation E =
MC2. English emphasizes the mass side of the equation, metaphorically
representing everything as objects, described as nouns, whereas some Indigenous
languages focus on energy and "the great flux, eternal transformation and an
interconnected order of time, space and events".289 This, apparently, makes it easy
for speakers of Indigenous languages to discuss theory with physicists and Ross
cites Sakej Henderson as saying:
285 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 310.
286 Ibid. at 313-15.
287 Ibid. at 78.
288 Rupert Ross, Returning to the Teachings: Exploring Aboriginal Justice (Toronto: Penguin Books,
1996) at 116.
289 Ibid. at 115.
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" ...when you're speaking Mi'kmaq. you can go all day
long without saying a single noun... ,,290
Others have observed that English, like other European languages and Sanskrit,
exhibits a long-term tendency to replace specific verbs with abstract nouns. This
seems to occur particularly when dealing with concepts introduced by the Norman
conquest and the Renaissance. Both added new vocabularies to the language based
respectively on French, classical Greek and Latin. The effect of nominalization, or
the translation of actions into nouns, is to camouflage who is responsible for what
happened. Use of imported nominalized language and other professionally specific
linguistic paradigms has thus been associated with the exclusion of particular
classes of people from centers of power, prestige and privilege.291
Regardless of the reasons for such linguistic differences, constructions
perceived as bizarre or lacking in credibility to outsiders, seem natural to native
speakers and most people develop only occasional awareness of the principles that
order the words they choose.292 The plays on words that typically occur in poetry
are often impossible to translate. Even within cultures, identical words may be
interpreted in radically different ways by men and women or by people from
differing social backgrounds.293 In summary, as well as generating
misunderstandings, the multiplicity of verbal and cultural paradigmatic systems that
290 Ibid at 110.
291 Joseph M. Williams, Style: Towards Clairty and Grace (University of Chicago Press, 1990) at 6,
ch.2.
292 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 100.
293 See ego Tannen, Framing in Discourse; That's Not What I Meant! Interpretive differences across
gender has become a recurrent theme in some fields. See ego Allen, The Sacred Hoop. Note that
Tannen used Lakoffand Johnson's work in her analysis.
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have developed gIve us many effective ways of both understanding and
misunderstanding the world and each other.
2.2.4.1 Linguistic World Views
The potential impact of linguistically embedded paradigms on both judicial
reasoning and intercultural relations is underscored by research indicating that they
can influence non-linguistic behaviour. It has, for example, been shown that English
speakers, who have two separate categories for the blue-green colour range, are
better than Tarahumara speakers at assessing variations in "greenness".294
Evidence of this kind has led Winter to argue that, because of our tendency to
conflate meaning, the metaphors we use to depict concepts affect the way they are
legally understood. Examining the word "power" in English usage, he identified a
matrix of inter-related representations: POWER IS AN OBJECT as in "He seized
power", which may be a food when "She has an appetite for power" or a weapon
when "He wields a lot of power and is able to strike down this initiative". POWER
IS A RESOURCE when we "conserve energy" and POWER IS A FORCE when
"he used his power to push the bill through" or "he had the power to bend the
members to his will ". It may also be a location when "She is in control" or "He
decided to shore up his power base", which might be a mountain as when "She has
reached the pinnacle of power" reflecting another basic metaphor in Anglo-
American culture which says CONTROL IS UP. Thus people rise to and fall from
294 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 330-334 on research reported in Paul Kay and
Willett Kempton (1984) "What Is the Sapir-Whorf Hyoothesis? 86.1 American Anthropologist 65-
79.
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power which is exercised "over" or "upon" others.295 On the basis of this analysis,
Winter concluded that
"All of our most basic, intuitive assumptions about
power - that it is grounded in violence; that it is an
external force that operates on a passive victim; that it
is expressed through hierarchy; and that power and
agency are synonYmous - turn out to be either
entailments or reductive understandings of these
metaphors.296
In his view, the representation of power as a force induces people to conflate power
and violence, the depiction of power as an object, which is implicit in the use of
nouns, makes temporary abilities appear to be essential traits. Similarly, the
assumption that "control is up" fosters the belief that power can only be exercised
through a top down hierarchical format. 297
According to Kuhn, people will continue to use an old paradigm unless there
is a viable alternative. As it happens, the English concept of power is by no means
the only one possible. In Chinese, for example, "power" is denoted by the character
li [.1.1 ], derived from the ancient pictograph representing sinew. 298 As such, it
denotes strength and it is used in relation to effort of any kind.299 Thus a man, nan
[!] is one who exerts his strength in the field and xie [t~], which shows ten [+]
times a multitude of people [ '1;),% ] joining their strength together means
295 Winter, "The "Power" Thing".
296 Ibid. at 754.
297 Ibid..
298 A.S. Hornby, E.C. Parnwell eds Oxford Intermediate Learner's English-Chinese Dictionary,
Simplified Character Edition (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1969 rev. 1987) s. v. "Power" .
299 Dr. L. Wieger, S.J. Chinese Characters: Their origin, etymo/0f?" history, classification and
signification (New York: Dover Publications, 1965 reprint of 1927 2" ed. Catholic Mission Press) at
143
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"agreement, concord or mutual help".3°o It is conceptualized as an internal force
rather than an external object and the multiple entailments associating this type of
force with effort in Chinese ideographs contradict the subjection and passive
victimization inherent to the English metaphorical construction.
In other words, the prototypical foundation of Ii [ fJ ] reflects a matrix of
associations that differs substantially from that elicited by the English word
"power". This makes it evident that, despite conventional translations, neither
Chinese nor English has a word that fully communicates the meaning of the other's
concept. The same inter-cultural dissonance almost certainly exists between French
and English, the official languages of law in Canada, and it must be even more
pronounced with regard to Indigneous languages such as Mi'kmaq, which ignore
material manifestations to focus on energy transformations.
When the deeply embedded nature of the paradigmatic schema that structure
language is taken into account, it becomes apparent that switching languages
involves switching conceptual frameworks. As explained by Wilhelm von Humbolt
in the 1830's:
"The variety of languages is not merely a variety of
sounds and signs, but in fact a variety of world-
views".3°1
The capacity to employ alternative modes of thought tends to enhance both
the volume of memory and the ability to think quickly. High functioning
multilinguals accordingly perform better than comparable monolinguals on tests
300 Ibid. at 144; A Pocket Chinese English Dictionary, (Hong Kong: ~ i-t'JifJ '
1978) 52.
301 J.M. Coetzee, "Newton and the Ideal of a Transparent Scientific Language" (1982) 11.1 1.
Literary Semantics, 3.
102
measuring over-all "intelligence" as well as creativity, divergent thinking, cognitive
flexibility and tolerance.3°2 However, the way in which additional languages are
taught is crucial. Children achieve high levels of literacy most quickly when the
mother tongue is the medium of education and new languages are introduced in an
additive fashion once the initial conceptual framework has become firmly
established. Despite the success of French immersion programs in some places,
attempts to provide primary education in a foreign language that is not spoken in the
home environment have been correlated with illiteracy and an incapacity to
communicate in either language. This, in turn, has been correlated with low
achievement, high dropout rates, high unemployment, high rates of imprisonment
and even suicide.3°3
Since it may take as little as one generation of externally imposed schooling
to extinguish a language, linguists like Skutnabb-Kangas have described English
and other homogenizing tongues act as "killer languages".304 Globalizing trends
have threatened a great number of languages with extinction including many
Indigenous languages in Canada.
2.2.4.2 Linguistic Knowledge Reservoirs
As the evidence provided by various areas of cognitive research suggests, the
death of a language represents the death of a conceptual system along with the
corresponding loss of all of the information that is embedded in its structure.
302 Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, "Language Policies and Education: The Role of Education in Destroying
or Supporting the World's Linguistic Diversity" (Barcelona: World Congress on Language Policies,
16 - 20 April, 2002 http://linguapax, prg/congres/plenaries/skutnabb.html) s.6.4 at. 19.
303 Ibid. at 12.
304 Ibid.
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Skutnabb-Kangas, for example, has reported that Finnish biologists were recently
surprised to discover that salmon use what appeared to be impossibly small rivulets
for spawning. Yet, this information was already known to the Indigenous Saami,
whose names for the rivulets often include the Saami word for "salmon spawning
bed".305 Languages thus serve, not only as systems of communications, but also as
repositories for cultural knowledge that has accumulated through countless
generations. Because of this, linguists and educators concerned with the lives of
minorities have linked the right to self-determination with linguistic rights.306
2.2. 5 Paradigms and Critical Skills
The importance of the frameworks used to structure our intellectual
processes has been emphasized from a different perspective by those charged
with teaching critical thinking at the university level. Just as transition from a
command model of legality to one based on human equality is core to the
decolonization process, so too an ability to shift from one paradigm to another is
crucial for advanced scientific research.30? This need for a critical awareness of
the use and availability of multiple paradigms has led science educators like
Craig E. Nelson to examine how expert reasoning capacity develops in
university students. Research in this field has led to the identification of several
stages of development.
305 Ibid. at 17.
306 See ego Margaret J. Maaka, "E Kua te Manuka Tutahi: Decolonization, Self-Determination, and
Education" (2004) 37.1 Educational Perspectives, 3; K. Laiana Wong, "He Hawa'e Kai Nui a Kau
rna Kula" (2004) 37.1 Educational Perspectives, 31.
307 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 174; Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous
Things at 306.
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2.2.5.1 The Primary System of Categorization
Primary education tends to emphasize rigid categorization because people
use sets of shared categories and metaphors to communicate and develop their
thoughts. At the novice level, the answers on spelling and basic math tests are
marked correct or incorrect and students are conditioned to reject uncertainty. As a
consequence, a substantial majority of Americans enter college with a simple
"dualistic" view of knowledge that prevents them from understanding complex
moral and intellectual issues.308 They are good at memorization, but tend to view the
world as if everything is either right or wrong. This blinds them to the tentative
nature of all knowledge, as well as to the complexity of reality which allows
multiple interpretations of the same data. It is an approach that corresponds to
"Black letter law".
2.2.5.2 Blind Faith in Authority or "Bullshit"
Once students learn that uncertainty exists, most continue to rely on
authority to provide "correct answers". Those who reach beyond simple obedience
may understand that various theories may be used to resolve areas of uncertainty;
however, they frequently assume that the choice is a matter of taste that may be
made on the basis of feeling or intuition rather than reasoned analysis.309 By the
graduate university level, students are expected to be able to apply the analytical
criteria that govern their particular discipline. However, many compartmentalize
their thought processes, thinking of what they are doing as "bullshit", particularly
308 Craig E. Nelson, "On the Persistence of Unicorns: The Trade-off between Content and Critical
Thinking Revisited" in B. Pescosolido and R. Aminzade eds. Social Worlds of Higher Education:
Handbook for Teaching in a New Century (Thousand Oaks, California: New Forge Press, 1999) 168
at 169.
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when they have not found a way to rationally integrate their discipline's models of
thought with their own personal belief systems.310
2.2.5.3 Reasoned Value-Based Choice
It is only when students have integrated an understanding of their own values
with those governing the field they are studying that they are able to take
responsibility for the perspectives they develop and deal with the extent to which
knowledge is constructed. 311 Judicial reasoning that follows this "expert" model is
able to integrate social values with the legal rules that can be found in legislation
and precedents..
2.2.5.4 Regression under Stress
People in general attempt to preserve cognitive consistency by resisting
change in their basic conceptual frameworks.312 Students accordingly tend to retreat
to earlier modes of reasoning when overwhelmed.313 Just as learners of a new
language slip into translating new words into their mother tongue, so too people
challenged with novel information attempt to fit it into their existing mental schema,
following the same patterns of thought that govern tht: practices of "normal science"
identified by Kuhn. When this attempt fails, there is a tendency to
309 Graduates of four year programs typically reflect this pattern. ibid at 171.
310 Nelson, "On the Persistence of Unicorns" at 177. This is read as interpreted in light of a number
of works based on Kuhn's theory including Lakoff, Johnson, Metaphors We Live By; Lakoff,
Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, Lakoff, Johnson; Winter, A Clearing in the Forest and "Death
is the Mother of Metaphor".
3ll Nelson, "On the Persistence of Unicorns" at 177.
312 John B. Mitchell, "Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking: A Full Faculty Considers the
Implications for Legal Education", (1989) 391. Legal Ed 275 at 287 n.30.
313 Nelson, "On the Persistence ofUnicorns", 177.
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compartmentalize incompatible evidence314, a practice that serves to protect people
from the mental chaos involved in changing the fundamental paradigms they use.
2.2.6 The Consequences of Cognitive Idiosyncrasies
The research in all of these related fields confirms that the maze created by
our initial cognitive patterning is deceptively difficult to escape. It governs our
ability to see and to know with such force that even those subjected to negative
stereotyping may adopt it. As put by Patricia Williams, "blacks are conditioned
from infancy to see in themselves only what others who despise them see.,,315 This
may affect task performance. It has thus been demonstrated that the mere mention
that a math test has been designed to be "gender neutral" can lower scores for men
and raise them for women. Similarly, American males identified as being "white"
perform better on basketball skills presented as a test of strategy, while those
identified as "Negro" perform better when the same tests are said to measure
"natural ability".316
Because of the profoundly pervasive effect of socially entrenched conceptual
frameworks, those who are not prototypical members of a culture find the task of
proving their experience to those who are very daunting indeed. When the
University ofMiami Law Review published William's story of being excluded from
a trendy shop on the basis of race, the reality of her experience was questioned by
law students, and even by prominent jurists who had not encountered what is, for
some people in North America, a relatively common phenomenon. Despite decades
314 Mitchell, "Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking".
315 Williams, "Spirit-Murdering the Messenger", 141.
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of law reform and desegregation initiatives, bad service, public humiliation and
legal harassment remain endemic for American citizens who are identified in
negative racial terms. Even celebrities like Oprah Winfrey may find themselves
standing outside by their limousines when exclusive shops refuse to allow them
entry.317 Stereotypes - or the prototypes that unconsciously govern the conceptual
categories we use - result in poor "reality testing". As Williams described it, they act
as a "powerful hallucinogen,,318 for, as Lawrence pointed out, they lead people of
normal intelligence to reject what they experience as real.319 Since this characteristic
arises from neurological function itself, it is inescapable and must be taken into
account if the ideal of human equality is to be achieved.
2.2.7 Summary
An accumulation of linguistic and behavioral evidence supports Kuhn's theory
concerning the importance of cognitive patterning, undermining the belief that any
individual can function in a way that is fundamentally neutral. As Lakoff and
Johnson have found, "we are not outside reality, we are part of it" and our
conceptual schemes shape the way we understand the world.32o Each of us, no
matter what our social position, functions according to our own idiosyncratic set of
paradigmatic assumptions and embodied metaphors. Some, like up and down or
colour perception, are based on common experience in the physical world. Some,
like the linguistic systems we use to express our thoughts or philosophical
316 Claude M. Steele, Thin Ice: "Stereotype Threat" and Black college Students (Atlantic Unbound,
August, 1999 http://www.theatlantic.com (accessed 6 June, 2001).
317 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 135.
318 Williams, "Spirit-Murdering the Messenger".
319 Lawrence, "Unconscious Racism" at 332.
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assumptions, are culturally defined. Others, including personal preferences,
expectations and responses may be highly idiosyncratic, varying according to
individual experience. The shift from a command theory of law to one based on
human equality must necessarily engage us, consciously or unconsciously, on all of
these levels.
The work of the cognitive theorists is useful to this study because it provides an
explanation for the conservative phenomena that Kuhn observed as part of the
process of paradigm change. It explains why the words and languages used in
judicial reasoning can serve as indicia of colonial and post colonial modes of
thought. It also describes both novice and expert patterns of thought and predicts
the responses that may be expected in the face of any challenge to an accepted
orthodoxy.
*********************************************************************
According to the embodied theory of human cognition:
-Human reasoning is inescapably paradigmatic in character.
- Understanding is physiologically embedded in multi-sensory neural
circuitry
- We reason using metaphors that function sub-consciously.
-The English language uses a container metaphor to structure knowledge.
-Knowledge is actually metaphorically structured around prototypes that:
-vary from one person, language and culture to the next
-define what we can perceive and
-influence beliefs and expectations.
*********************************************************************
320 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 261-263.
3.
COLONIAL and POSTCOLONIAL PARADIGMS
"After the fact, historians may look back upon a
season when a thousand lives, a hundred thousand
lives, moved in unison; but in the beginning there are
really only individuals, acting in isolation and
uncertainty, out of necessity or idealism, unaware that
h 1·· h h h,,32\t eyare Ivmg t roug an epoc .
Melissa Fay Greene
Praying for Sheetrock
Before it is possible to assess the extent to which Canada's Supreme Court
has decolonized its functions, the values and practices associated both with the
initial colonial paradigm and with its emerging replacement must be identified.
This chapter summarizes some of the academic commentary concerning the colonial
phenomenon that is available in Canadian university libraries. It then reviews the
concept of "decolonization" that emerged in international law before defining the
concept of "postcolonialism". By this means, indicia of the "colonial" and
"postcolonial" operational models have been identified, making it possible to assess
the character of both individual and collective social practices.
321 Melissa Fay Greene, Praying for Sheetrock (Reading Mass.: Addison-Welsley Publishing
Company, 1991) at ix.
110
3.1 Colonialism
"The violence which has ruled over the ordering of the
colonial world, ...has ceaselessly drummed the rhythm
of the destruction of native social forms and broken up
without reserve the systems of reference of the
economy, the customs of dress and external life ... ,,322
Franz Fannon,
The Wretched of the Earth
Experts on colonialism have described it as a phenomenon of "colossal
vagueness,,323 yet, however it is ultimately defined, its pedigree is long and well
documented. Colonialism is ultimately a dynamic that seems to emanate from
tensions over who should manage and benefit from limited resources. Ania Loomba
defined it as "the conquest and control of other people's lands and goods".324 In this
sense, evidence of colonial behaviour can be found in the historical record of
cultures in all parts of the world dating to the most ancient times. Some of its
elements can be seen in China's Spring and Autumn Annals which record events in
the State of Lu in the pre-Confucian era325 or in the biblical story of the Egyptian
322 Franz Fanon, Constance Farrington trans. The Wretched of the Earth, (New York: Grove Press,
1963) at 40.
323 W. Reinhard, "History of Colonization and Colonialism" in Neil J. Smelser, Paul B. Baltes eds.
International Encyclopedia ofthe Social and Behavioural Sciences (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001) vol
4. 2240. See also Ronald J. Horvath "A Definition of Colonialiam"(1992) 13.1 Current
Anthropology 45.
324 Wanda D. McCaslin, "Introduction: Naming Realities of Life" in Justice as Healing: Indigenous
Ways (St. Paul, Minnesota: Living Justice Press, 2005) citing John Boersig "Indigenous Youth and
the Criminal Justice System", Justice as Healing (2003) 8:2, 8, n.8 quoting Ania Loomba,
ColonialismlPostcolonialism (London: Routledge, 1998 at 2.
325 For China, see ego Spring and Autumn Annals in James Legge trans. The Chinese Classics,
(Shanghai: reprinted from the last editions of the Oxford University Press, 1935) ;
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pharoh's subjugation ofIsraeli famine refugees.326 Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of
the Navaho Nation, has described colonialism as "a triangle of power in which the
people at the top claim to have the right to control the people at the bottom".327 In
Europe, colonialism can be traced to the Greek and Roman practice of extending
their societies by establishing settlements far from home.328 England itself was once
colonised by Rome, and so colonial practices are entwined with the emergence of
literacy in the culture whose customs form the basis of Canada's legal system.
3.1.1 English Colonialism as a Law of Nature
Colonial patterns of thought and behaviour have been so prevalent for so
long that many believe they are part of the natural order of things. They have been
advocated and eulogized in countless literary works. Geoffrey of Monmouth's
History ofthe Kings ofEngland, which appeared about 1136, claimed, for example,
that Britain was founded by Brutus, the leader of a party of Trojans who settled on
the island of Albion and drove off a race of indigenous giants.329 The tale is pure
fantasy. Even at the time it was written, it was scorned by the Welsh historian
Giraldus Cambrensis. Yet it became profoundly influential. Despite the lack of
corroborating evidence for its version of "history", Monmouth's glorification of
brutality was popularly accepted as "the truth" until the beginning of England's
326 Monser, The Cross-Reference Bible at Genesis 12 :10, 41- 50, Exodus 1.
327 Robert Yazzie, "Indigenous Peoples and Postcolonial Colonialism" in Battiste, Reclaiming
Indigenous Voice and Vision, 39 at 43.
328 R. Hodder-Williams, "Colonialism: Political Aspects" in Neil 1. Smelser, Paul B. Baltes eds.
International Encyclopedia ofthe Social and Behavioural Sciences (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001) vol
4.2237 at 2239.
329 Geoffrey of Monmouth, Lewis Thorpe trans., The History of the Kings of England (London:
Penguin, 1966) Pt. 1.
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drive to establish colonies overseas.330 It remains widely known to this day because
of its inclusion in college courses on European literature.
During the colonial age, the most members of the English ruling class seem
to have accepted the morality of Monmouth's characters as readily as the veracity of
his apocryphal tale. Colonialism was openly promoted by the influential humanist,
Thomas More (1478-1535).331 His Utopia (1515), which was greatly admired by
King Henry VIII, proposed that whenever over-population developed in his ideal
society, a general emigration should be decreed. The citizens should establish a new
settlement on the closest uncultivated land they found, bringing the laws of the
mother country with them. If the people who lived there accepted the colonist's
imported institutions they would be assimilated. If not, they should be chased away
by force of arms.
Thomas More considered such behaviour a right according to the law of
nature.332 The prototypical experience that shaped his thought is apparent in
English history for his country had been subjected to successive colonizations.
William the Conqueror's invasion of 1066 is frequently considered to be the
foundation of England's legal system333; but the vocabulary of "colonization" comes
from the Romans, who gave the name colonia to settlements of retired soldiers.
330 Hugh A. MacDougall, Racial Myth in English History: Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons
(Montreal: Harvest House, 1982) ch.l.
331 Marcelle Bottigelli-Tisserand, "Introduction" in Thomas More, Victor Stouvenel trans. L 'utopie
(Paris: Editions sociales, 1974) at 12.
332 More, L 'utopie, ibid at 131.
333 See ego J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworth,
1979); Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law,2nd ed.
(Cambridge University Press, 1895); Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought. By
contrast, the Normans might also be seen as part of a series of diverse invasions. See ego Kent
McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 1.
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Roman occupation of Britania, whose chief city was officially known as the
Colonia Claudia Victricensis, lasted from 55 B.C. to 410 AD.334 Anglo-Saxon
invasions followed, and the Norman conquest replaced Anglo-Saxon landlords with
yet another foreign aristocracy that imposed its own form of government just as
More suggested the Utopians should impose their laws in the colonies they founded.
It can hardly be considered a coincidence then, that the same pattern of behaviour
was replicated during England's expansion overseas, which began with the
colonization of Ireland and led eventually to the dispersion of Anglo-European
culture around the globe.335
3.1.1.1 Trans-Atlantic Colonization
According to the evidence submitted to the Privy Council in St. Catherine's
Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen336, England's claim to the land now
known as "Canada" began with a quest for wealth and territorial dominion. More's
Utopia appeared at the dawn of Europe's consciousness of a larger world. On
March 5th, 1496, Henry VII had granted the Cabotspermission to leave with five
ships to explore parts:
"which have hitherto been unknown to all Christian
people to possess and occupy all the aforesaid
towns, castles, cities, and islands, by them discovered,
which by right may be subjugated and occupied, as our
vassals, and their governors, lieutenants, and deputies,
they obtaining for us the dominion, title, and
334 Anthony Thwaite, Beyond the Inhabited World: Roman Britain (London: Andre Deutsch
Limited, 1976) at 22.
335 See ego Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought.
336 Evidence submitted to the Privy Council in St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber CO. V. the Queen
on Information ofthe Attorney General ofOntario H.L. Vol. XVI 46 J.C. (1889) V.B.C. Law Library
KG42 P748 1888 No.69.
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jurisdiction of the said towns, castles, cities, and
islands and continents so discovered.,,337
His motivation appears to have been commercial for he claimed a fifth of the
anticipated gains.
Like More's Utopia and subsequent European rationalizations for colonial
behaviour, the plunder envisaged was justified on the grounds that the usurpers were
culturally superior. This seems to have been an extension of notions of social class
that prevailed in England, where land "ownership" was the traditional source of
wealth. Humphrey Gilbert and his half-brother Walter Raleigh, like several other
participants in colonization, were younger sons of the gentry in a society that
generally passed landed estates undivided to eldest sons. Participation in overseas
military ventures, be it in Ireland, America or on the continent of Europe, was a
means of gaining the resources required to maintain the standard of living they had
been raised to expect. Gilbert's oldest brother succeeded to his father's estates in
Devon. Raleigh's father had made his money through piracy and privateering,
which seem to have been culturally condoned at the time. As well as following in
his father's footsteps, Raleigh educated himself at Oxford and received legal
training at the Middle Temple. Relying on patents that followed the template of the
Cabot Charter, Raleigh and Gilbert sold about twenty million acres of land in
America that they had never seen.338 Thus, according to the laws of England,
physical presence was not required to begin the colonial process.
337. Ibid. at 25 citing Chalmers' Political Annals, Bk.I, 7-8.
338 David Beers Quinn, Set Fair for Roanoke: Voyages and Colonies, 1584-1606 (Chapel Hill:
University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1985) at 1 - 8.
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3.1.2 Colonial Ethnocentrism
The ethnocentric perspective underlying colonial behaviour has been widely
commented upon by those subjected to foreign control and its characteristics are
well known.
3.1.2.1 Differentiation of the Colonized
Franz Fanon and Edward Said both identified the differentiation of the
colonized as one of the requirements.339 As Said pointed out, the classification of
"natives" as an exotically inferior "other" was an essential part of the process used
to justify cultural domination.34o In recent years, much research has corroborated
this observation, charting the process through which de-humanization and racism
became legally institutionalized during the colonial age.341 The relegation of
invaded peoples to a different, sub-human status can already be seen in the Cabot
charter's validation of assaults on non-Christian peoples. This process continued
through the colonial era through a variety of mechanisms, many of which implicated
co-opted Indigenous individuals.342
3.1.2.2 Projection of Anglo-European Cultural Norms
Those who co-operated with the colonization process were often represented
as "chiefs" whose consent validated colonial encroachment when European
concepts of social order were projected onto the society that was being subjugated.
339 Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth at 37 et seq.
340 Edward Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered" (1985) 1 Cultural Critique 89; Culture and
Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).
341 See ego MacDougall, Racial Myth in English History; Theodore W. Allen, The Invention of the
White Race v.l Racial Oppression and Social Control (London: Verso, 1994).
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For example, in 1621 when prospective colonists asked "what right have I to go live
in the heathen's country", Robert Cushman, an agent for the Pilgrim Fathers,
invoked feudal concepts to claim that "the imperial Governor Massasoit", who had
"many other kings" under him, "hath acknowledged the King's Majesty of England
to be his master and commander".343 With no Indigenous witnesses available to
challenge the validity of his assumptions or to explain their concepts of social order,
Cushman's presentation may well have sounded credible. The rationale used to
justify British assertions of sovereignty changed little in the centuries to come, yet
discrepancies between what the colonists thought they were purchasing and what
Indigenous peoples thought they were selling have remained a recurrent problem.344
As Eve Darian-Smith observed, "Law, in a variety of ways, was the formal
mechanism and institutional frame through which colonial governments oppressed
and controlled indigenous peoples.,,345 Yet, in the colonial context "law" was not
applied with the rigour ideally required by domestic courts. Differences between
British and Anglo-colonial legality remain under-explored and historians are just
beginning to examine the mysteries surrounding the impact of contact on both
Indigenous and European societies. As the Cushman example suggests, one of the
342 Albert Memrni, Howard Greenfield trans., The colonizer and the colonized (New York: Orion
Press, 1965) Portrait du Colonise precede du Portrait du Colonisateur.
343 St. Catherine's Milling evidence: Robert Cushman, "Reasons and considerations Touching the
Lawfulness of Removing Out of England into the Parts of America - The Rights to Live in the
heathen's Country, - 1621" citing Youngs Chronicles ofPlymouth 239-242.
344 See ego Cronon, Changes in the Land at 70 et seq.; Sharon Venne, "Understanding Treaty 6: An
Indigenous Perspective" in Michael Asch, ed. Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on
Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference" (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 1997), 176; Walter
Hildebrandt, Dorothy First Rider, Sarah Carter, The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996).
345 E. Darian-Smith "Postcolonial Law" in Neil J. Smelser, Paul B. Baltes eds. International
Encyclopedia ofthe Social and Behavioural Sciences (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001) vol 17,11844.
117
features of this difference is that elements usually required to ensure credibility and
legal validity were often conspicuously missing. In this instance there was no "audi
alteram partem" and no verification of the claim that Massasoit actually was the
"Imperial Governor" Cushman claimed he was.346
3.1.2.3 Presumptions of Entitlement
The massive depopulation of North America by the diseases introduced at
first contact made it easy for Europeans to justify taking land that had previously
been under Indigenous cultivation.347 However, once the diseases had run their
course, a paradigm that assumed Indigenous peoples were primitive, uncivilized or
otherwise less than fully human supported the immigrant perception that the
Indigenous land they coveted was essentially terra nullius, belonging to no one. It
can, for example, hardly be considered a coincidence that the vast appropriations of
what was to become western Canada were preceded by the 1876 Indian Act with its
exclusion of "Indians" from the legal definition of a "person". Harold Cardinal has
pointed out that the Indian Act was neither mentioned nor explained to the signers of
the numbered treaties.348 These treaties are still relied upon to found Canadian
sovereignty. Though they are now recognized as being "sui generis,,349, there is
increasing discomfort concerning the circumstances of their creation. In academic
circles, at least, questions are being raised concerning whether it is legally and
346 There is certainly evidence to suggest that Indigenous concepts of government differed
substantially from those of the colonists who were accustomed to a command model. For a
discussion of how "Chiefs" among the Mi'kmaq were probably consensually chosen representatives
of their communities see ego Willian C. Wicken Mi 'kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land, and
Donald Marshall Junior (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) at 43.
347 Cronon, Changes in the Land at 90.
348 Goodwill, Sluman, John Tootoosis at 19.
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socially acceptable to appropriate the resources used by Indigenous peoples in
exchange for a handful of shoddy supplies at a time when they were suffering from
extreme duress caused by the major beneficiary ofthe treaty.350
3.1.2.4 Ignoring Indigenous Perspectives
The emergence of such issues reflects the fact that until very recently,
Indigenous perspectives on colonial relations were routinely ignored, along with
most of the established protocols normally associated with maintaining international
respect.351 Brian Slattery, among others, has pointed out that colonial courts
presented Europeans as if they were the only actors, functioning as if the original
inhabitants of the land lived in a juridical vacuum during the pre-contact era.352 His
own writing follows this tradition by maintaining an internal Anglo-Canadian
perspective that leaves aside both Indigenous and international frames of reference.
Legal analysis on this model replicates the way colonial history was
written.353 Indigenous knowledge was rendered invisible. New names were imposed
on places, plants and animals and even when garbled versions of Indigenous names
were maintained, their meanings were lost. Most Canadians, for example, do not
know the meaning of the names for provinces like "Ontario", "Saskatchewan" and
349 Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387.
350 See ego Dean Neu, Richard Therrien, Accounting for Genocide: Canada's Bureaucratic Assault
on Aboriginal People (London: Zed Books, 2003).
351 See ego Venne, Our Elders Understand Our Rights; Hildebrandt, First Rider, Carter, The True
Spirit and Original Intent ofTreaty 7..
352 Brian Slattery, "The Organic Constitution:Aboriginal Peoples and the Evolution of Canada"
(1995) 34.1 Osgoode Hall L. J. 101 at 104 and 105.
353 For an account of changing perspectives in Canadian historical writing with regard to "Indians"
see Trigger, Natives and Newcomers; "Indian and White History: Two Worlds or One?" c.1 in
Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi, Marianne Mithun eds. Extending the Rafters: Interdisciplinary
Approaches to Iroquoian Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984.).
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"Manitoba". Though images of Indigenous people were habitually incorporated for
decorative effect in paintings and photographs, they were treated like exotic flora
and fauna. Their own names and ways of knowing the world were ignored and,
because the Indigenous peoples were excluded from most discussions, the
colonizers were rarely even conscious of the ways in which they organized
information to support their in-migration. This ignorance made the "mask of
legality,,354 appear impenetrable from their internal cultural perspective.
3.1.3 The Legality of Command
As Purdy has pointed out, the perception of both colonial and indigenous law
differed depending on where one sat in relation to the colonial divide.355
Colonizers, who frequently deemed native populations to be less than human,
claiming they possessed no law at all.356 Indigenous peoples, by contrast, tended to
assume that regulatory schemes imported by foreigners had no validity what so ever
when unilaterally applied to them.357 Yet, the colonizers utimately used force to
impose their concept of legality.358
354 Darian-Smith, "Postcolonial Law"; Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies at 86-7; Greg Sarris,
Keeping Slug Woman Alive: A Holistic Approach to American Indian Texts (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993) at 129.
355 Jeannine Purdy, "Postcolonialism: The Emperor's New Clothes?" (1996) 5(3) Social and Legal
Studies 405-6.
356 Darian-Smith, "Postcolonial Law".
357 See ego the Haudenosuanee arguments in Woo, "Canada's Forgotten Founders".
358 This is an essentialized perspective. There were many individuals who did not follow this pattern
and there have been periods of inter-cultural co-operation. See ego Morin, L 'Usurpation de la
souverainete autochtone or White, The Middle Ground. However, the department of Indian Affairs
be~an as a military endeavour and the British offered rewards for killing Mi'kmaq before the mid-
18 century treaties. See R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 at [3].
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3.1.3.1 Military Force
The colonial age was an age of war which saw great advances in the
technology of weaponry as European battles for supremacy spread all around the
world. The same ethos governed relations with those who were being colonized.
The use of force, as seen in the repression of the Ghost Dancers359 or in the creation of
the "Oka Crisis", reflected entrenched patterns of behaviour. The extension of
European colonialism was marked by an endless succession of violent incidents
ranging from "Bacon's Rebellion" in 1676 involving the revolt of African and
European slaves and indentured servants in Virginia36o, to the opening of Japanese
ports at gun point by the United States in the mid 1800's, to the Taiping and Boxer
"rebellions" in China and the opium war that erupted when British and American
traders objected to China's attempt to stop their illegal importation of narcotics.361 As
Franz Fannon later observed, the use of force by the colonizers to resolve
conceptual disagreements was habitual and "Police stations, as sites of legal
violence were regarded as crucial to the maintenance of the divided world of the
colonial regime.,,362
3.1.3.2 Collaborators
Assertion of the colonial paradigm did not rely exclusively on externally
imposed legal regulation and superior weaponry. It was also imposed through
rewards and punishments. Whether native or immigrant, participants in the
359 Wallace "Introduction" in Mooney, Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of1890 at viii.
360 Allen, Invention ofthe White Race at 17.
361 See any standard history of Asia. ego Li, Ageless Chinese; Reinhard, "History of Colonization
and Colonialism", 2241. Extensive discussions concerning the violence of colonialism are also
included in Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth..
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colonizing project benefited from loyalty and obedience.363 Like the Roman
colonization to which it had been subjected, Britain's world-wide colonial enterprise
involved participants from all parts of the empire. Though the British made political
alliances with Indigenous nations like the Iroquois, they also incorporated
Indigenous individuals in their colonizing ventures. There were Muslim soldiers in
the Kashmir Infant~64 and Mohawk and Ojibway oarsmen on the Nile365 just as the
Romans before them had invaded using legions from France, Germany, Hungary,
Holland and later Spain, Morocco, Rumania and Syria.366 Modern historians, like
Bailyn and Colley, have accordingly begun to investigate the social pressures that
induced the colonizers to leave home.367
Soldiers, missionaries and others who adopted social roles that promoted
imperial endeavours were granted material rewards and high social status. Those
who did not could find their very survival in jeopardy. As a consequence,
individuals from both sides of the colonial divide contributed to the ideological re-
ordering that accompanied colonization. Constrained to internalize other peoples'
ideas about themselves, the colonized struggled to beat the invaders at their own
game by adopting self-definitions that fit a foreign vision of the world. In Canada,
this phenomenon has been commented upon by Indigenous and Quebecois critics
362 Purdy, "Postcolonialism", referring in part to Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth..
363 Ibid. at 405-6.
364 Raleigh Trevelyan, The Golden Oriole: Childhood, Family and Friends in India
(Oxford University Press, 1988) at 42.
365 Veterans Affairs Canada, "Native Soldiers - Foreign Battlefields" http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca
(7/12/2006).
366 Thwaite, Beyond the Inhabited World at 32.
367 See ego Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling of British North America: An Introduction (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1986); Colley, Captives.
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alike.368 Indeed, as a representative of a conquered people, Sir Wilfrid Laurier's
previously mentioned support for the British imperial project provides a ready
illustration of this aspect of the colonial phenomenon.369
3.1.4 Ideological Reordering
A key element in the colonization process was the conceptual re-ordering
that accompanied the imposition of alien values. Foreign frames of reference
restructured social knowledge to fit the immigrants' needs and expectations.
Indigenous traditions were ignored as resources were appropriated. Places were
renamed and history was rewritten.370 As described by Margaret J. Maaka:
"The oppression of our indigenous peoples, ... involved
the stripping away of the fundamental markers of our
identities - sovereignty, ancestral lands, language, and
cultural knowledge.,,371
The violent and oppressive nature of inter-cultural encounters under the colonial
ethos was disguised or left out of official accounts of history. Indigenous struggles
to maintain autonomy were called "rebellions", making the victims, rather than the
invaders, appear to be the source of social disruption. Public spokesmen fell into
the habit of referring to the world as if the original inhabitants of the land had never
existed or become extinct. Though the presence of the Indigenous peoples at the
time of "discovery" is often mentioned, the details of their struggles against
368 See ego Pierre Vallieres, Negres blancs d'Amerique (Quebec: editions parti pris, 1967) or Howard
Adams, A Tortured People: The Politics ofColonization (Penticton, B.C. : Theytus Books, 1995) - a
key reference used by the Canadian Commission on Race Relations, http://www.crr.com.
369 Skelton, The Life and Letters ofSir Wilfrid Laurier at 321.
370 See ego Cronon, Changes in the Land at 90.
371 Maaka, "DecoIonization, Self-Determination, and Education" at 3.
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colonization are typically ignored in official accounts of history, especially in places
where the colonizers became the majority.372
3.1.4.1 A Two Edged Sword
This denial of the real expenence of the colonized cuts both ways. It
prevents the victims of colonization, who have often lost their original languages,
from articulating their perceptions. This leads to confusion and low self-esteem. It
also inhibits the development of respectful behaviour among the colonizers,
breeding ignorance and insensitivity. The oppression endured by Indigenous
children who were presumed to be inherently backwards, who were prevented from
using the languages of their parents and who were taught not to articulate their
thoughts and feelings has erupted in addictions and abusive social relations leading
some to suggest that it was the colonized themselves who completed the task the
colonizers had begun.373
As a consequence of this dynamic, those struggling to survive on the
privileged side of the conceptual divide created by colonialism, prove all too ready
to blame the colonized for the profound economic, social and emotional problems
they have had to contend with. This has led Albert Memmi to describe colonialism
as a variety of fascism where "human relationships have arisen from the severest
372 Note ego Hubert Gendron and Gordon Henderson, Canada, A People's History
(http://history.cbc.ca/histicons/)orseeeg.Brian Maddock ed., History and Citizenship Education
(Beaconsfield, Quebec: 2004) currently in use for Grade 7 students in the English Montreal School
Board. For a Mohawk view of some of the same history see David Blanchard, Seven Generations: A
History ofthe Kanienkehaka (Centre for Curriculum Development, Kanawake Survival School,
Kanawake, 1980). Re. changes in historical perspectives see Trigger, Natives and Newcomers..
373 Sarris, Keeping Slug Woman Alive at 132-6 and 43.
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exploitation, founded on inequality and contempt, guaranteed by police
authoritarianism. ,,374
3.1.4.2 Conceptual Blindness
As demonstrated by the experiment with black hearts and red spades
discussed by Kuhn, it is difficult for people to assimilate information that does not
fit the idealized cognitive models already established in their minds. Like the
participants in that research, participants in colonial ventures often failed to note the
cruelty of their own actions or of the state policies they supported, even when
evidence was plainly before their eyes. Thus inquiries into Wounded Knee in the
1890's and the Oka Crisis in the 1990's left fundamental issues concerning social
order buried in the debris. The focus was on who shot first, leaving the institutional
deficit that led to the use of armed force in the first place unnoticed and
unexamined.
As many have noted, colonialism presumes the right to define what
legitimate knowledge is. In so doing, it edits perception and defines what can be
seen. When colonialism has taken root, even the colonized have difficulty
understanding the world in any other way for, as the Maori scholar Linda Tuhiwai
Smith has pointed out, colonial practices fragmented and alienated the Indigenous
cultural heritage, tearing apart and destroying "the material connection between
people, their place, their languages, their beliefs and their practices." 375
The capacity of colonialism to dominate human perception explains why
many scholars in respected universities have dismissed the complaints of the
374 Memmi, The colonizer and the colonized at 62.
125
colonized without making any serious attempt to understand them. Colonialism has,
for example, been described as "a general invective against western policy,
especially since the 1955 Bandung conference of recently decolonized Asian
countries".376 Even critics of colonialism tend to think they have found something
new. Yet, the archives kept by the colonizing cultures themselves record
innumerable instances of much earlier protest suggesting that the colonized have
struggled to uphold their own social norms from the time of first contact.377 Non-
European literature, commentary and historical records corroborate the fact that
resentment of the colonial enterprise has always run deep.
The catalogue of anti-colonial protests is impossibly long and the ways in
which particular incidents have been represented in historical records is highly
political. Reflecting the tendency Kuhn noted to re-write history in terms of the
prevailing paradigm, the victors generally omit references to the human rights
abuses they themselves committed, showing little inclination to conduct critical
evaluations of such phenomena as state sanctioned plunder, murder, drug-dealing or
genocide. Yet, one party's "rebellion" remains another's attempt to prevent abuse
and the legitimacy of any action depends upon whose concept of law is adopted and
which evidence is considered. If the people involved had consented to colonial rule,
violence would never have erupted in the first place. Indeed, the nature of the
violence involved in the colonial process is worth considering for those who have
375 Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies at 89.
376 Reinhard, "History of Colonization and Colonialism" at2240. See also Hodder-Williams,
"Colonialism" at 2237.
377 In the American context, see ego Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians,
Colonialism, and the Cant ofConquest (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975); Goodwill, Sluman, John
Tootoosis.
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succeeded at dominating have controlled the characterization of the historical record
and they have almost invariably been the most heavily armed. As Smith has noted
with regard to Maori subjugation in New Zealand, even the most passive resistance
has been classed as "war" or "rebellion" so as to justify military intervention and
other oppressive state measures.378
3.1.5 Questioning Colonialism
The twentieth century inclusion of non-European states in international fora
was not, in any sense, the beginning of anti-colonial sentiment. It merely focused
Euro-American attention on a discourse that was already well established among
those whose humanity or civilization had been discounted by those who coveted
their resources. Once the colonized were included in international discussions, it
became difficult to maintain the "othering" process that pretended they were child-
like creatures who needed to be spoken for. As described by Edward Said, the
nature of what they needed protection from became apparent and the usurpation of
their sovereignty and resources no longer seemed justifiable.379
3.1.5.1 Colonialism and Imperialism
Reflecting the sentiments of the colonized, Said pointed out that colonialism
is a product of imperialism which he defined as:
" ... an act of geographical violence through which
virtually every space in the world is explored, charted,
and finally brought under control.,,380
378 Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies at 91.
379 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993) at 226.
380 Ibid. at 9 and 225. Also cited by Jacobs. See also Reinhard, "History of Colonization and
Colonialism" at 2240.
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Historical writers have similarly described colonialism as being:
" ... the control of one people by another, culturally
different one, an unequal relationship which exploits
differences of economic, political and ideological
development between the two.,,381
On a practical level, the problems presented by colonialism vary according to
whether the colony in question is a trade or military base, an expansion of
settlement or a type of exploitation where temporarily sojourning profit seekers
collaborate with local entrepreneurs to appropriate resources for immediate gain,
benefiting only those privileged to participate.382
3.1.5.2 The Limits of Decolonization
As initially conceived early III the twentieth century, the process of
"decolonization" involved the withdrawal of imperial control over foreign
territories. This has been described as involving a dialectical process requiring an
independence movement, allies and willingness on the part of colonizers to let go -
a process that accelerated as the motives for territorial colonization disappeared and
administrative costs rose.383
However, territorial decolonization did not produce a break with Western
hegemony384 and hierarchical concepts of social order persisted. As the allocation
of wealth began to shift away from agriculture and resource-based economies, the
colonial powers retained the advantages they had gained through their
industrialization during the colonial age. There was, accordingly, no immediate
381 Reinhard, "History of Colonization and Colonialism" at 2240.
382 Ibid
383 Ibid
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leveling of the economic playing field which had become distorted during the
centuries of European exploration and conquest.
New states established during the twentieth century found themselves
constrained to use institutions and boundaries inherited from the colonizers who had
destroyed pre-colonial economic relations, social order, customs and law. Ironically
it seems to some that, as Eve Darian Smith points out:
"The very moment of self-determination by peoples
formerly colonized requires the adoption of European
knowledge such as notions of progress and
development, concepts of self and personhood, as well
as forms of government, state-building, and, perhaps
most important ofall, law,,385
Thus the ostensible decolonization of territories whose parameters had been defined
according to colonial politics did not, in and of itself, guarantee an escape from the
colonial dynamic. It required instead assimilation into the legal culture and social
paradigms of the colonizers.
3.1.5.3 Neo-colonialism
This phenomenon has contributed to the emergence of terms representing
other categories of colonialism. In the early 1960's, references to "neocolonialism"
gained currency as a means of describing a situation that already troubled many
people. At the 1955 Bandung Conference of non-aligned states, Indonesia's
president Sukamo pointed out that colonialism "has also its modem dress, in the
384 J.D. Kelly "Postcoloniality" in Neil J. Smelser, Paul B. Baltes eds. International Encyclopedia of
the Social and Behavioural Sciences (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001) vol 17,11844.
385 Darian-Smith, "Postcolonial Law".
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form of economic control, intellectual controL ..by a small but alien community
within a nation".386
As several commentators have noted, "independence" with laws and
regulatory institutions modeled after those used by the colonial states does not fully
repair the damage caused by colonization. W. Richard Jacobs has consequently
described the "neo-colony" as being:
"Independent by name, flying its own flag,
promulgating laws from its own Parliament, but
dependant in all material and metaphysical ways on
the umbilical cord which ties it to the metorpolitan
centre. The neo-colonial status, while it might in the
short run satisfy the ruling class, is a most debilitating,
humiliating and ultimately dehumanizing experience,
for it facilitates the sucking of the economic blood of
the neo-colony and the reciprocal fattening of the
metropole in full view of all ... ,,387
"Neocolonialism" is thus seen as economic reliance on former colonial powers
resulting from "structural dependency" created by the continuing importance of
institutions established during the colonial age.388
In this sense, organizations regulating international trade such as the
International Monetary Fund have come to be seen as tools of the American
dominated corporate imperialism that has typified the post World War II period.389
Some, like Purdy, have pointed to an externally imposed constitution as one indicia
386 Hodder-Williams, "Colonialism".
387 Purdy, "Postcolonialism", 407 citing W. Richard Jacobs, 'Societies in Crisis: Introduction' in S.
Craig ed. Contemporary Caribbean: A Sociological Reader,vol.2 (Trinidad and Tobago: S. Craig,
1982).
388 Reinhard, "History ofColonization and Colonialism" at 2240.
389 See ego Purdy, "Postcolonialism" at 406; Anne McClintock, "The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of
the Term "Post-Colonialism" 31/32 Social Text (1992) 84.
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of colonialism, while identifying economic domination as a fundamental element.390
Sakej Henderson has pointed out that:
"Eurocentric education forces Indigenous peoples to
live according to imposed Eurocentric scripts".391
To this day, as Rosemary J. Coombe has observed, Indigenous people are seldom
publicly heard and:
"Native peoples face a legal system that divides the
world up in a fashion both foreign and hostile to their
sense of felt need.,,392
This may be one of the reasons why Indigenous peoples have failed to be attracted
by egalitarian theorizing concerning their rights as "minorities" in states that were
established by colonial processes.393 In the words of Sharon Venne:
"The aim of Indigenous Peoples is not to be
assimilated into the state that has colonized and
dispossessed them".394
Korean scholar H. Cho summarized the effect ofbecoming "colonized" as "coming to
require foreign means, methods and tools simply to live and think".395 Maori theorist
Graham H. Smith agrees, characterizing the neo-liberal privitization of the New
390 Purdy, "Postcolonialism" at 409.
391 James (Sakej) Youngblood Henderson, "Postcolonial Indigenous Legal Consciousness" (2002) 1
Indigenous L. J. 1 at 16.
392 Rosemary J. Coombe, "The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native
Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy", (1993) 6:2 Can. J L. & Jur. 249 at 269.
393 See ego Richard Spaulding, "Peoples as National Minorities: A Review of Wi! Kymlicka's
Arguments for Aboriginal Rights from a Self-Determination Perspective", (1997) 47 UTL.J 35;
Thompson, The Rights ofIndigenous Peoples in International Law; Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and
the Canadian Charter"; Catherine Brolmann, Rene Lefeber, Marjoleine Zieck eds., Peoples and
Minorities in International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1992); A. Rigo Sureda, The
Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination: A study of United Nations Practice (Leiden: A.W.
Sijthoff, 1973).
394 Venne, Our Elders Understand Our Rights at 137.
395 Kelly, "Postcoloniality", 11848 citing H. Cho T'alsikminji Chisikin ui Kullikki wa Sami!kki,
[Reading Texts, Reading Life:The Point of View of a Post-Colonial Intellectua[j 3 vols. (Seoul:
Ttohaniuimunhwa Press, 1992-4).
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Zealand economy SInce the 1980's as a reformation of colonization because it
marginalized the concept of collective responsibility that is central to Indigenous
values.396 Recent attempts to patent Indigenous genetics and knowledge of the natural
world have similarly been seen as a "new wave ofcolonialism" or as "bio-colonialism"
because it allows business interests to encroach on the right to self-determination
turning life itself into a salable commodity.397
3.1.5.4 Internal Colonialism
Reflections on the nature of colonialism and on its capacity to appropriate
power and privilege398 have contributed to the emergence of the concept of
"internal colonialism" by which "particular groups, through their dominance of
political and economic power, ensured that other groups are kept in long term
subservience.,,399 This process has been identified in Britain's incorporation of the
"Celtic fringe" of Scotland, Wales and Ireland 400, in "white" South Africa's
subjugation of an indigenous "black" majority401, in Russian domination of the
former Soviet Union,402 as well as in Anglo-Canadian domination of Quebec.403 In
396 Graham H. Smith, "Mai i te Maramatanga, ki te Putanga Mai 0 te Tahuritanga: From
Conscientization to Transformation" (2004) 37.1 Educational Perspectives 46 at 47.
397 Debra Harry, Le'a Malia Kanehe, "The BS in Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS): Critical
Questions for Indigenous Peoples" in Beth Burrows ed. The Catch: Perspectives on Benefit Sharing
(Edmonds Institute, 2005); Debra Harry, Stephanie Howard, Brett Lee Shelton, "Indigenous Peoples,
Genes and Genetics: What Indigenous People Should Know About Biocolonialism, A Primer and
Resource Guide", Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism,
http://www.ipcb.orgipub/IPGG.html (accessed 25 April, 2005).
398 Purdy, "Postcolonialism"at 409.
399 Hodder-Williams, "Colonialism".
400 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536-
1966 (University of Califomia Press, 1975)
401 Hodder-Williams, "Colonialism".
402 Reinhard, "History of Colonization and Colonialism" at 2240.
403 See ego Vallieres, Negres blancs d'Amerique.
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all of these situations, pre-existing polities were turned into minorities in a larger
whole, as also happened to the Indigenous peoples over whom both Canada and the
United States claim sovereignty. The concept of internal colonization thus involves
the ex post facto imposition of a dominating culture's perspective. It allows the
more powerful party in any dispute to set territorial or legal boundaries that deny the
frames of reference of the invaded culture and legitimize both cultural and material
appropriation.
The process of differentiation and subordination that justifies colonialism
has been identified within cultures as well as between cultures. Courses on
feminism almost invariably contain some discussion of women as internally
colonized victims of patriarchal social norms404 Focusing on the ways in which the
colonial paradigm has supported relations of dominance and submission,
geographers have seen colonialism reflected in the administration of cities through
the use of ordinances about matters such as cleanliness, sanitation and town
planning.405 Allegations of "environmental racism" have also been made with
regard to decisions concerning toxic-waste disposa1.406 Advocates for bio-diversity
have observed a colonial dynamic at work in the promotion of mono-cultures and
the prosecution of farmers whose seeds have been cross-bred through natural
processes with genetically-modified cropS.407 The neglect of local languages and
dialects in favour of education in English and other majority languages has also
404 See ego University of Rhode Island www,uri.edu/artsci/wrns/hughes; University of Victoria:
http://web.uvic.calcalendar200 I/CDs/WS/CTs.html.
405 J.M. Jacobs "Postcolonial Geography" in Neil J. Smelser, Paul B. Baltes eds. International
Encyclopedia ofthe Social and Behavioural Sciences (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001) vol 17. 11838.
406 See internet sites such as http://www.ishgooda.nativeweb.org and
www.brook.edu/gs/EnvJustice/ejhp.htm.
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been equated with mental colonization.408 In short, colonial critique has inspired
many questions concerning the design and application of all kinds of conceptual
categories.
3.1.5.5 The State and Colonialism
The modem state, having arisen during the imperial age is generally considered
to be an heir to colonialism,409 so it is not surprising to see colonial values reflected in
the definition of a "state" used by some Euro-American scholars. Despite evidence that
escalation of legal violence tends to precede rather than resolve the spread of violence
in society,410 the state is presumed to playa socially protective role even when it
reinforces existing power imbalances instead of defending those who are socially
vulnerable. Colonial mores can accordingly be seen in the analyses of the political
scientists who define a "state" in terms of the ability to exert coercive power through
a monopoly on the "legitimate" use of internal violence or through monetary,
b . d ·1· 1411ureaucratlc an ml Itary contro .
Though ideals resembling those of the French revolution's "liberte, egalite,
fraternite" are frequently flaunted to justify state practices, studies like Foucault's
Surveiller et punir have documented the emergence of increasing internal state
regulation and surveillance during the 1i h to 19th century era that coincides with the
407 Harry, Kanehe, "The BS in Access and Benefit Sharing".
408 Skutnabb-Kangas, "Language Policies and Education" at 21
409 Reinhard, "History of Colonization and Colonialism" at 2240.
410 Purdy, "Postcolonialism" at 413.
411 LV. Gruhn, "State Formation" in Neil J. Smelser, Paul B. Baltes eds. International Encyclopedia
of the Social and Behavioural Sciences vo1.22 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), 14970; W. Reinhard
"State, History of' ibid at 14972.
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apex of European colonial expansion.412 For Foucault, the proliferation of state rules,
records, rankings, surveys, examinations, fmes and punishments is symbolized by the
architectural figure ofBentham's panopticon.
Fig. 2 Panopticon Prison Plan aimed at isolating inmates from each other and maintaining surveillance
on all from the centre ofthe circle.413
The panopticon's circular shape looks remarkably similar to Indigenous
medicine wheels or the wampum of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy (see Fig. 3
below); however, its function is radically different. Control is exercised exclusively by
those stationed in a central tower who can see the inmates without being seen and,
rather than uniting and empowering, its peripheral cells are designed to isolate and
412 Michel Foucault, Surveil/er et punir: Naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975).
413 Ibid., fig. 16.
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incapacitate their occupants.414 Instead of facilitating equal social relations, its aim is to
optimize state power by controlling the thoughts and actions of those imprisoned in
this system. As Foucault's observations demonstrate, a state's official intentions do not
always correspond to its practice. Critical evaluations of the colonial era accordingly
raise concerns about discrepancies or contradictions between the official ideals of
modem "democratic" states and records concerning what has actually been done.
3.1.6 Summary
Although there is no widely accepted theory of colonialism, it is generally
seen as a form of domination which aims to exterminate or assimilate those
belonging to subject cultures.415 Most of the varied considerations surrounding the
inter and infra cultural dynamics associated with this phenomenon have been taken
into account in geographer J.M. Jacobs' definition, which sees "colonialism" as
based on material self-interest involving the enactment of relations of differentiation
and domination to facilitate the exploitation of people and resources. This
definition is broad enough to include corporate as well as state practices for, as
Jacobs has pointed out, colonial values made "audacious and violent appropriations
make perfect sense to those whose interests were being served".416 In keeping with
Kuhn's theory, facts that do not fit with the protective function claimed by colonial
regimes tend to be ignored. This has made it easy to overlook the violence of
colonialism, despite the proliferation of guns, battles and prisons that accompanied
its expansion.
414 Ibid. at 233-235.
415 Horvath, "A Definition of ColoniaIiam" at 45.
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Colonial society accordingly functions by appropriating control over
property and technology, by denying other perspectives and by failing to provide
formal mechanisms to protect individuals or polities in minority positions from
those who claim to speak for them.417 A colonizing culture is typified by an
exploitive use of resources for the immediate benefit of a privileged few while the
needs of the colonized, as the colonized themselves see them, are denied
recognition. The authoritarian nature of colonial society is reflected in a legality
founded on unilateral judgements imposed by force and marked by the presence of
police stations, armies, prisons and economic confinement or marginalization.
Venues that allow the governed to discuss and implement alterations in policy and
practice are conspicuous by their absence. Initiatives aimed at defending the
colonized or reforming society are frequently characterized as "revolts" or
"rebellions". When colonialism is understood in a way that transcends the racist
stereotypes once promulgated in its defence, it can be seen as a paradigm that came
to be supported by the behaviours of colonizer and colonized alike.
The indicia of colonialism function as an interrelated matrix of behaviours.
The very existence of an imposed normative system implies the use of force of one
kind or another, presupposing unequal power relations and the denial of a political
voice for those who are subjugated or imposed upon. Reliance on force to define
legality is accordingly the foundation of the colonial legal paradigm.
416 Jacobs, "Postcolonial Geography" referred to "metropolitain appropriations".
417 Most of these indicia are listed by Purdy, "Postcolonialism" or Alan Norrie "From Law to Popular
Justice: Beyond Antinomialism" (1996) 5(3) Social and Legal Studies 383.
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*********************************************************************
Colonialism is accordingly characterized by the following indicia:
1) an externally imposed normative system
2) instituted by means of force - be it social, economic or military
3) to uphold an unequal distribution of social, economic and cultural resources
favouring people who consider themselves superior such that
4) the society includes classes of people who are denied a political voice and
excluded from the process of determining and interpreting laws and social
rules.
*********************************************************************
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3.2 Decolonization in International Law
"Reducing poverty depends as much on whether poor
people have political power as on their opportunities
for economic progress."
UN Human Development Reports.418
In Kuhnian terms, it might be said that rejection of the colonial paradigm began
with recognition of its inadequacies. By the end of World War I, it had become
apparent that universal world sovereignty of the kind envisioned for the British by
Sir Wilfred Laurier was simply unattainable as a practical matter. Yet, as
paradigmatic theory itself predicts, it is taking time for a new model for social order
to take shape and gain acceptance. Indeed, as the reflections on neo-colonialism
suggest, some would argue that the colonial dynamic is as strong as ever, having
simply altered its form of expression.
The slow pace of change reflects the difficulties involved in abandoning colonial
practice.419 This is not just a matter of altering theoretical perspectives as in the case
of scientific revolutions. Paradigmatic change at the state level often requires
institutional reform as well as the re-education of functionaries and citizens alike.
This is no easy task for it requires people to revise expectations and leave aside
familiar protocols, behavioural habits and concepts of social order. Decolonization
demands an end to coercive practices that have dominated political organization in
418 UN Human Development Reports, http://hdr.undbp.org.
419 For example, many writers retain a Eurocentric perspective that presumes only European people
had "law". See ego Oguamanam, "Indigenous Peoples and International Law.
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some parts of the world for well over two thousand years. As the movement gains
momentum, its deeply entrenched character is becoming increasingly apparent.
Colonial assumptions and modes of thought permeate collective rituals, standard
versions of history, literary masterpieces, and verbal idiom.
The magnitude and complexity of the task involved in perfecting this change
is often overlooked. Yet it is also easy to forget the progress that has already been
made in a relatively short period of time. The word "decolonization" itself did not
appear until 1932 when it is said to have been coined by the German scholar Moritz
Julius Bonn for his section on "imperialism" in the Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences. Even though the first steps in the direction of decolonization may be
identified decades earlier, it was not until the 1950's and 1960's that the concept of
decolonization became a topic of general discussion at the internationalleve1.42o
3.2.1 The World War I Turning Point
In the dominant cultures, the tide of opinion against the colonial dynamic
seems to have turned with the carnage of World War 1. This forced people to realize
that there never would be one universal hierarchy of the kind imagined by Laurier
and others schooled in the imperial precedents of his time. In keeping with Kuhn's
theory, rejection of the old paradigm was announced by someone who stood outside
the European core of colonialism's moral authority. Woodrow Wilson, the
President of the United States, delivered his "Fourteen Points" address to the U.S.
Congress on January 8th, 1918 capturing the imagination of a war-torn world by
420 M.E. Chamberlain, Decolonization: The Fall ofthe European Empires (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1985) at 1.
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suggesting the new model for international relations that everyone had been waiting
fOr.421
3.2.1.1 Rejection of War
Prior to the Treaty of Versailles422 , Europeans tended to take the victor's
right to the "spoils of war" for granted. Ordinary people had been allowed little say
concerning which imperial contender claimed the right to rule - except through the
choice of which army to support. Wilson's influential speech was widely welcomed
for its formal rejection of the use of force. Its announcement that "the day of
conquest and aggrandizement is gone" was hailed as the beginning of a new era.
Recommending the establishment of an association "for the purpose of affording
mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and
small states alike", Wilson demanded:
"A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial
adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict
observance of the principle that in determining all such
questions of sovereignty the interests of the population
concerned shall have equal weight with the equitable
claims of the government whose title is to be
determined. ,,423
As Kuhn's theory would have predicted, this new paradigm for international
order was not defined in detail. The concept of self-determination, which was to
become primordial as the twentieth century progressed, had yet to be clarified.
Though the use of force as a means of determining anyone's rights was now
421 F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1960);
Chamberlain, ibid. at 7.
422 28 June 1919,225 Cons. T.S. 195. The treaty was ratified for Canada by Britain: Treaty ofPeace
Act, 1919 (U.K.), 9 and 10 Geo. V., c.33.
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excluded, a distinction was still seen between "the interests of the population
concerned" and those of "government", suggesting that, despite the importance of
"self-government" for those following English traditions, the concept of transferring
sovereignty to the people was not necessarily contemplated at that point in time.
In the view of U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Wilson's proposals
were the dangerous dream of an idealist. "When the President talks of 'self-
determination', what unit has he in mind?" he asked, "Does he mean a race, a
territorial area or a community? It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It
will, I fear, cost thousands of lives.,,424 The significance of Lansing's question is
commonly overlooked and to this day consensus has yet to be reached concerning
how, exactly, polities such as "nations" or "peoples" should be defined. However,
concerns of this kind did not stem the tide of change. News of Wilson's speech
flashed around the world. The Germans surrendered much earlier than expected on
the understanding that the Fourteen Points would be used as the basis for a peace
treaty and representatives from almost every nation gathered in Paris to be present
as the future was decided.425
3.2.1.2. Persistence of the Old Paradigm
In practice, the negotiations that produced the Treaty of Versailles were
conducted in a way that contravened the very principles it espoused. Just as Kuhn
might have predicted, habits that had become entrenched under the colonial
423 For the full text of the address see www.ya1e.edu/1awweb/ava10n/wilson 14. Despite Wilson's
seminal influence, the United States never joined the League.
424 As cited by Richard Ho1brooke's introduction to Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919 (New York:
Random House, 2003) at viii.
425 Ibid. at 461.
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paradigm were not so easily caste aside. Negotiations took place in camera,
replicating the exclusivity envisioned by the Foucault/Bentham panopticon.
Everything was decided by four men: President Wilson himself, Lloyd George
representing Britain, France's Georges Clemenceau and sometimes Vittorio Orlando
ofItaly. The Germans were not included in the discussions at al1.426
The principle of self-determination was thus externally imposed with little
consciousness of the contradiction this involved. Moreover, it was unevenly
applied, being called upon only when it suited the purposes of the dominant three.
Some territories were treated as just rewards for the victors, while others were
placed on the road to independence. Even the Italians, who had access to the
exclusive meetings, complained that "they were not being treated as equals by the
other Powers; they were attacked and criticized on all sides; they were told what
was good for them, but not taken into real discussions" 427 The result was
characterized as an "imperialistic peace" and when the terms of the treaty were
publicized the Germans felt they had been betrayed. One commentator declared:
"We came to Paris confident that the new world order was about to be established:
we left it convinced that the new order had merely fouled the 0Id.,,428
3.2.2 Institutional Reform: The League of Nations
Nevertheless, the anomalies that challenged old modes of thought were
significant and even though a new paradigm had not been fully articulated or
implemented, the momentum driving the process of change continued. The League
426 Ibid.
427 "A British diplomat" ibid. at 288.
428 "Nicolson" ibid. at 467.
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of Nations was established under a covenant whose signing members undertook "to
respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all Members of the League ".429 They also agreed
to "promote international co-operation" by establishing "the understandings of
international law as the actual rule of conduct among Govemments".430 To this end,
a "Permanent Court of International Justice" was put in place to settle any question
concerning fact, law or treaty interpretation which could not be settled by
arbitration.431
3.2.2.1 Decolonization at the League
One of the most significant steps taken in support of the philosophical
reorientation that had begun occurred when the victors in the war chose not to
absorb territories which had formerly been governed by the defeated German,
Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires. Instead, new states like Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia were created along with a mandate system under which the colonies
and territories of the defeated powers were to be held in trust until they could
become self-governing.432
Without particularly intending to displace monarchy or disturb prevailing
concepts of legality, the new political order that began to emerge rearranged the
ways in which both polities and "the law" were conceived at the international level.
The United States had already demonstrated to Europeans that a state could exist
429 Covenant olthe League olNations, Art. 10
430 Ibid., Preamble.
431 Ibid., Art. 13, 14.
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without a monarch. As attention at the international level focused increasingly on
defining territorial boundaries and establishing political representation by popularly
elected legislatures, imperial paradigms of allegiance and ties of personal loyalty
were increasingly neglected. Yet, as Lansing's reservations indicated, there was no
consensus concerning which polities could become League members. Those who
participated in forming the League seem simply to have assumed that a distinction
could be maintained between inter-state self-determination and internal self-
determination for the peoples living within the territories they claimed. Thus,
despite the fine principles expressed in the Leagues' Covenant, Indigenous rights
were sacrificed in a process that allowed some people no political representation
what so ever.
3.2.3 Indigenous Exclusion: The Haudenosunee Experience
Curiously enough, the precedent for Indigenous exclusion was set by the
Dominion of Canada even though this state - or state in the making - came to
develop a reputation as a defender of human rights. 433 Once again, what happened
confirms Kuhn's theory that people tend to discard or ignore evidence that does not
fit the cognitive ideals that govern their minds.
Despite Canada's fine humanitarian reputation, "Indians", it might be
recalled, were legally defined as non-persons under Canadian law until 1951. To
this day, half a century later, there remains little official acknowledgement of the
432 Ibid, Art. 22 ; Chamberlain, Decolonization. Three categories of mandate territories were created
according to an assessment of their capacities for self-government. Patrick Daillier, Alain Pellet eds
Nguyen Quoc Dinh Droit International Public 6th ed. (Paris: L.G.DJ., 1999) at para 319.
433 For a detailed account of this incident see Woo, Canada v. The Haudenosaune; UN Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues: http:/www.un.org.esa/socdev/unpfii/aboutPFII/historyhome.htm
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fact that Anglo-Canadian officials frequently treated Indigenous peoples in ways
that are extremely difficult to reconcile with the belief that British colonialism
offered protection. As a consequence, certain events and policies tend to be ignored
by standard accounts of Canadian history. One of these concerns the application for
membership in the League of Nations made by the people living on the Six Nations
reserve near Brantford, Ontario. Most Canadians do not even know the name of the
people involved despite their pivotal role, on more than one occasion, in the
development of Canada's status as an independent state.
3.2.3.1 Canada v. the Six Nations Confederacy
The League of Nations incident involved a denial of the procedural due
process that had been the pride of the British justice system. Around the beginning
of World War I, tensions intensified between the Department of Indian Affairs and
the Haudenosaunee Confederacy concerning administration of the Six Nations
reserve. The Haudenosaunee, who belonged to an egalitarian federation of the
Kanionkehaka (Mohawk), Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga and Seneca, had once been
key players in colonial North American politics. Their ideals helped inspire the
Constitution of the United States434 and, during the eighteenth century, their
ambassadors had travelled to England where they had been entertained by British
monarchs. A century and a half later, when the League of Nations was founded,
Canada still functioned as an arm of the British Empire and it had yet to achieve the
capacity to appoint ambassadors. It could not even sign treaties independently until
1923. Yet Canada, along with the other British dominions, had become a founding
434. U.S. s. Con. Res. 76, 2 Dec. 1987.
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member of the League of Nations by virtue of its participation in Britain's Imperial
War Cabinet.435
The Dominions, which at that point also included Newfoundland, Australia,
New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland, were legally colonies. As some saw it,
their membership in the League allowed the dominant colonial power to secure
multiple representation, circumventing the rule restricting each member to one
vote.436 Yet Canadians, who had sacrificed thousands of lives in the war, saw an
increasing need to represent themselves. This sentiment in favour of "home-rule"
seems to have been selectively applied in a way that encouraged the Department of
Indian Affairs to become more assertive in its efforts to "civilize" the "Indians" by
imposing externally determined laws and social policies. Though the
Haudenosaunee reminded the department repeatedly that they were "allies, not
subjects of Britain", attempts to enforce the Indian Act on their territory intensified.
However, Wilson's declaration that large nations should not be allowed to oppress
the small had struck a chord. Like Canadians, the Haudenosaunee also believed they
had a right to self-government. In their view, they always had governed themselves
and the imposition of Canadian laws on them and on the territory where Britain had
promised to protect them was tantamount to an attempt by Mexico to enforce its
laws in the United States.437
435 Richard Veatch, Canada and the League ofNations (University of Toronto Press, 1975).
436 Ibid.
437 "The Last Speech of Des-ka-heh" [Nov. 1980] 3.11 Ontario Indian; Deskaheh, Iroquois
Statesman and Patriot (Akwesasne Notes, Mohawk Nations via Rooseveltown, N.Y.)
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3.1.3.2 Application for League Protection
When the Royal Canadian Mounted Police raided the Six Nations reserve in
December 1922, the Haudenosaunee complained that they had been invaded by a
foreign military force. Their numerous attempts to use Anglo-Canadian legal
procedures to protect their rights all failed. They were never given a chance to
present their case, either within the British Empire or internationally, though they
had gone to great lengths to obtain supporting archival evidence and to research
their legal position. This was their reason for applying for League membership.
Being small in numbers, a military defense was out of the question; however there
were no laments in this regard. The English translation for the Haudenosaunee law
- the Kaienerekowa - is "The Great Law of Peace" and the idea of using legal
procedures to resolve differences accorded fully with their traditions. They saw their
own federal organization as a precedent for the League of Nations. The League's
Covenant explicitly required the use of negotiations to resolve differences and their
application to use the League's institutions was formally supported at various times
by the Netherlands, Persia, Estonia, Panama and the Republic ofIreland.
3.2.3.3 The League's Failure
In the end, however, the habits of thought established under colonial
diplomacy prevailed, just as they had in determining the content of the Treaty of
Versailles. The Haudenosaunee were never given an opportunity to formally
present or defend their legal arguments. Falling back on colonial custom, British
diplomats manipulated League procedure behind the scenes to claim that even
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consideration of the preliminary issues of standing would constitute interference
with Canada's right to internal self-government.
Significantly enough, the Canadian public and most of their representatives
in the Canadian parliament had no knowledge of what was going on. All matters
were ultimately referred to Duncan Campbell Scott, the Deputy Superintendent of
Indian Affairs responsible for the contested policies. He did his best to ensure that
the incident was buried. As a consequence, allegations that his department had
misappropriated substantial portions of the funds it was holding in trust for the
Haudenosaunee were not reviewed. Once it became clear that the League would not
provide a procedural forum for these Indigenous complaints, Scott deposed the
traditional Haudenosaunee council that had survived intact since pre-contact days
and replaced it with a council of loyal followers constituted under Canada's Indian
Act.438 Thus, in spite of its fine aspirations, the League itself became a tool for
affirming the old paradigms that it purported to supersede.
3.2.4 The Definition of a "state".
It was not until 1933 that the question of state identity, which had been used
to obstruct the Haudenosaunee, was clarified. At that time, the Montevideo
Convention established an internationally accepted legal definition for a "state". To
qualify, there had to be a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective
government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.439
438 When the traditional council was deposed by Canada, it was denied access to its trust funds and
could no longer finance such mundane matters as road repairs and school construction. Woo, Canada
v. The Haudenosaunee..
439 InterAmerican Convention on the Rights and Duties ofStates (Montevideo, 1933) 165 R.T.S.D.N.
19.
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Paradoxically, because it did not have treaty-signing capacity, Canada had not
qualified on the last count of this definition when it was granted League
membership. The Haudenosaunee arguably did. Thus established European
stereotypes that presumed Indigenous peoples needed civilizing and excluded them
from the definition of a "person" carried more weight than the objective criteria
said to define a "state".
3.2.4.1 The Persistence of Colonizing Methodologies
As an heir to the League, the United Nations has adopted many elements of
League procedure and, in keeping with the Haudenosaunee precedent, the refusal of
its members to negotiate remains a major obstacle to "state" recognition, obstructing
even such prominent and beleaguered peoples as the Palestinians, the Tibetans and
the Kurds. Because of this, modem international law remains tied to the concepts of
hegemonic legality that it was founded to escape. Armed "rebellion" continues to be
used as a political tool and the capacity of certain states to appropriate resources
belonging to those that they do not represent still receives international protection.
In effect, the escalations of violence predicted by Lansing remain an on-going
political concern.
The exclusion of Indigenous peoples from the process of establishing
international norms reflects this failure to respect values that are important both to
Indigenous ways of life and to many citizens of modem states who have been
relegated to the social flotsam and jetsam created by the colonial project. Concepts
of custodial obligation to future generations and of umbilical ties to mother earth
have been ignored as boundaries continue to be negotiated in foreign capitals by
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diplomats and functionaries who have not consulted the people affected by the
decisions they make.
3.2.4.2 Structural Reorientation
Despite the shortcomings of the reform process that began with the founding
of the League of Nations, the structural reorientation represented by this initiative
altered the ways in which human rights were conceived. Instead of appealing to a
monarch supported by a militia, people are now expected to invoke written
constitutions and codes of conduct. Citizenship based on the place of birth has
largely displaced the dynamics of conquest and allegiance and, though the League
failed to prevent another war, the monarch's traditional role as protector and source
of justice has been increasingly reduced to a symbolic representation of half-
forgotten mores.
3.2.5 Equal Rights at the United Nations
The genocidal atrocities committed during the second World War made it
evident that the relationship of individuals to their states needed to be
reconsidered.440 The Charter ofthe United Nations accordingly sought to strengthen
universal peace by placing human rights front and centre, beginning with an
affirmation of "the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small.,,441 The mandate system for formerly colonized territories established at the
League continued442 in a context where the collective right of "peoples" to self-
440 See ego Hodder-Williams, "Colonialism" or D. Scott, "Colonialism, Anthropology of'.
441 26 June 1945, C.N.O.VJ, vol 15,365; Can. T.S. 1945 No.7 (entered into force 24 October 1945),
Preamble and Art. 1.
442 Charter ofthe United Nations, Chapters XI, XII and XIII.
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determination was now associated with democratic principles and the right of the
individual to participate in public affairs.443
This strengthening of egalitarian values reaffirmed the concept of negotiated
legitimacy that had been asserted by the League's Covenant but ignored in practice.
By now, it was becoming increasingly apparent that even though externally applied
force could be useful for restraining tyrants, it could not determine legality under the
principle of equality. The chaos of war thus helped to crystallize the new paradigm,
calling on self-restraint and co-operative understandings rather than appeals to
military commanders or an imperial overlord. As this new model for legitimacy
gained acceptance, assertions of egalitarian principles were reiterated in the
Universal Declaration ofHuman Right/44 and in countless subsequent international
treaties, resolutions and accords. Yet the acrimony that Kuhn identified with
paradigmatic change was everywhere apparent. Regional wars continued to erupt as
proponents of old models for social order tried desperately to impose discredited
notions on a world that was increasingly committed to what remained, for many, an
unfamiliar concept of social justice.
3.2.5.1 The Denunciation of Colonialism
Once states representing formerly colonized peoples began to participate in
internationalfora, non-European perspectives were accorded more weight. Though
the Euro-American tendency to see "others" through the prism of their own beliefs
and values continued, the international influence of non-Europeans increased
443 Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, L 'GNU et la democratisation de [,Etat: systemes regionaux et ordre
juridique universel (Paris: Pedone, 2000) at 125.
444 GA res.217(III), UN GAOR. 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/81O (1948).
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dramatically during the final decades of the twentieth century. Their acceptance as
equal participants in multi-lateral treaties according to the United Nations Charter
established a venue where Europeans were no longer seen as the only actors. This
created an alternative to the imperial models for social order that had dominated the
colonial age.
In keeping with the rising importance of egalitarian philosophy, colonialism
was overtly denounced in 1961 by the Declaration on the Granting ofIndependence
to Colonial Peoples,445 soon followed by the International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Right/46 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which set standards for ensuring "the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family".447 This was accompanied by an Operational
Protocol448 making it possible for individuals to seek affirmation of their human
rights outside their states of origin by holding signatory governments internationally
accountable.
For hierarchically organized societies, this emerging international emphasis
on the equality of all human beings contributed to the major realignment in the
concept of "law" outlined in the introduction to this study. This was accompanied
by the abandonment of many points of view once considered essential to the
maintenance of social order. In the League of Nations era French Foreign Minister
Aristide Briand had declared that it would be:
445 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res.
1514(XV), UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No.16, UN Doc. A/4684 (1961) 66.
446 19 Dec. 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171 ; Can. T. S. 1976 No. 46.
447 Preamble, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 Dec. 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171,
Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47.
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"inadmissible that the League of Nations should
become a tribunal before which a subject might plead
against his government".449
However, complaints of this kind are now institutionally provided for by
states that have become signatories to the Operational Protocol. Sandra Lovelace
used this procedure to challenge the sexually biased provisions in Canada's Indian
Act. 450 In fact, despite the denial of Court access experienced by the Haudenosaunee
in the 1920's, the Anglo-Canadian judicial system has always allowed subjects to
challenge governmental power under the "rule of law" principle, as seen in such
celebrated cases as Entick v. Carrington (1765); Campbell v. Hall and Edwards v.
A. G. Canada.451 Other institutions are slowly developing to solve access to justice
problems by allowing citizens to challenge state power and it is now widely
recognized that even when governments are democratically elected, the actions of
state officials do not necessarily represent the will of the people. This is leading to
considerable reflection concerning the nature of legitimate government, inspiring
the innovation of new legal concepts and procedures in support of the quest for
egalitarian justice.
448 Operational Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 Dec.1996;
999 U.N.T.S. 216; Can. T.S. 1976 No.47.
449 Veatch, Canada and the League ofNations, 112.
450 Lovelace v. Canada (1981) UN Doc. A/37/40,166; 2:1-2 HRLJ 158; (1981) I Can. Human
Rights YB.305. Canada's response ignored Indigenous sovereignty to unilaterally impose revisions
to the Indian Act via Bill C-31, seriously affecting local government and welfare on many reserves.
See Sandra Lovelace, "Award Address" in Andrea P. Morrison ed. Justice for Natives: Searching
for Common Ground (Montreal: Aboriginal Law Association of McGill University, 1994) 26. For a
full account of the struggle leading to the Lovelace case see Janet Silman ed. Enough is Enough:
Aboriginal Women Speak Out (Toronto: The Women's Press, 1987).
451 Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 St.Tr. 1030,95 E.R. 807; K.B.Campbell v. Hall (1774) I Cowp.
204,98 E.R. 1045; Edwards v. A.G. Canada [1930] A.C. 124 [1929].
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3.2.5.2 The Right to Self-Determination
As far as collective rights are concerned, the assertion of self-determination
for "peoples" might be seen as a natural consequence of the combined rejection of
the use of force and affirmation of human equality. The right to self-determination is
now considered fundamental in international law as recognized in the Declaration
on the Granting ofIndependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (G.A. res. 1514
(XV)452 and the principles for interpreting state obligations in this regard (G.A. res.
1541 (XV).453 Though implementation has been constrained by the stipulation that
the territorial integrity of existing states must be respected, it is now recognized that
a peoples' right to determine the form of their government may find expression
through various forms including the maintenance of independent status as well as
free association with, or integration in, another state. The Union of South Africa's
post World War II attempt to annex Namibia, which it had been holding under
mandate on behalf of Great Britain, was soundly denounced by the international
community.454 This anti-colonial stance was confirmed by the International Court of
Justice in the Western Sahara case which confirmed the rights of nomadic peoples
and specified that integration with another state must:
"be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the
territory's people acting with full knowledge of the
change in their status, their wishes having been
expressed through informed and democratic processes,
452 GA Res. 1514(XV).
453 Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to
transmit the information calledfor under Article 73 e ofthe Charter, GA Res. 1541 (XV).
454 Peter Fraenkel, Roger Murray, The Namibians, Minority Rights Group Report No. 19 (London:
Minority Rights Group, 1985).
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impartially conducted and based on universal adult
ffr 455 "su age...
The social paradigm that governed the formation of non-Indigenous concepts of the
modem Canadian state has thus been formally repudiated at the international level.
3.2.6 The New Legal Paradigm
Taken together, these are the changes that effected the revolution in the
international concept of legality referred to in the introduction to this work.456 The
once celebrated ability of the colonial powers to extend their influence through the
use of force and to keep their citizens in a state of subjugation has been replaced by
a new model for legality. Democratic procedures, fundamental human rights and the
rule of law are now considered primordial. The use of arms to expand sovereignty
has been discredited; human equality has become a moral and legal imperative and
the right to "self-determination", though still hotly debated, has been recognized as
fundamental.
3.2.6.1 The Indigenous Paradox
These reforms have left Indigenous peoples in an ambiguous position.
Although the United Nations has affirmed the right of self-determination for
"peoples" and "nations", its membership consists solely of "states" whose
admission has been approved by two thirds of the existing members.457 The
requirement for this level of international support makes it virtually impossible for
Indigenous nations to gain membership because the boundaries of many of the
455 Western Sahara, I.C.J., 16 October, 1975 para 57 at 12.
456 See also David Kennedy, "International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion"
(1996) 65 Nordic Journal ofInternational Law 385 at 388.
457 Charter ofthe United Nations, Arts.3, 4, 18 and 110.
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existing members incorporate resource-rich Indigenous territories. The International
Labour Organization has attempted to extend some protection through the 1957
Convention 107 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Populations and the 1989
Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries. However, the colonial construction of many state economies has led
their governments to believe that survival without Indigenous resources is
impossible. Though rarely articulated, there is fear that recognition of Indigenous
rights will impoverish existing states.
Pressure from Indigenous peoples for recognition of their rights has
continued none the less. Bitterly aware of the overwhelming limitations that afflict
them, many adamantly insist that curbs 011 the exploitation of Indigenous peoples
within colonially defined states does not equate with full affirmation of their right to
autonomous decision making concerning their lives or the use of their highly
coveted resources. Despite their relatively small populations, Indigenous rights
remain highly contentious. On July 28 th, 2000 the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations established a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues to serve as
an advisory body.458 Though this is seen by some as institutionalization of the
ultimate exclusion of Indigenous peoples from equal treatment with other nations, it
does, at least, provide a venue for recognizing the legitimacy of Indigenous
concerns which may, eventually, provide a stepping stone to the realization of
postcolonial ideals if its consensus-based decision-making process gains broader
acceptance.
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3.2.7 The Twentieth Century Re-orientation
To recapitulate - the shift to egalitarian values that accompanied the rejection
of territorial colonization involved a substantial reorientation of conventional
European legal concepts because military expansion and the legitimacy of using
force to resolve differences has been formally rejected. International legality now
focuses on ensuring the peaceful right to self-determination. Rejection of the old
legality made it necessary to develop new institutions for implementing the new
legal and behavioural norms. At the international level, consensual practices have
accordingly become the ideal. This, in itself, has contributed to the questioning that
is reorienting the concept of legality. Accords such as the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights stipulate that advancement towards this new
international standard is a work in progress. The French version of this document
makes the reorientation even more apparent, stating that it is "I 'ideal commun a
atteindre" or the common ideal to be achieved. As if to confirm Kuhn's prediction
that periods of paradigm change are marked by intensification of old modes of
thought and behaviour, violence continues to mark international relations and
military force is still being used to establish and maintain governing regimes;
however, the new paradigm has gained a foothold and military success no longer
guarantees international acceptance ofa general's victory or a state's legitimacy.
3.2.7.1 The Revision of Textual References
The abandonment of colonialism, like any paradigmatic change, demands a
comprehensive re-examination of many "truths" that previously seemed self-
458 UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 2000/22. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev
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evident. These include, not just the meaning of "law" but also established views of
history. As pointed out by Asbjorn Eide, the United Nations. Declaration on the
Rights ofMinorities now requires states to ensure, not only that minorities have the
resources needed to be educated in their own languages and traditions, but also that
the majority is educated to understand minority points of view.459 The United
Nations Language has accordingly promoted language revitalization projects in
conjunction with other initiatives aimed at ensuring effective political participation
by marginalized populations.46o Meanwhile, technological innovations have made
international travel and communications broadly accessible. The cultural barriers
on which colonialism relied are breaking down and it is becoming increasingly
apparent that it is only through co-operation, respect and mutual understanding that
the new legality can take effect.
3.2.7.2. Contradictory Practices
Colonial habits of thought are, however, showing remarkable resilience.
Another paradox involved in the decoIonization process arises from the fact that the
principle of human equality coupled with the right to self-determination raises the
expectation that the public will participate in law making and government officers
will be accountable. Yet regulatory mechanisms continue to rely on the structures
and rationales of the colonial era, functioning through the very government officers
that they must hold to account. The public often remains ill informed about just
what, exactly is being done "on their behalf' and, as cognitive research has
459 Asbjom Eide "Multicultural and Intercultural Education: Conditions for Constructive Group
Accommodation" (1999) 12.1 R.Q.D.I. 19 at 23; Grace Li Xiu Woo, "Debate on Intercultural Education
and Social Cohesion" 12.1 R.Q.D.I. 149 at 152.
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demonstrated, everyone tends to be blinded by the limitations of their own
conceptual models.
One characteristic of paradigmatic change identified by Kuhn is the
innovation and co-existence of conflicting theories and models of conduct. In
Canada at the moment government agencies often engage in contradictory practices.
For example, one arm of the federal government helped sponsor a widely publicized
quilting project that included contributions from members of Indigenous First
Nations in parity with contributions from citizens of states that belong to the United
Nations.461 The impression left by this initiative supports the sense that Canada
respects the distinctive and valuable perspectives of the First Nations. However,
the egalitarian approach to collecting quilt squares serves to camouflage
contradictory actions that are much less widely known among the public at large. As
a consequence, Indigenous complaints about Canada's refusal to sign the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.462 appear irrational.
Multicultural initiatives like the quilting project serve to confirm Canada's
magnanimous image. As a result, few, if any, questions are raised concerning
Canadian obstruction of attempts to ensure that Indigenous peoples benefit from the
basic human rights set out in international conventions.463
The conceptual blindness referred to by Kuhn and other cognitive researchers
is also manifest in the debates over the need to protect bio-diversity and Indigenous
460 Wong, "He Hawa'e Kai Nui a Kau rna Kula", 31.
461 Quilt ofBelonging, www.invitationproject.ca.
462 Cheryl Cornacchia, "Mohawk Leader slams Ottawa's about-face", The [Montreal}Gazette (6 July,
2006) A7.
463 Harry, Kanehe, "The BS in Access and Benefit Sharing". See also
http://www.ipcb.org/pub/IPGG.html
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knowledge. These are currently the focus of many international Indigenous
initiatives. As Debra Harry and Le'a Malia Kanehe have pointed out, the
Indigenous belief that the land and its resources are a gift from previous generations
and the birthright of future generations conflicts with Western legal frameworks that
see the world in terms of rights that can be commodified and sold, exempting
present owners from the communal obligation to share any benefits received.464
The United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
affirmed the principle of self-determination, declaring that "Indigenous peoples
have the right to own, develop, control and use the lands and territories...which they
have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used.,,465 However, international
regimes concerning access to resources and benefit sharing are being developed
through instruments that see "states" as exercising exclusive "sovereignty" over
resources. Thus the requirement in Article 15.5 of the Convention on Biodiversity
for "the prior informed consent of the Contracting Party" for access to genetic
resources affords no protection at all to Indigenous peoples for they are not "states"
and so cannot be "contracting parties".
Harry and Kanehe have accordingly pointed out that there is a conflict
between the egalitarian right to self-determination asserted in international human
rights law and recent regulatory developments that continue to follow the colonial
patterns of conduct used to impose European belief systems and appropriate
Indigenous land. Like other Indigenous activists, they fear that:
464 Ibid
465 United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.l of20 April, 1994 (Art.26)
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"Nearly every aspect of what we value as Indigenous
peoples - our technologies, our knowledge, the seeds
that produce our foods, and our medicines - is at risk
f ., ,,466o appropnatIOn.
3.2.8 Summary
The twentieth century witnessed a substantial change in the concept of
legality at the international level. The deficiencies of colonial modes of operation
were widely recognized and egalitarian values were accepted as general principles.
However, international law and decision making continues to function through
"states" that were defined according to colonial customs and usage. Acceptance of
the new concept of international legality has created contradictions with many
customary practices and operational assumptions. Decolonization requires an
understanding that international law is a work in progress and the standards that
apply to international conduct have changed in several important ways. However,
Kuhn's theory predicts that an old paradigm will not be abandoned unless there is a
new one to take its place. It would thus seem that until clearly defined institutional
replacements are developed, regression to colonizing practices will remain a
recurrent risk.
*********************************************************************
The demise of colonialism in international law means that
-Human equality is now a fundamental value.
-The use of force has been formally rejected as a foundation for legitimacy.
-International law aims to protect the peaceful right to self-determination.
-"Prior informed consent" is being promoted as the new basis of legality.
-Reform is understood as a work in progress, requiring the innovation of new
institutions and protocols to facilitate the participation of all concerned.
*********************************************************************
466 Harry, Kanehe, "The BS in Access and Benefit Sharing", conclusion.
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3.3 Postcolonialism
" ..the emergence of history in European thought is co-
terminous with the rise of modern colonialism, which
in its radical othering and violent annexation of the
non-European world, found in history a prominent, if
not the prominent, instrument for the control of subject
peoples,,467
The Post-Colonial Studies Reader
The word "postcolonial" encapsulates the broadly based social movement
whose aspirations have been articulated in egalitarian international legal norms.
Like the comprehensive, all pervasive set of social mores that it seeks to replace,
postcolonialism incorporates many shades of understanding through its implication
in theories of imperialism, modernity, racism, ethnicity, cultural geography, post-
modernism and feminism.468 Postcolonial values overlap those associated with
"democracy" which is said to be founded on two basic principles: popular control
over political decision-making processes and political equality in the exercise of
that contro1.469 Like "democracy" the term invokes different meanings for different
people at different times and places. Focusing, as it does, on the rejection of past
conduct and beliefs that have lost credibility, "postcolonialism" corresponds to the
467 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, Helen Tiffm eds. The Post-Colonial Studies Reader (London:
Routledge, 1995) at 355. The nineteenth century development of English as an academic subject
coincides with colonialism. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffm, The Empire Writes Back:
Theory andpractice in post-colonial literatures (London: Routledge, 1989) at 3.
468 Eve Darian-Smith, "Postcolonialism: A Brief Introduction" (1996) 5(3) Social and Legal Studies
291; Laura Moss "The Changing Shapes of Postcolonial Theory" (2002) Canadian Literature
vol.173 reviews www.canlit.ca/reviews/unassigned/444moss.html.Also.eg. Andy Greenwald
"Postcolonial Feminism in Nehanda" , The Literature and Culture of Zimbabwe,
www.victorianweb.org/post/zimbabwe/vera/greenwald1.html .
469 Weir, Beetham, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain at 6 - 7.
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stage in Kuhn's concept of philosophical revolution during which the inadequacies
of the old paradigm become increasingly apparent, inspiring a multiplicity of new
theories that compete to provide a new model for understanding and functioning in
the world. In this regard, it resembles the "hundred schools" era in Chinese history
that produced Confucianism, Taoism, Moism, Legalism and other philosophies.470
Postcolonialism represents a commitment to change. Having embraced the
ideological shift to egalitarian values, it questions the prototypes that governed in
the past and linger in institutional habit. It is not, in itself, a paradigm for social
order, but it does provide a venue for reflection and for sorting through the
confusion and uncertainty raised by the quest for a new social and legal institutions
that are not based on techniques of coercive enforcement. Committed to making the
new egalitarian ideology work, postcolonialism struggles to counter the power of
old cognitive models that continue to reassert themselves even after formal rejection
of the ideology on which they were based.
3.3.1 Origins
Etymologically, the term "postcolonial" is of recent origin. Used frequently
to describe the political condition experienced by new states on the granting of
independence, this word gained currency with the demise of colonial regimes
following World War 11.471 According to Jasbir Jain, scholars in India found "post-
independence" failed to adequately describe the situation experienced after 1947
because colonial institutions had taken root and pre-colonial native culture had become
470 See ego Li, Ageless Chinese at 89-94.
471 Jacobs, "Postcolonial Geography"; Darian-Smith, "Postcolonial Law".
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too remote. The forward-looking optimism of "post-independence" was thus replaced
by the backward "post-colonial" gaze in an attempt to break free from habits of
subjection which had been institutionalized and become ingrained.472
In this context scholars began to realize that "the study of English [as a
language] and the growth of Empire proceed from a single ideological climate" whose
intent, according to Gauri Viswanathan, was "to control the natives under guise of a
liberal education".473 Despite the official end of empire, knowledge about non-
metropolitan regions initially remained classified in India as "subaltern studies,,474
inciting critics like Gayatri Spivak to address the challenges confronting intellectuals in
a world that was officially, but not practically, decolonized by demanding "Can the
Subaltern Speak?".475 Some, like Kwame Anthony Appiah, discounted
"postcoloniality" as "the condition of what we might ungenerously call a comprador
intelligensia: a relatively small, Western-style, Western-trained group of writers and
thinkers, who mediate the trade in cultural commodities of world capitalism at the
periphery".476 Yet the shift in officially sanctioned values that accompanied the move
to decolonize has had profound implications for colonizer and colonized alike and
Appiah's critique might also be interpreted as a call for full realization of egalitarian
472 Jasbir Jain, Problems ofPostcolonial Literatures and other Essays (Jaipur: Printwell, 1991) at 3.
473 Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffm, The Empire Writes Back, 3 citing Gauri Viswanathan, "The Beginnings of
English literary study in British India" (1987) 9.1 and 2 Oxford Literary Review at 17. For extract see
The Post-Colonial Studies Reader at 431. The absence of minority perspectives in Canadian school
curricula is seen as a prime source of racism in this country. Commission on Race Relations.
www.ccr.com.
474 See ego Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism"
(1994) 20 Critical Inquiry 328.
475 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1994) The Post Colonial Critic 66
reprinting C. Nelson, 1. Grossberg eds. Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Basingstoke:
Macmillan Education, 1988) 271.
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values since it incorporates concern for giving a voice to those whose opinions were
previously denied consideration.
As the independence of former colonies stabilized, reflections on the
paradoxes involved in working within the colonizers' cultural medium have
proliferated and the contributions of a "newly diasporic intelligensia,,477 are making
it increasingly apparent that even those who co-operated with the Western agenda
felt constrained by Euro-American theory which was proving inadequate for dealing
with the complexity of their varied experience.478 The work involved in providing
empirical proof of the facts used to discount the concepts of legitimacy that
dominated the colonial age is pushing postcolonial analysis into the academic
mainstream. Arif Dirlik sees "postcolonial" as a term that came to prominence
when "Third World intellectuals arrived in First World academe".479 That is to say,
in keeping with Kuhn's observation that an old paradigm is not rejected unless there
is a new one to take its place, postcolonial perspectives are being developed by
those who have access to alternate frames of conceptual reference. Its growing
academic acceptance is fed by the ability of its critical stance to cast light on a broad
range of problems and issues. Thus, Rosemary 1. Coombe prefers the term
"postcolonial" to "multicultural" because of its capacity to:
"emphasize rather than obscure the very real histories
of colonialism from which all peoples in Canada are
still emerging, and the very real relations of power
476 Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Is the Post in Post-Modernism the Post in Post-Colonial" 17.2 Critical
Inquiry (1991) 336 at 349. The same quote is repeated in Kwame Anthony Appiah, "The Postcolonial
and the Postmodern" in The Post-Colonial Studies Reader.
477 Jacobs, "Postcolonial Geography".
478 Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back, 11.
479ArifDirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura".
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and domination inherited from our diverse colonial
pasts that continue to shape social relations of
difference in this country.'.480
3.3.2 Themes and Debates
Like others who received their primary education in the colonial hinterland,
Dirlik has observed that most of the themes popularly called "postcolonial" predate
their mid-1980's classification under this rubric, being founded in the "Third
World's" knowledge and understanding of its own history.481 Ella Shohat has
similarly suggested that the term emerged to eclipse "Third World" in the late
1980's. In her view, the postcolonial perspective operated as a successful venue for
unmasking the racist policies of white settlers, only to become suddenly invisible in
academic opposition to the Gulf War.482 She found that postcolonial doctrine had
little currency in the intellectual circles of debt-ridden African, Middle-Eastern and
Latin American countries with their intense experience of neocolonialism.483
Focusing on the military and economic hegemonism of the United States, Anne
McClintock has likewise accused postcolonialism of being prematurely celebratory,
retaining a Eurocentric focus of inquiry by "inscribing history with a single issue" -
the binary opposition between Europe's colonial enterprise and its "postcolonial"
rejection.484
This sense of entrapment is not shared by all. Like others who are familiar with
the long evolution ofolder civilizations, Kyung-Won Lee sees colonialism as a passing
480 Coombe, "The Properties of Culture" at 254, n.32.
481 Ibid at 329 and 332.
482 Ella Shohat "Notes on the "Post-Colonial"" 31/32 Critical Text (1992) 99.
483 Ibid at 106.
484 McClintock, "The Angel of Progress" at 85 and 87.
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phase in a broader historical context. 485 He has described postcolonialism as an
ideological battle, an antidote to colonial domination that works by taking a critical
look at texts in the Western canon to identify Eurocentric values previously assumed to
be universal and transhistorical.486 Rejecting discourses such as those of Bakhtin,
Foucault and Gramsci for their limited formulation on the basis of specifically Western
experiences ofclass or gender relations, Lee's post-colonialism is a movement initiated
by non-Western diasporic intellectuals.487 Like others, he has pointed out that
colonialism did not just silence non-western voices - it presumed that everything had to
be measured in terms of European or American ideals. From his perspective, the
attempt to incorporate postcolonialism in the "all embracing...and all devouring...post-
modernist project of Euro-American self-inquiry" is a manifestation of material
dependence on Western capital, publishers and readers. It would be naIve, he warned,
to assume that five centuries of European colonialization could be undone by only half
a century of counter-discursive practice.488
3.3.2 Perspective
Many writers share Lee's sense that rejection of Euro-centric focus that
characterized the colonial age is essentially an ideological struggle. It is not a rejection
of Europeans per se, but rather of the ethos of domination that characterized European
colonial expansion. As such, it is equally wary of the excessively imperialistic tactics
employed by some of the native rulers who took control when European colonists left,
485 Kyung-Won Lee. "Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full? Rethinking the Problems of Postcolonial
Revisionism" Cultural Critique (1997) 114.
486 Ibid at 114, 89, 110.
487 Ibid, at 98 and 113.
488 Ibid at 114.
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seeing them as an extension rather than a rejection of the colonial phenomenon.489
Memmi, among others, has discussed the dynamic through which members of a
colonized population become agents for the implementation or perpetuation ofcolonial
modes of operation. Sometimes this happens at a subconscious level. As Kuhn's
experiment with the black hearts demonstrated, models of expectation can have a
powerful effect on our capacity to perceive and analyze. These may even function
through the vocabulary we use, controlling our thoughts and actions in ways that
escape conscious awareness. Once socialized in colonial languages, mores and patterns
of thought, Indigenous conceptual categories and mechanisms of social control are
lost.
Because of this, Graham Smith has pointed out that 'just being brown does
not make theorizing Indigenous.,,49o In practice, some writers with Indigenous
ancestry have been fully assimilated into the colonizing culture. They are only
accountable to their academic peer group and their research is little more than a
performance exercise designed to ensure their own advancement within colonial
institutions. Smith has posited that research that is genuinely Indigenous must be
generated by the frames of reference offered by a particular Indigenous people.
That is to say, it must be centered in their "landscapes, images, languages, themes,
metaphors and stories".491
489 Lingaraja Gandhi, "Literature as a weapon for change" The Deccan Herald (23 Jan. 2005)
http://www.deccanherald.com.deccanherald/jan232005/artic.asp (accessed 3 May, 2005).
490 Graham Smith, oral presentation, "Research and the Self-Determination of Indigenous
Peoples" Education conference, Montreal, May 2005.
491 Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies at 146.
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Observations of this kind have led some Third world critics to view the push
for democratization as a reincarnation of colonialism. This allegation may confuse
others because some of the reasoning used to reject colonialism resembles the
arguments used to promote democratic rights, making the two difficult to distinguish.
However, awareness of democracy's ambiguous character can even be found among
the colonizers. Internal critics of British governmental practices have pointed out that
"democracy" was originally a term of disparagement in their society. Its use changed
during the twentieth century when it came to represent demands for reform to ensure
systematic processes of public consultation and dialogue, popular consent to legislative
initiatives and accountability ofpublic officials.492 When defined in this way, demands
for democratization parallel and overlap postcolonial critique because both idealize
populist values.
3.3.2.1 Breaking Boundaries
The problems classed as one form or another of neocolonialism serve as a
reminder that the struggle to escape the residual effects of the colonial dynamic
transcend racial classifications. They are entwined with phenomena like the
imprisonment, without trial, of Ngugi wa Thiong'o who wrote the first African
language novel, Caitaani Mutharabaini (Devil on the Cross) on toilet paper that was
later smuggled out of a Nairobi jai1.493 Ngugi, whose writing in English had already
been published, was inspired to use the Indigenous idiom of his childhood by the
realization that the people he had been writing about were unable to read his work.
492 Weir, Beetham, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain at 9.
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Since most African intellectuals have been educated exclusively in European
languages, he positioned such initiatives as a means of "Decolonizing the Mind and
Moving the Centre", suggesting that history and literature should portray the actual
struggles of the people and stand by those involved.
Having grown up in a context where there was effectively no state, the
experience Ngugi reported supports Benedict Anderson's assertion that the state is an
"imagined community".494 Emphasising the importance of performance and the
procedures through which human society is constantly renewing itself, Ngugi has
suggested that if we truly wish to escape colonialism, we must break the borders and
boundaries that separate people. His belief in the power of language seems to be
supported by the findings some linguists. 495 In Ngugi's words, "linguistic
engineering" is a colonizing force, suggesting that we will not be able to "recompose a
new world" unless we empower Indigenous languages and engage in a process of
inter-cultural borrowing that ensures the transfer of knowledge from the people to the
intellectuals and vice versa.496
Ngugi' s attempt to accomplish this goal by using the novel and other artistic
formats that are foreign to African heritage reflects the type of intercultural exchange
he advocates and recalls Homi K. Bhabha's reflections on the ways in which
493 Gandhi, "Literature as a weapon for change"; Charles Cantalupo, "Ngugi wa Thiong'o Penpoints,
Gunpoints, and Dreams" http://www.leftcurve.orglLC23webPagges/ngugu.htrnl (accessed 3 May,
2005).
494 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991). See also Katherine Biber, "BeingiNothing: Native Title
and Fantasy Fulfilment" (2004) 3 Indigenous LJ 1.
495 See ego Lakoff, Johnson, Metaphors We Live By and Philosophy in the Flesh; Lakoff, Women,
Fire, and Dangerous Things; Tannen, Framing in Discourse; That's Not What I Meant!; Winter, A
Clearing in the Forest.
496 As quoted Cantalupo, ''Ngugi wa Thiong'o".
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colonialism has resulted in hybrid cultures. These have become a conduit that allows
the denied knowledge of the colonized to enter the dominant discourse, undermining
the basis of the colonizers' former authority.497 For Ngugi, the concept of the state is
problematic because it resists the renewal that is necessary to ensure social vitality.
Refusal to work in African languages is, likewise, a type of neocolonialism that binds
people to foreign categories and thought processes. Like Lee and Bhabha, Ngugi's
work seeks to escape the Manichean duality of the western style of logic that attempts
to classify everything as "P or not p", excluding any middle ground.498 In his view,
healthy cultures are always reinventing themselves. Thus, new generations belong
neither to the culture of their colonizers, nor to those oftheir ancestors.
Reflections of this kind are typical of postcolonial debate and they are
beginning to have an impact on Euro-American literary and cultural studies. Many
have identifed the 1978 publication of Edward Said's Orientalism499 as the point at
which "postcolonialism" made its appearance.soo However this quest for an ultimate
authority who can be credited with inventing "postcolonialism" might also be seen
as a reassertion of the hierarchical expectations generated by Euro-American
patterns of thought. Said himself agreed with Dirlik and Lee in claiming only to
have repeated a message previously articulated by many others.501 Raised III
Palestine and Egypt, Said's critique of the way Asian cultures are studied III
497 Bhabha, "Signs Taken for Wonders" at 156.
498 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 8 and 44. See also ego Stuber, "Legal Reasoning after Post-
Modem Critiques of Reason".
499 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge, 1978) at 89. He defmes "Orientalism" as a Western
department of thought and expertise concerning the overlapping domains of the 4000 year-old history of
Eurasian relations, the advent in the West in the early 19th century of scientific study ofOriental cultures
and the false suppositions about the Orient that dominate modem political relations.
500 See ego Ashcroft, Griffith and Tiffm; Bohmer; Krupat, Lee.
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European universities argued that the line separating the Occident from the Orient
was a product of the human imagination.s02 The West's habitual silencing of
"Oriental" voices, raises many questions about how to make the production of
knowledge serve communal rather than factional ends. s03 According to Said, the
attempt to counter the objectification or "othering" of non-European peoples is part
of a larger project that includes the quest of marginalized audiences to identify
common ground instead of appealing to a centre of sovereign authority.s04 In his
words, the "tyrannical conjuncture of colonial power with scholarly Orientalism"
has created a trap that has prevented both Euramericans and those who have been
constructed as their excluded "Other" from objectively evaluating such problems as
the Palestinian situation or the human rights abuses of the Khomeni regime. 505
3.3.2.2 Questioning Accepted "Truths"
Said's critique points to a need to re-consider accepted truths. In keeping
with this theme, Jacobs has summarized the elastic field embraced by postcolonial
inquiry as intent on bringing into view "evident ruptures in the apparent coherence
of colonial occupation" and on uncovering "the silences that exist in the colonial
record" leading to a "radical rethinking of the forms of knowledge and social
identities authorized under colonialism."s06 E. Darien-Smith concurred, calling
postcolonialism a "rethinking of a dominant European historiography" that recovers
501 Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered" at 91 and 93.
502 Ibid at 90.
503 Ibid at 90- 91.
504 Ibid at 105-6.
505 Ibid at 103.
506 Jacobs, "Postcolonial Geography".
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"the ongoing significance of colonized peoples, recognizing the interdependence of
the oppressors and the oppressed".507
3.3.3 Applications
Though used most prolifically at first in the field of literary criticism, the
postcolonial perspective has become popular in other disciplines as a venue that
allows a wide range of investigation into power relations in various contexts.508
According to Dirlik, the goal of this field of inquiry is the abolition of all distinctions
between centres of power and the periphery to reveal the complex heterogeneity and
interdependence of all cultures.509 He has identified three uses for the term
"postcolonial": 1) to describe conditions in formerly colonial societies; 2) as a
substitute for "Third World" to describe global conditions after the period of
colonialism; and 3) to describe a discourse on the above conditions that is informed by
the epistemological and psychic orientations they produced.51o
507 Darian-Smith, "Postcolonial Law".
508 Brian Wall, "Literary Criticism", Summer 2000, Department of English University of Western
Ontario, http://instruct.uwo.ca/englishOO/index/html. Most references to postcolonialism or
decolonization in works by Canadian legal scholars were published after the research presented here
began, though Rosemary J. Coombe referred to "postcolonial struggles" in an article published in
1993. Sakej Henderson and Marie Battiste have directly associated some of their work with the
postcolonial movement and Richard Pesklevits identified this approach in the title of his masters
thesis. (See Bibliography) Many others have taken a critical stance with regard to the colonization of
Indigenous peoples or investigated questions that are consistent with the focus of the post colonial
movement. Several contemporary Canadian scholars write from a perspective that assumes the
validity of British assertions of sovereignty and a few reject the concept of Indigenous self-
determination, but none make assertions of racial or cultural superiority of the kind that could be
found at the height of the colonial movement. A few even consider the topic of corporate
colonialism.
509 Ibid at 329.
510 Ibid at 331-2.
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3.3.3.1 New Issues
The demise of colonialism has blurred previously defined social and cultural
distinctions. Just as the spread of colonization implicated the colonized by inducing
them to co-operate, so too the quest to permit the articulation of cultural difference has
raised convoluted issues concerning community membership, cultural inclusion and
exclusion and the problem of who can speak: for whom.511 The complex of social
assumptions we have been left with as a result of colonialism includes a deeply
entrenched tendency to invoke hierarchical models of social ordering. Internally the
colonial state gave preference to the opinions of a few individuals and classes while
denying a political voice to many others. At the collective level, colonialism granted
some cultures recognition as "states" while relegating others to minority status,
denying them a place at the negotiation tables where international policy is developed
and multilateral treaties formulated. The colonial assumption of state authority over
formerly self-regulating societies blurred the definitional boundaries that had
previously been in effect. Yet decolonization is raising its own set of problems, many
of which have legal implications. Parameters of identification, conceptual categories
and frameworks for distributing rights vary from one culture to the next. Attempts to
treat all conceptual systems equally leave us entangled in issues concerning
jurisdictional overlap and the need to respect diverse concepts of legitimacy while
maintaining egalitarian rights at both the individual and collective levels.
511 Homi K. Bhabha, "Signs Taken for Wonders"; "The Other Question: Stereotype, discrimination
and the discourse of colonialism" in The Location ofCulture (New York: Routledge, 1994); Linda
Alcoff, "The Problem of Speaking for Others" (1991) 20 Cultural Critique 5; Gail Valaskadis,
"Parallel Voices: Indians and Others - Narratives of Cultural Struggle" (1993) 18.3 Canadian
Journal ofCommunication 283 ; Paul Seesequasis , "Trick or Treat? What Kind ofIndian Are You?"
in A. Manguel ed. Why Are You Telling Me this? (Banff Centre Press, 1998) at 143.
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3.3.3.2 Negotiation and the New Legality
Some, like Eve Darian-Smith, fear there is no obvious solution that will
allow us to move beyond "the enduring problem of western domination". As she
stated:
"To really accept the challenges and resistences
presented by postcolonial law, be it from within or
without the boundaries of the nation-state, requires that
legal scholars accept that there is no universal legal
code and legal objectivity. This in tum would mean
that the relative dominance of one set of legal values
over another would be a constant topic of review and
analysis." 512
However, the need for constant re-negotiation and revision of legal rules is not seen
as a detriment by all. Some, thinking in line with Ngugi, see the re-negotiation
process as the very essence of the new legality. Weir and Beetham, for example, see
"systematic processes of consultation and dialogue" as essential to democracy.Sl3
With the approval of M. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former secretary-general of the
United Nations, professor Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos has gone so far as to suggest
that the right of all peoples to self-determination makes it both absurd and
unrealistic to imagine that the status quo at any particular moment in history will
determine the political status of a people once and for all.SI4 In short, postcolonial
concepts of democratic practice are beginning to approach Indigenous concepts of
legality.SIS The primacy now accorded to the egalitarian imperative and the
accumulating research demonstrating the impossibility of accessing a truly objective
512 Darian-Smith, "Postcolonial Law".
513 Weir, Beetham, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain at 9.
514 Sicilianos, L 'GNU et la democratisation de rEtat at 125. See also G.L.X. Woo "Linos-Alexandre
Sicilianos, L 'GNU et la democratisation de rEtat: systemes regionaux et ordre juridique universel,
Paris: Pedone, 2000" (2000) 13.1 R.Q.D.I. 367.
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reality suggest that the new legality is likely to be founded in process rather than in
the dominance of any particular legal interpretation.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the rejection of the colonial paradigm
has led to extensive questioning of concepts whose meanings were once taken for
granted. Whether "colonialism" is seen as a phenomenon conducted outside the law
as currently defined or "law" is seen as an instrument that was used to implement
colonial social relations depends entirely on the way in which "law" itself is
defined.516 Alan Norrie contributed to this aspect of the discussion by accusing
Western theorists of hijacking the concept of legality, turning popular justice into
the Other that validates its formalism. 517 Drawing on "antinomialism,,518, he defined
"legal form" as
"the imposition of one moral and political narrative
about how people ought to behave dressed in a
language of formality that has to be constantly
safeguarded against alternative moral and political
possibilities".519
In his view, western law has placed itself on an imperialist pedestal that
automatically excludes popular justice. Like Ngugi and others, he has suggested
that dialectical methodology may provide a solution, allowing us to examme
western law and popular justice as differently formed juridical modes. 52o
515 See ego Battiste ed., Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision.
516 See ego Purdy "Postcolonialism" at 410.
517 Norrie "From Law to Popular Justice" at 395.
518 Defined as "a self-contradiction by accepted ways ofreasoning[which] establishes that some tacit
and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and henceforth be avoided or revised" Norrie,
drawing on Quine quoted in Honderich, 1995 Oxford Companion to Philosophy.
519 Norrie, "From Law to Popular Justice" 393.
520 Ibid.
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3.3.3.3 Procedural Innovation
The postcolonial rejection of Western domination has inspired many
attempts to retrieve what was lost by restructuring society and re-examining
accepted practices and truths. It acknowledges the fact that a legality based on
human equality can only be achieved and maintained by seeking a balance between
collective needs and the right of others to live according to their own terms of
reference, both individually and collectively. This demands the development of new
ways of thinking, new customs and new institutions - or perhaps a revival of some
of the customs and practices that were repressed during the colonial era.521
Many agree with Maori theorist, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, that decolonization is
a process. As she has pointed out, it is not an end in itself. It demands the
development of practices and methodologies that will allow healing to take place so
people can connect with each other and ease tensions by becoming informed about
the blind-spots that developed under the colonial mystique.522
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission might be seen as
one example of an institution devised to facilitate decolonization. Established in
1995 to enable people in that country to come to terms with human rights violations
committed during the apartheid regime, it provided a venue for granting amnesty to
those who fully disclosed their participation in past abuses, for allowing the victims
to recount their perspectives on what happened to them and for facilitating
reparations.523 The establishment of the commission has not, in itself resolved all of
521 See ego Ross, Returning to the Teachings..
522 Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies at 116.
523 For the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995 see
http://www.doLgov.zaltrc/ (accessed 24 April, 2005)
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South Africa's problems; however, its focus on ubuntu or "humanity to others"
rather than on accusations and victimization has inspired people confronted with a
variety of challenges. The Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, founded by a
people whose culture was severely repressed under Franco's regime in Spain, has
for example, established a forum for civil society using the concept of ubuntu to
promote discussions in Chinese, Russian, Arabic and Swahili as well as Catalan,
English, Spanish and French.524 A multiplicity of inventive initiatives of this kind
reflect the spirit of the postcolonial movement, encouraging cross-cultural
discussions invigorated by many ideas and points of view.
3.3.4 Summary
Whether seen as a time of liberating emancipation or as a time when western
oppression has merely been veiled, the "postcolonial" era has been marked by a
transition from an ideal of imperial dominance to an ideal of co-operative effort and
self-determination.525 Though there are many notions of just what, exactly, "self-
determination" is, postcolonialism glorifies in this diversity, seeing it as a source of
strength rather than a threat to unity. This variety is fed by the existence of many
prototypes of independent statehood that shape the thoughts of different writers. Some
follow the model of the United States or one of the old colonial powers like France or
Britain. Others, including some Indigenous peoples, seek to reinstate pre-colonial
institutions. Despite this disparity, insights generated by postcolonial critique
generally share the egalitarian moral imperative now enshrined in international law.
524 http://ubuntu.upc.es/(Accessed April 24, 1995)
525 Darian-Smith, "Postcolonialism".
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When colonialism is defined in a way that allows us to address concerns about
the kinds of internal othering and oppression at issue in feminism, racism and similar
fields, postcolonialism becomes an intellectual movement concerned with the
critique of institutionalized power.526 It raises questions concerning how we can tell
whether we have truly escaped the "on-going set of relationships and processes
. d b h . fl··" 527maugurate y t e expenence 0 co omzatlOn . Postcolonial reflection thus
involves a questioning of the status quo in favour of processes that promote human
equality and oppose abusive military or governmental power. It is a demand for the
effective implementation of the key democratic principles of popular control and
political equality.
******************************************************************
As a repudiation of colonialism, postcolonialism seeks:
-laws that are self-determined by the people to whom they apply;
-consensual processes of implementation arrived at through fully informed
discussions among people who are treated equally and able to hold
government officials accountable for their actions resulting in
-an egalitarian distribution of power and resources across a society with
-respect for alternate opinions, minority rights and social differences.
******************************************************************
526 Ibid..
527 Jacobs, "Postcolonial Geography".
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3.4 Identification of Paradigm Change
"The hinge of the whole matter is, I think, this: Has the
central power complete control over the local
powers? .. .If not, anarchy is to be apprehended as the
result, sooner or later." 528
Edward Cardwell,
Colonial Secretary, 1864.
" ... sacred justice is found when the importance of
restoring understanding and balance to relationships
has been acknowledged,,529
Philmer Bluehouse, James Zion
Mediation Quarterly, 1993
Colonial law was established and maintained through the use of armed force.
The history of colonialism is a history of dominion - of battles, conquest and
usurpation. With the demise of colonial ideology, the ideal of legitimacy has shifted
to focus on consensual arrangements and human equality. Legal action now focuses
on inclusive social welfare and consensual arrangements like treaties and
negotiated settlements. The emerging paradigm is raising an entirely different set of
questions.
The change we are experiencing emanates from a shift in social beliefs and
values yet it functions through existing habits and social institutions. Because of
this, distinguishing colonialism from whatever its postcolonial replacement may be
528 John T, Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Powers and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism
(University of Toronto Press, 2002) 9 citing NAC, Monck Papers, Cardwell to Monck, Private, 18
Nov. 1864.
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is not a simple matter. A state's use of enforcement procedures is not, in itself,
definitive. If a state were to abdicate completely from all use of force, citizens could
be left unprotected. One must accordingly look at how and why power is used,
whose interests are served when social or military force is deployed and whose
opinions are relied upon to make this assessment. The last of these questions may be
the most important for, from a postcolonial perspective, one must look for the
elements in a governmental system that allow the opinions of all who are concerned
to be taken into account.
3.4.1 Characteristics of Colonial and Postcolonial Orientation
Paradigms provide alternate systems for interpreting reality and because they
function as models, they are not defined in detail. Each produces its own set of
values, priorities and questions. The insights provided by our emerging
understanding of the biology of human thought processes make it evident that it is
impossible to establish a set of absolute criteria that separate the postcolonial ideal
from the colonial model. However, the characteristics that distinguish colonialism
from postcolonialism as reviewed above might be summarized according to the
following four dimensions:
Table 1. Characteristics of Colonial and Postcolonial Legality
Colonial Postcolonial
Sources of Laws Imposed Self-determined
Social Order Hierarchical Egalitarian
Character of Laws Enforced Consensual
Social Discourse Exclusive Inclusive
529 Philmer Bluehouse, James Zion, "Hoozhooji Naat'aanii: The Navaho Justice and Harmony
Ceremony" (1993) lOA Mediation Quarterly, 328 as cited in Ross, Returning to the Teachings, 27.
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These characteristics are interrelated and yet they allow us to focus on four primary
characteristics that distinguish the colonial ideal from its egalitarian successor.
3.4.1.1 Sources of Laws
When examining a community's legal system for indicia of colonialism, one
of the first things to consider might be the source of its laws. Classical descriptions
of colonialism involve the imposition of a foreign social order. In a colonial regime,
those who make the laws have invaded or immigrated from elsewhere. They speak
a language that is foreign to the Indigenous inhabitants and they typically accord the
people whose lives they are encroaching upon no right to refuse the changes that are
being imposed. The colonized may not even be allowed to vote on or otherwise
participate in decisions concerning what laws apply and how they are to function.
By contrast, the laws of a community that is free from colonial influences
will have been agreed to by the people to whom they apply, either directly
themselves or by implication through the continuation of an ancestral legal tradition.
As stated in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
this means that all peoples have the right to "freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." The laws used
may be a heritage from the past or imported from elsewhere, but the decision to use
them will be the product of popular decision-making processes conducted by the
people concerned, in their own languages, and according to their own cultural
criteria. The result is ideally a consensus concerning the courses of action taken and
the interpretation of laws and social rules. In short, people are participants in the
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decision-making processes that affect them and they consent to the legal regime by
which they live.
3.4.1.2 Social Order
The social order produced by colonization is typically conceived in
hierarchical form with the colonizers sitting at the top of the social scale. The laws
and decisions they make are imposed on others who may respond either by rebelling
or by engaging in self-destructive behaviour producing high rates of addiction,
mental illness and other social dysfunctions. Those who actively assist in the
colonizing project sit high in the hierarchical social order while those who resist are
relegated to the bottom. They may even be assigned sub-human status according to
the colonizers' law.
Regulation, according to the colonial ideal, functions uni-directionally, top-
down. The consequences of decisions are not always felt by those who make them
and those who sit lower in the structure have no means of holding decision-makers
to account. Government is an instrument used by the colonizers to control the
colonized, to exclude them from resources or to force them to do disagreeable or
dangerous work. The exclusive character of executive functions produces an elite
class focused on promoting its own immediate benefits with little regard for others,
both living and unborn. Institutionalized inequities in power produce disparities in
wealth which, for those without privilege, may go so far as to affect nutrition and
other essential aspects of well-being. Thus, differences between classes may even
be found in the length of life enjoyed. With little investment in the past, the
colonizer does not think far into the future and when the environment becomes
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degraded through the production of toxic waste or mismanagement of other kinds
the colonizer expects to be able to move on - to another country - or even to outer
space.
Postcolonial society, by contrast, is inclusive, striving for human equality
and long-term prosperity for all. As stated in Article 2 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the aim is to ensure that all individuals
within a state's territory enjoy equal rights:
"without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other
status".
Full achievement of this ideal might be expected to result in unification of
government with the governed accompanied by an equalization of wealth and
resource distribution, including equal access to nutrition, decent accommodation,
education, work, leisure and other sources of social capital. This orientation is
confirmed by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.530 Social levelling on this order is inconsistent with the exercise of
imperative powers considered essential under colonial regimes, but it is not
inconsistent with the concept of government itself. Decolonization requires a
thorough re-evaluation of established institutions531 and, though the form or forms
that decolonized society may eventually take are not yet apparent, some of its
characteristics are.
530 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 19 Dec. 1966,999 V.N.T.S. 171;
Can. T. S. 1976 No. 46.
531 Re this process in Britain, note, for example, Weir and Beetham, Political Power and Democratic
Control in Britain: Wicks, The Evolution ofa Constitution.
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Egalitarian government aims at inclusion. There can, accordingly, be no
racially defined laws or subjection of particular classes of people. The well-being of
all is sought. Since equality invites diversity and mutual respect, minority rights, as
defined and understood by the minorities themselves, must be protected and
respected so the tastes of one element of society are not imposed upon by another.
Majority rule is inconsistent with the ideal of human equality. It eternally
denies the less numerous the right to live according to their beliefs and the insights
that may arise from their particular circumstances. So too is the subjection of the
citizenry to mindless and unmoderated regulation by state officials. Hierarchies and
the panopticon discussed by Foucault532 are the antithesis to postcolonialism, which
finds expression through circular formations and communication links. When
government functions as a tool of the people, it does not seek control. It functions
instead as a venue for uniting people so they can participate in consultative
decision-making processes that allow citizens as well as public officials to
contribute to the definition of social norms. Delegated governmental functions are
subject to public scrutiny for their exercise depends ultimately on the consent of the
people they serve. They must accordingly be conducted in public to ensure that
officials are accountable to those they represent.
Egalitarian inclusion also presupposes that the living do not have a right to
expropriate resources from future generations. A postcolonial society moderates the
profit motive by taking a custodial approach, aiming to conserve the long-term
health of the environment so as to ensure its continued viability. It considers the
532 Foucault, Surveil/er et punir at 205, 290.
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needs of the generations to come as well as the welfare of those currently living and
does not accept the toxic waste and environmental degradation that typify colonial
exploitation.
3.4.1.3 Character of Laws
Colonial law functions by fiat and its characteristics are familiar. Colonial
states are represented by "rulers". They command obedience, issuing orders and
initiating prosecutions that burden the accused with the task of disproving
allegations which may be made according to alien social paradigms. Intercultural
conflicts are classed as crimes or rebellions. The issues they raise are interpreted
and judged by someone selected by the colonizer, even if the colonizer's
government or its agents are parties to the dispute. Decisions are unilaterally made
and unilaterally imposed, resulting in convictions and punishments enforced by
police or other armed personnel in the form of fines, imprisonment or even
execution.
The egalitarian ideal raises radically different expectations. It can be realized
in full only if all those affected are able to participate in the processes for making
and applying laws. Equality means that the will and desires of anyone person will
not take precedence over those of another. Instead of "rulers", "commanders" and
"leaders" there are "representatives" or "spokespersons" whose actions must be
ratified by the people they represent before they attain legal status. The state is
unveiled. Its agents are seen as individuals subject to their own personal
idiosyncrasies which must be mediated with those of their fellow citizens. Legal
decision-making is generated by dialogue, discussions and negotiations culminating
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in accords reached through mutual agreement. Those who are affected by the
outcome must be able to participate and raise their concerns in ways that result in
serious consideration. Though the state may monitor citizens for administrative
purposes, the citizens are also able to monitor state agents to ensure that they are not
abusing their powers.
This idealized scenario does not correspond to the actual practice of most
modem "democratic" states. Yet, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights'
stipulates, its measures depict a common ideal that its signatories aim to achieve.
The postcolonial concept of law tends to be goal and process oriented rather than
rule defined. In complex societies with large populations, decision-making must
necessarily be distributed and delegated to specialists for it is impossible for one
person to fully comprehend all areas of expertise. However, diversity is managed
differently in postcolonial society for the egalitarian ideal requires all who act in the
public interest to be accountable. Their conduct must be open, transparent and
subject to public scrutiny. Consent is the foundation of postcolonial legitimacy and
because consent may be withdrawn, courses of action are always subject to re-
consideration as new conditions become apparent.
The egalitarian imperative requires a different approach to social problems.
Rather than ignoring minority interests, they must be accommodated. Rather than
punishing transgressions and violations, the situation that produced the
misbehaviour must be investigated. Legal solutions involve restitution and re-
calibration of social relations so as to support all members of society and re-
establish social balance. When aberrantly dangerous behaviour occurs,
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imprisonment or sequestration may still be used for the protection of society in an
overpopulated world where exile is not an option. However, except in the most
extreme cases, education and mentoring may be expected to replace fines and
punishments as prime regulatory mechanisms.
3.4.1.4 Social Discourse
The exclusive nature of colonial institutions is reflected in the authoritarian
tenor of their operation. Social order is dictated, changes are initiated by governors
and they are decided upon in closed meetings on the basis of undisclosed evidence
that may be provided by spies, anthropologists or hired informants. Under colonial
rule, the people being governed may send petitions and pleadings to a head of state
or other powerful figure, but there is no legal requirement to hear them or to accord
them any opportunity to contribute their knowledge, experience or preferences. The
history produced by this pattern of relations is accordingly written and taught
exclusively from the perspective of the colonizing elite.
Postcolonialism, by contrast, seeks a participatory and inclusive social
methodology. It depends upon "expert" reasoning skills and the ability not only to
recognize the existence of a variety of frames of reference, but also to make
informed choices based on the shared value of human equality. Government by the
people presupposes open and transparent public processes so anthropologists study
government officials as well as Indigenous peoples and those who are poor or
marginalized. Legal status for any course of action is obtained though consent
which can only be confirmed if all those affected are fully informed and invited to
contribute what they know. Solutions are generated through discussions and those
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concerned may reject proposals they do not agree to. When colonialism has been
transcended, the multifaceted nature of human understanding is both acknowledged
and valued. Minority perspectives on history and social issues become an integral
part of social history and so they are respected and included as part of the education
of the majority.
3.4. 1. 5 Chart Summary
The indicia of colonialism and post colonialism suggested by the foregoing
discussion might be summarized as follows:
Table 2. Indicia of Colonial and Postcolonial Society
1. Sources of Laws
2. Social Order
3. Character of Laws
4. Social Discourse
Colonial
Imposed
a. Foreign constitution
b. Alien law maker
c. Foreign language
d. No right to vote/interpret
Hierarchical
a. A dominant class
b Power to decide for others
c. Class specific laws
d. Disparities of wealth
e. Exploitive
Enforced
a. Orders, commands
b. State initiated processes
c. Military/police enforcement
d. Punishment
Exclusive
a. Dictated
b. Alien/specialized language
c. In camera processes:
d. Dominant perspective
Postcolonial
Self-determined
a. Own constitution
b. Makes own law
c. Own language
d. Participates/consents
Egalitarian
a. Social equality
b. Autonomy
c. Equal law
d. All provided for
e. Custodial
Consensual
a. Agreed goals
b. Interactive processes
c.Co-operative conduct
d. Mentoring
Inclusive
a. Dialogue
b. Popular language
c. Public process
d. Plural ers ectives
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3.4.2 The Dynamics of Paradigm Change
The indicia of the colonialism and postcolonialism identified in Part I of this
study have guided the analysis presented in Part II. As Kuhn observed,
paradigmatic change is a complex process. Established habits and procedures are
never abandoned unless there is a viable alternative and transition periods are
characterized both by a reassertion of the old paradigm and by a proliferation of
new theories proposed to take its place. Those invested in the old paradigm tend to
resist change, even when its weaknesses are apparent. The prototypes we use,
though constantly invoked, remain largely invisible. As a consequence, we may
apply them in ways that escape our conscious volition, particularly when no new
paradigm has emerged as a replacement.
3.4.2.1 Idealized Models and Hybrid Function
The colonial and postcolonial models presented here are ideals, distilled from
a wide range of academic discussion. As Kuhn explained, paradigms are only
models. They facilitate understanding by focusing understanding on particular
aspects of reality without attempting to explain everything. The models for social
order used by most societies can thus be expected to demonstrate characteristics of
both colonialism and postcolonialism especially since each of the indicia identified
above has its limits. For example, one of the paradoxes generated by the
postcolonial category is its requirement that alternate perspectives must be accorded
equal respect. This inherently excludes acceptance of the legality of commands even
though they may be the preference of some people in some circumstances.
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3.4.2.2 Dual Analysis and Anomalies
Dual analysis of the kind applied by this study accommodates paradoxes of
this kind. Thus an imperative legal procedure will score on the colonial side but it
may also demonstrate legitimacy according to the postcolonial model if it was
instituted through consensual processes. An event may also demonstrate both
colonial and postcolonial characteristics. For example, when the negotiations for the
Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I are examined it becomes possible to
see that, despite enthusiastic and wide-spread agreement with the principles
enunciated in Wilson's Fourteen Points, there was no comprehensive change in
diplomatic behaviour. The protocols and codes of conduct that characterized
colonial practice continued in use, lulling the whole world into accepting terms that
were dictated by the victors. 533 (See s.3.2.1.2 above)
What happened then was fully consistent with Kuhn's observation that
established paradigms tend to persist until a new generation schooled in the new
paradigm has become established. The fact that the players and the procedures used
in the Treaty of Versailles negotiations remained essentially the same as those that
had generated the war is highly significant. Indeed, it is widely believed that the
terms imposed at that time produced the social conditions that contributed to World
War II. The muddled outcome of that early peace initiative and the proliferation of
contradictory endeavours that characterized the twentieth century, including many
attempts to assert the old legality of dominance and aggression.
Full establishment of a new paradigm is, accordingly, a long-term process. It
requires the re-writing of basic texts and the re-education of those who work in the
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field as well as fresh generations of practitioners who understand the new theory
well enough to be able to rethink standard practices and innovate new
methodologies that will test and define its parameters.
3.4.2.3 The Predictable Confusion and Contradictions
Given the nature of the phenomena associated with paradigm change, we now
know that we can expect a confusion of responses in our quest for a society that can
fulfil the modem ideal of government that is inclusive, egalitarian, and custodial.
Despite our best intentions, elements of the imposed normativity generated by the
unequal power relations that colonialism fostered remain deeply embedded in
established patterns of social interaction and personal expectation. We cannot leave
them behind until we develop viable alternatives.
Even when alternatives are found, we may continue to reproduce old
paradigms unconsciously with the transmission of culture from one generation to
the next for they are enmeshed in the fabric of our thoughts through cultural habit
and the metaphors that structure the languages we use. Despite our democratic
assertion of human equality, "anarchy" continues to mean "chaos" to those of us
raised in hierarchical traditions because we do not have non-hierarchical models for
accomplishing complex tasks. In effect, in most fields we have yet to develop
egalitarian ways of organizing our mutual dependencies. We rely on established
procedures because adequate replacements have not been found and, as Kuhn
pointed out, old paradigms may even reassert itself with increased vigour in an
attempt to deal with the accumulation of anomalies that trouble their coherence.
533 See MacMillan, Paris 1919.
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PARTIEIl
DROITS DES PEUPLES AUTOCHTONES DU CANADA
Confirmation des droits
existants des peuples
autochtones
Definition de « peuples
autochtones du Canada»
Accords sur des
revendications territoriales
Egalite de garantie des
droits pour les deux sexes
35. (1) Les droits existants - ancestraux ou issus de traites - des
peuples autochtones du Canada sont reconnus et confrrmes.
(2) Dans la presente loi, « peuples autochtones du Canada» s'entend
notamment des Indiens, des Inuit et des Metis du Canada.
3) II est entendu que sont compris parmi les droits issus de traites,
dont il est fait mention au paragraphe (1), les droits existants issus
d'accords sur des revendications territoriales ou ceux susceptibles
d'etre ainsi acquis.
(4) Independamment de toute autre disposition de la presente loi, les
droits - ancestraux ou issus de traites - vises au paragraphe (1)
sont garantis egalement aux personnes des deux sexes.
PART II
RIGH'rS OF THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLES OF CANADA
Uecognition of existing
aboriginal and treaty rights
Definition of "aboriginal
peoples of Canada"
Land claims agreements
Aboriginal and treaty
rights are guaranteed
equally to both sexes
35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian,
Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada.
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty rights" includes
rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so
acquired.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal
and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally
to male and female persons.
PARTII:CASESTUDY
Decolonizing Relations with Indigenous Peoples
at the Supreme Court of Canada
" ...what actually stands behind the majestic curtain of
Law's rationality and impartiality is nothing other than
ourselves and our own, often unruly social
t· ,,534prac Ices ....
Steven L. Winter
A Clearing in the Forest, 200 1.
534 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at xiv.
4.
METHODOLOGY and CONTEXT
"There is a need to move beyond mere description of
problems and issues to making sure that change does
in fact occur" 535
Graham H. Smith, 2004
reo Kaupapa Maori theory
As the discussion in Part I suggests, the task of assessing whether a state's
function is colonial or post-colonial in character is not a simple matter of
determining whether the relevant international conventions have been ratified. 536
Paradigmatic change, as described by Kuhn, is a complex process when it affects a
single scientific discipline. We can expect it to be all the more convoluted and
involved when it comes to a movement like decolonization, which implicates all
actors in whole societies, both domestically and internationally. Yet, even though
established habits and procedures are resistant to change, patterns of thought do
evolve and sometimes transformations are as instantaneous as the mental switch that
reveals alternate interpretations of Gestalt images or allows a physicist to read a
bubble photograph.53? This, may explain why churches in Quebec, which once
exerted immense authority, suddenly emptied towards the end of the twentieth
535 Smith, "From Conscientization to Transformation" at 52.
536 Organizations like Amnest International and Human Rights Watch were founded for this reason.
537 Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions at Ill.
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century.538 Perhaps "law" too will change. At least, that is the dream of many
Indigenous peoples.
Kuhn and the cognitive theorists have, on the other hand, also provided a
scientific explanation for the popular aphorism, "plus 9a change, plus c'est la meme
chose (the more things change, the more they stay the same). An old paradigm, as
Kuhn noted, will reassert itself unless there is a new one to take its place. When
social behaviour is considered, there is the added problem of identifying just what,
exactly, the functional paradigm was or should be. The decline of the church in
Quebec did not, for example, exorcise authoritarian practices from Quebec society.
Moreover, it would be a mistake to assume that such a complex and long-standing
institution could be reduced to a single dimension excluding other prominent
aspects of its functioning such as its provisions for spirituality, art, music,
psychological counseling, medical care, education, cultural cohesion and social
welfare.
So too with "law". The paradigms we use are construed from overlapping
and ill-defined impressions produced by both individual and shared experience that
can neither be fully articulated nor fully understood. As Kuhn observed, it is easier
to make distinctions concerning this mass of inchoate impressions when there are
models for guidance. A model may accommodate many complex concern without
needing to explain or articulate them all. It may also be designed to focus attention
on one particular aspect of cognition so as to facilitate certain characteristics. This
would explain why people using languages that have different words for "blue" and
538 See ego Luc Noppen, Lucie K. Morisset, Eglises du Quebec: un patrimoine areinventer (Sainte-
Foy, Presses de l'Universite du Quebec, 2005).
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"green" find it easier to distinguish these hues on the visual spectrum.539 So too,
we can expect that real social change - or the capacity to engage in alternate modes
of collective behaviour - may be facilitated by clarifying our understanding both of
the model oflegality we are moving from and of the model we aspire to.
With these observations in mind, the case study presented here approaches
the subject matter through concentric circles of understanding. First the list of
indicia for the "colonial" and "postcolonial" ideals identified in Part I was modified
to focus on judicial reasoning. The revised list was applied to Supreme Court of
Canada judgments rendered in over sixty cases decided following the formal
recognition of "aboriginal and treaty rights" by the Constitution Act, 1982. (See
Appendix 4) This assessment required identification of underlying premises of the
kind signaled by L'Heureux-DuM J. in the quote at the beginning of Part I.54o In
order to explain the evaluations arrived at, Chapter 5 considers some of the
fundamental social ideals and behavioural models that define the role of the
judiciary. Chapter 7 provides an overview of the Court's current conception of the
rights protected by s.35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. It begins with a synopsis
of the Court's idealized view of the law it applies to "Aboriginal peoples". Then it
considers the Court's practice at the end of the first quarter century following the
passage of s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 by examining three cases released in
December, 2006: R. v. Sappier/ R. v. Gra/41 ; R. v. Morris542 and McDiarmid
539 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 79.
540 2747_3174 Quebec Inc..
541 R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, 2006 SCC 54 (CanLII).
542 R. v. Morris.
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Lumber Ltd v. Gods Lake First Nation. 543 Finally, it summarizes the ways in which
the individual judgments in the sample reviewed conform to the indicia of colonial
and postcolonial legality. Since the ideals expressed by the Court confirm
postcolonial legality, the study concludes with a few observations concerning how
its role may adapt over time to support the egalitarian norms that have been
identified as a common human goal in both domestic and international law.
4.1 Scope of the Inquiry
The focus of this inquiry is exclusively on the content of judgments made by
the Supreme Court of Canada during the first quarter century since the Constitution
Act, 1982 came into force. As can be seen in the Bibliography; a wide range of
Canadian legal literature was reviewed before the cases considered in this study
were analyzed. However, the analytical framework applied here differs
substantially from those used in standard legal commentary and even though many
references have been made to the opinions of other legal scholars, there has been no
systematic attempt to catalogue how many writers agree or disagree with any
particular point. That would be a study in itself, raising complex questions
concerning whose writing should or should not be referred to, depending on which
concept of "law" and which concept ofjurisdictional definition is chosen.
Similarly, the analysis has, of necessity, made some references to the
philosophies and cultures of some Indigenous peoples whose rights have been
affected in order to illustrate colonizing influences and lacunae in the Court's
methodology. However, there has been no attempt to present a whole picture of any
543 McDiarmid Lumber Ltd v. Gods Lake First Nation.
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Indigenous social, legal or philosophical system. Nor has there been an examination
of the effect of the Court's reasoning on any particular Indigenous nation, on
Canadian or provincial governmental practice or on society as a whole. The
colonizing impact of educational institutions, the media, government bureaucracies
or other aspects of the social matrix are also left aside to focus narrowly on the
reasoning of the Supreme Court itself.
4.2 Indicia of Judicial Colonialism and Postcolonialism
For the purposes of this specific study, the indicia of colonialism and
postcolonialism identified in Part I were adapted to focus on the following ten
aspects ofjudicial decision-making:
4.2.1 Who made the judgment?
The first factor examined was the identity of the judge or judges. At the high
end of the colonial side of the scale, legal decisions will be made by someone who
is both appointed by and a member of a social group that is imposing its own mores
on excluded others. At the postcolonial end of the scale we might expect judges to
disappear entirely because full equality requires parties to solve their differences by
mutual agreement. However, judges have specialized training and expertise as
neutral arbiters who can illuminate the blind spots created by conflicting frames of
reference. Judicial function may accordingly be entirely postcolonial in character
when decision-making authority has been delegated to the judges concerned by the
interested parties, either directly or by social implication. This, of course,
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presupposes membership III or intimate knowledge of the cultures of those
concerned.
4.2.2 Who were the parties?
Regardless of his or her identity and conditions of appointment, any individual
judge may promote postcolonial mores by remaining focused on egalitarian values
and alert to indicia of colonialism that may appear at various stages of court
proceedings. This requires an awareness of the identity of the parties. If human
equality is considered primordial, people should be able to choose their social
relationships as Canadians ideally do when we marry or divorce, emigrate, contract,
form charitable societies, incorporate business ventures and adopt or renounce
citizenship.
When an externally defined identity is in play, as happened when slaves, women
and Indigenous people were excluded from decision-making processes through their
definition as non-persons, a court that aspires to postcolonial norms must be
particularly cautious. The same is true of circumstances in which decisions must be
delegated, as when dealing with children, the mentally handicapped or when
specialized medical, scientific or other expertise is required. Power imbalances are
of special concern, especially when one party is the state. In such circumstances,
postcolonial mores suggest that the courts will lift the governmental veil to consider
who the effective decision makers were and how personal preferences may have
influenced decisions made by state functionaries. If equality is a fundamental value,
the interpretations of those who happen to be state employees cannot be favoured
over those of other citizens on this basis alone.
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4.2.3 Whose cultural venue was used?
Colonial values are manifest when foreign, in-migrating cultural needs are
addressed by imposing foreign customs on those who are already there. It is
accordingly necessary to consider the court's status as a cultural venue. In Canada,
the risk of colonization by the court varies according to the social background of
those involved. As will be discussed in the following chapter, the legal procedures
currently in use are, in themselves, manifestations of a particular cultural heritage.
There may be little concern in this regard when all affected by the issues at hand
belong to this culture and there are no obstacles presented by differences in wealth,
class, education or other sources of social disempowerment. Those involved may
find they are able to present their points ofview according to their own customs and
in their own languages.
The presence of cultural difference does not, in itself, impugn a hearing. Those
who have immigrated into a society may be taken to have chosen to live according
to its form of social order. However, competent interpretation must be provided
when parties use languages that are unfamiliar to the judge. Without the capacity to
understand what is being said, a person is effectively excluded from cognitive
participation. Canadian jurisprudence has established the right to interpretation so
any accused may know the case they have to meet and give full answer and reply.544
Yet, even with interpretation or even when all speak the same language, experience
and fundamental values often do differ, giving rise to honest misunderstandings that
544 See ego Singh v. Minister ofEmpolyment and Immigration [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 re interpretation of
the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms s.7.
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may need to be investigated and resolved, or at least accommodated, to meet
postcolonial expectations.
4.2.4 How were the issues formulated?
A judge who is aware of the cognitive traps identified by Kuhn and his
successors might want to consider how the legal issues before the court were framed
and how they arose. Who defined the dispute? How did it come to court? Are the
parties seeking a viable resolution to problems they have been unable to negotiate
on their own? Or is the court's involvement the culmination of one party's attempt
to dominate the other? Indeed, have the issues been defined in a way that respects
all relevant perspectives? Or has an issue been devised so as to preclude the
substantive content of one party's concerns as happened when women, slaves and
Indigenous people were classed as non-persons? Were the laws invoked instituted
during the colonial age? Or are they the product of free and democratic processes
through which all concerned had a political voice?
4.2.5 Were the procedures biased?
In order to support postcolonial mores, court procedures must treat all
members of society equally. This principle functions on several levels. To begin
with, judges must act with neutrality and they are expected to disqualify themselves
if they have a particular connection with any party. Judicial decisions set precedents
that may affect the public at large and one of the reasons why hearings must take
place in public is to allow people to observe the process used to define the social
rules that structure collective life. Those whose rights may be directly implicated
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must be allowed to intervene if they see fit. Within the court process itself, rules of
procedure must be applied in a way that avoids bias. Other elements that may
import inequities include unequal access to legal counsel as well as practical
considerations that may affect the impact of court costs and time constraints. For
example, child care and employment obligations or distance from court registries
and legal libraries may effectively force some people to submit to regulatory
interpretations that are imposed on them by others.
4.2.6 Was the reasoning founded on evidence?
As the experiment Kuhn referred to concerning the misperception of black
hearts and red spades indicates, one of the most challenging aspects of the judicial
role concerns the assessment of evidence that is outside the conventional experience
of the decision-maker. Today, after decades of consciousness-raising concerning
gender issues, the refusal of 19th century judges to uphold women's political rights
seems almost incomprehensible. They were, after all, presented evidence showing
that the vote had already been exercised by women in Trois Rivieres in 1820 and in
local circumstances in 18th century England.545 However, 19th century judges may
never have lived in any social context in which gender equality was practiced. This
is significant because the tendency to ignore information that does not fit personal
experience or prevailing paradigms functions at a visceral level. As Nedelsky
observed, "things that seem self-evident, natural and beyond dispute to one group
are perceived very differently by people from a different background".546 Because
545 See Woo, "The Cracked Mirror".
546 Jennifer Nedelsky, "Embodied diversity and the Challenges to Law" (1997) 42 McGill J. 91 pUll.
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it is impossible to anticipate which elements are fundamental to a paradigm derived
from radically different experience, fair-minded judges must pay close attention to
the evidence submitted by the parties to ensure that none is overlooked and that they
do not rely excessively on personal presumptions under the guise of "judicial
notice" - particularly when accepted "truths" are in play.
4.2.7 What concept of law was applied?
The colonial concept of law is derived from sources that are foreign to one or
more of the parties and applied without considering their preferences. The
"objective" standard it applies is founded on egocentric or ethnocentric experience.
A postcolonial judgment, by contrast, will ground legality in consensual practices,
geared to meeting norms that were agreed to by the parties through mutually
inclusive legislative processes. It will accordingly consider whether or not the
parties involved had access to the construction or reformulation of the social norms
applied. For example, were they excluded from voting at the time the law concerned
was enacted? If so, particular problems arise. According to the postcolonial ideal,
the solutions to these must involve informed discussion and the consent of all
concerned.
4.2.8 What was the character of the reasoning?
Colonial judicial reasoning is declaratory in character. A judge need only
announce an outcome to make it legal so there is little need for explanation.
Judgments founded on a belief in human equality tend, by contrast, to be
introspective. They remain conscious of the personal bias inherent in all reasoning,
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taking great care to explain the logical process used as is required to persuade and
gain the consent of the parties.
The reasoning applied by a judge may either correspond to or contradict the
model of legality endorsed at the ideal level. Reasoning confirms postcolonial
values when it relates the positions taken in the judgment to principles that were
established through egalitarian processes. Short judgments are certainly more
accessible because more people have time to read them. Yet, selective blindness is
easier to avoid when each party's arguments are re-stated and systematically
addressed in written reasons that set out the decision-making process in detail for all
members of the society affected by the outcome. The need for full and complete
explanations tends to make decolonizing judgments long-winded. However, once a
paradigm for a particular area of law is established the need for judicial decisions
may diminish and judgments may become shorter because they may rely on
established analysis.
4.2.9 What values were applied?
The values reflected in a judgment may be either colonial or postcolonial in
character. Colonial characteristics are manifest when reasoning is founded on
"authority" or the social power to impose a particular state of affairs. Postcolonial
reasoning seeks evidence of consultation and consensus, reflecting consciousness of
the difficulties involved in defining and protecting equal rights.
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4.2.10 What perspectives were considered?
Kuhn's theory and subsequent research suggest that it may ultimately be
impossible to escape the ethnocentric or egocentric nature of our cognitive
processes. It is, however, possible to acknowledge and respect alternate
perspectives. Colonialism tends to assume that there is only one correct way of
looking at things, but as we move into the postcolonial age we are becoming
increasingly conscious of the ways in which the choices we make reflect
idiosyncratic values. A postcolonial approach to judicial reasoning can accordingly
be expected to note the options presented to the court and examine their
implications so as to uphold inter-cultural tolerance and the mentoring and
restorative approach to social problems that is replacing the authoritarian, exploitive
and punitive practices characteristic of colonialism.
4.3 Modified Analytical Chart
The character of a judicial decision can thus be measured in terms of the
following considerations:
Table 3. Indicia of Colonial and Postcolonial Judgments
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof
7. Concept of Law Imposed Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Respect/place for others
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4.4 Selection of Judgments
The model of analysis developed for this study was applied first to the
Indigenous Bar Association list of "key cases" concerning "Aboriginal and treaty
rights" decided following the enactment of section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982.547 This list ended in 2002. More recent decisions were identified through a
search on the Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII) web site using the
terms "Constitution Act 1982 s.35" and "Aboriginal" then eliminating cases that did
not consider the application of s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.548 Saskatchewan
Indian Gaming Authority v. CAW-Canada549 was dropped from the original list
because it deals only with a procedural matter, providing no material for analysis.
Some cases were assessed on the basis of the lower court decisions affirmed, in one
way or another, by the Supreme COurt.550 Other cases concerning "aboriginal rights"
from the 1982 to 2002 period were added to supplement the Indigenous Bar
Association list because they were cited by judges who relied on their own previous
reasoning.
The resulting list of cases set out in Appendix 1 to this work does not fully
represent the Court's involvement with Indigenous rights. The methodology used to
supplement the Indigenous Bar Association list excluded several relevant cases.
Mackiegan v. Hickman[1989] 2. S.c.R. arose from the Marshall Inquiry and
considered whether a judge of a superior court could be compelled to testify before
547 Indigenous Bar Association, http://www.indigenousbar.ca/conferences/papers.html (2/17/06).
548 Canadian Legal Information Institute, http://www.canlii.org confirmed (6/22/2006).
549 Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority v. CA W-Canada [2001] S.C.R. 644.
550 Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation; R. v.Deane. Goodswimmer v. Canada was conceded as
being moot.
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the Commission. Westbank First Nation v. British Columbia Hydro and Power
Authority [1999] 3 S.C.R. 134 found that a band could not use its taxing authority
under the Indian Act to levy funds from a provincial utility which had been granted
a licence to use of its land by the federal government. A search adding the term
"residential school" produced other significant cases. These and others which were
not included import complex issues that merit much fuller consideration than can be
managed within the confines of this study.551 The purpose of this research is not to
present a complete analysis of the Court's relationship with Indigenous peoples
during the past quarter century, but rather to introduce and demonstrate an analytical
methodology that may caste some light on the impasses that impair cross-cultural
understanding.
4.5 Analytical Process
The cases were read (or re-read) in chronological order using a two tiered
analytical approach. As well as looking at the character of the underlying premises
used to structure the reasoning, each case was systematically measured against the
scale of colonial and postcolonial indicia as revised to assess judicial reasoning. In
some instances separate evaluations were made for the effect of the judgment on
different social groups. For example, the Reference re Secession of Quebec was
evaluated with regard to Canada in general, as well as Quebec and Indigenous
peoples. (In another context, this judgment would also be amenable to analysis with
regard to non-European immigrants such as Chinese, Japanese or East Indians.)
551 Winnipeg Child and Family Services, (Northwest Area) v. G. (D. F.), [1997] 3 S.C.R., 1997
CanLII 336; E.B. v. Order ofthe Oblates ofMary Immaculate in the Province ofBritish Columbia,
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Because colonialism and postcolonialism both manifest themselves in
comprehensive multifaceted ways, it would be impossible as well as pointless to list
and explain every instance of certain indicia in every set of reasons. Points of
particular interest are discussed in the text and the charts in the appendices provide
useful summaries and brief notes on supportive examples.
The scores produced are not mathematically exact. Since subjectivity is an
inherent characteristic of human reasoning, persuasive arguments could be made for
higher or lower evaluations on almost every dimension considered. Moreover,
ambiguity runs rampant in the complex interplay between culturally diverse
assumptions and expectations. Characteristics of colonialism and postcolonialism
appear, at times, to be interwoven in the very same sentence, especially when
underlying assumptions about concepts like "law", "sovereignty" and "jurisdiction"
are taken into account. A point celebrated as a significant break-through by some
readers of a judgment could accordingly trigger profound disappointment for others.
My own perceptions concerning the relative importance of an argument or comment
wavered depending on which other case or which law journal article came to mind.
In effect, everyone who applies this system is likely to produce a somewhat
different rating based on their own individual insights, inspired by experience as
well as inexperience, not to mention the capacity for cognitive blindness that afflicts
us all, judges and readers alike. In the course of my reading, I sometimes became
aware of my biases or errors. For example, Gonthier's dissenting reasonmg m
Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Fown) included evidence of a decoIonizing
[2005] 3 S.C.R. 45, 2005 SCC 60 (CanLII); Blackwater v. Plint, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2005 SCC 58
(CanLII).
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perspective that I had overlooked in my initial analysis of Canadian Pacific v.
Matsqui. However, there must certainly be many other insights that I have
overlooked.
Though the evaluations provided here are all inherently subjective and highly
debatable, this variability is of no concern in postcolonial terms. The aim of this
exercise is not to produce an authoritative ranking, but rather to raise awareness of
assumptions and cognitive structures relied upon both by the Court and by those
who read its judgments. Because of the experiential basis of the prototypes that
shape our rational processes, ambiguity is a constant. Legal practice, as understood
in postcolonial terms, does not aim for a finality that is impossible to achieve. It
does, however, attempt to bridge social and cultural divisions such as the lingering
misunderstandings that continue to trouble Canadian relations with Indigenous
peoples. Postcolonial legal practice hopes to stimulate discussion and foster
understanding, both of existing social custom and of areas in need of reform.
4.6 Sources of Subjectivity
A postcolonial approach to law requires a constant awareness of the
subjective nature of all knowledge. Because of this, the backgrounds of the judges
will be considered in the following chapter. However, my own sources of
subjectivity should also be acknowledged. The questions I have raised are, in many
regards, the culmination of previous research concerning Chinese legal history552
and Haudenosaunee political philosophy as revealed by the "Six Nations"
552 Li Xiu Woo, "Repairing the Dome of Heaven: A Re-examination of the Classical Roots of
Women's Legal Status in China" (1994) 24.2 Hong Kong Law JoumaI231-275.
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application for membership in the League of Nations.553 Those familiar with the
Chinese Classics may recognize their influence in the acknowledgement of change
and ambiguity underlying the previous paragraph.554 As for the Haudenosaunee,
their paradigm for social order provided a model that raised issues that might
otherwise have passed unnoticed. It is unlikely that this is the only historical
prototype for a more egalitarian form of society.555 As the following chapter
indicates, there are precedents for populist rights in England itself. However, since
the Haudenosaunee model influenced my reflections and since it is one of the
models that the Supreme Court tacitly seeks to accommodate in its determinations
concerning "aboriginal and treaty rights", references to it are included at appropriate
points in the text.
At a more fundamental level, my own expenence as a member of the
colonizing culture during the last half of the twentieth century could also be
considered relevant. It is the filter through which this study was conducted and so I
will provide a brief outline: My ancestry of farmers, tradesmen and school teachers
of Welsh, Dutch and Norwegian origin, immigrated to various parts of the land that
became Canada between 1760 and 1919. According to family stories, my Dutch
ancestors were attracted by the prospect of an egalitarian lifestyle and by the
fraudulent or misguided promise that there was "empty" land on the prairies. My
grandfather, who came to Canada as an infant, had close friendships from childhood
553 Woo, Canada v. The Haudenosaunee at n.l31.
554 Note the assumption that change is a constant. See the I Ching or Book ofChanges which was
part of the curriculum for those appointed to the judiciary in Imperial China. Woo, "Repairing the
Dome of Heaven".
555 Consider ego elements of the Hanseatic League or the Jolof Confederation of Senegambia.
Boubacar Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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with Waw-see-ja-nas and Bill Standingready of the White Bear Reserve near
Carlyle, Saskatchewan.556 Judging by his accent, he may well have learned English
from the "Indians".
Like the prototypical judge on the Supreme Court of Canada, I myself had
no childhood contact or friendships with any Indigenous people. I began school
oblivious to Indigenous history and interests in Lethbridge, Alberta, probably under
the same curriculum as McLachlin C.J., at a school where we tried to practice
Scottish Highland dancing during winter lunch breaks. My prototypical
understanding of Britain was influenced by my maternal grandfather who emigrated
from London when he was nineteen and shaped by a year spent there at the age of
nine with parents who took full advantage of the opportunity to visit sites of
historical interest. My father was a plant pathologist who worked for the Canadian
Department of Agriculture and after he transferred to Ottawa our family hosted
visiting scientists from around the world at a time when international awareness in
the rest of the country was low. Canadian history in my youth was taught entirely
from a 19th century British colonial point of view, as it still seems to be taught
today.55? Despite the international visitors, daily life in an Ottawa suburb isolated
me from people of other backgrounds. I knew little about the lives of people who
lacked the security provided by civil service tenure or military command and I
remained ignorant about other cultures including those ofmy Dutch, Norwegian and
Welsh ancestors.
556 For a history of the area see Carlyle and District Historical Society, Prairie Trails to Blacktop
(Altona, Manitoba: Friesen Printers, 1982).
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I am, nevertheless, part of a generation that opened up to the world through the
increasing accessibility of education and international travel. I attended Queen's
University at Kingston, Ontario and graduated from Memorial University in
Newfoundland in 1970 with a degree in sociology and English literature. I spent
three years travelling through Europe and Asia learning about where the house
guests of my childhood had come from. Adult employment included teaching
primary school in a Newfoundland outport and participation in the opening of China
trade (1978-86) through a small Vancouver business importing antique porcelain,
hand-made carpets and other arts in partnership with my late husband of Quebecois
origin.558
After playing our small role in facilitating Canadian relations with China, I went
back to school and received an LLB from the University of British Columbia in
1990. I articled at the Immigration and Refugee Board as a Refugee Hearing
Officer cross-examining people who claimed Convention refugee status before
practicing at Fan and Co. in Vancouver's Chinatown. The legal aid work I did at
that time to supplement work for the core business clientele was mostly for
Indigenous people and others suffering from obvious misfortunes such as childhood
abandonment, mental retardation and head injuries.
When my husband died, I left Vancouver to do a masters in international law at
the Universite du Quebec aMontreal. I focused on Indigenous issues at the request
557 Note ego Gendron and Henderson, Canada, A People's History (http://history.cbc.ca/histiconsD or
see ego Maddock ed., History and Citizenship Education as contrasted ego with Blanchard, Seven
Generations.
558 See "Jean-Paul Martino" in Fran~ois Charron ed. Imaginaires surrealistes: poesie 1946-1960
(Montreal: Les Herbes rouges, 2001).
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of former clients and was eventually qualified to teach for a few sessions in the
Programme of Legal Studies for Native People at the University of Saskatchewan.
My close personal friends now include people of many Indigenous, colonial and
immigrant origins. In short, my social background has left me predisposed to the
polyglot populist values represented by the postcolonial perspective.
5.
The Internal Architecture of the Court's Reasoning
"The fundamental objective of the modern law of
aboriginal and treaty rights is the reconciliation of
aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples and
their respective claims, interests and ambitions."
Binnie J.,
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada, 2005. 559
The legal objective identified by Binnie for a full and unanimous Court in
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada560 is fundamentally postcolonial in spirit.
This judgment reasoned from the assumption that the "claims, interests and
ambitions" of Indigenous peoples exist on a level of parity with those of "non-
aboriginal peoples". It also viewed "law" in terms of common objectives rather
than authoritarian command, bringing it close to the postcolonial ideal despite the
constraints of the Court's institutional format and the genesis of the issues before it.
Yet both judgments in Marshall/Bernarcf6 / decided just a few months earlier and
both judgments in R. v. Morris decided at the end of 2006 exhibited nine out of ten
of the characteristics of colonial legality identified here. Why did this happen?
As discussed in Part I, the rejection of colonialism involves a change in the
concept of legality. The capacity to command and control that dominated the
colonial age must yield to a quest for human equality and social consensus. This
559 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister ofCanadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 (CanLII), I.
560 Ibid.
561 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, 2005 SCC 43 (CanLII).
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shift in both focus and practice has placed Canadian judges in a difficult position.
Many of the legal precedents and institutional norms that they are expected to
uphold in the name of equality are products of the command model of legality that
prevailed during the country's historical construction. Moreover, despite their
privileged position, judges are only part of the broad matrix of influence that may
push society as a whole to adopt either colonial or postcolonial modes of behaviour.
Judges cannot change the written constitution or laws. They can only interpret them
and they must do this in the context of the issues that happen to be presented to
them. As pointed out by Lamer C.J.:
"To a large extent, the Court is the prisoner of the case
which the parties and interveners have presented to us,
and the arguments that have been raised, and the
evidence that we have before us ... ,,562
Paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, postcolonial norms would be violated if
the judiciary were to caste off their medieval robes to institute radical revisions in
the procedures and frames of reference that define their function. Such usurpation
of the idealized role of the legislature would be inherently colonial in character and
do nothing to facilitate the postcolonial transition that concerns us. There are,
moreover, no institutional alternatives available to replace many traditional aspects
of the judicial role. If postcolonial norms are to be realized in full, some
circumstances require the judiciary to wait for the slow percolating process of
consensus formation to run its course and culminate in whatever constitutional and
legislative revisions the people they serve may find necessary.
562 Ref re Remuneration ofJudges ofthe Provo Court ofP.E.!. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at [82].
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Within these constraints, the members of the Court can, none the less,
exercise considerable influence based not only on their traditional social position,
but also on their extensive knowledge concerning the content and structure of
Canadian law. Even in the most egalitarian of contexts their specialized expertise
and their position as elders in Canadian society would lend weight to their opinions.
Yet, when it comes to implementing postcolonial legality with regard to
Indigenous issues their limitations are obvious. As the full Court has already
acknowledged in the Mikisew Cree First Nation case:
"The management of these relationships [between
"aboriginal" and "non-aboriginal" peoples] takes place
in the shadow of a long history of grievances and
misunderstanding. The multitude of smaller
grievances created by the indifference of some
government officials to aboriginal people's concerns,
and the lack of respect inherent in that indifference has
been as destructive of the process of reconciliation as
some of the larger and more explosive controversies.
".563 [text in brackets added]
However, liberal as this formulation may seem, it did not acknowledge the historical
fact of colonialism per se and, since the Court determined in the Reference re
Secession of Quebec564 that Canada is founded on "an historical lineage stretching
back through the ages", the need to examine underlying premises to prevent
reversion to the colonial paradigm remains an on-going concern.
The present chapter focuses on aspects of what the Secession Reference
referred to as the "internal architecture,,565 of Canadian legality. These are often
taken for granted. Section 5.1 below examines the prototype for social order upheld
563 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada at [I].
564 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [49].
565 Ibid., [50].
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by the Court. Section 5.2 considers the social role that judges are expected to play
within that order. Section 5.3 looks at the social backgrounds of the judges
themselves. Section 5.4 examines the conceptual and metaphoric structure of
judicial reasoning, while section 5.5 looks at the frames of reference applied in the
judgments. All five areas are potential sources of inter-cultural misunderstanding
which raise questions related to the goal of reaching a mutually agreeable
reconciliation between Indigenous rights and Canadian custom.
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5.1 The Concept of Social Order
"Two features have at all times since the Norman
Conquest characterised the political institutions of
England...The first of these features is the
omnipotence or undisputed supremacy throughout the
whole country of the central government. .. The second,
which is closely connected with the first, is the rule or
supremacy oflaw."s66
A. V. Dicey,
Introduction to the Study ofthe Constitution, 1885.
In the preamble to the British North America Act, now known as the
Constitution Act, 1867, Canada's constitution was described as being "similar in
Principle to that of the United Kingdom".s67 As British commentators have noted,
the origins of some of the beliefs and practices from which their constitutional
model evolved are lost in times68. Canada has inherited this British "deficiency".
There are, moreover, significant differences between Canada's constitution and that
of the colonial motherland that are camouflaged by the unwritten character of the
British constitution. This is not, however, a barrier to identifying constitutional
norms. It simply requires a more acute awareness of the precedents that have shaped
"legal" practice and of their variation through time.
566 As cited by Weir, Beetham, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain, 27. Note that
Dicey was writing at the height of British colonial power.
567 See ego Remuneration Reference, [83] et. seq.
568 See ego Weir, Beetham, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain; Pollock, Maitland,
The History ofEnglish Law.
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As Kuhn's theory suggests, we construct our understanding of the world using
models based on past experience. Even when not explicitly acknowledged, as for
example when a codified system is applied, these underlying mental constructs are
reflected in metaphoric inferences that operate at a predominantly subconscious
level concealed in the language we use to formulate our thoughts. It is only after
these basic prototypes are established that we develop the conscious abstract
theoretical models needed to classify and understand our world. Our capacity to
comprehend reality tends thus to be shaped and constrained by past experience. So it
was with the British constitution. It developed in practice before it was described in
words. Thus, as the Court stated in the Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, Canada is
founded on "an historical lineage stretching back through the ages".569 When this
lineage is examined, we find that both colonial and postcolonial models for
constitutional behaviour can be found in the historical record.
5.1.1 Anglo-Norman Heritage
Canada's constitution is structured on habits of social practice that were
carried through colonization and the conquest of New France from England where,
as Dicey has suggested, the Norman conquest of 1066 A.D. is conventionally
considered to be the beginning of the country's legal history.57o When the Normans
imposed their brand of legality and political order, they established a foreign elite on
569 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, [49].
570 See ego Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 11; McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal
Title at 83. McNeil's conclusions concerning "conquest" by the Normans are based on the Case of
Tanistry (1608) Davis 28 at 41 rather than the content of the Doomsday survey.
220
top of a variety of pre-existing arrangements.571 At conquest, the population of
England is estimated to have numbered from one and a quarter to two million and,
according to the Doomsday book, 17% of the land was held by the king and his
family, 26% by bishops and abbots and 54% by about 190 lay tenants-in-chief.
Though several formerly independent Anglo-Saxon and Danish thanes became sub-
tenants of Norman lords, the only member of the pre-conquest nobility who retained
his estates had collaborated with the invasion.572 Thus, the majority of Norman land-
holders came from the area that is now northern France. In other words, the
Doomsday book did not concern itself with the land rights ofIndigenous Britons.
As in the subsequent colonization of North American, the only documentary
evidence of what life was like in those years was compiled predominantly by the
conquerors. Yet despite the displacement of the previous overlords, it is believed
that the changes the Normans brought had little effect on the lives of sub-tenants
and the peasantry who continued to cultivate the same land as before.573 Of these,
only a few were free men. About 30% of the population were villains who were
required to cultivate the lord's land as well as their own. Small holders and cotters,
who owed greater services to their lords, sat lower on the social scale and about a
tenth of the population were slaves who held no land and were considered to be
chatte1.574 Norman society was accordingly imposed on the basis of norms that were
571 Knowledge of this era is uncertain. Feudalism as a system of dependent land tenures was not
universal in England prior to 1066. McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title at 80.
572 Thomas Hinde ed. The Domesday Book: England's Heritage, Then and Now (Godalming, Surrey,
England:CLB International, 1997) at 14,17.
573 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 195.
574 Hinde, The Domesday Book at 17.
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anything but egalitarian for the majority of the people appear to have been
subjugated.
5.1.1.1 Constitutional Reciprocity
Despite the fact that the conquest effected a form of colonization, the
English constitution was not conceived in totalitarian terms. There were reasons
why the majority of the people co-operated with this militarily imposed regime.
William I justified his rule by claiming to be the lawful heir to his predecessor,
Edward the Confessor. 575 More importantly, he promised the English they could
keep their own laws. The political relations established by this means were
understood as reciprocal bonds of loyalty that resembled the status established by
marriage. 576 As explained in Halsbury 's Laws ofEngland::
"The relationship of subject and monarch was
conceived of as a personal one, involving a bargain
under which the monarch gave the subject protection
and undertook to govern according to the laws of the
land, and the subject owed the monarch legally
enforceable allegiance".577
Thus, even though it was externally and forcefully imposed, Norman legality was
conceived in terms of the protection it offered from foreign invasion and other
forms of social disorder. There had, after all, been three contenders for the English
throne at the time of Edward the Confessor's death.
575 The English Earl Godwin and his heir, Earl Harold, objected to the legitimacy of Edward the
Confessor's choice. Hinde, The Domesday Book at 11.
576 Halsbury's Laws of England (4th), vo1.8(2), 26. Elizabeth I wore a ring at her coronation to
symbolize her "marriage" to the people of England. Chris Openshaw dir.; David Starkey, nar.
Elizabeth (B.B.C. - The History Channel, A and E Television, 2002).
577 Ibid.
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5.1.1.2 Hierarchical Structure
The bond between subject and monarch mirrored the bond between subject
and lord that characterized feudal society.578 In Norman times, a process called
"subinfeudation" created chains of relationships leading from the sovereign to the
person who actually worked the land. Under this system, land ownership was
separated from occupation and use. In theory, as later described579, only the
monarch had full ownership. The subject's right to use land was protected by his
lord in return for swearing an oath of allegiance by which he was expected to follow
his lord's commands in everything except treason, theft and murder. A lord forfeited
his lordship if he took away the land the tenant used or failed to protect him.
According to Pollock and Maitland, the feudal bond may well have been so socially
powerful that a man could be obliged to fight on his lord's behalf against the
king. 58o William the Conqueror consolidated his hold on England through the
innovation of requiring all lords to pay homage and swear an oath of allegiance
directly to him.581 This produced a pyramidal social structure whose basic geometry
continues to serve as a model for Canadian concepts of social order despite
substantial institutional change and the abandonment of most aspects of feudal
practice and belief.
5.1.1.3 Paradigmatic Persistence
The origins of the feudal system are lost in time. It appears to have grown out of
lived experience and it was not described in writing until Littleton's Tenures was
578 See ego Pollock, Maitland, The History ofEnglish Law.
579 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 162.
580 Ibid at 298-300.
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printed in 1481.582 By then, it was considered part of an idealized past. There have
been significant constitutional reforms since that time; yet many of the beliefs and
expectations generated by the Anglo-Norman feudal paradigm remain embedded in
the conceptual architecture of its cultural heirs. The American revolution could, for
example, be seen as a consequence of the Crown's inability to provide protection in
the colonial setting where, for all practical purposes, the colonists were already
relying on themselves. The Royal Proclamation, 1763 and other assertions of
Crown "protection" for Indigenous peoples are consistent with this model for social
order that saw itself as a protector of locally defined legality.
The persistence of this paradigm can be seen in the fact that, to this day, oaths of
allegiance continue to be sworn both in Canada and in the United States reflecting
the common belief that citizens have religiously sanctioned duties of loyalty and
obedience to the state.583 This deeply rooted cultural patterning that presumes that
social "order" requires obedience to a superior conflicts with the more recent
democratic assertion that government is by and for the people. It also conflicts in
several regards with at least some Indigenous world views. For example, as seen at
Oka and discussed in the course of this work, the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) insist
that government should serve in an exclusively representative capacity.
Another constitutional thread that can be traced to Norman feudal
preoccupations is the male preference that has been a bone of contention in the
581 Ibid..
582 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 162.
583 The American Pledge of Allegiance appears to be a reversion to the earlier model. It was first
published in a children's magazine and adopted for use in schools in 1892. It was not until 1954
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recent struggles for gender equality. Feudal society was founded by warriors who
distributed wealth and power unequally. Female roles in this society were ignored
and women had no formal political function except for the occasional individual
who became a monarch. Recruitment to the hereditary elite was based on
patrilineal, male-preferred, primogeniture and the persistence of this polarized
concept of social order has been documented in modem Canada by works like John
Porter's The Vertical Mosaic. 584 As set out in the introduction to this work, it was
only during the twentieth century that the formal exclusion of women from
governmental processes was officially terminated. Yet the basic institutional
structure to which women gained admission was designed by and for men and it
remains in place. This is another source of conflict and misunderstanding with
Indigenous cultures. In the case of the Haudenosaunee, for example, powerful
political roles for women are provided for by the constitutional structure of their
polity.585
5.1.1.4 Personnification
English constitutional history is long and it involved many democratizing
reforms. However, the metaphoric representation of the state by the monarch has
persisted since Norman times and it continues to permeate the language of law and
government. The colonies from which Canada evolved were initially "ruled" by
"governors" who represented the monarch. Though successive reforms have rendered
when President Eisenhower was in office that the words "under God" were added. "Pledge of
Allegiance" http://en/wikipedia.org (8/27/2006)
584 John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis ofSocial Class and Power in Canada (University
of Toronto Press, 1965).
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their role largely ceremonial, the Queen remains the "head of state" today, for Canada
as well as Britain. She presides over the House of Commons and the Senate and
represents the state as the Crown in litigation. In 1608, Sir Edward Coke, then Lord
Chief Justice of the Common Pleas,described the relationship between subjects and the
monarch in Calvin's Case saying:
"Ligeance is a true and faithful obedience of the
subject due to his Sovereign. This ligeance and
obedience is an incident inseparable to every subject:
for as soon as he is born he oweth by birth-right
ligeance and obedience to his Sovereign....As the
ligatures or strings do knit together the joints of all the
parts of the body, so doth legiance join together the
Sovereign and all of his subjects ...But between the
Sovereign and the subject there is without comparison
a higher and greater conncexion: for as the subject
oweth to the King his true and faithful legiance and
obedience, so the Sovereign is to govern and protect
his subjects, ... ,,586
As this metaphorical representation confirms, the English monarchical state tended to
be seen as a single human body with control vested entirely in the Monarch.
The corporate unity between subject and monarch is not, however, always
maintained. In court cases, legal issues are presented in an oppositional format that
separates the individuals concerned from the state to which they presumably belong.
Thus cases have names such as Nowegijick v. The Queen or R. v. Horse. Like Coke's
unified metaphor, the representation of the state as an individual whose interests are
separate from those of the citizen concerned reinforces the external character of social
control, contradicting the democratic theory that government is by the people. It also
585 Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations, 98-100; Karoniaktajeh, Hom, English trans.
Gayanerekowa.
586 Calvin's Case (1608), 7 Co. la at lOb, 77 E.R. 377, (K.B. and Exch. Ch.) at l.(a).
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amplifies hierarchical preoccupations because it suggests that decision-making is
ultimately the responsibility of one person, the head of state, even though this is not
actually the case.
5.1.2 Modern Apparitions of the Feudal Paradigm
This phenomenon reflects one of the characteristics of paradigmatic function
identified by Kuhn. Until an adequate replacement has become established, people
must necessarily rely on the precedents provided by old paradigms to shape their
thoughts and order their conduct. Although Anglo-Norman society is part of a dimly
understood past, the geometry and metaphoric presumptions that structured feudal
social relations are woven into modem practice. They might be seen, for example, in
the doctrine of "parliamentary supremacy" discussed by Dicey. The judicial system
likewise follows a hierarchical model for, as graphically described on the Supreme
Court of Canada web site:
"The Supreme Court of Canada stands at the apex of
the Canadian judicial system...The Canadian courts
may be seen as a pyramid, with a broad base formed
by the provincial and territorial courts whose judges
are appointed by the provincial and territorial
govemments."S87 (emphasis added)
There are many other manifestations of the pervasive Canadian tendency to assume
that social order must necessarily be understood in hierarchical terms. Despite the
notional equality of federal and provincial jurisdictions under ss. 91 and 92 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, the doctrine of federal paramouncy developed to deal with
587
"Role of the Court: The
csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/role/index e.asp (7/1/05).
Court's Jurisdiction" http://www.scc-
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inconsistencies.588 Parliament in Ottawa tends to be described as the top level of
government, sitting above provincial and territorial governments, which in tum are
depicted as being above municipal and local governments.589 The electorate, if
represented at all in diagrammatic representations of the Canadian polity, are
conventionally placed at the bottom of the social pyramid and they may be referred
to metaphorically as a "popular base", as ''foot soldiers", "grass roots" or in other
terms that signify a lowly position.59o
This again conflicts both with the twentieth century notion of human equality
and with at least some Indigenous concepts of social order. New Canadians are told
that the "Constitution" is "the system of laws and conventions that we Canadians
use to govern ourselves".591 Yet, despite the formulaic assertion that Canada is a
"democracy" and that "democracy" represents "government by all the people,,592,
common parlance excludes "the people" from "the government", perpetuating the
feudal distinction between subject and monarch. This separation is implicit in the
chain metaphor invoked to tell prospective citizens that their Member of Parliament
is their "linlC' to "the federal government", who can ask questions "about" and help
get information ''from'' the federal government. 593 In other words, "government" is
588 Federal and provincial law are supposedly equal within the spheres defined by the Constitution
Act, 1867 ss 91 and 92; however, in overlapping areas, the doctrine of federal paramouncy renders
provincial laws inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency. See ego Hogg, Constitutional Law of
Canada at ch.16.
589 A Look at Canada 2004 ed. (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada,
2004) at 29, 30.
590 The circumstances in which various metaphors are used merits more systematic research.
591 A Look at Canada at 13.
592 See "democracy" in Sykes, The Concise Oxford Dictionary..
593 A Look at Canada at 33.
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spoken of as a separate, personified entity rather than as a process for collective
decision-making.
In modem practice, the personification motif represented by the ubiquitous
Crown appears to maintain the effective exclusion of the people from governmental
decision-making processes. The metaphoric distinction recurs frequently in
descriptions of governmental function. For example, according to the Public
Information Office of the Library of Parliament:
"We cannot marry or educate our children, cannot be
sick, born or buried without the hand of government
somewhere intervening".594 (emphasis added)
One of the consequences of choosing to refer to government as if it was a human
body distinct from the citizenry is the assumption that there must be a "head" of
state. As everyone knows, the body cannot survive without a head. Political rivals
were literally beheaded at some points in British history. Even though there is no
significant difference between the mental capacity of either the Queen or the Prime
Minister and anyone else, personification of the state enhances the importance of
people in such positions and tacitly reinforces the command theory of legality. This
happens because the metaphor is frequently conflated with reality. The human body
cannot function without a head and so there is a tendency both to ignore the
cognitive capacities of ordinary citizens and to presume that all organizations need a
"head" in order to function and that without a "head" there is no control.
The language used by the Supreme Court of Canada in its judgements
concerning s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 did not break from this metaphoric
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schema. Applications of democratic theory to analyses of "aboriginal rights" in
relation to those of the in-migrating society were conspicuous by their absence.595
Corbiere altered voting rights for all Band Council elections in Canada using a
process in which the majority of the people affected had no representation what so
ever.596 Similarly, the Court applied the Indian Act and the Natural Resources
Transfer Agreements without acknowledging the fact that the Indigenous peoples
concerned had not participated in their formulation or demonstrated their informed
acceptance of their terms.597 In this regard, the Court acted consistently as an agent
of the Crown to control Indigenous peoples as if they were little more than ligatures
or joints.
5.1.2.1 Paradigmatic Conflict
Attempts to solve problems that arise between Canadians and Indigenous
peoples often founder on the false presumptions produced by metaphors like the
personified representation of the Crown. One prominent example was described by
Mac1aine and Baxendale in This Land is Our Land. Early in the Oka crisis, Surete
du Quebec police approached the people camping by the barricade at the entrance to
the Pines where their ancestors were buried and demanded to meet their spokesman:
594 Eugene A. Forsey, How Canadians Govern Themselves 5th ed. (Ottawa: Canada, Library of
Parliament, Public Information Office, 1980,2003) 1 and back cover.
595 Aside from the Secession Reference, the only discussions of democratic practice occurred in
Goodswimmer v. Canada and Corbiere. v. Canada.
596 Pleadings at trial concerned only the Batchewana Band, which was not represented. Corbiere at
[32]. At the Supreme Court there were 5 interveners: Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc.,
Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, Lesser Slave Lake Indian Regional Council, Native Women's
Association of Canada and United Native Nations Society of British Columbia. These organizations
could not, in any sense, provide democratic representation of the people affected by the Corbiere
decision, yet the Court accepted the idea that its judgment would affect "most if not all Indian bands
in Canada". Corbiere v. Canada at [22].
597 See R. v. Horse at [7]; R. v. Horseman; R. v. Blais.
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"You are talking to our spokesmen," answered one of
the women. "You're talking to our women and
children. There are children here. Don't point your
guns at us".
The police fired tear gas at the people, then repeated their demand.
"The women asked Johnny Cree to come up and speak
to the police. He agreed....
"Are you the leader?" asked the SQ officer.
"No, I'm just a spokesperson," said Cree. "There is no
leader. The people lead".598
Because of his cultural conditioning, this answer did not satisfy the police officer.
The Mohawk's could not produce a "leader" for their people because they do not
use this model for social order so there was none. The police, however, presumed
both that there had to be a "head" and that the people should "obey". The stand-off
escalated and lasted all summer, with traumatic consequences on both sides. The
Commission des droits de fa personne du Quebec later found that the long-standing
tensions with the people of Kanesatake were founded on a conflict between two
legal orders. 599
Fifteen years later, the fundamental social assumptions that feed such conflicts
are still poorly understood and very much in evidence, especially in the
hierarchically structured court system. The Mohawks are not the only ones to
complain of misunderstanding at this basic level. Rupert Ross has reported that
Ojibway women in Northern Ontario see the hierarchical structure imposed by the
598 Madaine, Baxendale, This Land is Our Land at 14 - 17.
599 Monique Rochon, Pierre LePage, Oka-Kahnehsatke - EM 1990 (Rapport de la Commission des
droits de la personne du Quebec, Avril 1991) at 54 -56.
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Indian Act as the source of physical and sexual abuse in their communities. As one
woman stated:
"..we see the charter as just one more step down the
whiteman's road. We don't want to take that step. We
want to try a different path instead".600
5.1.2.2 Paradigmatic Persistence
The subliminal power of pyramidal geometry should not be underestimated.
Even though the Constitution Act, 1867, designates concomitant but separate
jurisdictions for the federal and provincial legislatures, the courts have determined
that when federal and provincial laws conflict, federal law should prevail according
to "the doctrine of paramouncy,,601 Cabinet function has likewise drifted into a
hierarchical format. As Senator Eugene Forsey has pointed out, the Prime Minister
was described in the mid-twentieth century as being "the first among equals";
however, it is now considered that all elected representatives must bow to a decision
made by the Prime
Minister.602
Despite democratic reforms that ostensibly favour government "by the people",
the semantic positioning of "law" remains above the people in a way that is difficult
to reconcile with notions of popular rule and human equality. Canadians are
expected not only to abide by the law, but also to obey it603 and, according to s.15 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, they are only equal "before and under the law"
600 See ego Ross, Returning to the Teachings at 55.
601 See Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada at ch.16.
602 Forsey, How Canadians Govern Themselves at 39.
603 Canada, A Look at Canada at 39.
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(emphasis added).604 This vertical schema is consistent with Winter's observation
that, according to Anglo-American cultural metaphors, power is "up".605 It is
replicated in the seating arrangement of most court rooms where the judge or judges
sit on a raised platform at one end of a room and the seating fans out past the
lawyers and court reporters to accommodate the mass of the public who are usually
separated from those involved in the proceedings by some sort of railing.606 Court
architects may even accentuate the effect by placing a high skylight over the judge
and a low ceiling over the public in inverse relation to the need for air.607
Rupert Ross has learned through his association with the Anishinabe or Ojibway
that this type of hierarchical social ordering violates the emphasis they place on
interconnected relationships. Some judges in northern courts that deal almost
exclusively with Indigenous people have accordingly modified seating arrangements
to take a more egalitarian circular format. 608 For the Anishinabe, as for Canadians,
behaviours like assault are unacceptable. However, instead of focusing on the guilt
or innocence of an individual, they seek to heal the whole social matrix within
which the dysfunction occurred. This requires the involvement of a broad range of
people, creating a pattern of interaction that differs substantially from that found in
standard Canadian courtrooms which focus on the guilt of a particular individual.
As he described it, those sitting in a sentencing circle are considered equals:
604 Constitution Act, 1982 s.15.
605 Winter, "The "Power" Thing".
606 At a trial I attended in France, the seating arrangement was similar but the jury sat behind the
bench with the judge.
607 See ego the court house in Burnaby B.C.
608 See ego Ross, Returning to the Teachings at 7.
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"A question is asked, or an issue raised, and then,
going around the circle, each person takes turns
speaking to it. Everyone is free to speak as long as
they wish, or not at all. The choice is theirs, and no
one will interrupt or show impatience. No one speaks
until it is their tum, and everyone concludes their tum
by saying thank you to the circle for their chance to
contribute.,,609
Ross cited an article by Philmer Bluehouse and James Zion concerning the
Navaho Justice and Harmony Ceremony to explain the differences between
Indigenous mediated justice and the adjudicated justice of the colonizing society:
"Adjudication uses power and authority in a
hierarchical system. A powerful figure [the judge]
makes decisions for others on the basis of "facts"
which are developed through disputed evidence, and
by means of rules of "law" which are also contested by
the parties... In sum, adjudication is a vertical system
of justice which is based on hierarchies of power, and
it uses force to implement decisions.
In contrast, mediation is based on an essential equality
of the disputants. If parties are not exactly equal or do
not have equal bargaining power, mediation attempts
to promote equality and balance as part of its process.
It is a horizontal system which relies on equality, the
preservation of continuing relationships, or the
adjustment of disparate bargaining power between the
parties.,,610
The use of mediating processes of one kind or another does not necessarily rule out
all roles for the institutions of the colonizing society. The judiciary may, for
example, have a role to play in ensuring that the cultural space required for
egalitarian dispute resolution is provided.
609 Ibid at 140.
610 See ego ibid at 56 citing Bluehouse, Zion, "Hoozhooji Naat'aanii".
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Mutually accepted methods of inter-cultural reconciliation are not likely to be
appealed and none of the cases examined for the purposes of this study made any
reference to accommodations of the kind Ross reported. Isolation from this aspect
of legal practice leaves the Supreme Court at a disadvantage. Despite its well-
meaning intention of reconciling Indigenous and no-indigenous interests, its
reasoning demonstrated no awareness of some of the structural problems that bring
Canadian institutions into conflict with at least some Indigenous ways of doing
things. There was thus no reflection on the difficulties involved in reconciling
circular models for social order with the hierarchical structuring represented by the
Supreme Court of Canada.
5.1.3 Inter-Cultural Mismatch
As the Oka incident suggests, the subliminally pervasive presence of
hierarchical patterning presents a significant challenge to egalitarian reconciliation
with Indigenous peoples. The command model of legality that is implicit in
hierarchical structure is, for example, completely incompatible with the
Haudenosaunee social ideals in play at Oka - both in terms of wealth distribution
and relational expectations.611 Though a full inter-cultural analysis is beyond the
611 See ego Cadwallader Colden, The Five Indian Nations Depending on the Province ofNew-York in
America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964 reprint ofPt.l 1727; Pt.2 1747); Alfred, Peace,
Power and Righteousness; Jose Barreiro ed. Indian Roots ofAmerican Democracy (Ithaca, New
York: Akwe:kon Press, Cornel University, 1992); Morrison, Justicefor Natives; Foster, Campisi,
Mithun, Extending the Rafters; Donna Goodleaf, Entering the War Zone: A Mohawk Perspective on
Resisting Invasions (Penticton, British Columbia, Canada: Theytus Books,1995). Kahente Horn-
Miller, The Emergence ofthe Warrior Flag: A symbol ofIndigenous unification and impetus to
assertion ofidentity and rights commencing in the Kanionkehaka community ofKahnawake (M.A.
anthropology, Concordia University, 2003) [unpublished]; Beverley Jacobs, International Law/The
Great Law ofPeace (LL.M. thesis, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan, 2000)
[unpublished]; Jemison, Schein, Treaty ofCanandaigua 1794; Karoniaktajeh (Louis Hall) Warrior's
Hand Book (Kahnawake Mohawk Territory: Rotiskenrakete - Kahnawake Men's Society, 1997
reprint); Kahntinetha Hom, Traditional Culture and Community conception: An Analysis ofthe on-
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scope of this study, a brief review of Haudenosqaunee social geometry may help to
clarify the dimensions of the problem represented by the Court's attempts to
reconcile Indigenous concepts of legality with the assumptions that underlie Anglo-
European tradition. How, for example, is the standard Canadian pyramidal model to
be reconciled with the wampum of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy?
Fig. 3 Haudenosaunee Confederacy Wampum.612
~\
:' ·l
.1
going struggle between the Great Law and the Code ofHandsome Lake in Kahnawake (M.A.
Department ofLaw, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1997) [unpublished].
612 Illustration from Diamond Jenness, Indians ofCanada 7th ed. (University of Toronto Press reprint
of Bulletin 65, Anthropological Series No. 15, National Museum of Canada, 1932) at 136.
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5.1.3.1 Haudenosaunee Political Models
The idealized model of social order represented by the Haudenosaunee
Confederacy Wampum (Fig. 3) is circular in format with strings of beads
symbolizing the people whose opinions, linked together, represent the councilors.613
Unlike the Foucault/Bentham panopticon (Fig. 2), there is no position of centralized
control. The idea of central control is fundamentally incompatible with
Haudenosaunee political philosophy, which sees autonomous responsibility as a
basic ethical ideal and understands social order in terms of linkage and
relationships.614
This principle of egalitarian linkage can also be seen in The Hayewahta
(Hiawatha) wampum belt, which is popular today as a decorative motif on
everything from bumper stickers to baby bonnets615 It represents the confederation
of the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondagua, Cayuga and Seneca nations using a model that
excludes both hierarchy and the concept of a single "head of state" or Crown.
Fig. 4 Hiawatha Belt 616
613 See ego Jacobs, International Law/The Great Law ofPeace. at 9 -11.
614 See ego Williams, Linking Arms Together at 64 and 54.
615 See ego Darren Bonaparte, Creation and Confederation: The Living History of the Iroquois
(Ahkwesahsne Mohawk Territory: The Wampum Chronicles, 2006).
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The same principle can be seen in the "Linking-hands" symbolism used in a variety
of forms to depict treaties and accords.
Fig. 5 Linking-Hands Symbolism in Haudenosaunee Wampum
A) "Great Treaty Wampum Belt" ca. 1682 associated by Pennsylvania Quaker tradition with a
treaty with the Delaware. 617
B) Wolf belt of the 81. Regis Mohawks said to represent a pact of peace and friendship with the
French guarded by wolves.618
616 Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois, (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1988) at 29.
617 Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984),246.
618 Parker, The Constitution ofthe Five Nations at 162; Graymont, The Iroquois at 72.
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C) The Washington covenant belt, commissioned by the U.S. Congress for conveyance to affirm
peace with the Six Nations in 1779 or 1789. 619
The antiquity and persistence of the concept of linked autonomy can also be seen in
the concept of the Covenant Chain. The English expression "chain" seems to have
been a translation of this imagery of linked or clasped hands. According to Walters,
an "iron chain" treaty had initially been negotiated with the Dutch.62o Following
their displacement by the English, the Covenant Chain was confirmed in 1644
619 William Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse: A Political History of the Iroquois
Confederacy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998),237.
620 This issue merits further research. According to Kanienkehaka oral tradition, the treaty was a
hemp chain with the Dutch, an iron chain with the French, a silver chain with the British and a gold
chain with the Unitged States. Oral communication, Kahntinetha Horn, 20 Jan. 2007.
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through the Haudenosaunee gift of wampum and the reciprocal English gift of a
silver chain.621 During the ceremony, a Kanienkehaka orator reportedly addressed
the Governor of New York concerning how the parties were now of "one head
(mind)".622 However, this phrasing is consistent with the metaphors used for the
collective decision-making process described in the Haudenosaunee Great Law of
Peace. 623 It does not in any sense suggest that the Haudenosaunee had been
absorbed into the person of the Crown under the authority of a single head of state.
This is evident in the way the wampum imagery depicts many heads linked through
the intentional, voluntary and egalitarian gesture of holding hands.
By contrast, the metal chain that represented the same relationship for
Europeans is an inanimate object used to stop ships from drifting away or even to
prevent prisoners from escaping. Like the ligatures in Coke's metaphor, it ignores
the mutual will and intelligence required to maintain human connections and
negates the autonomy that is essential to Haudenosaunee political concepts. The
conceptual shift that occurred in translation reflects a fundamental misunderstanding
that can be charted in the historical record.624 Its on-going influence on current
reasoning at the Supreme Court of Canada was explicit in Binnie's minority
judgment in R. v. Mitchell. In an attempt to accommodate an "updated concept of
Crown Sovereignty" based on his reading of the "merged" or "shared" sovereignty
621 Walters, "Brightening the Covenant Chain" at 80-81.
622 Ibid at 81. The Walters quote says "of one heart and one head(mind)" The idea of being of one
heart is consistent with English imagery that sees the state or Crown as a single corporate body.
However, it is reportedly inconsistent with Kanienkehaka understanding of the relationship which
can only be "ofone mind". Oral communication, Kahntinetha Hom Jan. 20, 2006.
623 Parker, The Constitution ofthe Five Nations"; Karoniaktajeh, Kahn-Tineta Hom, Gayanerekowa.
624 See ego Walters, "Brightening the Covenant Chain" at 102 et seq. re Johnson's objections to the
misinterpretation ofagreements he had negotiated.
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promoted by the final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoplei25,
Binnie suggested that "aboriginal and non-aboriginal Canadians together form a
sovereign entity", proposing that:
" ... to return to the nautical metaphor of the "two-row"
wampum, "merged" sovereignty is envisaged as a
single vessel (or ship of state) composed of the
historic elements of wood, iron and canvas. The
vessel's components pull together as a harmonious
whole, but the wood remains wood, the iron remains
. d h . ,,626Iron an t e canvas remams canvas.
What he does not seem to have noticed is that his interpretation of the Two Row
Wampum is simply a restatement of the single body metaphor used by Coke in
Calvin's Case. It represents his own culture's concept of the Crown, imagining a
European ship with wood, iron and canvas. Presumably it had only one rudder and
one steering wheel. His misappropriation of Indigenous symbolism accordingly
reduced Indigenous peoples to mind-less structural elements, fully assimilated under
colonial command, ignoring the requirement under international law for prior
informed consent when one polity is absorbed by another. 627
5.1.3.2 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
The same structural problem troubles the proposals of the Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples. Like the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Wampum, the
Commission's logo envisages circular, linked relations without any governing head.
The Commission also used a circular format to conceptualize the principles of a
renewed relationship between Canada and Aboriginal peoples:
625 Mitchel/v. MNR. at [129].
626 Mitchel/v. MNR. at[130].
627 Western Sahara, Le.I., 16 October, 1975 at 12, [57]
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Commission's logo envisages circular, linked relations without any governing head.
The Commission also used a circular format to conceptualize the principles of a
renewed relationship between Canada and Aboriginal peoples:
Fig. 6 Circular symbolism at the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples628
FIGURE 16.1
The Commission's Logo
Th~ logo was designed by]ouph Sagutch, an Ojibwa artistporn Toronto, Ontario.
It was chosm by the Commission from among 51 entries.
FIGURE 16.2
The Principles of a Renewed Relationship
Recognition
Sharing
Respect
Yet, when it came to considering organizational relations between Canada and
Indigenous peoples, the Commission continued to envision a hierarchical model that
ignored the distinct nationalities and preferences of the Indigenous peoples
concerned.
628 Erasmus, Dussault, (ReAP, 1996), Lookingforward, looking back at 676-7.
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Fig. 7 "Organization of the Government of Canada,,629
flCURE 3.2
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We are accordingly faced with questions concerning how this culturally entrenched
hierarchical model that presumes an organizational head with top-down control can
be reconciled with circular Indigenous models that exclude positions of control such
as that presented by Haudenosaunee traditionalists who object to the very possibility
of this kind of command or "leadership" role.
5.1.3.3 Creative Co-Existence
Despite the structural incompatibility of Canadian concepts of social order
and at least some Indigenous models for human society, these cultures have
coexisted, and even co-operated, for several centuries. This may have been possible
because, as Richard White has pointed out, cultural conventions do not have to be
629 Rene Dussault and Georges Erasmus co-chairs, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, v.2,
Restructuring the Relationship (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services. 1996) at 362.
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"true" to be effective. In effect, as some legal pluralists suggest, different legal
norms can be applied to the same factual situation.63o Thus, people functioning in
terms of incompatible ideals can coexist and co-operate in ways that allow each to
pursue both shared and different goals.
Notwithstanding the impact of European diseases, it is now believed that
European beliefs did not in themselves disrupt Indigenous customs so long as the
members of the in-migrating culture remained too few in number to enforce their
norms on the original inhabitants of the land.631 Making an observation that
supports this theory, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples situated "the
imposition of a colonial relationship" in conjunction with the Indigenous
displacement caused by the settler influx that followed the end of the War of
1812.632 This corresponds with the findings of legal historians who have noted
changes in policy with regard to Indigenous peoples during the last quarter of the
eighteenth century.633
630 See ego Sebastien Grammond, Les Traites entre I 'Etat canadien et les peuples autochtones
(Cowansville, Quebec: Les Editions Yvon Blais, 1995) at 8; Sally E. Merry, "Legal Pluralism"
(1988) 22 L. & Soc. Rev. 869; Sally Falk Moore" Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous
Social Field as an Appropriate Object of Study" 7 L. & Soc. Rev. 719; Andree Lajoie, Roderick A.
MacDonald, Richard Janda, Guy Rocher eds., Theories et emegence du droit: pluralisme,
surdetermination et effectivite (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1998).
631 Note especially French Algonquian relations in the Great Lakes region. White, The Middle
Ground, ch.2.
632 Erasmus, Dussault, (RCAP, 1996), Restructuring the Relationship at 362.
633 See ego Morin, L 'Usurpation de la souverainete autochtone; Mark Walters, "Brightening the
Covenant Chain: Aboriginal Treaty Meanings in Law and History after Marshall" (2001) 24.2
Dalhousie Law Journal 75.
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5.1.4 British Constitutional Norms
Aside from the practical impossibility of exerting de facto control during the
first centuries of colonial "plantation", certain English constitutional features may
have facilitated early inter-cultural co-existence.
5.1.4.1 Minority Respect and the Rule of Law
The "rule of law", which is the second constitutional characteristic identified
by Dicey, is frequently misunderstood. Since justice was seen as a prerogative of
the Crown, many people today assume that British royal power was totalitarian. For
example, a resource guide prepared by Heritage Canada claims that "In Europe,
during the Age of Discovery...kings and queens directly ruled over their countries
through royal prerogative, which gave him or her absolute power to rule".634 In the
case of England, as well as at least some other European and non-European states,
this representation of monarchy is a misapprehension.635 Indeed, as philosophers
from the time of Mencius (372-289 B.C.) have pointed out, monarchical power
depends ultimately on popular support because people will rebel or desert tyrannical
regimes if they can find a better option.636
The fact that the power ofthe English monarchy was not customarily considered
to be absolute is very well documented. Notwithstanding Cokes' metaphor in
Calvin's Case, this understanding is reflected in the reciprocal conceptualization of
the subject-monarch relationship as well as the myriad detail of historical acts and
634 Canadian Heritage/Patrimoine canadien, Canadians and Their Government
http://canadianheritage.gc.calspecial/gouv-gov/section1 (7/28/05).
635 Consider Scandinavia or see ego Louis Assier-Andrieu, Le peuple et la loi: Anthropologie historique
des droits paysans en Catalognefranrraise (Paris: Librarie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1987).
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social custom. William I did not rely on conquest to justify his rule. He persuaded
people to accept his rule by claiming to be a defender of English law and the lawful
heir of Edward the Confessor.637 The localized conception of the "rule of law"
applied at that time is reflected in the limitations placed on his royal successors by
instruments like the Magna Carta of 1215 and the Bill of Rights of 1689.638 The
original British constitutional paradigm favoured an ethos of respect for
difference.639 As described in Halsbury's Laws of England, the constitution was
customarily conceived in contractual terms.640 This principle of constitutional
reciprocity may well explain the relative longevity of British monarchy. Instead of
subjecting the people to alien rules, the colonizers of Britain left a considerable
amount of law making in the hands of the people. Despite all of the beheadings,
executions for treason and wars that litter that country's history, diversity remained
an institutional norm.
The Normans, for example recognized three distinct legal systems: the law of
Wessex, the law of Mercia, and the Danelaw and within these juridical norms could
vary from one manor to the next.641 According to the Magna Carta, even Welshmen
were protected, for their land and liberties could not be removed without legal
636 Li, The Ageless Chinese; James Legge trans. The Works ofMencius in The Chinese Classics 2nd•
ed. rev. voU (Shanghai: Oxford University Press, 1935) at 125.
637 The English Earl Godwin and his heir, Earl Harold, objected to the legitimacy of Edward the
Confessor's choice. Hinde, The Domesday Book at 11.
638 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 11 and 21.
639 Re deeply embedded cultural themes see ego Parkhill, Weaving Ourselves into the Land
640 Halsbury 's Laws ofEngland (4th) vo1.8(2) at 26.
64! Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 12.
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judgment of their peers according the laws of Wales.642 When the colonization of
North America began, Englishmen carried their varying laws with them. Kentish
legal custom governed the Massachusetts Bay Company's charter, which conferred
land: "as of our manor of Eastgreenwich, in the County of Kent, in free and
common Socage, and not in Capite, or by knightes service".643 However, other
New England settlements were governed by different sets of laws, depending on the
terms of Crown grants and whether or not they were established under royal
charter.644
As confirmed by the Covenant Chain and Two Row Wampum, the principle of
accommodating differing systems of legality was shared by Indigenous peoples, so
in this regard, English and Haudenosaunee systems of law overlapped. The British
even extended this principle to conquered territories. Thus the Quebec Act, 1774645
restored French civil law following British conquest in the same year that the Court
of King's Bench held in Campbell v. Hall646 that once the king had instituted a
legislature for a conquered colony, he could not impose laws or taxes through the
use of prerogative power. As recently as 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada
confirmed this basic constitutional principle in the Reference re Secession of
642 Albert Beebe White and Wallace Notestein trans. Source Problems in English History (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1915) at Medieval Sourcebook: Magna Carta 1215
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/mcarta.html see s.56.
643 Cronon, Changes in the Land at 71. The Charter of Massachusetts Bay: 1629, The Avalon
Project, Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon (24/04/2007)
644 Ibid. This situation contributed to disputes such as that reviewed in Johnson v. M'Intosh, (1821)
21 U.S. 543, 8 Wheat 543. See also Norgren, The Cherokee Cases.
645 Quebec Act, 1774 (U.K.) R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No.2.
646 Campbell v. Hall (1774).
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Quebec with its affirmation of "constitutionalism and the rule of law; and respect
for minorities.,,647
5.1.4.2 Conquest and Dominion
If respect for minorities is basic to the Anglo-Canadian constitutional system,
some violations of this principle are of equally ancient standing. The use of force to
accomplish acts of colonization and conquest is obviously incompatible with the
principle of inter-cultural accommodation. Yet the rise and expansion of the British
empire and of English culture in general was based on an ethos of dominion that
included many contradictory elements. In terms of British constitutional norms, the
American revolution could be seen as a reaffirmation of the principle of rule by the
people as far as the colonists were concerned. However, when the rebels rejected
..
subject status they also rejected obligations incurred under treaties Britain had made
with Indigenous nations. This may be one of the reasons why Indigenous allies often
sided with the British rather than the Americans when forced to choose sides at that
time.
5.1.4.3 The Norman Paradigm
According to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, the current
Canadian quest for "Negotiation and Renewal" seeks to replace the ethos of
"Displacement and Assimilation" that prevailed during the 19th and 20th centuries.648
However, as Kuhn pointed out, paradigm change is often accompanied by a more
647 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec.
648 Erasmus, Dussault, (ReAP, 1996), Lookingforward, looking back, 38.
. 1· . f ld 1 649ngorous app IcatlOn 0 0 ru es.
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We might thus expect the reassertion British
historical prototypes during the postcolonial quest to achieve the goal of human
equality.
Table 4 Norman monarchy as experienced by Indigenous Britons650
Colonial Postcolonial
Source of Laws Imposed Self-determinedx
1 Foreign constitution Yes Own constitution
2 Alien law-maker Yes Makes own law Some
3 Foreign language Yes Own language Some
4 Imposed interpretation Yes Participates/consents Some
Social Order Hierarchical Egalitarian
5 Dominant class Yes Social equality
6 Decides for others Yes Autonomy Some
7 Class specific laws Yes Equal laws Some
8 Disparities of wealth Yes Provision for all
9 Exploitive Yes Custodial Some
Form of Law Enforced Consensual
10 Orders/commands Yes Agreed Goals
11 State initiated Yes Interactive Some
12 Armed enforcement Yes Co-operative agenda Some
13 Punishment Yes Mentoring/restitution
Social discourse Exclusive Inclusive
14 Dictated Yes Dialogue Some
15 Specialized language Yes Shared language Some
16 In camera processes Yes Public processes Some
17 Dominant perspective Yes Plural perspectives Some
Total 17 6?
Without conducting an in-depth study of Norman monarchy, it is apparent that
the social model it provided, corresponds to all of the indicia of colonialism
identified in Part 1. The ordinary peasant was probably not a "free man" and hence
not a beneficiary of the protections afforded by the Magna Carta. The Normans
649 See ego Bruce Ryder, "The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism:
Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations" (1991) McGill L. J. 308; Thomas Isaac,
"The Concept of the Crown and Aboriginal Self-Government" (1994) 14.2 Canadian Journal of
Native Studies, 221; Walters, ""The "Golden Thread" of Continuity".
650 The evaluation would differ for the landed gentry or barons who actually negotiated with
monarchs and were able to assert their own constitutional customs, functioning in their own
language.
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conquered.651 They installed a new ruling class. They ignored whatever Indigenous
identities may have survived previous British colonizations using their own
constitution and language to impose their own beliefs and priorities and keeping
political power concentrated in the hands of a few land owners. These actions
served as a precedent for the colonial process later advocated by Thomas More's
Utopia and carried into effect in overseas practice. Yet, when the Norman
administration is examined for indicia now associated with postcolonialism, respect
for a substantial measure of cultural autonomy can still be found.
Then, as now, county assemblies and other regional institutions administered
local affairs and the customs these employed varied significantly across the royal
domains, which extended at one time from Scotland to Gascony in what is now
France.652 "Sovereignty" was not seen as an absolute power. As demonstrated by the
limitations placed on King John by the Magna Carta, the "rule of law" ideally
curbed the arbitrary exercise of power by subjecting all members of society,
including the monarch, to particular social protocols.653 Though the language of
the invading monarchy was not the language of the people and the existence of
villeinage attests to social stratification, land could not initially be enclosed for
private ownership unless those who had been using it in common agreed. Trials
were conducted in public. Juries participated in the interpretation of law and
651 The conquest was of the people and cannot be taken as leading to the aquisition of the land.
Consider McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title.
652 Britain's entry into the European Union is likely to inspire new prespectives on its historical
development.
653 There was no ready remedy for breaches of the law by the monarch so practice could violate the
ideal. As a practical matter, strong monarchs like Elizabeth I heeded popular sentiment of those who
were near though she also presided over colonial operations in Ireland and overseas that were
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evidence, and the eventual development of parliament provided a venue for regional
representation. It is thus evident that many elements of both colonial and
postcolonial practice can be traced to the Norman source of Anglo-Canadian legal
tradition.
5.1.5 Conclusions
The Court's attempt to reconcile Canadian and Indigenous concepts of
legality faces a major hurdle when it comes to the concept of social order. Anglo-
Canadian political geometry assumes a pyramidal shape, while at least some
Indigenous concepts of social order are circular. Moreover, Canadian culture
presumes that there must be a head of state who can direct the polity as a whole and
this concept violates some of the most basic tenets of at least some Indigenous belief
systems which place such great store in personal autonomy that their representatives
on council are not authorized to make decisions without consulting the people.
Despite these differences, many of the characteristics of postcolonial legality are
deeply rooted in Anglo-Canadian tradition suggesting that stability may be
maintained during the decolonization process through a reassertion or revitalization
of some past practices and traditions.
arguably genocidal in character. See ego Allen, The Invention of the White Race; Williams, The
American Indian in Western Legal Thought.
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5.2 The Judicial Role
"The task of the Court has been to clarify the legal
framework within which political decisions are to be
taken "under the Constitution", not to usurp the
prerogatives of the political forces that operate within
that framework" 654
Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, 1998
According to the web site of the Supreme Court of Canada, the British North
America Act, 1867 "defined the basic elements" of the Canadian judicial system.655
However, the Act itself provides no explanation of what the judicial role was
expected to be, confining itself to declaring how judges are to be appointed, selected
and paid.656 In effect, Canada shares what Weir and Beetham consider to be one of
Britain's major systemic deficiencies: its failure to define the function of the
judiciary in relation to democratic criteria.657
The concept of what judges should do, like the concept of social order
discussed in the previous section, is derived from the declaration in the act's
preamble that defines Canada's constitution as being "similar in principle to that of
the United Kingdom". Rand J., cited with approval by Lamer C.J. in the Reference
re Remuneration ofJudges, found that the preamble articulated "the political theory
654 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, [152].
655 "Role of the Court: Creation and Beginnings of the Court" http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/role/index e.asp (7/1/05). See the Constitution Act, 1867 ss.96-101.
656 Constitution Act, 1867, ss.96-101.
657 Weir, Beetham, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain at 443.
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which the Act embodies".658 But our understanding of this political theory depends,
once again, on the "custom usage and convention" identified as a source of
constitutional norms by Lederman659 and implicit in the "historical lineage" relied
upon by the Court in the Reference Re Secession ofQuebec.66o An understanding of
what Canadian judicial function is, must accordingly begin by considering the
historical evolution of the judiciary.
5.2.1 The Origin of the Judicial Role
Baker has suggested that the personalization of authority inherent in the
judicial role is derived from the constitutional ascendancy of the king. 661 The
folcriht of Anglo-Saxon custom had no judge. The court's ability to assume a
supervisory role by compelling suitors to attend court depended on a capacity to
exercise control. The judicial role is thus seen as a derivative of the royal power
that made it possible to enforce judgments by order. This suggests that judicial
function depends on the colonial character of the social order from which it was
derived because it involves an ability to impose particular outcomes or
interpretations of the law. However, as discussed in the previous section, judicial
function emerged from a context that had the institutional capacity to accept some
cultural diversity and some traditional sources of legality in ways that may be
considered consistent with postcolonial norms.
658 Remuneration Reference at [82].
659 Ledennan, "Canadian Constitutional Amending Procedures" at 341.
660 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [49].
661 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 9.
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At the time of Glanvill (justiciar of England, 1180-80), a great variety of
local legal custom existed within the English monarch's jurisdictional sphere. The
records of that era are not as comprehensive as those of more recent times, but we
do know that, juries were employed to assess factual evidence in relation to local
mores and, aside from the king's courts, England once had courts of lords as well as
courts of the shires, hundreds and boroughs. The decisions of these courts were
sometimes appealed to the king's court whose judges initially acted as deputies of
the monarch in a society that had recourse to archaic procedures such as trial by
ordeal and trial by battle. In company with the broad range of the sovereign's
power, English legality also included ecclesiastical courts inspired in part by Roman
law and in part by stories from the Christian Bible which includes accounts of the
judicial practices of King Solomon.662
Whether appeals to the king and his court were inspired by the monarch's
military capacity or by a populist rule of law principle, they had a unifying effect.
By the time trans-Atlantic colonization began, the interpretations of the king's court
were developing into "the law of the realm", common to all and known as the
"common law".663 Without conducting a specific study of any of the identifiable
influences, it is obvious that judicial practice in England drew inspiration from
precedents of many kinds. Some entwined with the Christian belief in a supreme, all
powerful, all knowing God who would hold everyone accountable at death on "the
Day of Judgement,,664 and some supported the "accommodation of difference" still
662 See ego Baker, ibid., 298; Mouser, The Cross-Reference Bible, I Kings 3: 16.
663 See ego Baker, ibid. at 9 and 12.
664 Mouser, The Cross-Reference Bible at 228.
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espoused by the Supreme Court of Canada. Others manifested a lethal intolerance
that saw people of one religious persuasion or another hanged, drawn, quartered and
disemboweled according to law but on the flimsiest of evidence.665
5.2.1.1 Rejection of the Divine Right of Kings
During the 17th century the Stuart monarchs violated what are now seen as
the traditional terms of the British constitutional bargain666 by claiming absolute
power under the doctrine of the "divine right of kings". Coke C.l. and a number of
other judges were dismissed. Charles I even attempted to govern without
parliament. This rejection of established institutions led to Cromwell's rebellion
and, according to Baker, when the British monarchy was restored the capacity of the
judiciary to act independently to protect the "rule of law" was considered
sacrosanct. Following restoration of the monarchy, judges continued to be appointed
by the king; however, the personal loyalty they owed under the oath of allegiance
was now articulated as a duty to uphold the integrity of the office of the Crown and
of English common law.667 The traditional British constitutional bargain of loyalty
in return for protection was thus reaffirmed and the judicial role was understood as
an obligation to maintain a particular concept of social order that respects the "laws
of the land".
665 See ego H.B. Irving, The Life ofJudge Jeffreys (London: Heinemann, 1898).
666 See ego Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 123-4; McHugh, "Tales of
Constitutional Origin" at 69-70.
667 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 114.
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5.2.1.2 Colonial Migration
There was, concomitantly, little concern with the laws of the lands that were
being colonized. Like Thomas More's Utopians, British colonists carried their laws
with them when they emigrated. Many were attracted to foreign shores because they
were dissenters of one sort or another or because they were economic migrants
seeking a place where they could realize their ideals or at least live decently.668
Baylin has argued that the colonial movement was simply an extension of migratory
patterns that were already well established in Britain.669 Thus movement from town
to town and from country to city rippled into an overseas Diaspora. Whatever
motivated their departure, colonists were sometimes required to guarantee their
loyalty to the Crown before they set sail. For example, in 1634 the Mary and John,
destined for the Puritan colony of Massachusetts Bay, was detained at
Southhampton until the passengers had sworn an oath of allegiance to the king.67o
Thus each colonist was personally bound to carry the authority of the English
Crown abroad.
5.2.1.3 Indigenous Social Influence
Because of the Indigenous depopulation caused both by European diseases
and by the genocidal character of some of the initial inter-cultural meetings, the first
"New England" colonists often moved into a juridical vacuum. The original
668 See ego George F. Willison, Saints and Strangers (New York: Time Reading Program special
Edition, 1964 reprint of 1945).
669 Bernard Baylin, The Peopling ofBritish North America: An Introduction (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1986).
670 Victoria Freeman, Distant Relations: How My Ancestors Colonized North America (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 2000) at 20.
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inhabitants had either died or fled from areas of contact.671 Yet those who met the
Indigenous guardians of the continent now known as North America were
fascinated by their egalitarian lifestyle. As Cadwallader Colden marveled in his
1727 History ofthe Five Indian Nations:
"they never execute their Resolutions by Compulsion
or Force upon any of their people".672
This made their social order fundamentally incompatible with that of the settlers
whose institutions, including the judiciary, were frequently compulsory in
character.673
Many early settlers witnessed Indigenous council meetings including Sir
William Johnson (1715-1774), who became the first Superintendent of Indian
Affairs for the northern British region in 1755. With the conquest of Quebec in 1760
his responsibilities extended to Canada. The son of Irish gentry, Johnson (1715-
1774) formed a partnership with a young Mohawk woman, Konwatsi'tsaienni
(1736-1796). Known in English as "Molly Brant", she bore him nine children and
exercised considerable influence in Indigenous society.674 The British continued to
seek her support after Johnson's death, particularly in relation to their fear of
671 See ego Jack Leustig, dir. 500 Nations (U.S.: Warner Brothers, 1994); Willison, Saints and
Strangers. The disappearence of the large settlement surrounded by cultivated fields visited by
Cartier in 1535 by the time of Champlain's visit in 1603 remains controversial. James White ed.
Handbook ofIndians ofCanada, (Ottawa :appendix to the Tenth Report of the Geographic Board of
Canada, 1913), 200 at http://www2.marianopolic.edu/quebechistory/encyclopedia (8/12/2006);
"Hochelega (village)"(sic) http://en.wikipedia.org (8/12/2006); Marcel Trudel ed, Champlain
(Montreal: Fides, 1956 reprint of Champlain's memoirs of 1618).
672 Colden, The Five Indian Nations at xx.
673 Many works include reflections on this aspect of Indigenous societies. See ego Leacock, Myths of
Male Dominance.
674 She was a Mohawk. As the older sister of Joseph Brant she probably also enhanced his career.
Lois M. Huey and Bonnie Pulis, Molly Brant: A Legacy ofHer Own (Youngstown, New York: Old
Fort Niagara Association, 1997); Earle Thomas, The Three Faces of Molly Brant (Kingston, Ont.:
Quarry Press, 1996).
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further uprisings like Pontiac's "rebellion,,675 and Lady Simcoe, the wife of the
British Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada (1791-1796), saw their union as an
advantageous match.676
Though little known to the rest of the world, the philosophy of the
Haudenosaunee677 (also known as the "Iroquois" or "Five Nations") has arguably
had a significant impact on modem political thought. Benjamin Franklin published
an account of the 1744 Inter-Colonial Council at Lancaster including controversial
speeches by Teoniahikarawe (Hendrick) and Canesatego who urged the British
colonies to unite in friendship as the Haudenosaunee had done in the pre-contact
era.678 In 1754 Franklin drafted the Albany terms of union at a conference attended
by 150 "Iroquois" and 23 representatives of the British colonies.679 Though the
constitution eventually adopted after the American secession differed in format, the
United States Senate has formally acknowledged the "Iroquois" contribution to
American political deve1opment.68o
This influence, in tum, has had a significant international impact. The
rejection of monarchy became a wide-spread movement and the United States
Constitution eventually served as a model for the preamble to the Charter of the
675 Huey, Pulis and Thomas ibid.
676 J. Ross Robertson ed., The Diary of Mrs. John Graves Simcoe, wife of the first Lieutenant-
Governor ofthe Province ofUpper Canada, 1792-6 (Toronto: William Briggs, 1911) at 247.
677 "Haudenosaunee" literally means "people of the long house" in metaphoric reference to
traditional bark houses. The houses could be enlarged and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy
contemplated the addition of other nations to the original five members. See ego Foster, Campisi,
Mithun, Extending the Rafters. "Haudenosaunee" is the Onondaga form of "Rotino'shon:ni" in
Kanionkehaka (Mohawk). Oral communication, Kahntinetha Hom.
678 Bruce E. Johansen, Forgotten Founders: How the American Indian Helped Shape Democracy
(Harvard: Harvard Common Press, 1982); Robert W. Venables, "The Founding Fathers: Choosing to
be the Romans" in Barreiro, Indian Roots ofAmerican Democracy.
679 See ego letter to James Parker in Lemay ed. Writings, at 442.
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United Nations. 681 Iroquoian models have also had an impact on the field of
anthropology where Henry Lewis Morgan's League of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee,
Iroquoii82 was the first full ethnography of an "Indian tribe".683 His later work,
Ancient Society, was used as a reference by Engels when he wrote The Origin ofthe
Famity, Private Property and Society. 684 Yet European society, both at home and in
its colonies, retained many of its coercive and authoritarian characteristics.
5.2.1.4 Reaffirmation of the Judicial Role
Despite the American rejection of monarchy, Marshall C.l of the United
States Supreme Court, like Coke C.l. before him, asserted a strong, hierarchically
structured role for the judiciary in the newly independent state. In 1803 he ruled in
Marbury v. Madison685 that the Supreme Court of the United States had jurisdiction
to settle disputes concerning the distribution of legislative powers between federal
and state governments and that constitutional law would prevail over statute law in
case of conflict. Thus, British assumptions concerning both the judicial role and the
character of social order were replicated in American constitutional practice. The
hierarchical, coercive, adversarial concept of legality was retained, while the
680 S. Con. Res. 76,2 Dec. 1987.
681 Hans J. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A critical analysis of its fundamental problems
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1950) at 6.
682 Henry Lewis Morgan, League of the Iroquois, (Secaucus, N.J. 1962 reprint of Rochester: Sage
and Brother, 1851).
683 Leacock, Myths ofMale Dominance, 90; Dean R. Snow, The Iroquois (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994)
at 168-76.
684 Leacock, Myths ofMale Dominance at 90; Johansen, Forgotten Founder at, 122.
685 Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U. S. (I Cranch) 137.
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American Bill ofRights replicated the protective function once asserted by Britain's
theory ofmonarchy.686
5.2.2 Modern Concepts of the Judicial Role
Despite lacking formal constitutional definition, modem members of the
Canadian public have no difficulty identifying judicial function. In stereotypical
television caricatures, as well as in reality, the judge ritually reinforces hierarchical
social notions, presiding over the courtroom from behind a high desk or "bench",
often wearing a voluminous robe of medieval European design, and possibly a wig.
He (or she) peers down at the plaintiff or their lawyer on one side of the room and
the respondent or their lawyer on the other. If it is a criminal trial, there will be the
accused in the prisoner's dock and the prosecutor. There may also be a jury to the
side. Judges typically wear black robes and they may carry a wooden gavel to pound
on the bench and cry out "Order in Court".
At the Supreme Court of Canada, judges have red robes for the most formal
occasions and their behaviour is more sedate, though no less ceremonial. Yet the
drama and paraphernalia alone do not define judicial function. As Chief Justice,
Beverley McLachlin, sees it:
"Courts offer a venue for the peaceful resolution of
disputes, and for the reasoned and dispassionate
discussion of our most pressing social issues."
686 The first ten amendments to the U. S. constitution were passed by Congress Sept. 25. 1789 and
ratified by % of the states Dec. 15, 1791.
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The judiciary, according to her explanation, guarantee that governments act in
accord with the constitution. They give effect to Canadian law and meaning to civic
rights and duties, demonstrating Canada's commitment to the key values of:
"democratic governance, respect for fundamental
rights and the rule of law, and accommodation of
difference".687
According to John D. Richard, the Chief Justice of Canada's Federal Court of
Appeal, the presence in Canada of an independent and readily accessible judiciary is
a means of ensuring that government decisions are transparent and free from
. fi 688mter erence.
Despite the profound twentieth-century reorientation in the concept of
legality outlined in the introduction to this work, none of the post 1982 cases
reviewed included any reflections on the ways this change may be affecting judicial
practice. Several judges did, however, make statements alluding to their
understanding of the Court's role.
5.2.2.1 Legislative Supervision
The Firearms Reference, like McLachlin C.J.'s description on the Supreme
Court web site, states that one of the Court's tasks is to supervise legislation to
ensure that it does not violate the Constitution.689 However, the Court's role is
passive. Courts do not initiate investigations into the nature and integrity of
governmental institutions or their interpretations of the law. They address only the
687 Beverley McLachlin, "Welcome", Supreme Court of Canada's Home Page, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/Welcome/index e.asp (7/1/05).
688 John D. Richard, "Federal Court of Appeal: Welcome" http://www.fca-caf.gc.ca/index e.shtml
(7/29/05)
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questions that happen to be raised by citizens, with or without government office,
who choose to invoke the judicial system. As Lamer C.l. stated in the Remuneration
Reference, the judiciary remain very much prisoners of the questions placed before
them. 690 The Supreme Court is only called into play when decisions made by
previous courts are appealed or when specific questions are referred to it by the
Privy Council. Moreover, the questions it addresses are defined narrowly in terms of
the aspirations of the parties and the legal issues invoked by the specific factual
circumstances at hand.
This limitation was of concern in the second Marshall decision. The case
had been brought to court because a Mi'kmaq man protested the charge that he had
violated Canadian law. The Court's finding that the defendant had a treaty right to
acquire enough trade goods to sustain a "moderate livelihood" and that Crown
officials had not met the requirements for infringing this right seemed to have broad
consequences for fisheries management. Yet, when the West Nova Fishermen's
Coalition requested a re-hearing so the scope of Canadian regulatory powers could
be considered, the Court refused saying the question was too broad. It insisted that
its jurisdiction was:
" ... limited to the issues necessary to dispose of the
appellant's guilt or innocence.,,691
It thus refused to become a venue for in depth discussion. This would appear to
violate Indigenous legal norms such as those of the Anishinabe described by Rupert
689 Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 at [35].
690 Remuneration Reference at [82].
691 Marshall II at [11].
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ROSS.692 If there had been Mi'kmaq representation in the legislatures concerned
with fisheries regulation or if there had been an on-going tradition of international
negotiation consistent with the 18th century treaties that served as the Court's source
of legality, the Marshall decisions might have served as an invitation for further
negotiations or legislative discussions. However, because of an institutional or
customary deficit in this regard the judgements seem to have opened the door to a
contentious episode in Canadian-Mi'kmaq relations that saw Canadian fisheries
officers ramming the fishing boats of those Mi'kmaq who did not accept the terms
Canadian officials offered.693
In the Court's view, which seems to replicate traditional British respect for
popular legality, responsibility for negotiating social order remains predominantly
with the people. Thus:
"The various governmental, aboriginal and other
interests are not, of course, obliged to reach an
agreement. In the absence of a mutually satisfactory
solution, the courts will resolve the points of conflict
as they arise case by case. ,,694
In practice, however, the disputes generated by the Marshall decisions never
reached the Supreme Court, if they reached any court at all. The material available
for this study accordingly provides no means of determining whether or not a
mutually satisfactory fisheries management regime was eventually agreed upon.
The spectacle provided by Department of Fisheries and Oceans aggression leaves
692 Ross, Return to the Teachings.
693 Coates, Ken, The Marshall Decision and Native Rights (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 2000) at 179-80; "Mi'kmaq say DFO rammed boat" CBC News, 19 Aug. 2000
http://www.cbc.ca
694 Marshall II at [43].
263
reason to doubt, especially given the huge economic imbalance between Canada and
the Mi'kmaq.695
Even if the Mi'kmaq had the economic means to challenge the Department
of Fisheries and Oceans and even if they felt that the Canadian court system was an
appropriate venue, it must be remembered that the judges of the Supreme Court only
grant leave to about 80 of the 550 to 650 applications for review made each year.696
The decision to grant leave is made by a panel of three judges based on their
assessment of the public importance of the legal issues raised. It would be
impossible for the Court to hear 650 cases a year, so time constraints must be a
factor. However, the situation allows the members of the Court to act as gate-
keepers. It also suggests an institutional deficiency that is leaving many social issues
without a venue where they can be resolved or even aired.
Since this study did not examine the cases for which leave was denied, it is
impossible to determine whether or not the Court was able to avoid the introduction
of bias through this exercise of judicial discretion. The Court considers that its
supervisory role only comes into effect when there is a "live controversy,,697 or
administrative disagreement. This means there must be an actual dispute with
government officials before a citizen can question administrative conduct. In other
words, the tenor of debate is oppositional rather than constructive and the Court
only uses its expertise to apply a legal analysis to a situation under conditions of
695 When I visited Eskinopetij towards the end of the "Burnt Church" fishing dispute, the people had
no independent legal advice in negotiations with Canadian officials. Housing was provided by the
band council, but the cash income of all those I met was less than $200 per month. Most appeared to
be malnourished.
696 Supreme Court ofCanada's web-site http://www/scc-csc.gc.ca (7/1/05).
697 Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General) [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342.
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stress, leaving the tenor of day to day conduct to Canadian officials and citizens
themselves.
5.2.2.2 Procedural Justice
Despite these limitations on access to a Supreme Court hearing, access to the
judicial system itself is considered a right. In Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui
Indian Band, Lamer C.J. explained that:
"a fundamental rule of the common law relating to
administrative procedures.. .is that everyone has a right
to a hearing where matters are involved affecting that
person's liberty or property rights. This rule is derived
from the principles of natural justice, which are
fundamental principles of administrative law that
basically ensure (i) a person's right to a hearing and
~W that the person is heard by an impartial tribunal."
In Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission) Bastarache J., for a
unanimous Court, identified the difference between an administrative board and a
board that performs a judicial function by referring to the procedures used saying:
" . .. the marketing board almost always conducted
hearings with witnesses, sworn testimony and oral
submissions; provided the opportunity for parties to be
represented by counsel; and gave reasons for its
decisions. The Court of Appeal held that the statutory
appeal to the Marketing Board was a full hearing on
the merits ... The Marketing Board was not a generalist
court, but a specialized tribunal expected to use its
expertise.,,699
The judicial role has thus been defined in terms of concrete procedures rather than
in terms of a theoretical function. Similarly, by focusing on solving actual problems,
698 Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3; 1995 CanLII 145 (S.C.C.) at
[74].
699 Paul v. British Columbia at [44]
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the Court participated in a process that defined both its function and the law by
establishing precedents that serve as prototypes for subsequent court decisions as
well as private and administrative actions.
5.2.2.3 Source of Legal Knowledge
The detailed explanations included III the judgments produced by the
members of the Supreme Court attest to the store they place in their own acquired
expertise concerning Canadian law. The singular nature of day to day judicial
experience, reviewing voluminous pleadings, authorities and arguments formulated
by people with conflicting perspectives, seems to confirm McLachlin c.J.'s
assertion in Haida Nation that:
"The law is capable of differentiating between tenuous
claims, claims possessing a strong prima facie case,
and established claims. Parties can assess these
matters, and if they cannot agree, tribunals and courts
can assist. 700
In fulfilling this supportive function, the Court purports to follow established
professional norms. As stated by Lord Blackburn over a century ago in reasoning
that is still considered valid:
". .. it is to be borne in mind that the office of the
judges is not to legislate, but to declare the expressed
intention of the legislature, even if that intention
appears to the court injudicious ..." 701
In the Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, which dealt with the question of whether
the province of Quebec could legally separate from Canada, the Court was at pains
700 Haida Nation v. British Columbia at [37] (McLachlin C.l.).
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to define its "proper role within the constitutional framework of our democratic
form of government" even though it is well known that the inclusion of Quebec in
the British empire was not accomplished by democratic means. The Court focused
on more recent events, insisting that:
"The questions posed by the Governor in Council, as
we interpret them, are strictly limited to aspects of the
legal framework in which that democratic decision is
to be taken. . ..The legal framework having been
clarified, it will be for the population of Quebec, acting
through the political forocess, to decide whether or not
to pursue secession." 02
It did not reject, or even address, the history of English invasion and conquest.
Despite its claim to rely on history, it turned a blind eye to this aspect of Canada's
ambiguous legal heritage, limiting itself to "filling in the gaps in the express terms
of the constitutional text". It justified its focus on the constitutional acts passed by
Britain specifically for Canada on the grounds that:
"A written constitution promotes legal certainty and
predictability, and it provides a foundation and a
touchstone for the exercise of constitutional judicial
review.,,703
Though the Court settled on a requirement for the support of a clear majority on a
clear question before secession can be legally effected, it completely ignored the
demise of the British imperial paradigm through which Canada was founded,
sidestepping questions that might have been asked concerning the implementation
of the Constitution Act, 1982 by Britain's parliament rather than through a vote on a
clear question by a majority of the Canadian people.
701 River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson and Others, [1874-80] All E.R. 1 H.L. at 12 cited in
Goodswimmer v. Canada (Minister ofIndian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 1 F.e. 389
{18}, appeal considered moot, Goodswimmer v. Canada.
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5.2.2.4 Clarification of the Legal Framework
The perception that "gaps" exist is, as Kuhn explained, highly dependent on
the paradigm chosen or the frames of reference applied. This is why the concept of
social order discussed in the previous section is important. The British belief that
there must be a head of state has led to mechanisms like the Indian Act that identify
"chiefs" and other components that are necessary for "government" according to
their set of cultural assumptions. Concomitantly, Weir and Beetham's classification
of Britain's failure to provide a democratic definition of the judiciary as a
"deficiency" is an anachronism.704 The perception that something is "missing"
could not have come into being until democratic government became the expected
norm. It depends entirely on the ex post facto adoption of this governmental
paradigm and could hardly have been considered a deficiency in the feudal age
during which the judicial role was established because modem theories of
democratic government were not yet on the horizon.
The Secession Reference reasoning likewise invoked conceptual frameworks
that were both anachronistic and selectively applied. By phrasing the issue of
secession as a matter that was not provided for by the British North America Act or
the Constitution Act, 1982, the Court was able to ignore aspects of Canada's
colonial heritage that are troubling by modem standards. These include the fact that
these laws were passed by a British parliament that did not represent the Canadian
people and that Quebec was incorporated by conquest in direct violation of the
principle of democracy espoused by the Court. Nevertheless, as suggested by
702 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [26-7].
703 Ibid at [53].
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Lamer C.J.' s sense of imprisonment in the Remuneration Reference, the Court may
have felt pushed into this position both by the character of the questions and
pleadings before it and by the weight of behavioural precedent.
It is the requirement to mediate such profound changes in values and social
norms that makes the judicial role so complex and challenging.70S As McLachlin J.
suggested in her dissent in Opetchesat, the Court generally considers that the
intention of Parliament is to be taken from the "plain meaning" of the words of a
statute unless there is ambiguity. To this end, she found that the "modern rule" is
that:
"courts must interpret legislation "in its total context,
having regard to the purpose of the legislation, the
consequences of its proposed interpretations, the
presumptions and special rules of interpretation, as
well as admissible external aids".706
However, she acknowledged that:
"When read in the context of the purpose of the Act,
what seems at first blush to be a "plain meaning" may
be revealed to be not so plain after all. Ambiguities
may appear, bringing into play subsidiary rules ... " 707
Given the Court's assertion in the Secession Reference that Canada's constitution
was founded on "an historical lineage stretching back through the ages,,708, it seems
that it has yet to develop a theory concerning the management of paradigm change.
704 Weir, Beetham, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain at 443.
705 See ego Andree Lajoie, Jugements de valeurs : Ie discours judiciare et Ie droit, colI. « Les Voies
du Droit» (Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1997).
706 Opetchesaht Indian Band V. Canada, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 119 at [75] citing Drieger on the
Construction ofStatutes (3 rd ed. 1994), by R. Sullivan, at 131.
707 Ibid at [80].
708 Reference re Succession ofQuebec, S.C.C. [1998] 2 S.C.R.217 para 49.
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5.2.2.5 Expert Reasoning
Nonetheless, one of the ways in which the Court may assist the parties is by
providing a model for "expert reasoning" as identified by Craig Nelson and
discussed in s.2.2.5 above.709 For example, the Secession Reference drew on social
values to inform established professional norms. Though obviously influenced by
their own contemporary experience of democratic institutions, the members of the
Court sought these values in "unwritten constitutional principles" derived from
historical practice.710 With the contentious issue of Quebec separation before it,
their reasoning reiterated that:
" ... it is not the role of the judiciary to interpose its
own views on the different negotiating positions of the
parties, even were it invited to do so." 7ll
It thus affirmed a consensual standard even though relying on the history of a
regime imposed by conquest.
5.2.2.6 Constitutional Protection
In the Secession Reference, the Court attempted to apply the values it
identified in a way that accorded with postcolonial deference to popularly defined
legality. Again, this vision of judicial function is in conformity with the English
ideal asserted by Coke C.l. in his remonstrances with the Stuarts. According to this
view, the Court serves as a guardian for a system in which the state protects a
legality formulated by the people through a variety of procedures. The Secession
709 Nelson, "On the Persistence ofUnicoms" at 177.
710 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [48-53].
711 Ibid. at [101].
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Reference reasoning thus emphasized the participation of Quebec in Canadian
institutions and the constitutional protection provided for Quebec culture, stating:
"The principle of federalism recognizes the diversity
of the component parts of confederation, and the
autonomy of provincial governments to develop their
societies within their respective spheres of
jurisdiction".712
And:
"The federal structure adopted at Confederation
enabled French-speaking Canadians to form a
numerical majority in the province of Quebec, and so
exercise the considerable provincial powers conferred
by the Constitution Act, 1867 in such a way as to
promote their language and culture. It also made
provision for certain guaranteed representation within
the federal Parliament itself." 713
As the cases examined for this study attest, this principle has not been
universally applied in Canada. Indigenous peoples do not share the same
institutional protection as Quebec. The Canadian Constitution as traditionally
interpreted does not recognize any sphere of autonomy in which Indigenous peoples
can develop their societies as they see fit. Nevertheless, the Court continued to see
itself as a guarantor of a concept of social order that protects a variety of social
preferences. As explained by McLachlin C.J. in Haida Nation:
"This case is the first of its kind to reach this Court.
Our task is the modest one of establishing a general
framework for the duty to consult and accommodate,
where indicated, before Aboriginal title or rights
claims have been decided. As this framework is
applied, courts, in the age-old tradition of the common
712 Ibid. at [58].
713 Ibid. at [59].
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law, will be called on to fill in the details of the duty to
consult and accommodate.,,714
According to Kuhn, people attempt to integrate anomalous information with
the prevailing paradigm. This opening to the right of Indigenous Nations to at least
be consulted must thus be considered in conjunction with other statements made by
the Court concerning legal processes. In Paul v. British Columbia, Bastarache J.
asserted that:
"By performing judicial revIew of the decisions of
administrative tribunals, superior courts play an
important role in assuring respect for the rule of
law.,,715
Considerable expertise IS required for this task because popular legality finds
expression through a variety of legislatures importing a wide range of interpretative
possibilities that must be coordinated. Thus:
" ...within the unitary court system of Canada,
provincially constituted inferior and suPterior courts
apply federal as well as provinciallaws.,,7 6
The cognitive modelling provided by the Supreme Court is important because:
" ...boards must take into account all applicable legal
rules, both federal and provincial.,,717
In Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver, Iacobucci 1. explained that when the Court
embarks on this process, it assumes that the Crown has acted intra vires or within its
legal mandate even if left unchallenged by the party affected. Thus:
" ... this Court is not required... to give legal effect to
an unauthorized act of the state,,718
714 Haida Nation at [11] (McLachlin C.J.). Note the colonial tinge to this statement that effectively
presumed the Court's capacity to impose a conceptual framework.
715 Paul v. British Columbia at [22].
716 Ibid at[21]
717 Ibid at, [23]
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Within the context of that particular case that did not question the authority of the
Canadian state, this stance would seem to support postcolonial legality through its
refusal to ratify dictatorial power. There is, however, considerable ambiguity in the
way this statement seems to situate the source of legality in the Court rather than in
a representative legislature and in the Court's overall reluctance to recognize any
autonomous jurisdictional sphere for any Indigenous nation.
5.2.2.7 Adjudication not Legislation
In keeping with the deference accorded to the role of elected legislatures, the
Court is expected to exercise its capacity to "fill in" legal lacunae in a way that does
not overstep its adjudicative role. Though the act of judging is inherently colonial,
this self-limitation is postcolonial. As seen by Bastarche for the Court in R. v. Paul:
"an adjudicator does not create, amend or extinguish
aboriginal rights.,,719
Yet the conflict between the act of judging and the requirement for respect of an
externally defined category is so difficult to manage that even a Court of Appeal
may be accused of "erring" in this regard.720 The presumption that the legislative
interpretations settled upon by the judges of the Supreme Court are inherently more
correct than anyone else's violates postcolonial norms. Since postcolonial legality
is in the process of emerging, solutions for possible impasses have yet to be agreed
upon. However, postcolonial ideals would seem to be better served if contentious
matters were referred to the parties, affording an opportunity to discuss the concerns
718 Osoyoos Indian Bandv. Oliver at [69].
719 Paul v. v. British Columbia at [29]
720 Ibid. at [6]
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that remain following judicial clarification so they can reach their own agreement
regarding the meaning and application ofthe rights involved.
5.2.2.8 Legal, not Factual, Authority
Except when considering a reference, the Supreme Court of Canada
functions as the final court of appeal on questions of law related to issues that have
already been considered by several "lower" courts or tribunals. As explained by
McLachlin C.J. in Mitchell:
"Courts render decisions on the basis of evidence.,,721
Most judgments included in this study accordingly began by methodically setting
out previous findings of fact and law before explaining the approach that the Court
had decided to take concerning whatever issues motivated the appeal.
Several of the judgments alluded to the professional convention that
differentiates the fact finding function of the court of first instance from the law
finding function of appeal courts. In Haida Nation, McLachlin described the
relationship between "facts" and "law" as follows:
"The existence or extent of the duty to consult or
accommodate is a legal question in the sense that it
defines a legal duty. However it is typically premised
on an assessment of the facts".722
As stated in Mitchell v. MNR., the process of interpreting and weighing factual
evidence
"is generally the domain of the trial judge, who is best
situated to assess the evidence as it is presented.,,723
721 Mitchell v. MN.R. at [11].
722 Haida Nation v. British Columbia at [61].
723 Mitchell v. MN.R. at [36].
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As might be expected when the paradigmatic variability identified by Kuhn is taken
into account, there are no absolute principles governing the assessment of evidence
by the trial judge.724 Indeed, the determination of which facts are relevant depends
on which legal framework is applied. It may also be difficult to distinguish issues of
fact from issues of law725 and because of this, the parameters of the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction are sometimes explicitly or implicitly defined in the hazy realm
of social context. Thus, in Gladue, Cory and Iacobucci 11. found that determination
of a fit sentence required "taking the circumstances of the offence, the offender, the
victim and the community" into account.726
Additional facts can radically change the assessment of any situation, and in
Osoyoos, Iacobucci J. reflected on the practical constraints that limit a court's fact-
finding function saying:
" ...we must determine the rights of the parties as best
we can using the evidence at hand.,,727
When confronted with the controversy that frequently surrounds the interpretation
of historical events and the way in which their character can alter drastically as new
evidence comes to light, Binnie J. protested in Marshall that:
"The reality, of course, is that the courts are handed
disputes that require for their resolution findings of
certain historical facts. The litigating parties cannot
wait for the possibility of a stable academic consensus.
The judicial process must do the best it can.'.72S
724 Ibid
725 R. v. Marshall/Bernard at [28].
726 R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 at [75].
727 Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 746 at [40].
728 R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (Marshall I) at [36-37].
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Because paradigmatic change may alter the importance of particular
information or even the ability to perceive facts, the value of precedential
judgements may change over time. For example, the determination in Edwards v.
A. G. Canada729 that women were "persons" has percolated slowly through Canadian
legality resulting in a profound reorientation in the legal status of women. This has
involved the rejection of many established precedents as attention refocused on facts
that were once ignored. One of the functions of the judiciary, particularly at the
Supreme Court level, is to navigate the hazy boundaries between "law" and "fact"
that changes of this nature entail.
5.2.2.9 Defending Social Values
The most comprehensive discussion of the values that affect Supreme Court
of Canada decision making was found in the Secession Reference, where the Court
stated:
"In our view, there are four fundamental and
organizing principles of the Constitution which are
relevant to addressing the question before us (although
this enumeration is by no means exhaustive):
federalism; democracy; constitutionalism and the rule
oflaw; and respect for minorities.,,73o
The members of the Court are thus conscious of the fact that they rely on
fundamental social concepts to shape their reasoning. L'Heureux-DuM J., for
example, drew on this methodology in her minority reasons in Corbiere, which
were supported by Gonthier, Iacobucci and Binnie 11., when she stated:
729 Edwards v. A. G. Canada.
730 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [32].
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"The principle of democracy underlies the Constitution
and the Charter, and is one of the important factors
guiding the exercise ofa court's remedial discretion.".
In this context, concerned with voting rights for band members, the judges proffered
what sounds like a distinctly postcolonial perspective, L'Heureux-DuM J., relied on
an article by Hogg and Bushell to characterize judicial review as a "dialogue"
between courts and legislatures saying:
"The remedies granted under the Charter should, in
appropriate cases, encourage and facilitate the
inclusion in that dialogue of groups particularly
affected by legislation.731
They even went so far as to suggest that one of the Court's functions is "to ensure
substantive equality is present in Canadian society.,,732 because
"s.15(1) mandates that government decisions must be
made in a manner that respects the dignity of all of
them, recognizing all as e~ually capable, deserving,
and worthy of recognition."7 3
Yet, as already pointed out in s.5.1.2 above, Corbiere altered voting rights for all
Band Council elections in Canada using a process in which the majority of the
people affected had no representation what so ever.734 In other words, the effect of
the Court's own reasoning contradicted its assertions of egalitarian democratic
rights.
731 Corbiere v. Canada at [116] citing P.W. Hogg and A.A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between
Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter ofRights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All)" (1997),
35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75.
732 Ibid at [94].
733 Ibid at [98].
734 Pleadings at trial concerned only the Batchewana Band, which was not represented. Corbiere v.
Canada at [32]. At the Supreme Court there were 5 interveners: Aboriginal Legal Services of
Toronto Inc., Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, Lesser Slave Lake Indian Regional Council, Native
Women's Association of Canada and United Native Nations Society of British Columbia. These
organizations could not, in any sense, provide democratic representation of the people affected by the
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5.2.2.10 Independent and Impartial Assessment
Despite the Court's conscious reliance on values of one sort or another, it
displayed little consciousness of the ways in which its own cultural values might
differ from those of Indigenous peoples. Impartiality was accordingly considered
"the fundamental qualification of a judge and the core attribute of the judiciary".735
As understood by the Court in the second Wewaykum case:
"...public confidence in our legal system is rooted in
the fundamental belief that those who adjudicate in
law must always do so without bias or prejudice and
must be perceived to do so ....The essence of
impartiality lies in the requirement of the judge to
approach the case to be adjudicated with an open
mind.,,736
Though the Chief Justice is ritually distinguished from the other members of the
Court, and though the names of the judges are conventionally listed in order of
seniority of appointment, each is expected to corne to an independent decision
concerning the case at hand. In Wewaykum II, the Court described its decision
making process as follows:
"The decision-making process within the Supreme
Court of Canada, while not widely known, is a matter
of public record....Each member of the supreme court
prepares independently for the hearing of appeals. All
judges are fully prepared, and no member of the Court
is assigned the task to go through the case so as to
"brief' the rest of the panel before the hearing. After
the case is heard, each judge on the panel expresses his
or her opinion independently. Discussions take place
on who will prepare draft reasons and whether for the
majority or the minority. Draft reasons are then
Corbiere decision, yet the Court accepted the idea that its judgment would affect "most if not all
Indian bands in Canada". Corbiere v. Canada at [22].
735 Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada at [59] citing Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles
for Judges (1998) at 30.
736 Ibid at [57-8].
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prepared and circulated by one or more judges. These
reasons are the fruit of a truly collegial process of
revision of successive drafts. In that sense, it can be
said that the reasons express the individual views of
each and every judge who signs them, and the
collective effort and opinion of them all.,,?3?
Because of this, the Court found that a "reasonable person" would not conclude that
Binnie J.'s minimal involvement as counsel for the Crown in the early stages of the
case impugned the judgment he wrote for the initial Wewaykum case after it reached
the Supreme Court. This raises the question of what seems "reasonable" to the
members of the Court and, as Kuhn's theory suggests this will depend on which
paradigms have become entrenched through their previous personal experience.
5.2.3 Conclusions
The origins and structure of the judicial role make it inherently colonial in
character. It was derived from the prerogative power originally acquired by
conquest and, as a social mechanism, it permits a privileged few to impose their
interpretations of legality on the rest of Canadian society. However, the Supreme
Court views its function in a way that enhances postcolonial elements that may be
traced back to Anglo-Norman custom. When asked to define its role, it has relied
consistently on formal popular processes as the source of legality. It has also
defended the ideal of human equality and left the negotiation of day-to-day social
relations squarely in the hands of the people, declining to intervene except when an
unresolved dispute was presented for its consideration. The members of the Court
have made a conscious attempt to apply an expert model of reasoning,
737 Ibid at, [92].
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acknowledging the existence of differing analytical approaches and drawing on
shared social values to make decisions and mediate disagreements concerning the
interpretation of popularly defined law. Since an absence of institutional regulation
would permit the strong to impose their will on the weak with impunity, the Court's
concept of its role seems to be based on postcolonial values even though the effect
of its practice may be otherwise.
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5.3 The Judges
"Experience, rather than logic, governs the
development of the law"
McEachern C.l (B.C.c.A.)
in A(C) v. Critchley (1998) 738 re Guerin739
As Kuhn's theory and subsequent linguistic research suggests, we are
conditioned by experience to structure our thoughts using culturally defined
categories and paradigms. The backgrounds of the judges who sit on the Co~ can
thus be expected to affect their reasoning. This has been acknowledged to some
extent by the Supreme Court Act and by the constitutional customs that govern the
choice of who sits on the Court. According to the Act, the nine judges are appointed
by the Governor in Council. The fact that there is some uncertainty concerning the
relative roles played in the selection process by the Prime Minister and the Minister
of Justice reflects the command model of legality implicit in Canada's colonial
evolution. However, the ancient constitutional principle of popular representation
has not been forgotten. Each appointee must have been a judge of a superior
provincial court or have at least ten years standing at a provincial bar and at least
three judges must be appointed from Quebec.74o In order to maintain regional
738 A(C) v. Critchley (1998), 166 D.L.R. 4th 475 at [84]. See James I. Reynolds, A Breach 0/Duty:
Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples ( Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2005) ch.l O.
739 Guerin v. The Queen.
740 Hogg, Constitutional Law o/Canada at 170; Supreme Court Act, R.S., c.S-19, ss. 4,5,6.
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representation, an equal number is customarily appointed from Ontario, while two
come from the Western provinces and one from the Atlantic region.741
5.3.1 Representative Capacity
At the United Nations, under-representation in the judiciary is considered an
indication of bias and cultural exclusion.742 The Supreme Court Act's concern with
regional representation is thus consistent with international standards. Other
internationally accepted indicia of bias include inaccessibility of the legal system
due to geographical distance, financial cost, language and other cultural barriers.743
These factors are reflected in the colonial and postcolonial frames of reference
established above. Because this study focuses on the texts of the judgments
themselves, a full examination of the Court's representative capacity is beyond the
scope of this work. However, Indigenous representation among the judiciary is
conspicuous by its absence. This lack of representation extends beyond the
Supreme Court of Canada itself, to all of the courts of appeal and courts of first
instance whose findings of fact were crucial in some of the sixty-odd cases
considered. On top of this, none of these cases included Indigenous representation
through the use of a jury. There was accordingly no evidence of the peer
assessment demanded by the Magna Carta despite the relatively large number of
cases concerned with "Aboriginal rights".
741 Hogg, ibid.
742 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, director and lead author; Cait Murphy, Bruce Ross-Larson eds.; Human
Development Report, 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World (United Nations
Development Programme, http://hdr.undp.org, 2004) 58.
743 Ibid.
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5.3.1.1 Systemic Mis-match
The issue of Indigenous representation on the Supreme Court of Canada is a
direct product of the colonizing society's system of cultural categorization from the
perspective of at least some Indigenous polities. For example, Haudenosaunee
traditionalists contend that the principle of autonomy represented by the Two Row
Wampum and in the Covenant Chain continues in effect so they do not believe they
are part of Canada. They claim a right to negotiate with Canada on a nation to
nation basis as seen to some extent in the representations made by Mike Mitchell in
Mitchell v. The Minister ofNational Revenue.744 From this perspective, the absence
of Indigenous representation on the Supreme Court of Canada is ofno more concern
than the absence of Canadian representation on the Supreme Courts of the United
States and Britain or Brazi1.745 Yet, because the Court's analysis presumes that
"Indians" are "Canadians,,746, the complete absence of Indigenous representation
casts a colonial pall over the Court's function that is beyond the control of the
judges themselves.
5.3.1.2 Geographic Representation
The brief biographical sketches used to introduce the judges to the public on
the Supreme Court of Canada web-page provide little insight into their personal
experience with Indigenous peoples.747 (For summary, see Appendix 2.) As far as
the principle of popillar representation is concerned, the Supreme Court Act seems
to be a somewhat clumsy instrument. Twelve of the twenty-seven judges who sat
744 Mitchell v. MN.R..
745 See ego "The Last Speech ofDes-ka-heh" [Nov. 1980] 3.11 Ontario Indian.
746 See ego Nowegijick v. The Queen at 36.
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on the cases included in this study were born in Quebec, three in each of Ontario
and Saskatchewan, two in each of New Brunswick and Alberta, and one in each of
Nova Scotia, Manitoba, British Columbia, Scotland and Germany. A few moved in
childhood and Wilson J., who was the first woman to sit on the Court, emigrated to
Canada as an adult. Ten were first called to the bar in Quebec, six in Ontario, three
in Alberta, two in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Manitoba and one in each of
Saskatchewan and British Columbia. Though Sopinka and Binnie JJ. were later
called to territorial bars and Charon served as a deputy judge to the court of
Nunavut before appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada, this belated
experience would necessarily be constrained by prior conditioning. The geographic
areas represented by Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, the Yukon, the
Northwest Territories and Nunavut appear to be completely unrepresented at the
level of formative experience. For the purposes of this study, it is worth noting that
the excluded areas include regions where Indigenous ways of life remain a
significant social influence.
5.3.1.3 Educational Representation
Within the context of mainstream Canadian society, the formal education
received by the members of the Court appears relatively broad. The twenty-seven
judges earned law degrees from twelve different Canadian law schools spread from
coast to coast. The fact that subsequent honorary degrees were listed on a par with
degrees earned for academic work suggests that social prominence was valued more
highly than measurable accomplishment by the compilers of the Supreme Court
747 Supreme Court ofCanada, http://.scc-csc.gc.ca (6/7/2006).
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vignettes; however, the actual academic accomplishments of the members of the
Court are respectable. All twenty-seven had law degrees. Iacobucci earned a LL.D
and seven other judges had masters degrees. Two were Rhodes Scholars and there
is a degree each from the universities of Aberdeen, Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard,
Yale, Paris, Lyon and Nice. Given the educational function of Supreme Court
judgments, both for the legal profession and for the public at large, the fact that all
but six taught at a university or the bar before appointment to the Court seems
entirely fitting. Several of the judges had also published academic articles and/or
text books.
5.3.1.4 Social Experience
The narrowness of the social experience represented is, however, a cause for
concern when it comes to considering issues like the Court's concept of what a
"reasonable person" would think. Most appear to have moved straight through the
education system into legal practice suggesting relative social privilege and comfort
with the status quo. All appear to be of European ancestry and none appear to have
had much, if any, experience of the world outside the Anglo-French cultural
dynamic as experienced in Canada. Though Frank Iacobucci has Italian ancestry
and recent appointee Rosalie Abella was profoundly marked by her family
experience of holocaust survivaf48 they, like all of the others except Wilson, seem
to have been raised in middle to upper-class Canada. In other words, all of the
members of the Court appear to have been socialized entirely within the cultures
that colonized the peoples who are Indigenous to North America.
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Even within this culture, their experience is relatively narrow. Their average
age when called to the bar was 26. La Forest, LeBel and Deschamps were only 23.
Only Michel Bastarache and Frank Iacobucci who were 33 and Bertha Wilson who
was 35, were past their twenties so the members of the Court have had little
opportunity to experience life as anything but successful members of the legal
profession. Most of the judges attended the regional university closest to home. All
of their pre-law education was in the arts except for a couple of commerce degrees
and Wilson's Scottish education degree. Because most focused early on law, their
experience of other disciplines and ways of life can hardly be considered
representative of the general Canadian public. Moreover, none had regional
attachments that were strong enough to cause them to refuse the move to Ottawa as
required by Supreme Court appointment.749 Some of the first judges in the sample
represented a past generation in that Ritchie, Dickson, Estey, McIntyre and LeDain
were all veterans of World War II and Cory was an RCAF pilot. However, shared
experience with current generations is thin on the ground. Dickson and Bastarache
worked with insurance and Sopinka played professional football for the Toronto
Argonauts. Fish was a journalist. Most seem to have raised families and Wilson
was a minister's wife.
5.3.1.5 Recruitment
There is little in either the personal or professional background of the judges
to indicate how they came to be chosen for this prominent office from among all of
748 "Remarks of the Honourable Rosalie Silberman Abella", (Ottawa: Swearing-in Ceremony, 4
October, 2004) http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca (6/1 1/2006).
749 Supreme Court Act, R.S., c.S-19, s. 8.
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the members of the legal profession who meet the requirements of the Supreme
Court Act. Porter's 1965 study, The Vertical Mosaic, found that Canadian superior
court judges appointed between 1940 and 1960 had strong political connections. He
found no pattern of moving up the judicial hierarchy. Appointment as a judge
seemed to be "the end of the line for a political career" and ten of the 17 Supreme
Court of Canada judges had no previous judicial experience.75o
Without looking specifically into the political background of the judges on
the Court, this pattern appears to have broken down in the 1982 to 2006 period
covered by this study. McLachlin C.J. began her judicial career at the British
Columbia County Court and Abella J. at the family division of the Ontario
Provincial Court. A total of thirteen had experience in courts that may have been
charged with making the "findings of fact" relied upon at the appellate level and
only Ritchie, Binnie and Sopinka JJ. were appointed directly to the Supreme Court
of Canada. None of the Supreme Court of Canada judges in Porter's study or in
mine had held elected office. However, the importance of political connections may
well continue. The official biographies do not report on prior party affiliations;
however, those in the know may be able to read something into the law firms the
judges worked for. Political influence may also be inferred from professional
experiences that demonstrate competence and expertise, but also suggest political
affiliation and bureaucratic sympathy. For example, Chouinard, LaForest,
Iacobucci and Binnie all served as federal or provincial deputy ministers of justice
before appointment to the Court and several others were appointed after heading
prominent government commissions investigating particular issues.
750 Porter, The Vertical Mosaic at 415-6.
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5.3.1.6 Association with Indigenous People
None of the above concerns indicates any judge's initial contact or
prototypical experience with Aboriginal peoples. We cannot tell from their
biographies whether any of them ever had a classmate at school, a co-worker,
student, neighbour or close personal friend who belonged to an Indigenous culture.
We can only guess in this regard and the fact that twenty-one of the twenty-seven
were born or raised in large cities must certainly affect their assumptions.751
5.3.2 The Effect of Prior Experience
The embodied theorists whose research appears to explain some of the
phenomena identified by Kuhn have pointed out that the ways in which we structure
knowledge and "the gut feelings that are the starting point of decision making,,752
appear to be embedded in the neural circuitry that controls both physical action and
emotional reaction. As legal scholars like Winter and Nedelsky put it, "things that
seem self-evident, natural and beyond dispute to one group are perceived very
differently by people from a different background.,,753 Hamilton has likewise
cautioned that the power of dominant norms lies in the fact that they are invisible to
those whose experience fits their expectations754 and, John B. Mitchell has observed
with regard to teaching critical reasoning to law students that:
751 Yorkton, Grand Falls, Pincher Creek, Mattawa, Repentigny and Sturgeon Falls were not counted
as cities in this context.
752 Nedelsky, "Embodied diversity and the Challenges to Law".
753 Ibid.
754 Hamilton, "The use of Metaphor and Narrative To Construct Gendered Hysteria In the Courts" at
[ 89].
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"the more alien the world underlying the cases is to
one's own, the greater the inclination to hold on to
one's previously acquired approach to the world".755
The experience, education and culture of the judges on the Court can thus be
expected to affect their reasoning in profound and significant ways.
5.3.2.1 The Firearms Reference
One example that may illustrate the effect of cultural bias seems clear to me
though it may raise vehement protests from some readers. In the Firearms
Reference, the Court attempted to determine what gun control was about in its "pith
and substance".756 Comparing the "roles of guns and cars in Canadian society" the
members of the Court reasoned that:
"Cars are used mainly for transportation. Danger to
the public is ordinarily unintended and incidental to
that use. Guns by contrast, pose a pressing safety risk
in many if not all of their functions. Firearms are often
used as weapons of violent crime, including domestic
violence; cars generally are not.,,757
No statistics were cited to support this point of view and the comparison seems
curious because the annual carnage caused by cars that are licensed notoriously
exceeds that caused by guns that were not. The court's reasoning in this instance
seems to draw on their personal urban experience coupled with the same tendency
to conflate the characteristics of prototypes that prevents us from thinking of the
pope as a bachelor even though he is a man who has never married. 758
755 Mitchell, "Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking" at 288.
756 Firearms Reference at [3].
757 Ibid. at [43].
758 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest, at 77; Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 70.
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In keeping with what the cognitive theorists tell us, the judicial perception of
cars was probably derived from early childhood memories involving transportation
without accidents. Their thoughts, like everyone else's, are shaped by the
prototypes created by direct experience. If, like me, they were raised in cities, they
probably rode safely in cars with Mom and Dad more times than they can
remember, while their prototypical experience of guns probably came from
television where guns only make the news if involved in a crime or tragic accident.
The experience of my students when I was teaching in northern Newfoundland was
completely different. We did not have a road or television, but their fathers almost
all had guns and when they took them out there was the hope of something good to
eat for dinner. The kids loved the line in Johnny Cash's "Folsom Prison Blues" that
said:
"When I was just a small boy, my mother told me son,
"Always be a good boy, don't ever play with guns".
They had all heard those exact words at home. No one could afford fancy gun
cabinets because the people really did "make their living on the land and on the sea"
just as it said in one of the folk songs they sang. But in all the long winter evenings
when they sat around the kitchen table telling stories, (because we did not have
television), there was not one single account of any accidental injury, crime or
domestic violence involving a gun in our community or on the entire northern
peninsula of Newfoundland. Guns meant food. We needed meat to survive in that
cold climate. That's why wives shoved their husbands out of bed at four o'clock in
the morning. People did not have much money so the men did not waste shells. In
their experience the danger surrounding guns was much easier to deal with than the
290
danger surrounding ice or ocean fishing in small boats. It was just as incidental to
their use as the danger associated with cars for urban families.
The lawyers arguing against the gun registry legislation tried to
communicate this difference and what the judges heard was only this:
"ordinary guns, like rifles and shotguns, are common
property, not dangerous property. Ordinary firearms
are different, they argue, from automatic weapons and
handguns that Parliament has regulated in the past.,,759
Their pleadings failed and none of us who were raised in large cities were surprised.
5.3.2.2 R. v. Nikal
Visceral assumptions of the kind that made the Court assume that guns are
somehow more dangerous than cars may also explain why Indigenous people who
went hunting for food so often found themselves trapped in a legal maze resulting,
more often than not, in convictions.76o Bewildering layers of assumption similar to
that found in the Firearms Reference can be seen in R. v. Nikal where a
Wetesuweteen man was charged with violating provincial regulations by fishing
without a provincial licence on a river where it passed through his reserve. The
charge was laid even though the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en had their own fishing
regulations that had been approved by Canada's Department of Indian Affairs.
In keeping with the "inclination to hold on to one's previously acquired
approach to the world,,761 identified by educational theorists, Cory's majority
reasons ignored the Nowegijick principle of liberal construction in favour of
759 Firearms Reference at [44].
760 Acquittals resulted in Simon v. The Queen and R. v.Powley, but convictions were upheld in Jack
and Charlie v. The Queen; Dick v. The Queen; R. v. Horse; R. v. Horseman and R. v. Blais.
761 Mitchell, "Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking" at 288.
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"Indians,,762, commencing with a declaration that the band's right to fish on the river
was "very different and distinct" from the right to fish that was protected by s.35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982. His reasons for coming to this conclusion were not
explained, nor did he provide an account of how the river in question came to be
considered part of "Her Majesty's Dominions". The analysis provided launched
directly into consideration of what the Crown intended to "grant" when the reserve
was established in the nineteenth century, as if the land rights of Indigenous peoples
had been dependent on Crown grants like those of the settlers. This was
accompanied by a complete failure to explain how the geographic and political
parameters of their British colonial understanding had been superimposed on a
resource over which the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en had, in all probability, exercised
autonomous control before the relatively recent arrival of Europeans.
Nikal was heard on November 30, 1995, one day after Van der Peet, but the
judgment was released four months earlier and it did not include anything
comparable to Lamer's breakthrough acknowledgement in that case that:
"when Europeans arrived III North America,
aboriginal peoples were already here, living in
communities on the land, and participating in
distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries".
[underlining in original]763
As if operating under the kind of spell that prevents people from seeing black hearts
and red spades in an apparently ordinary deck of cards, the Court also conflated the
presumed intention of the provincial regulations with their actual effect. Without
referring to any evidence that there had ever been pressure on the fishing resources
762 Nowegijick v. The Queen at 36.
763 R. v. Van der Peet at[30].
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in question before colonization or that modem Gitksan-Wet' suwet'en practices
posed any kind of threat to fish, Cory claimed for the majority of the Court that:
"If the salmon fishery is to survive, there must be
some control exercised by a central authority."
As he saw it,
"The licence is the essential
preservation and management
resource".764
first step in the
of this fragile
Thus, like Sparrow before it and Adams released a few months later, Nikal ignored
the possibility that the fragility of the resource had been caused by colonization,
reflecting the Court's blind faith in the ecologically protective capacity of the
colonizing governments. In practice, "central authority" has proven notoriously
ineffective at preserving such important resources as the Grand Banks fishery off
Newfoundland and by the time the Court recognized a limited Aboriginal right to
fish in Adams, that part of the St. Lawrence River was so seriously polluted that the
only people who ate fish on the Akwesasne reseserve were those who could afford
imports from the Maritimes.765
Resource conservation IS fully consistent with postcolonial norms.
However, the real issue here concerned who had a right to make laws for this
764 R. v. Nikal.
765 By 1985 it was discovered that children had been playing barefoot in toxic waste. Mothers found
that their breast milk was contaminated. The abundant wild life for which the region was once
known had disappeared. Turtles and a shrew were discovered containing hundreds of times the
contamination required to qualify as hazardous waste. The pollution was caused by industries that
had come into the area because of the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway which had been
highly contested by Mohawks both at Kahnawake and Akwesasne. In 1986 pregnant women were
advised not to eat fish from the St. Lawrence River and by 1990 New York State extended this
warning to everyone with regard to fish caught in certain areas of the reserve. Bruce Johansen,
"Don't Drink the Water, Dont Eat the Fish" in "Akwesasne's Toxic Turtles" a chapter from Ecocide
ofNative America: Environmental Destruction ofIndian Lands and People (Clear Light publishers)
http://www.tuscaroras.com/greydeer/pages/Toxicturtle4.html (12/31/05)
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purpose.766 The Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en by-laws were on record in Nikal, but Cory
failed to address them and his declaration that they did not apply sits like an
afterthought, without explanation among his concluding comments.767
We can only speculate about the reasons for this, but the fact that he and his
fellow judges were raised in an era when "Indians" were excluded from the legal
definition of a "person" in the Indian AcP68, accompanied by their experience of
Canada's on-going practice of assuming supervisory powers, should not be
discounted. Under the circumstances, Cory found that the requirement for a
provincial licence was justified because:
"The simple requirement of a licence is not in itself
unreasonable; rather, it is necessary for the exercise of
the right itself....The licence by itself, .. .is nothing
more than a form of identification. Requiring
identification so as to assist fisheries officers in
distinguishing right holders from non-rights-holders
cannot be interference with the preferred means of
exercising that right."769
Though there was no evidence that licensing had been required in pre-contact
society, which certainly did exercise the right to fish, this reasoning was supported
by the majority of the Court and, once again, the personal inexperience of the judges
seems to have affected the result. McLachlin, with L'Heureux-Dube concurring,
dissented with regard to Nikal's acquittal on the grounds that the licence conditions
were unconstitutional, yet all agreed that the federal government could impose its
regulatory scheme. Because of this, the case was not really a victory for Nikal. It
766 R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013 at[IV].
767 R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013 at [CXVIII].
768 The definition introduced in the Indian Act, 1876, S.C. 1876, c.18 (39 Vict.) s.12 was removed in
the Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c. 29 s.123.
769 R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013 ; 1996 CanLII 245 (S.C.c.) [XCIX, CI]
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was an incident of colonial humiliation because his personal acquittal was
accompanied by the negation of his people's right to control their own use of a
traditional resource.
The lack of judicial familiarity with contemporary Indigenous reality can be
seen in other telling assumptions. Conspicuously missing from the judicial analyses
was any explanation of why an additional piece of identification should be required
when "Indians" already qualify for "status cards". Leaving aside the expeditionary
and time consuming problem of contacting a licensing agency from remote
locations, the judicial presumption that their requirements were "simple" also
suggests that no member of the Court has ever had a close enough friendship with a
"status Indian" to drive to three pharmacies trying to get a prescription filled under
the Indian Act or to wait for twenty minutes while a waitress calls the manager and
tries to avoid dealing with the tax-exempt status of the friend's meal. 770 How else
could the imposition of this bureaucratic requirement be seen as a "mere
inconvenience"?
5.3.3 Decolonizing Developments
The lack of broad social representation on the Court is, of course, partly a
function of the exceptionally high level of writing and literacy skills required, as
well as the time, expense and culturally specific experience involved in gaining a
legal education. As discussed in the introduction to this work, the British social
system was structured in a way that favoured a male elite; however, with the social
770 See ego John Cuthand, "Beware of con artists posing as spiritual elders" 9.8 Eagle Feather News,
(Aug. 2006) 6.
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changes effected by the twentieth century and the recent Constitutional articulation
of egalitarian rights we are moving away from that model.
5.3.3.1 The Inclusion of Women on the Court
Wilson J., the first woman to sit on the Supreme Court of Canada, took
office in March 1982 just before the Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect. Seven
of the twenty-seven judges who sat on the cases in this study were women. There
was at least one woman judge sitting on all but Nowegijick, the first case included in
the study (See Appendix 4), and these pioneering women appear to have contributed
significantly to the breadth of the Court's vision, even if their opinions were often
expressed in minority reasons.
Since many Indigenous societies are matrifocal, the appointment of women
to the Supreme Court could be expected to exert a favourable influence as far as
understanding and protecting Indigenous rights is concerned. A statistical
examination of the core body of cases examined for this study (See Appendix 3)
shows that women represented about one quarter of the judicial sittings though they
produced about one third of the sets of reasons. (26 of 88 with identified authors).
Despite this general indication of hard work, only three of the seven women wrote
reasons (Wilson, L'Heureux-DuM and McLachlin) and only 8 of the 62 majority
reasons were written by women. Of these, Wilson wrote one77l and all of the rest
were written or co-authored by McLachlin, only two before she became Chief
771 Roberts v. Canada.
772 R. v. Williams; Corbiere v. Canada (with Bastarache).
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This profile suggests that - at least in cases concerning "Aboriginal rights" -
the Supreme Court has not escaped the "glass ceiling" that is believed to
marginalize women's perspectives in Canadian society at large. However, in such a
small sample, the difference might also be attributable to individual character.
McLachlin is, after all, the chiefjustice and both Wilson and L'Heureux-DuM have
been highly influential contributing significant insights into the reasoning of their
colleagues through their dissenting opinions. The lack of reasons from the other four
women judges, may have been due to the specialized complexity of "Aboriginal
law" in the case of Louise Arbour or to the recent appointment to the Court of the
other three. On average the women's scores were only slightly lower than the men's
on the colonial scale and higher on the postcolonial scale.(7.4/8.2 Colonial/ 5/4.8
Postcolonial). The difference is marginal and the number of women involved is too
small to make generalizations or to prove any kind of inherent gender difference as
far as colonizing tendencies are concerned. Indeed, some men exceeded some
women on at least one scale (e.g. Fish 7.4/5.1 v. Arbour 8/5.2).
5.3.3.2 Collegiality
The over-all similarity in the judges' scores seems to confirm the collegiality
of their approach as described in the second Wewaykum case.773 Though this study
examined only the texts of the judgments, the round-table discussions and editorial
exchanges that reportedly occur before a set of reasons is finalized seems to parallel
some of the consultative processes used by the Haudenosaunee.774 Despite the
773 Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada II at [92].
774 See: A.C. Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations or the Iroquois Book of the Great Law
[originally New York State Museum Bulletin: 184 (Albany:University of the State of New York,
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application of a majority rule approach and the fact that the judgments were not
phrased in the language of consensus formation, the judges report that they function
among themselves in a way that supports egalitarian postcolonial norms.
5.3.4 Caveat
Differences between the scores of individual judges are attributable in part to
differences in the questions addressed from one case to the next. This effect is
particularly pronounced when a judge has participated in a small number of
decisions. (eg. Charon 9/2.75 and 4/6) Since all of the points of evaluation are
highly subjective, and since the opinions of individual judges may change over time,
it is impossible to produce a mathematically reliable measure. The charts in the
Appendices are used only to provide an overview and food for thought. The focus
of this study remains fixed on the specific characteristics of the reasoning that make
it appear to be either colonial or postcolonial in character.
5.3.5 Conclusions
The culturally biased composition of the Court creates a serious handicap
when it comes to putting postcolonial norms into effect. No members of the
Indigenous societies being judged were included in the decision making process.
. This meant that the Court's decisions were institutionally designed to impose
externally determined cultural norms in accord with the colonial practices that
established the modem Canadian state. Moreover, none of the judges appear to
have had access to any means of acquiring any depth of understanding of
1916)] (Ohsweken, Ontario: lroqrafts, 1991) at 98-100; Karoniaktajeh (Louis Hall), Mohawk trans.
and Kahn-Tineta Horn, English trans. Gayanerekowa: The Constitution ofthe Iroquois Confederacy,
298
Indigenous realities outside of the formal pleadings and whatever may have
survived in the lower court judgments presented to them. Though they sincerely
attempted to maintain neutrality, the judges had no access to any institution
designed to correct misperceptions of the kind that normally occur in intercultural
situations.
Despite their narrow cultural origins, the judges did express widely different
points of view. They wrote their judgments following round table discussions that
attempted to reach consensus while respecting distinctly different perspectives. This
suggests that they applied a postcolonial decision-making methodology among
themselves. Because of this, and because judicial practice fosters acute awareness
of the viability of alternate analytical frames of reference, the judges appear to have
an experiential foundation on which to build reasoning that supports postcolonial
norms.
(Kahnawake, Mohawk Territory:Owera International, 1993) owera@cyberglobe.net.
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5.4 Categorization and Judicial Technique
"In general, the true statements we make are based on
the way we categorize things and, therefore, on what is
highlighted by the natural dimensions of the
categories".
George Lakoff
Metaphors We Live By, 1980775
As Lackoff and Johnson observed, the "truth" communicated by any
sentence is generally dependent on human purposes or, to use Kuhnian terms, it
reflects the paradigm applied.776 "The earth is a sphere" in order to teach elementary
astronomy, but not when its orbit must be precisely calculated. Light may be
"waves" or "particles" depending on which aspect is being considered and which
theory is being tested. So too it is in law. Judges, like the rest of us, structure their
analysis on tacitly applied conceptual systems that affect the sense of what
constitutes "knowledge" itself. Some of the most basic assumptions that underlie
judicial reasoning are woven into the very structure of the thought processes
involved.
As Madam Justice L'Heureux-DuM has pointed out, underlying premises
"must be brought to the surface in order to promote consistency in our law and the
integrity of our judicial system".777 Yet these premises can be very difficult to
identify. Like the participants in Kuhn's experiment who failed to see the black
hearts and red spades in an ordinary deck of cards, Rupert Ross found that even
775 Lakoff, Johnson, Metaphors We Live By at 163.
776 Ibid. at 164.
7772747_3174 Quebec Inc..
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after he had published a book about differences between Anishinabe (Ojibway)
perspectives an his own, he failed to fully comprehend the extent to which different
languages can lead to different understandings about what life is and how its
challenges should be addressed.778
According to Ross, European languages structure thought around material
categories represented by nouns; however, some Indigenous languages focus on
energy and relationships.779 With no capacity to speak Anishinabe, Mi'kmaq or any
other Indigenous language, most of us cannot fully comprehend the conceptual
perspectives they represent. We can, however, consider some of the assumptions
implicit in Supreme Court of Canada reasoning by examining the patterns of
thought presented there.
5.4.1 Metaphoric Illusions and "Black Letter" Law
In keeping with the Anglo-European tendency to objectify or nominalize
experience, several commentators have observed that judicial decisions tend to
follow a rigid binary format that excludes any middle ground.78o The goal is to sort
the "true" from the "false". Concepts and categories are defined in opposing terms,
identified by properties that are either present or absent, ignoring aspects of
commonality. This process, that is used in an attempt to "uphold the law", tends to
polarize opinion, affirming conceptual frames of reference that mayor may not be
explained. It relies heavily on the container metaphor for categorization which, as
778 See ego Ross, Returning to the Teachings at 99.
779 Ibid. at115.
780 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest at 8 and 44. See also ego Stuber, "Legal Reasoning after Post-
Modern Critiques of Reason" at 4. The dualism of Western thinking is highly frustrating to Maori.
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Lakoff has explained, tends to govern the way we think of words themselves.781
However, as the cognitive researchers have demonstrated, knowledge is not really
compartmentalized in our minds. It is "embodied" and stored in multi-sensory
neural circuits that build on previous established prototypes. Our experience with
containers shapes our expectations concerning the nature of a "category". It is the
model for a concept, just as James Bond may be the model for a "bachelor", a car
may be the model for "transportation" and a gun may be a model for either "danger"
or "food" depending on one's social background.
Though it seems we actually understand through a gestalt process of
metaphoric association, judicial reasoning typically treats situations as if they were
objects that may either be inside or outside whatever boundaries have been set in
place by the definition of a word, by legislative enactment or by judicial
interpretation. Ignoring the way in which knowledge is built on interactive, multi-
dimensional analogies, judgments tend to assume that boundaries can be perceived
in the same way by everyone. They attempt to class all aspects of experience as
being either P or not P. Legal rules either do or do not apply. The scales of justice
tip one way or the other. The defendant is declared to be "guilty" or "not guilty" and
decisions are made either for or against the plaintiff. This is the ideal of "black
letter law." The tendency to conflate metaphor with reality is an ever-present
danger.
Wally Penetito, "Research and context for a theory of Maori schooling" (2002) 37: 1 McGill J. Ed.
89.
781 See ego Lakoff, Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh at 51.
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5.4.2 The Primacy of the Container Metaphor
Examples of reasoning that follows the model provided by the container
metaphor can be found in each and everyone of the sixty-two cases considered in
this study. My very choice of which cases would be examined and of which aspects
of those cases would be noted was also governed by a categorization process.
Though the application of a dual scale softens the effect, the over-riding outcome
divides aspects of the reasoning into what is or is not either "colonial" or
"postcolonial". The selection of cases was largely governed by the question of what
was "in" or "out" of the category called "aboriginal and treaty rights" by s.35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982. As L'Heureux-Dube stated in her dissent in Van der Peet :
"The issue of the nature and extent of aboriginal rights
protected under s.35(1) is fundamentally about
characterization."782
The reasoning in the cases themselves was concerned with container-like
categorization from start to finish. Thus, Guerin defined a category called "fiduciary
obligation,,783 and Powley defined "Metis".784 Williams v. Canada asked whether
Unemployment Insurance payments were "a debt to the unemployed contributor".785
Others cases were concerned with the application of categories established in
previous judgments. Lac Mineral narrowed the fiduciary obligation established as a
category in Guerin to exclude some relationships between a fiduciary and a
beneficiary786 and, in Quebec v. Canada (National Energy Board), Iacobucci J.
782 R. v. Van der Peet.
783 Guerin v. The Queen.
784 R. v.Powley.
785 Williams v. Canada, at {9}.
786 Lac Minerals Ltd v. International Corona Resources Ltd.
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called on these categorical distinctions in the course of determining that the
National Energy Board had not "exceeded" the scope of its review jurisdiction.787
Categorization could be seen in the distinctions made between "the facts" and "the
law" and it continued within each of these classifications to consider whether
"extrinsic,,788 or "oral,,789 evidence is admissible or whether a function is governed
by s.91 or s.92 of the Constitution Act, 1982.790
5.4.2.1 Sub-categorization and Narrowing
Judicial reasoning also uses categorization to aid the examination of different
facets of a situation. Thus in Sioui, when Lamer set about determining whether or
not General Murray's document was a "treaty", he divided the evidence into three
sub-categories concerned with 1) the historical context, 2) the signing and 3)
subsequent conduct of the parties.791 A variant use of subcategories can be seen in
the second Marshall judgment where the Court limited the impact of its first set of
reasons by insisting on a narrow interpretation of the category it referred to as
"gathering". This led to the explanation that:
"The Union of New Brunswick Indians suggested a
need to "negotiate an integrated approach dealing with
all resources coming within the purview of fishing,
hunting and gathering which includes harvesting from
the sea, forests and the land". This extended
interpretation of "gathering" is not dealt with in the
September 17. 1999 majority judgment, and
negotiations with respect to such resources as logging,
minerals or offshore natural gas deposits would go
787 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (National Energy Board at {17 and 27}.
788 Eg. R. v. Horse.
789 Eg. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.
790 Eg. Quebec v. Canada (N. E. B.), or Friends ofthe Old Man River Society v. Canada.
791 R. v. Sioui.
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beyond the subject matter of this appeal. The
September 17, 1999 majority judgment did not rule
that the appellant had established a treaty right "to
gather" anything and everything physically capable of
being gathered. The issues were much narrower and
the ruling was much narrower" [underlining added]
In this passage, the Indigenous proposal for a negotiated solution in keeping with
postcolonial norms was held to be incompatible with the adjudicating function of
the Court, which was asserted through the imposition of a rigid categorization
process that ignored unresolved issues concerning the nature of "sovereignty".792
5.4.2.2 Metaphoric Consciousness
Judicial consciousness of their use of categorization techniques was
ubiquitous, if not always explicitly stated. The container metaphor was overtly
referred to in Canadian Pacific Ltd v. Matsqui Indian Band where Reid's
Administrative Law and Practice was quoted as saying:
" ... 'tribunals' is a basket word embracing many kinds
and sortS.,,793 [underline added]
In Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada, Binnie likewise acknowledged the act of
categorization when he stated:
"both the historical context and the inevitable tensions
underlying implementation of Treaty 8 demand a
process by which lands may be transferred from one
category (where the First Nations retain rights to hunt,
fish and trap) to the other category (where they do
not). The content of the process is dictated by the duty
of the Crown to act honourably.,,794[underlining added]
792 The concept of "sovereignty" is tied to feudal concepts of social order and merits a more detailed
investigation than can be provided here.
793 C. P. v. Matsqui, [82] citing "Reid, Administrative Law and Practice, 1971" (full cite not given).
794 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada at [33].
305
The immense power incorporated in the ability to define categories and govern their
application to others may be considered a manifestation of the command model of
legality.
5.4.2.3 Metaphoric Mystification
When Binnie himself became an object to be categorized in the second
Wewaykum case, the application of this metaphorical device began to stretch
credulity. His colleagues at the Court were faced with the task of determining
whether his judgment in Wewaykum I had been impugned by his previous
involvement as counsel for the Crown. They approached the situation by dividing
his thought processes into two separate compartments as if this was physiologically
possible, stating:
"To distinguish between his role as judge and as
Associate Deputy Minister, Justice Binnie is referred
to in these reasons as Binnie J. and Binnie
respectively.,,795
Thus, categorization came to the rescue once again, preserving the integrity of the
status quo as perceived by the members of the Court. Supreme Court judges serve
as prototypical models for juridical integrity and, just as the Pope cannot be a
bachelor, so too, it seems, they themselves cannot accept the fact that they may be
seen as having violated fundamental norms like the rule that no one should judge
their own judgment or serve as judge and party.
In short, basket-like categorization is what modem legal analysis is about
and the cascading exercises in classification and re-classification set out in the
Supreme Court's reasoning suggests that this process has become so habitual to the
795 Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada II at [6].
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members of the Court that they sometimes lose touch with reality as it may be seen
by ordinary members of the Canadian or Indigenous public.
5.4.3 Whose Categories Were Used?
The heavy reliance placed on the container metaphor in Canadian judicial
reasoning excludes whatever conceptual processes may seem more natural to the
original peoples whose ancestors lived here before European colonization began.
As a consequence, the questions that surround "Aboriginal Rights" tend to be
formulated as if Indigenous struggles concern whatever is, or is not, included in a
basket. The importance of negotiated co-existence is sidelined and issues are
nominalized III a way that disguises the subjective agency involved in the
colonization process.
As Kuhn has pointed out, an old paradigm will persist unless there is an
alternative to take its place and, once a new paradigm has become established,
history is rewritten to exclude references to old theories. This makes it difficult to
understand the ways in which people approached problems in the past. Yet
discarded paradigms sometimes addressed evidence that is not considered by the
current orthodoxy and they may be worth studying if we wish to understand the
possibility of paradigmatic alternatives. As far as legal reasoning is concerned, it
might be noted that the current emphasis on category definition may be a trait, no
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only of a specific conceptual and linguistic culture, but also of a specific European
philosophical era. 796
5.4.3.1 Codification and Cultural Relativism
According to some commentators, the assumptions about reality (or the
human capacity to perceive it) generated by modem judicial analysis is a product of
the European Enlightenment.797 One characteristic of this mind set is the move
towards legal codification, which emerged in conjunction with modem "scientific"
method. This sought to escape the personification of nature to achieve "neutral"
descriptions of phenomena. Though the Romans798, the Chinese799 and other older
civilizations used written legal codes or lists of rules of one kind or another, the
word "codification" itself did not become part of the English language until it was
introduced by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832).800 In other words, the quest for
something that approximates the certainty ideally provided by written laws is a
796 For a discussion of alternatives, see 2.2 above on Newton's attempt to avoid the metaphysics
implicit in Indo-European languages through categories like "thing" and "event" and metaphors like
"attraction", See Coetzee, "Newton and the Ideal ofa Transparent Scientific Language".
797 Eg. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest, 22.; Coetzee, "Newton and the Ideal of a Transparent
Scientific Language".
798The Romans compiled lists of laws beginning with the Law of XII Tables, 451-450 B.C.
Justinian's Digest, sometimes referred to today as a "codification", was not compiled until 530-533
A.D. It should be noted that the function of these lists of rules was not the same as that of the
Napoleonic code. Consider: B. O. Foster trans. Livy Book III Loeb Classical Library v.l.(London:
Wm. Heineman Ltd, 1957); C. Pharr trans. The Theodocian Code (New York: Greenwood Press,
1952); T.Mommsen, P. Kreuger, A. Watson, The Digest ofJustinian (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1985); Michel Morin, Introduction historique au droit romain, au droitfranr;ais
et au droit anglais (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 2004), 18.
799 About 500 B.C. there was extensive debate, particularly between Legalists and Confucians
concerning the use of written legal codes though a combination of codified law and Confucian
philosophy was used from the Han Dynasty until the modem era. See Li, The Ageless Chinese; Woo,
"Repairing the Dome of Heaven"; James Legge, trans., The Chinese Classics 2nd• ed. rev. (Shanghai:
Oxford University Press, 1935) Tso Chuan, Book X, Year VI, 609; J.J.L. Duvendak, The Book of
Lord Shang (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); A.F.P. Hulswe, Remnants ofHan Law
(Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1955).
800 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 186-188.
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relatively recent addition to British legality, which was once based on local
interpretations of local custom.80l Codification is founded on a belief that law can
and should reflect a set of "objective" norms - a belief that seems to have been taken
to extremes by Napoleon who reputedly claimed that a single commentary on his
famous and highly influential legal code would signify its ruin.802 In other words, it
presumes that there is only one correct way to understand things and that this may
be imposed by force.
Napoleon's stance recalls the "dualistic" view of knowledge that, according
to Nelson, is characteristic of American college freshmen who retain the primary
school belief that everything is either right or wrong.803 It seems amusingly
unrealistic in this age when we celebrate alternative points of view and reject
conquest as a legitimate means of state definition. Yet the assumptions underlying
the codification movement have become so deeply embedded in Canadian judicial
reasoning that they tend to be taken for granted.
5.4.3.2 Belief in a "Correct" Standard
The idea that there can be one correct legal solution can, for example, be
seen in Mikisew Cree Nation v. Canada, the last case examined in the core study,
where Binnie stated:
"It is always open to an intervener to put forward any
legal argument in support of what it submits is the
correct legal conclusion on an issue properly before
801 Re attempts to codify English law in India see Morin, Introduction historique at 337 n. 589.
802 "Un seul commentaire, et mon code est perdu." Norbert Rouland, "Preface" in Michel Morin,
Introduction historique au droit romain, au droitfranr;ais et au droit anglais (Montreal: Les Editions
Themis, 2004) at xi.
803 Nelson, "On the Persistence ofUnicoms" at 177.
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the Court, provided that in doing so its legal argument
does not require additional facts, not proven in
evidence at trial or raise an argument that is otherwise
unfair to one of the parties.,,804 [underline added]
The suggestion that there is a single "objective" standard that the Courts should
uphold is likewise firmly entrenched. It might, for example, be read into
McLachlin's assertion in the Marshall/Bernard case that:
"The Court's task in evaluating a claim for an
aboriginal right is to examine the pre-sovereignty
aboriginal practice and translate that practice, as
faithfully and as objectively as it can, into a modem
legal right".805 [underline added]
This suggests that the pre-sovereignty practice is an object that might reasonably be
compared and classified along with similarly objectified modem practices. The
colonizing impact of this procedure depends, of course, on whose analogies prevail
in the objectification process. If the classification is imposed by members of an alien
culture without the consent of those concerned, it would be colonizing in character.
However, if it is agreed to by the people concerned it would accord with
postcolonial norms.
Consent was not a factor that was considered with regard to the
establishment of most of the analytical norms applied in the cases examined. For
example, in the second Wewaykum case, the Court described the objective standard
as:
"the most demanding for the judicial system, because
it countenances the possibility that justice might not be
seen to be done, even where it is undoubtedly done-
that is, it envisions the possibility that a decision-
maker may be totally impartial in circumstances which
804 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada at [40].
805 R. v. Marshall/Bernard at [48].
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nevertheless create a reasonable apprehension of bias,
requiring his or her disqualification".806 [underline
added]
This passage raises questions concerning the Court's concept of "objectivity". How
can there be no "doubt" that justice has been done when it is not "seen", or at least
perceived by some sense? Did the judges sitting on that case believe in some sort of
mystical "justice" that can be "done" independently of perceived norms? Did they
think they had a greater capacity to "know" than the members of the public who
"see"? Or than the two opposed Indigenous parties who both wanted Wewaykum I
set aside on the grounds of bias when they learned of Binnie's earlier implication on
behalf of the Crown? If the members of the Court were claiming privileged access
to some sort of "correct" justice that exists beyond human perception, how can this
be reconciled with the democratic ideals discussed in the Secession Reference?
5.4.3.3 Shifts in Social Assumptions
Some of the contradictions apparent m the Court's reasonmg may be
attributable to shifts in basic social values and assumptions. According to Baker, the
belief that a rational legal system could be established to define laws in a way that
expelled all doubts and uncertainties did not become established in England until the
second quarter of the 19th century.807 There was no judge in the ancient English
folcriht, it might be recalled. The legal ideal later applied by the monarchy was the
"law of the land" which varied from one region to the next.808 Because of the
inherently subjective nature of all knowledge, the belief that there can be one
806 Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada II at [67].
807 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 186-188.
808 Ibid. at 9.
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"correct" way of looking at things that may legitimately be imposed on others is
profoundly colonial in character and so perhaps it is no coincidence that the
movement for legal codification emerged at the very apex of the colonial
movement.809 Codification is certainly not the only means of ordering a complex
society as can seen in the intense debates that took place between the Confucians
and the Legalists in the "Hundred Schools" period in China.(ca. 400 B.C.)810
5.4.4 Literacy, Codification and Colonization
Today, written codes are generally considered the epitome of legality. Even
though Canada's constitution itself is the product of an unwritten tradition, the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples adopted this logic when it concluded that
a written constitution should be a prerequisite for aboriginal self-government.8ll
Had the Commissioners forgotten that the Indigenous peoples had been governing
themselves long before the arrival of literate members of the English and French
elite? Literacy has been one of the tools of colonialism. The English imposition of
colonial legality in Canada began with Henry VII's charter to the Cabots.812 The
written word made it possible to command at a distance and to sell or grant title to
land that had never been visited. Within the colonizing cultures literacy itself spread
with the expansion of colonialism. It was only later that the "lower classes" and the
colonized took hold of this tool and used it to assert their human equality.
809 See ego Morin, Introduction historique at 333 et seq.
810 See Li, Ageless Chinese, ch.2: Confucius "had no use for law, as law involved compulsion, and its
observation arose from fear. A good government relied on morality to prevent wrong-doing instead
of law to punish wrong-doers". The Legalists, who were concerned with maintaining power,
instituted codes enforced with draconian insensitivity that continues to impugn the concept of
"legality" in China to this day.
811 Erasmus, Dussault, (RCAP, 1993), Partners in Confederation at 44.
312
5.4.4.1 Conflation of Literacy and Legality
The shift over time in the use of literacy may explain why the reasoning in
the Secession Reference, reflected a similar faith in the written word per se, stating:
"A written constitution promotes legal certainty and
predictability...,,813
None of the cases expressed any consciousness of the extent to which linguistic
categories reflect cultural preferences.814 The sense that everything can and should
ultimately be codified in writing can be seen in the view that there are "gaps" in the
constitutional text that need to be "filled".815 The reasoning processes used to this
end create mandatory precedents referred to as the "Sparrow test", the "Nowegijick
principles" or the standard of a "reasonable person". The gap metaphor and the
proliferation of detail as judgments accumulate encroach on the social space left for
Indigenous preferences and autonomous negotiation. In the course of the past
quarter century, the Court's own culturally determined thought processes have
become like codified obligations. In Van der Peet, for example, Lamer explicitly
stated that the Court intended to "articulate a test for identifying aboriginal
rights".816 That is to say, the Court presumed the right, not only to interpret, but also
to establish the limits of the category called "aboriginal rights" without the
negotiated consent of the Indigenous peoples concerned.
812 St. Catherine's Milling evidence.
813 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [53].
814 See ego Skutnabb-Kangas, "Language Policies and Education"; Penetito, "Research and context
for a theory of Maori schooling"; Ross, Returning to the Teachings.
815 Ibid.
816 R. v. Van der Peet at [4].
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5.4.4.2 Alien Categorization
The quest for a pristine objective standard that can be externally imposed is
further troubled by the fact that the categories that make sense in one set of cultural
circumstances may not be so easy to apply in another. A relatively simple example
of this can be seen in R. v. Horseman. All parties agreed that the accused had been
legitimately hunting moose for his own use when he shot a grizzly bear in self-
defence in the Treaty 8 area. As the trial judge stated, he "did not kill the bear with a
view to selling its hide although he was eventually driven to do so a year later in
order to feed himself and his family." After the sale, he was charged with
"trafficking in wildlife" contrary to the Alberta Wildlife Act. The Supreme Court of
Canada eventually found itself grappling with expert evidence showing that in the
native economy concerned there was no "neat distinction" between commercial and
domestic use. What had seemed clear to whoever drafted the law was simply
"unrealistic" in a context where people customarily ate the meat and sold the skin.817
Such problems could, of course, be alleviated if the Court limited itself to
applying laws formulated according to postcolonial norms or defending Indigenous
jurisdictions from encroachment by the colonizing culture. In this instance,
however, the Court applied laws formulated by legislatures in which the Indigenous
polity to which the accused belonged had no representation.
5.4.5 Limitations of the Container Metaphor
Cross-cultural differences in experience are not the only challenge to the
assumption that everything can be neatly sorted into container-like categories. The
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categories we use to think with facilitate reflection. However, as the cognitive
theorists have pointed out, they are a product of our neural functioning rather than a
reflection of reality per se. Thus categories that function well in one situation may
be problematic in another. This is true whether or not the issues involved concern
Indigenous peoples.
5.4.5.1 Constitution Act, 1867
One of the most prominent limitations on use of the container metaphor for
classification that can be found in Canadian law involves the Constitution Act, 1867
which lists separate spheres of federal and provincial jurisdiction in ss.91 and 92.
The usual basket-like metaphor for classification is difficult to apply in this instance
because:
"no one government is isolated from the other, nor can
it usurp the functions of the other".818
In effect, Canadian and provincial jurisdictions are customarily defined in territorial
terms and the Constitution Act, 1867 established a situation in which two sets of
laws apply on most territory.
At the time of Confederation, which served to unite previously independent
colonies, this set up seemed practical. It allowed the laws of the pre-existing
provincial jurisdictions to continue as before while areas of mutual concern, once
managed by colonial officials in Britain were administered by the federal
parliament. The set-up was not a significant departure from the previous state of
affairs because the colonists already derived their political rights from their shared
817 R. v.Horseman at {20}.
818 Firearms Reference at [31].
315
status as British subjects. Over time, however, difficulties have arisen because
many situations arguably involve elements of both federal and provincial
jurisdiction. Courts dealing with the separation of federal and provincial powers
have found that they cannot "draw sharp lines".819 As the Supreme Court stated in
the Firearms Reference:
"Determination of which head of power a particular
law falls under is not an exact science.,,82o
The inexactness of that "science" was challenged from the outset in this case (See
5.3.2.1 above) It arose because a federal amendment to the Criminal Code requiring
gun owners to register and licence their guns was very unpopular in some parts of
the country. In response, the province of Alberta argued that it violated provincial
jurisdiction over "property and civil rights" under s.92(13). In other words, the case
included elements that could be defined as belonging to both federal and provincial
jurisdictional categories.
5.4.5.2 Pith and Substance Analysis
The solution to problems created by ss. 91 and 92 has been to digress from
container-like categorization to apply a "pith and substance" analysis. The analogy
to the pith or growing core of a tree might seem to provide a model for a more
diffuse understanding that more closely resembles the prototype-focused way that
categories are actually formed in our minds. However, the cases in this study
suggest that the altered imagery provided by the pith and substance paradigm has
had little impact on the Court's use ofthe concept of categorization. Most situations
819 Ibid at [50].
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were still treated as distinct objects that could be sorted into different baskets and
the reality of on-going overlapping effects that characterises Indigenous experience
was ignored.
An example of the persistence of container-like categorization can be seen in
Kitkatla. When the province of British Columbia issued a timber license allowing
the destruction of culturally modified trees on land claimed by more than one
Indigenous group, counsel for the Kitkatla argued that application of the relevant
British Columbian legislation to them was ultra vires the province because it
concerned "Indians" under s.91(24).821 Writing for a unanimous Court, Lebel seems
to have assumed that legal rights cannot be inherent and must be donated by some
external source for he stated that:
"The Constitution of Canada does not include an
express grant of power with respect to "culture" as
such." [underline added]
He then applied "pith and substance" analysis in a way that charted a course through
categories and sub-categories effectively ignoring the overlapping character of the
situation.
5.4.5.3 Arbitrariness
The fact that the categories we use are sometimes unrealistically arbitrary
recurrently troubles judicial reasoning. The judges on the Supreme Court of Canada
are obviously aware of some of the disjuction that exists between the container
metaphor and our real experience of the world. The metaphor simply does not work
820 Ibid at [25].
821 Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia.
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in some circumstances. Thus, in the Secession Reference the Court was at pains to
explain that:
"none of the rights or principles under discussion is
absolute to the exclusion of the others.,,822
It fully acknowledged the interrelated character of the "fundamental constitutional
principles" it was relying upon stating:
"These principles inform and sustain the constitutional
text: they are the vital unstated assumptions upon
which the text is based....These defining principles
function in symbiosis. No single principle can be
defined in isolation from the others, nor does one
principle trump or exclude the operation of any
other.,,823 [underlining added].
5.4.6 Alternatives and Innovation
As seen in the Secession Reference, judicial awareness of the shortcomings
of container-like analysis led to some attempts to use alternate models. In Corbiere,
L'Heureux-Dube's minority reasons used a prototype-based methodology by
finding that:
"equality is a comparative concept, the analysis must
consider the person relative to whom the claimant is
being treated differentially".824
Similarly, in Lovelace when the Court was asked to consider whether Indigenous
communities that were not "bands" under the Indian Act could share in the profits
generated by reserve-based casinos run by Ontario and the "First Nations" of that
province, it referred to "constellations of disadvantage" saying there was not
822 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [93].
823 Ibid at [49].
824 Corbiere v. Canada at [69].
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" ... a strict dichotomy of advantaged and
disadvantaged grou~s within which each claimant
must be classified.,,8 5.
Because of this it found that:
" ... substantive equality analysis cannot be reduced to
simple analytical formulae. For, while it is often true
that distinctions may produce discrimination, there are
many other situations where substantive equality
requires that distinctions be made in order to take into
account the actual circumstances of individuals as they
are located in varying social, political, and economic
situations.,,826
The Court has recognized that even actuarial accounting can defy absolute
definition. Thus, when called upon to evaluate land leased on a reserve in
Musqueam v. Glass, McLachlin noted that: "appraisal is a notoriously unscientific
endeavour".827 She, in particular, seems to have given some thought to alternate
conceptual frameworks. In Marshall/Bernard, she may have been influenced by pith
and substance reasoning when she stated:
"The question is whether the practice corresponds to
the core concepts of the legal right claimed....To
determine the aboriginal entitlement one looks to the
aboriginal practices rather than imposing a European
template ... ,,828
Similarly, in Haida Nation, she specifically rejected the container metaphor with
regard to the Crown's duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous interests
suggesting:
"the concept of a spectrum may be helpful, not to
suggest watertight compartments but rather to indicate
what the honour of the Crown may require in
825 Lovelace v. Ontario.
826 Ibid. at [60].
827 Musqueam Indian Bandv. Glass at [16]
828 R. v. Marshall/Bernard at [48-9].
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particular circumstances. At one end of the spectrum
lie cases where the claim to title is weak, the
Aboriginal right limited, or the potential for
infringement minor....At the other end of the spectrum
lie cases where a strong prima facie case for the claim
is established, the right and potential infringement is of
high significance to the Aboriginal peoples, and the
risk of non-compensable damage is high....While
precise requirements will vary with the circumstances,
...This list is neither exhaustive, not mandatory for
every case.,,829
Thus, despite its ubiquitous use of container-like categorization, the members of the
Court seem to be aware of some of the limitations of this device.
5.4.7 Judicial Awarness of Cognitive Processes
Because judges are constantly involved with the analysis of both their own
and other people's reasoning, it is not surprising to find that they have gained some
insight into cognitive functioning.
5.4.7.1 The Problems of Subjectivity
McLachlin acknowledged the inherently subjective nature of our thought
proceses in her Van der Peet dissent where she criticized Lamer's Integral-
Incidental test as being too categorical because:
" ...different people may entertain different ideas of
what is distinctive, specific or central.,,830
Her proposal for defining "aboriginal rights" corresponded to what cognitive
researchers have found we do in practice:
. .. "we should look to history to see what sort of
practices have been identified as aboriginal rights in
the past. From this we may draw inferences as to the
829 Haida Nation v. British Columbia at [43-44].
830 R. v. Van der Peet at [257].
320
sort of things which may qualify as aboriginal rights
under s.35(1). Confronted by a particular claim, we
should ask, "Is this like the sort of thing which the law
has recognized in the past?" This is the time-honoured
methodology of the common law.,,831
Many other aspects of this passage merit consideration.832 The problem that
concerns us here is that what looks "alike" on the basis of one person's experience
will look radically different to someone else so McLachlin's formulation does not
escape the shortcomings she identified with Lamer's test. Though she did
demonstrate awareness of the fact that there is a problem in this regard, the net
result is a colonizing imposition of an externally defined categorisation process.
5.4.7.2 Tolerance of Alternate Perspectives
One of the outstanding characteristics of the judicial reasoning examined in
this study is that, despite the relative homogeneity of the judges' culture and
experience, they sometimes took radically different approaches to the issues at hand.
In Van der Peet, McLachlin's dissent joined another by L'Heureux-DuM. As a
result, three different "tests" were proposed. In Blueberry River, Gonthier and
McLachlin both reached the same conclusion - that the Crown owed compensation
to the Band for the loss of the mineral rights from their reserve. However, their
reasoning was completely different. McLachlin relied on the nemo dat quod non
831 Ibid. at [261]. See also Peter W. Hutchins, Anjali Choksi, "From Calder to Mitchell: Should the
courts Patrol Cultural Borders?" in 2001 Constitutional Cases: Fifth Annual Analysis of the
Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School,
Continuing Legal Education, 12 April, 2001) at 25.
832 For example, the impact of this passage will be postcolonial if the "aboriginal rights" protected by
s.35(1) are defined by the Indigenous people themselves in accord with the traditional British
concepts of the monarch's protective role, but it may have a colonizing impact if "the law" referred
to is defined exclusively by the colonizing society.
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habet833 principle and emphasized a procedural defect within the Canadian
system.834 Gonthier, by contrast, emphasized the intent of the parties in the
transaction which he saw as a "variation of a trust in Indian land". Their approaches
differed from that of the trial judge and the Crown who thought the mineral rights
had been transferred because they were not expressly excluded while Stone l.A. on
the Court of Appeal had seen the transaction as a "revocation surrender".
Such disparity of opinion is typical of legal argument. It is one of the
reasons why there is often no "right" answer on Canadian law school exams. As
observed by La Forest when addressing a less conceptually chaotic situation in
Friends ofthe Old Man River Society:
"A variety of analytical constructs have been
developed to grapple with the problem, a1thou~h no
single method will be suitable in every instance". 35
5.4.8 Conclusions
The uncertainty created by the availability of different analytical options
does not mean that categorization processes and "objective" standards can or should
be abandoned. Even though it is just an analogy, the container metaphor is useful.
Indeed, some elements are inherent to the way we think - in English and French at
least. We can, however, take an informed approach. As the applications of
paradigmatic theory discussed in section 2 above suggest, science no longer
considers "objectivity" in absolute Napoleonic terms. In Lakoffs words:
833 "You cannot give what you do not have".
834 There was no evidence to show revocation of the 1940 surrender of mineral rights so it could not
have been included in the 1945 surrender prior to sale of the land to the Veterans' land program.
835 Friends ofthe Old Man River Society v. Canada at {42}.
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"To be objective, we must be aware that we have a
particular conceptual system, we must know what it is
like, and we must be able to entertain alternatives".836
The same calibrated concept of objectivity may be applied to legal reasoning.
Though none of the judgments examined for this study took scientific account of the
subjective nature of human thought processes, some did articulate a value oriented
concept of objectivity and many traditional common law practices accommodate
what is, after all, a part of everyone's experience.
Notwithstanding the examples discussed in this section, the Court
consistently advocated a model of reasoning governed by principled choices, most
notably in the Secession Reference. Yet Canada's traditional approach to "Indians"
was formulated by policy makers who firmly believed that the land they sought to
"develop" was theirs and that the original peoples belonged to a backwards, dying
race whose survivors needed to be assimilated into a British imperial organization
that was destined to govern the world. This was the epitome of colonialism. As a
consequence, a key question about any particular judgement concerns whose
categories were chosen to serve as the containers for the reasoning and why. Over
all, the post s.35 judgements remained profoundly colonial in their capacity to
impose externally defined frames of reference, categories and prototypical models
on Indigenous people even though, among themselves, the judges demonstrated the
awareness and tolerance of alternatives that is characteristic of postcolonial
reasomng.
836 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 264. See also Skutnabb-Kangas (1981, xiii) as
cited by Penetito, "Research and context for a theory of Maori schooling".
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5.5 Judicial Frames of Reference
"The patterns of abuse and harm do exist today, not
only as today's reality but also as multigenerational
legacies that will extend into the future unless the
patterns are changed." 837
Wanda D. McCaslin (Metis) 2005,
"Naming the Realities of Life"
The majority of the judgments examined for this study followed a set
formula. They described the "facts", the applicable Canadian "law" and the
reasoning in the "Courts below" before defining the issues to be considered at the
Supreme Court and presenting the analysis that justified the Court's conclusions.
Because of this, the frames of reference set out by settler society legislation or
applied by the trial and appeal courts are readily accessible. However, judicial
representations of the frames of reference asserted by the parties to the litigation
remained surprisingly vague given the primacy of equality rights in the modem
Canadian Constitution and the Court's claim that s.35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982 is intended to have a conciliatory function. 838
Although arguments made by one side or another were referred to from time
to time, they were not set out systematically in every case as one might expect if one
of the Court's purposes is to serve as a forum for public discussion. 839 References to
frames of reference used by the Indigenous society concerned tended to arise in
extraneous commentary like Binnie's ruminations on merged sovereignty in
837 McCaslin, Justice as Healing..
838 Note ego Van der Peet, [31].
839 See ego McLachlin, "Welcome". By contrast, see Bennell v. State of Western Australia [2006]
FCA 1243 which takes a more systematic approach to the presentation ofIndigenous arguments.
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MitcheU840 or when raised by Indigenous people as a defence to violations of the
settler society's norms. They were not part of the structure of the Court's analysis,
occurring, if at all, as part of the evidence to be examined as happened in
Delgamuukw or in the cases concerned with Mi'kmaq rights. This cavalier disregard
for Indigenous reality and the colonial character of Canadian history made it
difficult to determine what, exactly Indigenous parties had pleaded within the
structure for legality imposed upon them. For example, in St. Mary's Indian Band v.
Cranbrook, Lamer's statement of the issues concluded with:
"In my view, the other two issues raised by the
appellants do not arise on the facts of this case." 841
Without access to the pleadings, there is no way of knowing what those issues were
and he did not explain how he made this determination. This leaves us to wonder
how many other issues may have been overlooked or swept aside in other cases,
reminding us of the enormous supervisory power exercised by the Court through its
capacity to determine which cases will or will not be heard and which frames of
reference it will support or impose. It also suggests that the St. Mary's Indian Band
may have been operating on the basis of a different conceptual framework - one that
cannot be determined by reading the resulting judgment. As Kuhn pointed out,
people tend to ignore facts and questions that do not fit the paradigm they are
applying, and this is precisely what Lamer did when the St. Mary's Indian Band
case reached his court.
840 Mitchell v. MN.R. at [130].
841 St. Mary's Indian Band v. Cranbrook, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 657 119 at [11].
325
The same considerations anse concermng whatever was argued by the
interveners who participated in all but ten of the cases examined.842 Once again,
their perspectives were only occasionally set out and there is no readily available
means of determining what points of view they put forward or whether the Court
represented those that were mentioned accurately. As a consequence, the judgments
serve exclusively as a record of the frames of reference adopted by the judges who
served at the various levels of the settler society's system of courts.
5.5.1 Subjectivity v. the Nowegijick Principles
The Court's apparent lack of concern for the perspectives of both the parties
and the interveners may be an unconscious perpetuation of the colonial belief that
one's own point of view represents an "objective" standard that exists independently
of human beliefs and perceptions. The postcolonial movement has been
accompanied by a rise in consciousness concerning the profound variability in
frames of reference that may be found as one moves across time or from one culture
or sub-culture to the next. This in tum raises questions concerning the protective
function traditionally claimed by the Crown. The Secession Reference insisted that it
was not the role of the judges to impose their personal preferences.843 Yet, choices
and perceptions are inevitably coloured by personal experience. In order to uphold
egalitarian principles, judges must accordingly be introspective enough to be
conscious of the choices they make and articulate enough to relate these choices to
842 The cases without interveners were: Jack and Charlie; R. v. Horse; Roberts v. Canada; Lac
Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd.; Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band; Williams v.
Canada; Goodswimmer v. Canada; R. v. Catcheway; Musqueam Indian Band v. Glass,; R. v. Deane.
843 See ego Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [101].
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the fundamental principles agreed upon by the society or societies concerned as well
as to the perspectives of the parties involved in the situation at hand.
This requires a very high level of analytical skill, though it IS not
unobtainable. Sensibility on this order might even have been part of British Imperial
legal methodology. For example, back in 1921 the Privy Council in England made
similar observations concerning the caution required to ensure respect for the
multiple perspectives and concepts of legality incorporated in the British Empire. In
Amodu Tijani, which considered Southern Nigerian land rights, Viscount Haldane
insisted on the need for:
"the study of the history of the particular community
and its usages in each case".844
Though writing several decades before Kuhn's influential work, he seems to have
been conscious of the same idiosyncrasies of human cognition. He pointed out that
explanations of Indigenous concepts in English legal terms were "mere analogies of
English jurisprudence" and, with the support of his Privy Council colleagues, he
stipulated that:
"Their Lordships make the preliminary observation
that in interpreting the native title to land, not only in
Southern Nigeria, but other parts of the British
Empire, much caution is essential. There is a
tendency, operating at times unconsciously, to render
that title conceptually in terms which are appropriate
only to systems which have grown up under English
844 Amodu Tijani [1921] 2 A.C. 399 at 403. See also Brian Slattery, The Land Rights ofIndigenous
Canadian Peoples, as affected by the Crown's Aquisition oftheir Territories [Doctoral Dissertation,
Faculty of Law, Oxford University, 1979) 45-61; Brian Donovan, "The Evolution and Present Status
of Common Law Aboriginal Title in Canada: The Law's Crooked Path and the Hollow Promise of
DelgamuukW' (2001) 35:1 UBC L.R 43; "Common Law Origins of Aboriginal Entitlements to
Land" 29:3 Manitoba L.J.289.
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law. But this tendency has to be held in check
closely. 845
Forbearance with regard to the preferences or conceptual frameworks of others
appears to have been considered so important to the English that the concomitant
limitations extended even to the monarch as seen Lord Denning's 1964 declaration
in Southam v. Smout that:
" 'The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to
all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail - its roof
may shake - the wind may blow through it - the storm
may enter - the rain may enter - but the King of
England cannot enter - all his force dares not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement.' So be it - unless he
has justification by law.,,846
This ethos of imperial honour and restraint was not confined to judicial
reasoning. School children were also lectured on tolerance as can be seen in a 1919
Saskatchewan high school civics text which reasoned:
"Since Canada is now assuming in a definite way the
duties of empire, there is a certain imperial feeling
that we should strive to develop, The British Empire
is so vast that it contains within itself nations of all
languages and all religions. As a citizen of the
Empire you should, therefore, have respect and
tolerance for the opinions of others. Our empire
cannot long continue to exist, unless it is something
for which our brother nations may all have an ardent
loyalty, whatever may be their creed, race or tongue.
This imperial feeling will also help us in our national
affairs, for it will enable us to be sympathetic to our
fellow citizens throughout the Dominion.,,847
The capacity to recognize and respect "internal" jurisdictions must have
facilitated the spread of the community imagined by British imperialism. In North
845 Amodu Tijani [1921] 2 A.C. 399 at 402-3.
846 Southam v. Smout [1964] 1 Q.B. 308 at 320.
847 R.S. Jenkins, Canadian Civics, Saskatchewan Edition (Toronto: The Copp, Clark Company
Limited, 1919), 167.
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American Euro-Indigenous relations, it can be seen in the creative compromises of
the eighteenth century described by White848 and, as recently as 1909, Frank Oliver
who was Canada's Minister of the Interior, expressed a governmental policy of
respecting the Six Nations right to continue using their traditional government. 849
However, the rationale for colonial encroachment tended to supercede the ethos of
respect and imperial forebearance as can be seen, for example, in the obliteration of
Metis governments in the West or, according to Allen, in the earlier colonization of
Ireland.850 Certainly, the extension of the principle of self-government to the settler
colony of Canada appears to have facilitated its retraction from Indigenous peoples
in the case of the Six Nations. 851
Amodu Tijani may have inadvertently contributed to the extension of this
colonizing dynamic into Canadian legal reasoning for, in the course of explaining
the importance of respect for cultural difference, Haldane cited St. Catherine's
Milling as authority for the proposition that "Indian title to reserve lands in Canada"
was a "usufructuary right". His comment completely overlooked the fact that
neither the character of "reserve lands" nor "native title" was at issue in that case852
and that Lord Watson had specifically stated that he was not expressing an opinion
848 White, The Middle Ground. For problems and miscommunications that resulted see ego Walters,
"Brightening the Covenant Chain".
849 Frank Oliver to Chief J.S. Johnston, Deputy Speaker, Six Nations Council (5 April, 1909) in
Petition and Case ofthe Six Nations ofthe Grand River presented to the Colonial Office, 25 August,
1921) PAC ARA A-dossiers 1918-1940 inv. no. 152l.
850 See Allen, The Invention of the White Race.
851 Woo, "Canada's Forgotten Founders"; Woo, Canada v. The Haudenosaunee (Iroquois)
Confederacy at the League ofNations ..
852 Amodu Tijani [1921] 2 A.c. 399 at 403.
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on "the precise quality of the Indian right". 853 This subtle error helped establish a
path leading away from the very principles Haldane espoused. The power of his
casual comment arose in part because, unlike the British, who could refer to local
customs and practices to define their laws, Canadians were living far from their
ancestral homes and the legal regime they applied was imported. As a consequence,
they they had no local laws that the Crown could protect and, through institutions
like the Privy Council itself, they had developed the habit of deferring to the
authority of the "motherland". Such, according to the cognitive theorists, is the
effect of subjectivity and lived experience.
5.5.1.1 Judicial Awareness of Subjectivity
Though differences between Canadian juridical assumptions and English
sensibilities tend to be ignored854, the members of the Court who wrote the decisions
examined in this study frequently demonstrated an understanding of the subjective
nature of their analyses. The authors of judgments were usually identified and
phrases like "in my view" occurred regularly. Such self-awareness is fully
consistent with a scientifically informed concept of objectivity that attempts to
account consciously for the beliefs and assumptions that shape the terms of
reference chosen.
As will be discussed below, the judges whose opinions were considered for
this study often went to great lengths to explain the principles that founded their
853 St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1888) 14 App.Cas. 46 at 55. See
Donovan, "The Evolution and Present Status of Common Law Aboriginal Title in Canada" at 50.
The problem was not mentioned in Brian Slattery's thesis.
854 Historical researchers like McNeil, Walters, Clark, Donovan and Pesklevits and have, however,
brought some aspects of this dynamic to light.
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reasoning. Even if they did not agree, they routinely expressed respect and
deference for the analysis of prior decision makers, particularly when "findings of
fact", issues of credibility8s5, or expert assessments8S6 were involved. However, they
could also rely arbitrarily on personal sentiment or invoke the mythically pristine
standard of objectivity to which Napoleon aspired. For example, in Delgamuukw
Lamer baldly declared:
"I believe that all the parties have characterized the
content of aboriginal title incorrectly.,,8s7
Scientifically speaking, nothing can be "correct" except In relation to some
standard. According to democratic theory, the measure of correctness is collective
public opinion as determined through formal legislative processes. However in this
instance Lamer resorted to a personal standard. Instead of grounding his analysis in
a collectively defined legality created with the consent of the people affected, he
sought to impose his own ill explained beliefs. This gave his reasoning a colonial
tinge.
5.5.1.2 Unacknowledged Subjectivity
As far as the goal of decolonization is concerned, this dynamic was much
more insidious when the judges did not acknowledge that they were applying a
personal or culturally determined perspective in relation to concepts that were
fundamental to the issues before them. Colonial modes of reasoning asserted
themselves at this level even in cases that are celebrated for affirming "Aboriginal
855 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia at [79].
856 Paulv. B. C.(Forest Appeals Commission) at [31].
857 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia at [110].
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rights". For example, Nowegijick, the oft cited first case in this study, is best known
for the principle that:
"Treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be
liberally construed and doubtful expressions resolved
in favour ofthe Indians".858
Yet this case registered nine out or ten of the indicia of colonialism.
When we look to see why this happened we see that Gene A. Nowegijick is
identified only as an "Indian". This is a category that exists only in Canadian law.
It is defined by the Indian Act but, there was no evidence of such a classification in
any Indigenous culture. The characterization represents a mode of thought that
came into being because of European in-migration that affected peoples who were
otherwise distinct. As such, it maintains the "othering" that has been much
discussed by scholars like Said and Memmi. The case came to court because of a
demand for income tax supported by the coercive power of the Canadian state.
Nowegijick was not free to imagine his existence according to the parameters of his
ancestors. Proceedings took place in the language and according to the institutions
of the colonizing culture. The way in which Nowegejick constructed his identity in
Indigenous terms was neither acknowledged nor explained. Even the attempt to be
respectful by referring to him as "Mr. Nowegijick" imposed the British social
category of "Mister".
Of course, none of these concerns would have had a colonizing effect if
"Mr. Nowegijick" had voluntarily adopted Anglo-Canadian language, culture and
political norms. However, evidence to this effect was conspicuous by its absence.
858 Nowegijick v. The Queen at 30.
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The analysis began with the blunt declaration that "Indians are citizens". No
evidence or legal explanation was offered to support this assertion. It may have felt
like a magnanimous gesture to the members of the Court because it distanced them
from the uncomfortable fact that "Indians" were once excluded from the definition
of a "person" under Canadian law. However, the aura of abuse that hangs over past
and even present Canadian-Indigenous relations was not acknowledged. The
analysis simply presumed cultural and political assimilation.
The reason for this founding premise may not have been so generous. The
full sentence in which the statement occurred reads as follows:
"Indians are citizens and, in affairs of life not governed
by treaties or the Indian Act, they are subject to all of
the responsibilities, including payment of taxes, of
other Canadian citizens,,859
In other words, the purpose seems to have been to establish basic liability for
Canadian income tax. Yet it is misleading in this regard because the Income Tax
Act under which Nowegijick was charged stipulates that tax liability is based on
being a "resident in Canada", not on citizenship.86o
The most serious problem with this statement from a postcolonial
perspective is, however, that the reference to citizenship implies political
participation in the establishment of the tax regime that simply did not exist. As
Dickson stated, income tax was introduced as a temporary war-time measure in
1917, long after the antecedent to s.87 of the Indian Act was implemented. It is, as
he pointed out, an "idle pursuit at best" to speculate about whether parliament
859 Ibid at, 36.
860 Income Tax Act, s.2(1); Nowegijick v. The Queen at 34.
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intended the s.87 exemption to extend to a tax that had not yet been created.861 Yet,
whatever nation or nations Nowegijick's Indigenous ancestors belonged to, they had
no representation in either of the parliaments that pased the legislation being
considered by the Court. In 1917, it might be recalled, "Indians" were explicitly
excluded from the definition of a "person" in Canadian law.862 Under the
circumstances, it can hardly be considered that Nowegijick's people became subject
to Canadian laws as a result of:
"the freely expressed wishes of the territory's people
acting with full knowledge of the change in their
status, their wishes having been expressed through
informed and democratic processes, impartiallr
conducted and based on universal adult suffrage... ,,86
In other words, the Nowegijick case does not meet the standards affirmed by the
International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara case in 1975. Since Canada
was a voluntary participant in the institutions that articulated the norms applied in
Western Sahara this situation presents a structural flaw in the Nowegijick reasoning.
The same problems trouble Dickson's application, in the same case, of
Bachrach v. Nelson's finding that "money" is "property".864 He did not set out the
principles applied to make this determination, so his adoption of the language of this
American case is, in essence, another example of pure reliance on the social
authority accorded to his personal opinion. His deference to the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of Illinois also violates the popular representation that is
861 Nowegijick v. The Queen, ibid.
862 Indian Act, 1906 S.C. 15 Geo. VI c.29 as amended by 1-2 Ed. VII, 1910 c.28; 1-2 Geo V, 1911
c.14; 4-6 Geo. V, 1914 c.35; 8-9 Geo. V.
863 Western Sahara, I.C.J., 16 October, 1975 at 12, [ 57].
864 Nowegijick v. The Queen at 38 citing Bachrach v. Nelson, 182 N.E. 909 (1932).
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fundamental according to English constitutional norms. If the case Dickson relied
on had reasoned on the basis of the customs of both Nowegijick's people and of
Canadians it would have been applying "the laws of the land"; however, this aspect
of the reasoning relied on an external interpretation of words in a language that was
certainly foreign to the targeted party's ancestors.
5.5.1.3 Respect for Indigenous Perspectives
These shortcomings do not detract from the fact that the Nowegejick case did
represent a significant breakthrough in postcolonial terms. The Court's enunciation
of the principle that Indigenous perspectives must be acknowledged and that the
words of statutes and treaties must be interpreted "in the sense in which they would
naturally be understood by the Indians" 865 might be seen both as a restoration of the
classical British constitutional paradigm that was founded on the laws of the land
and as a repudiation of the colonial presumption of Indigenous inferiority that
ensured that their points of view were routinely ignored.
5.5.1.4 Creative Accommodation?
In fairness to Dickson and the members of the Court it should be noted that
it is unlikely that international law was presented in any of the pleadings before
them. Nowegijick's taxable income of only $11,057.08 indicates a significant power
imbalance between him and the Canadian state. Notwithstanding the presence of a
long list of Indigenous interveners, the time frames and cost involved were not
conducive to the articulation of arguments involving the kind of fundamental
paradigmatic reorientation required to persuade Canadian judges to think of
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Indigenous peoples on a fully equal basis. Those involved in Nowegijick's defense
may well have decided that it would be strategically politic to settle for an attempt
to reestablish the kind of creative ambiguity that appears to have governed
Indigenous relations with Europeans in the early contact era.866 They limited their
arguments to a narrow sphere and, since the political status of Nowegijick's people
was not in issue, the case cannot be taken as authority for the statement made in
obiter that "Indians are citizens" of Canada.
5.5.2 Who Framed the Issues?
With regard to all of the judicial reasoning examined in this study, it is
important to remember that, as Lamer pointed out in the Remuneration Reference,
the party who frames the issues plays a significant role in determining the grounds
on which analysis proceeds.867
5.5.2.1 The Power of the Crown
There was plenty of evidence to validate the judicial perception that they
were imprisoned to some extent by the questions before them.868 When considering
who framed the issues in the sixty-two cases in the core sample examined, it is
obvious that the Crown exercised by far the greatest influence. (See Appendix 5)
Only three cases involved private suits against indigenous parties and none involved
865 Ibid at 37.
866 See White, The Middle Ground
867 Remuneration Reference at [82].
868 Ibid at [82].
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an Indigenous complaint about a purely private matter.869 Aside from the two
references to the court by governments, fully thirty cases began with penal charges
against Indigenous people. Most of these concerned hunting or fishing rights. Only
the robbery of a pizza parlour in R. v. Williami70 and the murder in R. v. Gladue871
were conventional crimes with no direct connection to the historical fact of
colonization. Two further cases involved non-Indigenous penal charges. Four
involved tax or customs levies and ten arose from the state's ability to encroach on
Indigenous ways of life by granting land title, rights of way or licences for logging,
power export or road construction to outside interests. Thus, a quick review that
does not address the colonizing aspects of the situation surrounding such matters as
Guerin's lease and the band council elections in Corbiere and Goodswimmer,
demonstrates that most of the cases required the Court to reason according to frames
of reference established by agents of one aspect or another of the Crown.
5.5.2.2 The Crown's Duty to Protect
This leads us to consider who the "Crown" or government actually
represents. In Sparrow, Dickson and Laforest stated that a general guiding
principle for s.35(l) was that:
" ...the Government has the responsibility to act in a
fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples.
The relationship between the Government and
aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and
contemporary recognition and affirmation of
869 Though Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada involved a dispute over land rights, it concerned the
Crown's attribution ofa reserve.
870 R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128.
87! R. v. Gladue.
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aboriginal rights must be defined In light of this
historic relationship.,,872
We might thus expect the Crown to promote, protect and act on behalf of
Indigenous points of view. However, when we look at the interests supported by the
Crown in the 62 cases examined, we find that only six involved no element of
adversity between the Crown and Indigenous interests. As listed in Appendix 5, the
Crown supported private property interests in 27 cases. It supported Indigenous
interests in only six cases. In five of these it was acting against another Indigenous
point of view and in one against a private complainant.873 Despite the presumption
that the Crown played a fiduciary role, there were no instances of litigation initiated
by the Crown on behalf of an Indigenous interest or of prosecution by the Crown to
defend Indigenous rights. Moreover, the federal Crown acted as an intervener in 22
cases and provincial Crowns acted as interveners in 37 cases. There is no evidence
that any of these interventions supported Indigenous positions. In effect, as might be
expected given the historical genesis of the Crown's presence, it represented settler
society.
Indigenous interests were, however, allied with those of some members of
settler society in seven cases suggesting that support from private organizations,
such as environmental groups, is more readily available to Indigenous peoples than
Crown support. Many of the settler interests with which the Crown aligned itself
were able to mount their own legal arguments creating a reduplication of anti-
872 R. v. Sparrow at 1108.
873 Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band.
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Indigenous effort. There were private interveners in a total of 22 cases, while only
10 cases had no interveners at all.
With the Crown acting at times as both prosecutor and intervener,
Indigenous interests were often required to defend themselves against multiple
manifestations of the settler culture. Moreover, as well as having a behind-the-
scenes involvement in Wewaykum II before he became a member of the Court,
Binnie was counsel of record for the Crown in two cases that opposed Indigenous
points ofview.874 Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see how it can be argued
that the Crown's position in relation to Indigenous interests, as defined by the
Indigenous peoples themselves, has been "trust-like, rather than adversarial".
5.5.3 Whose Frames of Reference Prevailed?
Another indication of the Court's stance with regard to Indigenous points of
VIew can be found by considering whose frames of reference were ultimately
validated by the judgments rendered.
5.5.3.1 Who Won?
The oppressive character of the Crown's use of the Court seems to be
accentuated when we consider who "won" in the cases involving penal charges. As
set out in Appendix 5, charges against a total of 99 Indigenous people were
considered in 30 cases. Of these, 70 people were convicted, 13 were acquitted and
retrial of one kind or another was ordered for 15. Thus, despite the ordeal involved
874 Guerin v. The Queen; Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation.
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in contesting a charge all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada, only a small
percentage of those charged were eventually exonerated.
Aside from the tax and customs charges that were of concern in four cases,
colonial social norms were expressed through the granting of licences and leases to
non-Indigenous interests in 14 cases. This dynamic, coupled with the Court's
standard procedural methodology of applying legislation and principles established
without Indigenous involvement, enhanced the colonizing burden represented by the
use of the Supreme Court as a venue for resolving intercultural issues.
5.5.3.2 Who Used the Court?
Under the circumstances, it should not surprise us to find that, according to
the cases that reached the Supreme Court, it does not appear to have been an
institution that was voluntarily chosen by Indigenous peoples to regulate their rights
amongst themselves. None of the cases examined in this study called on the Court
to resolve disputes that exclusively concerned Indigenous parties with no Crown
implication. Of the eighteen cases that were instituted by Indigenous parties all but
one named a settler government as the defendant.
5.5.3.3 Creative Use of the Right of Reply
Because Indigenous people have become familiar with the customs of settler
society some of the cases instituted by the Crown or by business interests could be
considered to have been intentionally provoked. Two began with blockades, three
with tax assessments and one with the registration of cautions on land claimed by
the Crown. In R. v. Jones a Band Council Resolution renounced federal and
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provincial jurisdiction and in Pamajewon and Mitchell non-compliance with settler
regulatory regimes was deliberate, public and pre-meditated. This may also have
been the case with Marshall/Bernard. This approach may have been adopted in part
as an assertion of Indigenous sovereignty, but also because any accused or
respondent may use the right of reply guaranteed by standard court procedure to
introduce a point of view that differs from that of the accusing party. It should be
remembered that in all of these instances prosecution was not the only option
available to the Crown. It could have chosen to accept and accommodate
Indigenous conceptualizations of their rights.
5.5.3.4 Mitchell and the Problem of Issue Re-definition
In Mitchell the Court was dealing with a situation in which Canadian law
was intentionally being tested by an Indigenous applicant. The international
boundary with the United States as well as provincial boundaries had been drawn
through a pre-existing community. It is currently impossible to drive from the
Ontario part of Akwesasne to the Quebec part without passing through the United
States and Cornwall Island can only be reached by road by passing either through a
toll bridge or the Canadian border control.875 Mike Mitchell, the Chief of the
Mohawk Council of Akwesasne, knew that he would be charged when he refused to
pay customs on goods he was carrying to symbolize unity within the Mohawk
nation.876 He explicitly described himself as "a citizen of the Mohawk Nation,,877
875 The u.s. border control is on the outside edge of the reserve, rather than in the middle.
876 Mitchell v. MN.R. at [2].
877 Ibid. at [67].
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and claimed his right on this basis with regard to personal goods, community goods
and goods for small scale trade. 878
The trial court found that there was an Aboriginal, but not a treaty right "to
pass freely across what is now the border" and to carry goods for noncommercial
scale trade. On appeal, this right was confirmed within the traditional range of
Mohawk trade, limited to goods purchased in New York state, brought to a border
crossing between New York and Ontario or Quebec and used only for trade with
other Aboriginal communities within those two provinces.879 However, at the
Supreme Court of Canada, McLachlin redefined the issue as an unlimited right to
trade across the St. Lawrence River, broadly phrased so as to include mobility rights
which had been carefully excluded from the issue submitted for consideration.88o
She then found that the claim for the right as she had redefined it had not been made
out. This dynamic effectively prevented formal analysis of the issues as understood
by Mike Mitchell and the Mohawk nation.
5.5.3.5 Interpretation of Indigenous Culture in Mitchell
McLachlin's failure to address the question that had actually been brought
before the Court may have been due in part to an inability to grasp the social
parameters of an alien culture about which the court evidently knew little. This is
suggested by the misrepresentation in the majority reasons of some of the expert
878 Peter W. Hutchins, Anjali Choksi, "From Calder to Mitchell: Should the courts Patrol Cultural
Borders?" in 2001 Constitutional Cases: Fifth Annual Analysis ofthe Constitutional Decisions ofthe
Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School, Continuing Legal Education, 12
April,2001).
879 Ibid at [5-7].
880 Ibid at [16- 25,60]; Hutchins, Choksi, "Fom Calder to Mitchelf' .
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evidence that had been presented at trial. McLachlin's reasoning was based, in part,
on the assertion that:
"Richter contends that warfare between the Five
Nations and their northern nei~hbours precluded the
possibility of trade (at 28_29),,88
What Richter actually wrote, as a quote from his work provided by McLachlin
herself demonstrated, was that:
" ... a lack of reciprocity, as epitomized by the absence
of trading relationships, could easily lead to a
presumption ofhostility.,,882 [italics in original]
That is to say, McLachlin reversed the order of causality suggested by Richter883 in
a passage that he identified as conjecture saying:
"Whatever the case may have been...For the Five
Nations, the theme of reciprocity and exchange, war
and peace, and alliance and spiritual power entwined
to define most relationships among persons, kin
groups, and villages.,,884
Given Richter's conclusion, it is difficult to understand why McLachlin claimed
that:
" ...while Richter's book may support the pre-contact
existence of north-south trade routes, it refutes the
direct involvement of the Mohawks in this trade.,,885
Richter's book did nothing of the sort. Its thesis was that if there were Iroquois,
there was reciprocity and exchange. Besides, Richter was not addressing the
Court's question of whether or not north-south trade existed. He was demonstrating
881 Mitchell v. MNR. at [44].
882 Ibid
883 War prevented trade instead oflack of trade led to a presumption of hostility.
884 Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal ofthe Long-house: The Peoples ofthe Iroquois League in the Era
ofEuropean Colonization (University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1992) at 29.
885 Mitchell v. MNR.. at [46].
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his assertion that: "Reciprocity... infused Iroquois concepts about property".886 This
surely supported Mitchell's claim that "trade and commerce [is] central to their
soul,,887 and accordingly integral to the Mohawk sense of who they are.
McLachlin's understanding of Mitchell's pleadings was so disoriented that it
is only by reading Binnie's minority reasons that we learn that Mitchell based his
rights on Haudenosaunee citizenship as established in the pre-contact era.888
However, neither judgment mentioned the recognition of Indigenous sovereignty
that characterized early Anglo-Iroquois relations or the era when Britain dreamed of
establishing "Indian" buffer states between the loyal colonies and the rebellious
United States.889 This significant contextual void may explain why Binnie's attempt
to reinterpret the Two Row Wampum violated the very principle commemorated by
its symbolism. (See s.5.1.3.1 above)
We need only turn back a few paragraphs to see where Binnie's well-
intended reasoning went off course as far as giving equal weight to "aboriginal and
non-aboriginal" perspectives is concerned. Mitchell's argument focused exclusively
on trade with "other First nations".890 His view, as stated by Binnie, was that:
"Akwesasne is a Mohawk community that has existed
from time immemorial, with its own laws and
government, and we have consistently been
886 Richter, The Ordeal ofthe Long-house at 21.
887 Mitchell v. MN.R. at [18].
888 Ibid. at [67. 70. 109].
889 See eg.Mark Walters, "Brightening the Covenant Chain: Aboriginal Treaty Meanings in Law and
History after Marshalf' (2001) 24.2 Dalhousie L.J. 75 at 110; Samuel Flagg Bemis, Jay's Treaty: A
Study in Commerce and Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Remi. Savard, "Un
projet d'Etat indien independent a la fin du XVIIIe siecle et Ie traite de Jay" 24.4 Recherches
amerindiennes au Quebec (1994-5) 57; Allan W.Eckert, A Sorrow In Our Heart: The Life of
Techmseh (New York: Konecky & Konecky, 1992) at 347,385.
890 Mitchell v. MN.R.. at [16].
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determined to maintain the sovereignty of our
Nation".891
Historically speaking, the community at Akwesasne has not existed since time
immemorial, but the Mohawk community that inhabited a much wider geographic
sphere has.892 In effect, Mitchell asserted his rights in terms of a concept of
nationality that was relationally defined in keeping both with Mohawk custom and
the semantic origins of the concept of a "nation".893
Binnie, by contrast, applied a territorial concept of nationality stating that, in
his view, the claim could:
"only properly be construed as an international
trading and mobility right".894
Thus, like McLachlin, he reformulated the question posed to suit his own conceptual
framework, giving priority to Euro-American boundaries and semantic preferences.
Though not explicitly explained, his presumption that Canadian nationality and
jurisdiction are, and must be, territorially defined can be seen in statements such as:
"Canadian sovereign authority has, as one of its
inherent characterstics, a monopoly on the lawful use
of military force within its territory".[underlining
added] 895
or:
891 Mitchell v. MNR.. at [117].
892 In the pre-contact period Iroquoian communities typically moved every 12 to 20 years. A
community was established at that location in the 1740's or early 1750's. Gerald F., Kahnawa:ke:
Factionalism, Traditionalism, and Nationalism in a Mohawk Community (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2004) at 12.
893 He was not a formal representive of his people in this proceeding and the community he
represented was not defined. Since he described himself as "Mohawk", he might have defined it by
membership through birth or formal adoption into the Wolf, Bear or Turtle clan of the Kanienkehaka
Nation. See ego Annemarie Anrod Shimoney, Conservatism Among the Iroquois at the Six Nations
Reserve (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 1994). Gerald R. Alfred, Heeding the Voices of
Our Ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise ofNative Nationalism (Toronto: Oxford,
1995). However, as Daren Bonaparte has pointed out, every community that survived colonialism is
a mishmash of tribes genealogically speaking.
894 Mitchell V. MNR.. at [126].
895 Mitchell v. MNR.. at [153].
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"Control over the mobility of persons and goods into
ones country is, and always has been, a fundamental
attribute of sovereignty". [underlining added]896
In other words, even though relations between the Mohawks and the British Empire
were originally established at a time when both polities were relationally defined,
Binnie responded in terms of the modem Canadian concept of nationality that
assumes a territorial paradigm in keeping with the definition of a "state" set out by
the 1933 Montevideo Convention (See 1.2 and 3.2 above). His approach was
consistent with vernacular usage such as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's
"National News", which refers to events on the territory over which the Canadiasn
federal government claims jurisdiction. In the terminology of the people of
Akwesasne, this shift from a relational to a territorial concept of nationality or
statehood represents a violation of the Two Row Wampum that envisions two
separate vessels sailing on separate paths on the same river. In terms of the
metaphoric understanding of the people of Akwesasne, Mitchell represents an
attempt to use Canadian law to steer the Indigenous canoe.897
5.5.4 The Anglo- Canadian Socio-Cultural Framework
Because of the structure and mandate of the Court, even successful cases like
Guerin have had to frame the issues in terms that make sense according to Anglo-
Canadian legal custom. The bias in favour of the conceptual categories of the
colonizing cultures created by the use of the colonizers' languages and institutions
was accentuated by the law that was applied. If the judges had been applying
896 Mitchell v. MN.R.. at [160].
897 See ego Katenies [aka Janet Davis] v. Her Majesty the Queen, Superior Court of Justice, Province
of Ontario, City of Comwall ,Motion to Dismiss Information #C2202/03 12 January 2007.
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statutes passed according to the customs of the people concerned using egalitarian
democratic processes, their reasoning would have rated high on the postcolonial
scale for this indicater. However, as pointed out by the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, the dominant culture has been attempting to displace and
assimilate Indigenous peoples since the end of the eighteenth century.898
Though we have supposedly entered an age of "Negotiation and Renewal"
the Court has yet to develop a methodological approach in this regard and, with the
exception of the treaty cases and Wewaykum II, consideration of the nature of the
processes that produced any of the "law" relied upon by the Court was
conspicuously missing. All of the statutes and judicial precedents used to frame
analysis in the cases included in this study were produced by the colonizing culture
using legislative processes that included no institutional recognition for any
Indigenous jurisdictions. In short, the Court considered the issues that arose in an
institutional context that has failed to adjust its policies and procedures to reflect the
egalitarian norms that emerged during the twentieth century. As a consequence,
Indigenous polities were not accorded respect in a way that is comparable to that
enjoyed by the founding colonies that have been incorporated as "provinces" in
Canada.
5.5.4.1 Ignoring Indigenous Historical Experience
This failure to adapt manifested itself, not so much in the reasoning itself, as
in what was missing from the reasoning. The Court's methodology for applying
Canadian laws gave no consideration to the fact that many were creations of an age
898 Erasmus, Dussault, (ReAP, 1996), Lookingforward, looking back.
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when Indigenous people had no vote.899 As previously mentioned, they were even
excluded from the definition of a "person" by the Indian Act between 1876 and
1951.900 Furthermore, as set out in Mabo, the British law applied in colonial
contexts developed a legal fiction that pretended Indigenous peoples had no law.901
Though both Lamer and McLachlin cited Mabo in Van der Peet, neither the
Supreme Court nor the Canadian legal profession as a whole has engaged in as
much reflection as one might have expected concerning the implications of this
received legality. The Court, in particular, has generally assumed the legitimacy of
British assertions of sovereignty, framing events as if the the Indigenous peoples
had no history during the thousands of years that preceded the arrival of Europeans.
For example, in Guerin, the Musqueam were anachronistically described as
"descended from the original inhabitants of Greater Vancouver".902 The city was
only a century old at the time of this decision. The Musqueam had been there for
millennia903 and the Court's characterization camouflaged this fact. Anachronisms
of this kind were accompanied by reliance on the very colonial legality that the
Court ostensibly repudiated when it found that s.35 had "changed the rules of the
game". 904 Thus, seminal cases like the Secession Reference and Van der Peet relied
899 Until 1960, except for a few who could vote before 1898. S.C. 1960, c.39. See Richard H.
Bartlett, " Citizens Minus: Indians and the Rights to Vote" (1979) 44 Sask. L. Rev. 163; Sally M.
Weaver, "The Iroquois: Grand River Reserve, 1875-1945" in Edward S. Rogers and Donald Smith
eds. Aboriginal Ontario, Historical Perspectives on the First Nations (Toronto: Dundurn, 1994),
213; Woo, Canada v. the Haudenosaunee Confederacy s.3.3.3.1.
900 Indian Act, 1876, S.C. 1876, c.l8 (39 Vict.) s.12; Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c. 29 s.123.
901 Van der Peet at [40 and 265].
902 Guerin v. the Queen at 339.(Wilson)
903 Dickson later acknowledged they had been there at least 1,500 years, though archaeological
dating and oral tradition suggest occupation has been much longer. R. v. Sparrow at 1094; Musqueam
Indian Band, http://www.musgueam.bc.ca
904 R. v. Sparrow at 1105 citing Lyon, "An Essay on Constitutional Interpretation".
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uncritically on "historical practice" as a source of law much as the research
participants referred to by Kuhn continued to sort black hearts into the pile of red
cards.90S
This somewhat naIve concept of history as a repository of both constitutional
norms906 and Aboriginal rights is consistent with what MacDougall, among others,
has identified as an English cultural tendency to see "history" as "a justification of
whatever is".907 Its effect has been to tie the Court's reasoning to the colonial
conduct that founded the Canadian state. However, a dawning wariness with regard
to some of the assumptions of that era did crystalize into an articulated concern in
Binnie's supplementary reasons in Mitchell, which cautioned that:
"Care must be taken not to carry forward doctrines of
British colonial law into the interpretation of s.35(l)
without careful reflection".908
His awareness that tensions do surround the Court's reliance on "history" can be
seen in his observation that:
"The courts have attracted a certain amount of
criticism from professional historians... ,,909
In an attempt to justify the contradictions raised by the Court's reliance on
superficial investigations of past social dynamics, he suggested that:
"The law sees a finality of interpretation of historical
events where finality, according to the professional
historian, is not possible. The reality, of course, is
that the courts are handed disputes that require for
their resolution findings of certain historical facts.
905 Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions, 63 citing Bruner, Postman, "On the Perception of
Incongruity".
906 Reference re Succession ofQuebec, S.C.C. [1998] 2 S.C.R.217 at [49].
907 MacDougall, Racial Myth in English History at 90.
908 Mitchell v. MNR.. at [149].
909 R. v. Marshall at [36-37].
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The litigating parties cannot wait for the possibility of
a stable academic consensus. The judicial process
must do the best it can. ,,91 0
He does not seem to have realized the extent to which the need for "findings of
historical facts" was culturally constructed and though he acknowledged that the
past was necessarily seen "as through a glass darkly,,911, this did not prevent the
Court from continuing to apply its impugned quasi-historical methodology. As
McLachlin explained in Marshall/Bernard, according to the test that the Court has
devised for "Aboriginal title":
"The process begins by exammmg the nature and
extent of the pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice in
question. ,,912
In other words, the test is founded on historical speculation for, as McLachlin
herself admitted in Marshall/Bernard:
" ...one must look to evidence. But evidence may be
hard to find ....The problem is compounded by the
difficulty of producing evidence of what happened
hundreds of years ago where no tradition of written
history exists".913
This suggests that the Court has reached the point of recognizing that there
are problems with the methodology it has established for determining Aboriginal
rights but it has yet to find an adequate replacement. Thus. as Kuhn pointed out, old
methods of analysis persist as we wait for a new paradigm to emerge.
Responsibility for the Court's shortcomings in this regard must, in all probability, be
born in part by the legal profession as a whole for there is little indication that the
pleadings presented to the Court were conducive to the profound reorientation
910 R. v. Marshall at [36-37].
911 R. v. Marshall at [3].
912 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard at [51].
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required. Though a full discussion of the use of history by the courts and by the
Canadian legal profession is beyond the scope of this work, the Court's reliance on
past practices instead of principled negotiation to define legality is problematic from
a postcolonial perspective, not only because of the unreliability of this procedure,
but also because it allows the past to colonize the present.
5.5.4.2 Indigenous Rejection of Canadian Frames of Reference
Because this research focuses exclusively on Supreme Court judgments, an
investigation of the reasons why Indigenous people have not used the judicial
system to mediate their differences with Canadian state agencies lies beyond its
scope. However, the fact that the courts have almost invariably required the
application of Canadian frames of reference must surely be a factor. Historical
experience is likely another reason for this reticence. For example, the
Haudenosaunee/Six Nations are still marked by events of the 1920's when they
attempted to mount a formal legal argument that the Indian Act was ultra vires the
B.NA. Act.914 Despite top legal counsel, unremitting effort and appeals to all
possible authorities in Colonial society, they were ultimately excluded from all
courts, both within the British empire and internationally. Their traditional
government was deposed by Canada in 1924 and the Indian Act was amended to
prevent "Indians" from collecting funds to hire lawyers.915 This may be one reason
why some Indigenous people today refuse to use Canadian institutions, insisting that
913 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard at [64].
914 They argued that Britain could not give Canada more rights than it had so s.91(24) only gave a
right to negotiate with "Indians".
915 Woo, "Canada's Forgotten Founders"; Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927 c. 98 s.141.
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resolution of the issues that arise should be negotiated on a nation to nation basis.916
A third factor may be related to the fact that many Indigenous communities lack
even such basic amenities as clean drinking water. This suggests that economic and
social hardship must also present a significant barrier to realization of the ideal of
free access to the court system.
5.5.4.3 Judicial Awareness of the Problem
In practical terms, the lopsided character of the cases that come before the
Court contradicts the egalitarian democratic ideals espoused by judicial reasoning
and the Court's uneasiness on this count was sometimes evident. As Dickson and
LaForest observed in Sparrow:
"the trial for a violation of a penal prohibition may not
be the most appropriate setting in which to determine
the existence of an aboriginal right.,,917
This comment appears to have had little, if any, impact on the habitual conduct of
government functionaries. Such bureaucratic indifference may explain the sense of
outrage expressed by the Court in Mikisew Cree First Nation, the last case in the
core sample analysed for this study, which railed from the first paragraph against
"the indifference of some government officials to aboriginal people's concems".918
It may be worth noting, however, that such indifference is encouraged by Canada's
institutional structure which provides Indigenous venues for collective
representation with little substantive power.
916 See eg., "From the Women Title Holders of the Rotino'shon:ni also known as the Six Nations
Iroquois Confederacy on Turtle Island to Mme. Michaelle Jean, Governor General of Canada" 20
June, 2006, Mohawk Nation News, (23/08/2006).
917 R. v. Sparrow at 1095.
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5.5.5 Sui Generis Reasoning
Throughout the judgments examined for this study the Court accepted the
proposition that, as stated in R. v. Cote, the Constitution Act, 1982 "changed the
landscape of aboriginal rights in Canada".919 However, as Kuhn has pointed out,
there is a tendency to try to make anomalies fit existing paradigms. One of the
techniques used by the Court to gloss over the rupture represented by the twentieth
century repudiation of colonialism has been the classification of "Aboriginal
Rights" as "sui generis" meaning simply that they do not fit the traditional
categories of English law. This device is inherently colonial in that it takes the
conceptual framework of the in-migrating culture as the standard against which
Indigenous rights must be measured. However, it may also function as a
mechanism for implementing postcolonial legality to the extent that it created a
space for Indigenous points of view, particularly in formulations that emphasized
the fiduciary duty of the Crown. This is what Borrows and Rotman hoped would
happen when they reviewed the "The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights" in
1997.920
5.5.5.1 Definition of "Sui Generis"
When considering what, exactly, the members of the Court meant when they
used the term "sui generis" it should be noted that Aboriginal rights are not the only
ones that the Court has described in this way. In Lac Minerals Ltd v. International
Corona Resources Ltd, which did not concern Indigenous rights, Sopinka called the
918 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada.
919 R. v. Cote at [51].
920 John Borrows, Leonard I. Rotman, "The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights": Does it Make
a Difference ?" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9.
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action for breach of confidence sui generis because it did not fit "the traditional
jurisdictional bases for action of contract, equity or property".921 Similarly, in
Friends ofthe Oldman River Society, La Forest stated:
"I agree that the Constitution Act, 1867 has not
assigned the matter of "environment" sui generis to
either the provinces or Parliament. The environment,
as understood in its generic sense, encompasses the
physical, economic and social environment touching
several heads of power assigned to the respective
levels of government". [emphasis added]922
In these instances, the term "sui generis" meant simply that something did not fit
established categories.
5.5.5.2 Sui Generis Ambiguity
Anglo-Canadian law as applied at the height of the colonial era during the
"Displacement and Assimilation" stage identified by the Royal Commision on
Aboriginal Peoples923 conflicted both with the treaty-based legality that governed
relations during the stage of "Contact and Co-operation" and with modem
international standards to which Canada has agreed. A person who was not familiar
with current Canadian case law might accordingly expect the term "sui generis" to
be applied to the temporally limited concept of legality that prevailed during the
stage that Canada is attempting to leave behind according to the Royal
Commission.924 This, however, is not how this term was used in the cases
considered for this study.
921 Lac Minerals Ltd v. International Corona Resources Ltd at {29}.
922 Friends ofthe Old Man River Society v. Canada at {41}.
923 Erasmus, Dussault, (RCAP, 1996), Looking Forward, Looking Back, 38-41.
924 See ego Bruce Ryder, "The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism:
Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations" (1991) McGill L. J. 308; Thomas Isaac,
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Guerin was the first in this sample to use the term "sui generis" to describe
"Aboriginal rights". In Mitchell v. Peguis, Dickson summarized his reasoning in
that case saying that the "Indian interest in land" was a:
"sui generis interest, the nature of which cannot be
totally captured by a lexicon derived from European
legal systems".925 [italics added]
Though this appears to legitimize Indigenous difference, "sui generis" identification
also confirmed the social barrier established by the in-migrating culture. It was not
used to invoke the Crown's protective duty towards both Indigenous and immigrant
legality in the sense that English tradition recognized the Danelaw along with the
laws of Essex and Mercia or modem Canadian law recognizes provincial
jurisdictions or even the customs of an industry as seen in Lac Minerals. Instead, the
term sui generis elicited the kind of "othering" that Said has described. If the Court
had adopted a fully egalitarian postcolonial methodology, it would have pointed out
that each jurisdiction has its own internal logic and inter-cultural norms cannot be
unilaterally defined by Anglo-Canadian institutions. They must be mutually agreed
upon by the people concerned, including those who happen to be Indigenous if they
are to have legal and political legitimacy. Thus, despite the Court's best intentions,
the Guerin formulation of the sui generis principle had an effect that was
decolonizing in its recognition of Indigenous difference but ultimately colonizing in
its imposition of an externally defined conceptual framework.
"The Concept of the Crown and Aboriginal Self-Government" (1994) 14.2 Can. Jo. Native Studies,
221; Walters "The "Golden Thread" of Continuity".
925 Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band at {31}. See Guerin v. the Queen at 382,385,387. Also: Simon v.
The Queen at [33] ; R. v. Sioui at {l6}.
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According to the embodied theory of knowledge, patterns of thought become
entrenched in the very physiology of our being. This may explain why, despite
repeated statements concerning the importance of recognizing Aboriginal
perspectives, this is not what the Court did in most instances. Habits formed
through past experience may be so strong that they induce people to act ways that
contradict principles they have consciously endorsed. It was thus quite predictable
to find a judicial tendency to revert to constructions of knowledge that were
established during their formative schooling and that reflected the assumptions of
the era when Indigenous peoples were excluded and ignored.
Analysis of Aboriginal rights according to a framework that sees them as sui
generis appears to be part of this phenomenon. This establishment of Canadian
terms of reference as the standard against which Indigenous experience is to be
measured violated the principle of equality that is primordial from a postcolonial
perspective. Moreover, the sui generis classification camouflaged the ordinary
nature of some of the issues brought forward. For example, Guerin concerned
misconduct by Indian Affairs officials who leased land on terms that were not
agreed to by the Musqueam. The scenario presented would have been grounds for
legal action even if the victims were not Indigenous. The Court's digressions
concerning "Indian title" and sui generis rights made the situation seem
unnecessarily exotic reflecting, once again, the colonial "othering" described by
Edward Said. Yet, the recognition that the Musqueam had rights on a parity with
other human beings was decolonizing in a context that had developed under the
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aegis of an act that had excluded "Indians" from the definition of a "person" until
after the judges sitting on the case had reached adulthood.
5.5.5.3 Acknowledgement of Indigenous Difference
When the sui generis concept was used to acknowledge cultural difference,
the Court's theoretical approach to Indigenous points of view was generally
equalizing. In her dissenting reasons in Horseman, which were supported by
Dickson and L'Heureux-Dube, Wilson reasoned that:
"The interpretative principles developed in
Nowegijick and Simon recognize that Indian treaties
are sui generis ...These treaties were the product of
negotiation between two very different cultures and
the language used in them probably does not reflect,
and should not be expected to reflect, with total
accuracy each party's understanding of their effect at
the time they were entered into,,926 [italics added]
Similarly, after considering the "historical context" that produced the document
under consideration in R. v. Sioui, Lamer dealt with an obvious cultural imbalance
by finding that the treaty actually negotiated was oral. With regard to the treaty-
making capacity of those involved, he noted that:
"The question of capacity has to be examined from a
fundamentally different viewpoint and in accordance
with different principles for each of these groupS".927
In Sparrow, Dickson and Laforest likewise cautioned that:
"Courts must be careful, then, to avoid the application
of traditional common law concepts of property as
they develop their concept of what the reasons for
judgment in Guerin referred to as the "sui generis"
nature of aboriginal rights.',928
926 R. v. Horseman at {6}.
927 R. v. Sioui at {l6}.
928 R. v. Sparrow at 1112.
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In Delgamuukw agam, Lamer's rather fulsome description remained conscious
enough of the culturally specific nature of the Court's perspective to place "normal"
in quotes saying:
"What the Privy Council sought to capture (in St.
Catherine's) is that aboriginal title is a sui generis
interest in land. Aboriginal title has been described
as sui generis in order to distinguish it from "normal"
proprietary interests, such as fee simple ... .It is also sui
generis in the sense that its characteristics cannot be
completely explained by reference to either the
common law rules of real property or to the rules of
property found in aboriginal legal systems. As with
other aboriginal rights, it must be understood by
reference to both common law and aboriginal
perspectives.,,929
These statements provide ample evidence of the Court's quest to recognize
Indigenous terms of reference and accord Indigenous peoples equal treatment with
members of the colonizing culture in a way that is consistent with the principles that
Canada has agreed to uphold at the United Nations.
5.5.5.4 Colonization in Guerin
The principle that Aboriginal perspectives must be respected was, however,
frequently ignored in practice. An example showing how this happened can be seen
in Guerin, where we find that Dickson was aware of the difficulties created by the
kinds of categorical misfit that have been of concern to modem historians. He
struggled with the phenomenon, finding that the descriptions in previous cases of
"Indian title" as "a beneficial interest of some sort" or as "a personal and
usufructory right" involved the application of "a somewhat inappropriate
terminology drawn from general property law" whose categorization was not quite
929 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia at [113].
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accurate.930 However, after this moment of lucidity, he launched promptly into an
ethnocentric analysis that ignored "aboriginal perspectives" and relied on categories
defined by the very Anglo-centric custom that he had described as "somewhat
inappropriate" in the previous paragraph. He declared that:
"Indians have a legal right to occupy and possess
certain lands, the ultimate title to which is in the
Crown."
The concept of a "title" that rests "in the Crown" reflects a decidedly English way
of looking at the world. The rest of Dickson's explanation veers even further into
ethnocentrism stating:
"While their interest does not, strictly speaking,
amount to beneficial ownership, neither is its nature
completely exhausted by the concept of a personal
right. It is true that the sui generis interest which the
Indians have in the land is personal in the sense that it
cannot be transferred to a grantee, but it is also true, as
will presently appear, that the interest gives rise on
surrender to a distinctive fiduciary obligation on the
part of the Crown to deal with the land for the benefit
of the surrendering Indians".931[underlining added]
This brief passage incorporates a good half dozen concepts that might require some
explanation in an introductory class on Anglo-Canadian legal reasoning. The
audience Dickson was addressing obviously did not include the Indigenous people
whose rights were in issue. Guerin concerned the Musqueam. Yet the judgement
included no reference to any evidence concerning Musqueam concepts of land
rights.932 Notwithstanding their "win" in the outcome, it is thus impossible to tell
whether or not Dickson's analysis seemed plausible according to their traditional
terms of reference.
930 Guerin v. the Queen at 382.
931 Ibid.
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5.5.5.5 Conclusions
Kuhn's observation that a paradigm will continue in use, even when it is
discredited unless there is an alternate to take its place may explain the Court's
reliance on "sui generis" identification and its frequent reassertion of Canadian
conceptual categories despite its insistence on the importance of accommodating
Aboriginal perspectives. None of the cases included a full account of Indigenous
legality and the Court structure itself asserted Canadian frames of legal and
historical preference. Under the circumstances, it should not surprise us that the
members of the Court found it difficult to access analytical modes that may have
been more amenable to respecting Indigenous priorities.
5.5.6 History and the "Integral to a distinctive culture" Test
The Court's reliance on historically based cultural assumptions generated
another set of problems created largely by the imperative character of judicial
practice. History would not have assumed the same importance if consensual legal
methodologies had been employed. Moreover, though Canada is institutionally
designed to accommodate a measure of consensual legality, Parliamentary
procedure is adversarial and it does not promote the type of interactive consultation
and exchange provided for by the Haudenosaunee Great Law ofPeace or used in
the development of international conventions at the United Nations. Nevertheless,
the existing institutional framework does allow the Court to use history in ways that
may either enhance or diminish colonizing effects. For example, despite its
imposition of an external perspective, Guerin upheld the Musqueam right to make
932 If none was entered in evidence, its absence was not noted.
360
their own business decisions and in Sioui the Court sought an understanding of the
intentions of all parties to the treaty considered. Both cases affirmed principles that
are well established within British legality, suggesting that reaffirmation of some
Anglo-Canadian legal traditions may support the emergence of decolonizing norms.
We might consider, for example, McLachlin's "empirical approach" in her
dissenting reasons in Van der Peet, which suggested:
. .. "we should look to history to see what sort of
practices have been identified as aboriginal rights in
the past. From this we may draw inferences as to the
sort of things which may qualify as aboriginal rights
under s.35(1). Confronted by a particular claim, we
should ask, "Is this like the sort of thing which the law
has recognized in the past?" This is the time-
honoured methodology of the common law. Faced
with a new legal problem, the court looks to the past
to see how the law has dealt with similar situations in
the past. The court evaluates the new situation by
reference to what has been held in the past and
decides how it should be characterized. In this way,
legal principles evolve on an incremental, pragmatic
basis.,,933
This passage promotes reliance on behavioural precedent mirroring the cognitive
theorist's description of how human reasoning is actually structured. The problem is
that the history we have inherited contains colonial elements that have been
formally repudiated by both Canadian law and international accords and the
problems involved in implementing this revised concept of legality are not
addressed.
Though the methodology described by McLachlin is English, it need not be
fully colonial. So long as it is applied in a way that excludes colonizing behaviours,
it can create a space for the kind of creative accommodation that Richard White has
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suggested held sway in the Great Lakes region during the 1i h and 18th centuries.934
This is possible because the character of the procedure McLachlin proposed
depends entirely on who is taken to have identified rights in the past and who is
determining how things should be characterized in the present. If interpreted in light
of either the Crown's traditional obligation to uphold the laws of the land or the
consensual norms of postcolonial legality, one would expect this methodology to
make Indigenous perspectives central to the consideration of "Aboriginal rights",
especially when one recalls the ancient English customary ideal of trial by a ''jury of
peers", the equality provisions in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms or the Court's assertion that s.35 established new rules for "the game". If
the "time-honoured methodology of the common law" is applied on that basis, it
may promote decolonization.
5.5.6.1 The Van der Peet Effect
Van der Peet seems to have crystallized the Court's use of history for the
purpose of determining "aboriginal rights", so it is worth taking a closer look at the
concepts it applied. True to some of the most ancient tenets of British tradition, the
very first consideration addressed in the "Integral to a Distinctive Culture Test" set
out by Lamer in his majority reasons was the "perspectives of the aboriginal peoples
themselves". In light of the monarch's traditional obligation to protect the laws and
customs of the people, this would appear to be a very conventional English
approach. Lamer did not go so far back in time, however, to establish this principle.
He cited Dickson and La Forest in Sparrow as saying that it is:
933 R. v. Van der Peet at [261]. See also Hutchins & Choksi, "From Calder to Mitchelf' at 25.
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" ... crucial to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective
itself on the meaning of the rights at stake.,,935
In other words, he took an authoritarian rather than a principled approach, relying
on the Court's own recent jurisprudence rather than on deeply rooted British or
inter-cultural law and tradition.
As L'Heureux-DuM pointed out in her dissent, Lamer himself did not
actually follow the principle he set out.936 It would seem that his own lived
experience took precedence over the idealized customs of the legal tradition to
which he was heir, for he immediately imposed colonial norms by insisting that:
"It must also be recognized, ... that that perspective
must be framed in terms cognizable to the Canadian
legal and constitutional structure." 937
Within these conceptual confines, Lamer's reasoning swayed to the postcolonial end
of the spectrum by acknowledging the weight of academic opinion that, as stated by
David Elliott, "the prior aboriginal presence is at the heart of the concept of
aboriginal rights".938 He quoted Mark Walters, not once, but twice, for his
postcolonial assertion that:
"a morally and politically defensible conception of
aboriginal rights will incorporate both [aboriginal and
non-aboriginal] perspectives".939
934 White, The Middle Ground.
935 R. v. Van der Peet at [49] citing R. v. Sparrow at 1112.
936 R. v. Van der Peet at [141].
937 R. v. Van der Peet at [49] citing R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1112.
938 R. v. Van der Peet at [41] citing David Elliott, Law and Aboriginal Peoples of Canada (2nd ed)
(North York, Ontario: Canadian Legal Studies Series. Captus Press, 1994) at 25.
939 R. v. Van der Peet at [42] & [49] citing Mark Walters, "British Imperial constitutional Law and
Aboriginal Rights: A Comment on Delgamuukw v. British Columbia" (1992) 17 Queen's 1. 1. 350 at
412-13.
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However, the attraction of this quote, which was also referred to twice by
McLachlin in her dissent940, may have lain in the lifeline it offered to the non-
aboriginal part of its equation. Though affirming "aboriginal rights", Lamer may
have latched on to Walters' formulation because it seemed to grant permission to
return to familiar conceptual ground. This subliminal thread may have run through
McLachlin's dissent as well for she interpreted Walter's statement to mean, not that
an egalitarian negotiated paradigm was required, but rather that:
"We apply the common law, but the common law we
apply must give full recognition to the pre-existing
aboriginal right." 941
Since the "common law" in question was English, this affirmed the superimposition
of foreign legal concepts. The fact that English common law did not exist in the
pre-existing aboriginal context was not discussed in these formulations that
implicitly demanded acceptance of colonization as a precondition for the
establishment of "Aboriginal rights" by requiring conformity to "the Canadian legal
and constitutional structure."
Attempts of this kind to reaffirm the familiar are, as Kuhn pointed out,
entirely predictable. Despite accumulated anomalies, old paradigms continue in use
until viable replacements are found and, in this instance, the Court did not even
identify the need for a new paradigm. Nevertheless, the Court did reject some of the
founding tenets of colonialism. Lamer's majority reasons in Van der Peet began
with a statement supported by the full Court that almost acknowledged the colonial
character of the past, saying:
940 R. v. Van der Peel at [232] & [310].
941 R. v. Van der Peel at [232].
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"In my view, the doctrine of aboriginal rights exists,
and is recognized and affirmed by s.35(1), because of
one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North
America, aboriginal peoples were already here, living
in communities on the land, and participating in
distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries. It
is this fact, and this fact above all others, which
separates aboriginal peoples from all other minority
groups in Canadian society and which mandates their
special legal, and now constitutional, status.,,942
[underline in the original]
Over all, however, the fact of colonization and the Court's complicity in it was not
quite admitted and continuation of the old legality was tacitly endorsed through the
use of "history" to affirm "whatever was".943 In short, the Court did not reject
colonialism as one might have expected it to given the wording of s.35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, the simultaneous assertion of egalitarian principles in the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the recognition that "the rules of the game"
had changed.944
5.5.6.2 Lacunae in Van der Peet
According to Kuhn, the paradigms we use determine what facts are
considered relevant and even what facts are seen. This effect can be found in the
Van der Peet analysis where the opening recognition of prior Indigenous presence
was followed by a yawning gap. According to the postcolonial ideals espoused, one
might have expected the Court to proceed by describing the development of the
Sto:lo relationship with the British and identifying how the rule of Anglo-Canadian
law came to be established. Sto:lo opinion on this issue was surely not only
942 R. v. Van der Peet at [31].
943 MacDougall, Racial Myth in English History at 90.
944 R. v. Sparrow at 1105 citing Lyon, "An Essay on Constitutional Interpretation".
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relevant, but crucial. It was, after all, their rights on their ancestral homeland that
were being considered.
According to evidence placed before the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples and published the same year as this judgment, Sto:lo society only permitted
male heads of households to speak at official public gatherings though they
represented the entire family.945 Van der Peet provided no explanation as to how the
woman, whose simple sale of ten fish came to serve as the flagship for defining
"Aboriginal rights", fell into the position of defending not simply her own conduct
and the custom of her own family and nation, but also the rights of all Indigenous
people in Canadian law.
This situation is partly a product of the externally imposed character of the
issues the Court was asked to consider. If evidence of a kind that seemed pertinent
was unavailable, Lamer could at least have acknowledged this fact and sought a
means of accommodating Sto:lo perspectives as was done in Sioui. However, he
seems to have lost sight of the importance of Sto:lo consent to British sovereignty
and of the need for information on their opinion in this regard. The discussion
denied their human intellectual and law generating capacities, turning them into an
object for anthropological examination. The fact that their name means "people of
the river,,946 suggests, in itself, that from their point of view their rights should have
been defined in relation to the river and its resources. However the English
translation of their name was not even considered by the majority and might not
have been mentioned were it not for L'Heureux-DuM's dissent.
945 Dussault & Erasmus, R.C.A.P. v.2 pt.l Restructuring the Relationship, 122.
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In short, the Court's postcolonial intentions seem to have drowned when
confronted by colonial reality. The emphasis placed on the acknowledgement that
the Indigenous peoples "were already here" seems almost comical because it is so
obvious that one wonders why it took the Supreme Court of Canada to notice. Yet
instead of deconstructing Canada's colonial heritage, Lamer simply assumed that
Canadian law applied to the distinctive Sto:lo culture, jumping right into an
assertion that:
"what s.35(1) does is provide the constitutional
framework through which the fact that aboriginals
lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their
own practices, traditions and cultures, is
acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty of
the Crown.,,947
From a postcolonial perspective, this statement is problematic because there was no
demonstration that Dorothy Vander Peet's people ever accepted incorporation in
the Canadian state.
Even if Canadian jurisdiction could be assumed, the analysis failed to invoke
the egalitarian principles set out in the Constitution Act, 1982, which is supposedly
the legal vehicle for the opinion of the Canadian people. It relied instead on the
academic opinion of Mark Walters. Though his egalitarian formulation
corresponded to the egalitarian requirements of Canadian law, one wonders why the
Court did not ground its reasoning directly in the Constitution itself. The reliance
on academic opinion alone is difficult to reconcile with democratic theory.
946 R. v. Van der Peet at [209].
947 R. v. Van der Peet at [32].
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On top of this, Lamer seems simply to have taken Walter's principle of
cultural equality as a green light for the reassertion of what felt proper and familiar
to him. His historical analysis depended entirely on categories that were specific to
his own culture leading him to discount traditional exchanges between kinship
groups to make the remarkable claim that:
"The absence of specialization in the exploitation of
the fishery is suggestive, in the same way that the
absence of regularized trade or a market is suggestive
that the exchan~e of fish was not a central part of
Sto:lo culture".9 8
In the end, Dorothy Van der Peet was convicted on the basis of an externally
defined test that was not devised until her case reached the Supreme Court level.
Under the circumstances, it was not possible for her to know in advance the case she
had to meet and so the outcome contradicted the norms of procedural fairness
outlined by the Court in other contexts.949 What could be more colonizing than
that?95o
5.5.6.3 Alternative Models for Colonization
In their different dissenting reasons, L'Heureux-Dube and McLachlin also
relied on "history" to found "aboriginal rights" instead of Indigenous participation
and consent. L'Heureux-Dube, who campaigned for attention to "the broader
context of the historical aboriginal reality in Canada,,951, was astute enough to notice
that the crux of the standard set by the "integral to a distinctive culture" requirement
948 R. v. Van der Peet at[90].
949 See ego Singh v. Minister ofEmpolyment and Immigration [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
950 The fact that non-Aboriginal people may encounter the same problem in dealing with the Supreme
Court does not diminish the colonizing effect. Colonialism, as defmed for the purposes of this study,
may happen internally through the oppression of one class or group by another as well as
interculturally.
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lay in its application.952 She emphasized the importance of being sensitive to the
perspective of the particular Aboriginal culture in question, rejecting the "search for
a pristine aboriginal society,,953 and Lamer's limitation of the right to practices that
are individual or distinct.954 In her view:
"Defining existing aboriginal rights by referring to
pre-contact or pre-sovereignty practices, traditions and
customs implies that aboriginal culture was
crystalized in some sort of "aboriginal time" prior to
the arrival of Europeans".955
Her solution was a "dynamic right" approach that would ensure the "continued
vitality" of Aboriginal rights956 by recognising practices that had been considered
significant for "a substantial period of time". This she defined by accepting Brian
Slattery's suggestion that "in most cases a period of twenty to fifty years would
seem adequate".957
This figure, it might be noted, was arrived at without consultation or
negotiation with the Sto:lo whose opinions on these issues were not considered in
the discussion of their rights. There was likewise no evidence of the opinion of any
of the other "Aboriginal people" whose rights were ostensibly being defined. Thus,
despite significant insights and strong postcolonial sentiment, L'Heureux-Dube
slipped back into the familiar colonial mold by using declaratory law and failing to
acknowledge a jurisdiction within which Indigenous peoples could define their
951 R. v. Van der Peet at [105].
952 R. v. Van der Peet at [148].
953 R. v. Van der Peet at [168].
954 R. v. VanderPeetat[151-2].
955 R. v. Van der Peet at[165].
956 R. v. Van der Peet at[172].
957 R. v. Van der Peet at [177] citing Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" at 758.
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culture for themselves. Her formulation left any adaptation or innovative practice
vulnerable to challenge by the in-migrating culture during the first several decades.
Moreover, she retained the Euro-Canadian assumption that history can be
objectively determined by an institution that is external to the culture in question.
This can be seen in her reliance on her own culture's Bering Straight land-bridge
theory of Indigenous origin, proffered without offering any evidentiary proof in its
support.958
McLachlin was the only member of the Court who would have acquitted
Dorothy Van der Peet outright. As shown in the quote above, she arrived at this
conclusion through a reassertion of the English common law model, which led her
to conclude that:
"It may now be affirmed with confidence that the
common law accepts all types of aboriginal rights,
"even though those interests are of a kind unknown to
English law".959
This interpretation is fully consistent with the monarch's traditional obligation to
protect the laws and customs of the land. The colonizing assumption that "the law"
was English was thus offset by England's traditional acceptance of "aboriginal
rights". McLachlin even went so far as to assert that the Crown could not transfer
rights to non-Aboriginal people "without the consent of aboriginal people, without
treaty, and without compensation".96o This is a fully postcolonial formulation that
conforms to the modem requirements of international law.
958 R. v. Van der Peet at [106].
959 R. v. Van der Peet at [269] citing Lord Denning in Oyekan v. Adele, [1957] 2 All E.R. 785 at 788.
960 R. v. Van der Peet at [310].
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McLachlin's reasoning in Van der Peet raises questions concerning why her
subsequent reasoning did not consistently apply a consent-based concept of legality.
How, for example, could such a strong expression of postcolonial principle devolve
into the Marshall/Bernard presumption that all Mi'kmaq rights had evaporated
except "the right to practice a traditional 1760 trading activity in the modem
context,,?961 The roots of this colonial backlash might be traced in part to
McLachlin's reliance on the materialistic Euro-Canadian concept of history, which
led her to declare that:
"What the laws, customs and resultant rights are
"must be ascertained as a matter of fact" in each
case.,,962
She seems to have been unaware of the extent to which "facts" are designed by
cultural and linguistic categories. For example, she adopted Sparrow's analysis of
"fishing" as if it concerned only a physical resource which could be divided into
"aboriginal", "commercial" and "sports fishing" with no apparent awareness of how
these categories were products of her own culture's habits of thought and
practice.963 This, along with her limitation of the Sto:lo right in Van der Peet to "the
aboriginal people's historical reliance on the resource" presumes that the "aboriginal
right to fish" did not occupy the entire material and conceptual field of "fishing" at
contact. Yet, paradoxically, like all of the other cases included in this study, Van der
Peet included no evidence to demonstrate that the interjection of colonial resource
961 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, 2005 SCC 43 (CanLII) at [26].
962 R. v. Van der Peet at [269] citing Brennan J. in Mabo v. Queensland[No.2] (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1
at 58.
963 R. v. Van der Peet at [269].
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exploitation is sustainable over long periods of time comparable to the thousands of
years that sustained Indigenous use.
McLachlin seems similarly to have accepted the proposition that prior to
1982 the Crown could legally extinguish Indigenous rights if the intention was
"plain and clear".964 No explanation was offered to indicate the source of this
concept of legality or how it might be reconciled with the current presumption of the
human equality of Indigenous people.965 There was likewise no explanation
provided for McLachlin's statement a few paragraphs later that the Crown could not
transfer rights to non-Aboriginal people: "without the consent of aboriginal people,
without treaty, and without compensation".966 In other words, conflicting concepts
of legality were proffered without providing a formula for transition or coordination.
In fairness to her, and to the other members who sat on that Court, it should
be noted that Van der Peet was heard in 1995, a year before publication of the
reassessment of Canadian history provided by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples. Since all of the members of the Court were born and raised in a colonial
culture, it is entirely possible that none had any personal experience of the respect
for custom-generated legality of the kind represented by Lord Denning's support for
the right of cricket players to use a ground they had been keeping for a mere 70
years despite complaints by the residents of a new housing development that their
964 R. v. Van der Pee! at [286].
965 The suggestion that this contradiction is implicitly resolved because colonial legality should be
respected in the interest of stability only makes sense from a perspective that excludes Indigenous
reality and the profoundly destabilizing effect of the experience of being colonized. From a
postcolonial perspective, the question is whether any Indigenous people ever viewed Anglo-
Canadian law from the stage of "Displacement and Assimilation" as legitimate.
966 R. v. Van der Pee! at [310].
372
windows were being smashed by errant balls.967 It is quite possible that none of the
members of the Court noticed the contradictions inherent to their attempt to impose
their own culture's concepts of law and history in a colonial setting. Reflections
along this line were, after all, just beginning in Canadian society as a whole.
5.5.6.4 The Court's Interpretive Monopoly
Even ifIndigenous peoples shared Canadian concepts of history, the Court's
framing of the past and its appropriation of the right to determine what is "integral"
to Indigenous cultures is problematic from a postcolonial point of view. Through
sui generis differentiation, the Court has treated Indigenous peoples as exotic others,
simply assuming the universal validity of its own cultural terms of reference,
including language, time frames and the system of legal categorization applied. It
has asserted important facts without providing an evidentiary foundation and,
though some of the treaty cases acknowledged that Indigenous points of view might
differ from those of settler society, the overall standard upheld was based on
traditional "common law methodology".
This introduced a decolonizing influence by providing a means for
recognizing Indigenous cultures. Yet, the judicial appropriation of exclusive
interpretative authority enhanced the colonizing effect of English precedent by
ignoring the part of British tradition that extended jurisdictional respect to those
under sovereign protection. Despite the Supreme Court's concern for the bias
created by the way issues were brought before it, it has contributed in its own way
967 Miller v. Jackson (1977) Q.B. 966.
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to the colonizing character of its judgments. Through the Van der Peet
methodology it has turned interpretation of the Aboriginal rights protected by
s.35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 first and foremost, into a unicultural exercise
that takes the colonizing culture's perspective as the norm. 968 Van der Peet did
nothing to counter the observation made by Bell and Asch that the Court has
developed a tradition of "moulding Aboriginal interests into familiar categories of
English law and measuring their enforceability by English standards. ,,969 In this
regard, it should be remembered that, unlike the English who have their parliament
and unlike the members of Canada's majority cultures, the Indigenous peoples have
no legislative power in Canada and thus no power to modify or reverse judicial
interpretations of the law with which they disagree.
5.5.7 Signs of Paradigmatic Stress and Change
The foundational nature of the shift in the concept of legality that has
accompanied decolonization has left the Court in an awkward position. As Kuhn's
theory might lead us to expect, the field is rife with anachronisms which the judges
sometimes found overwhelming. In Mitchell v. Peguis, Wilson noticed the deeply
rooted character of the issues presented and demurred saying:
"Because these issues concern fundamental questions
about the relationship between the courts and
government, this Court is ill-equipped to engage in the
delicate task of rewriting the law in this area.'>970
968 See ego Guerin v. The Queen; St. Mary's Indian Band v. Cranbrook etc.
969 Bell, Asch, "Challenging Assumptions" at 38 & 45.
970 Mitchel/v. Peguis at {25}.
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Equipped or not, people expect the Court to come up with solutions".971 Despite the
obvious institutional and historical bias in the formulation of the issues all of the
members of the Court have attempted to demonstrate an egalitarian approach to
Indigenous rights though the results have been ambiguous.
5.5.7.1 Exclusion from "Reasonable Persons"
The classical standard applied in the judicial analysis was based on the
standard of the "reasonable person". As described in Wewaykum II, this approach
takes the inherently subjective nature of knowledge into account by specifying that
')ustice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to
be done" so
" .. .in cases where disqualification [of a judge] is
argued, the relevant inquiry is not whether there was in
fact either conscious or unconscious bias on the part of
the judge, but whether a reasonable person properly
informed would apprehend that there was.,,972
[emphasis in original]
Unfortunately, in this instance, the Court appears to have excluded Indigenous
people from its definition of a "reasonable person". Both the plaintiff and the
defendant were Indigenous. Both claimed bias on account of Binnie's earlier
involvement in the first Wewaycum case on behalf of the Crown. Yet the Court
upheld Binnie's judgment.
The concept of human equality has, however, become so firmly entrenched
in Canadian culture that it can now be presumed that Indigenous people tend to be
included in the category of "reasonable persons" in most circumstances. None of
971 Marshall I at [37].(Binnie)
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the cases included in the study embarked on the kind of "civilizing" discourse that
can be found in discussions concerning "Indians" in the 1920's.973 The trouble is
that, in the absence of a jury or democratically instituted legislation, the only
standard of reasonableness the judges have is themselves. Like the rest of us, they
are subject to the conditioning provided by their particular experiences and, as Kuhn
observed, old paradigms tend to persist, reasserting themselves with particular force
in the face of the stress created by anomalous circumstances. This may explain the
ghostly invasion of archaic perspectives that had been rejected at the conscious level
though their imprint can be found in one form or another in almost all of the cases
included in this study.
5.5.7.2 Recognition of Indigenous Frames of Reference
Treaty interpretation seems to have inspired some of the most
comprehensive consideration of Indigenous frames of reference. Dickson's oft
quoted analysis in Nowegijick recognized that:
"From the perspective of the Indians, treaties were
drawn up in a foreign language, and incorporated
references to legal concepts of a s~stem of law with
which the Indians were unfamiliar,,9 4
Similar reasoning seeped into cases that did not involve treaty relations. In Sparrow
Dickson found it was:
" ... crucial, to be sensitive to the aboriginal ~erspective
itself on the meaning of the rights at stake." 75
972 Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada II at [66].
973 See ego Sero V. Gault (1921) 64 D.L.R. 327 (Ont. S.C.).
974 See ego Mitchell V. Peguis at {39} citing Dickson C.J. in Nowegijick v. The Queen at 36.
975 R. V. Sparrow at 1112
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Reasoning from a point of view reminiscent of that adopted in 1921 by Viscount
Haldane for the Privy Council in Amodu Tijani976 (which they did not cite),
Dickson and LaForest warned that:
"Courts must be careful, then, to avoid the application
of traditional common law concepts of property as
they develop their concept of what the reasons for
judgment in Guerin referred to as the "sui generis"
nature of aboriginal rights".977
Even though the institutional venue and the way in which the issues were
brought before the Court created an inherent cultural bias, the fact that conventional
Canadian frames of reference might not fit Indigenous people was plainly on the
table throughout all of the cases. McLachlin seems to have been particularly
punctilious about articulating this principle. In Mitchell, she acknowledged that:
"Cultural identity is a subjective matter and not easily
discemed.,,978
She went on to say:
" ...judges must resist facile assumptions based on
Eurocentric traditions ... ,,979
In Marshall/Bernard she likewise noted that:
"To determine the aboriginal entitlement one looks to
the aboriginal practices rather than imposing a
European template..,,98o
Yet, despite this conscious legitimization of Indigenous points of view, the Court
generally failed to systematically explore or apply Indigenous perspectives and its
976 Amodu Tijani [1921] 2 A.C. 399 at 407.
977 R. v. Sparrow at 1112.
978 Mitchell v. MN.R. at [32].
979 Ibid at [34].
980 R. v. Marshall/Bernard at [48-9].
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reasoning was often inimical to Indigenous preferences as can be seen in the high
rate of convictions upheld (See Appendix 5). This problem may be due in part to the
character of the pleadings received and it suggests that the task of escaping "fascile
Eurocentric assumptions" may be much more challenging than the Court's good
intentions might lead us to believe.
5.5.7.3 Institutional Deficiency
The difficulty the Court experienced with regard to "the aboriginal
perspective" and the concept of objectivity discussed by Lakoff and taught to
university science students by Nelson may be attributable in part to the institutional
context in which it functions. The adversarial structuring of traditional court
procedure tends to straight-jacket judicial reasoning into a binary "P, not P"
container-metaphor format. This feeds the perception that there must always be a
"winner" and a "loser". Coupled with the Court's failure to systematically present the
arguments of the parties and the interveners and to relate its decisions to their frames
of reference, it is not surprising that judicial reasoning often creates considerable
dissatisfaction among Indigenous peoples.
Other than the haphazard appearance of subsequent appeals on different
facts, there is no institutionalized means of providing feed-back to the judges
concerning the impact of their decisions. The response of the Wewaykum or
Campbell River Band to the first Wewaycum case was noted in Wewaykum 11 as
follows:
"They were upset, quite frankly, with the tenor of the
reasons in the sense that the claim had been dismissed;
some of the words used were "paper claim" And in
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effect they thought, as parties sometimes feel when
they lose cases, that their arguments had not been
properlyaddressed.,,981
Though the Court dismissed the Indigenous objections in that instance, the fact that
it felt impelled to issue supplementary reasons in MarshaU982 confirms the sense
that a venue that allows a broader exploration of the issues may be required.
Decolonization does, after all, present a rather daunting challenge. In effect, the
postcolonial paradigm requires adaptation of a complex and socially entrenched
body of law so as to uphold Canada's international commitments and accommodate
both Indigenous and Canadian interests on an egalitarian basis.
Deficiency in current institutional structures is also suggested by R. v.
Deane.983 Kenneth Deane was the Ontario Provincial Police officer who shot
Dudley George at "Ipperwash Provincial Park", which was situated on land
expropriated from the Stoney Point band for military use during World War 11.984
Deane was convicted of criminal negligence causing death after the trial judge
found that his claim to have seen muzzle flashes was "concocted ex post facto in an
ill fated attempt to disguise the fact that an unarmed man had been shot".985 The
appeal on the grounds that a voir dire should have been held was rejected by the
majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal with one dissent. In a two sentence
judgment, the Supreme Court found that even if a voir dire should have been held,
no substantial miscarriage ofjustice had occurred.
981 Wewaykum Indian Bandv. Canada II at [16].
982 Marshall I; Marshall II.
983 R. v.Deane.
984 "Indepth; Ipperwash" , CBC News Online:(l5 Feb. 2006) http://www.cbc.ca (5/15/2006).
985 R. v.Deane at [65].
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According to Canadian terms of reference, this result might seem to
vindicate the Indigenous cause. However, there is no evidence to suggest that
vindication is what Dudley George's people wanted. It is obvious that they were
not satisfied with the result and if one thinks about it, it is easy to understand why.
Would the people at the first Wounded Knee have felt that justice had been served if
the first soldier who fired a machine gun had been convicted and hung? Not likely.
Indigenous people tend to see the Ipperwash action as part of an on-going
process of colonial intimidation.986 Deane was under orders when he donned his
riot gear and loaded his gun. His conviction hung on the interpretation of split
second reactions during a tense situation. By making him a scapegoat, attention was
deflected from the question of why things became so tense to begin with. Why were
there guns? Those in command knew that the "protesters" were unarmed. The
Stoney Point claim to the land was well documented and if the province of Ontario
disagreed it could have taken its claim to court. It took years of lobbying and a
change in the Ontario government before members of George's family managed to
get the province to institute an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding his
death.987 But by the time the hearing ended, the land claim had not been settled.
Though their concerns were eventually validated by the Inquiry report, the
cumbersome character of the whole procedure has not been reassuring.
986 Tom Keefer, Struggle for the Land: Footage of and Statements from participants of the Sicx
Nations Land Reclamation (April-June 2006) (Toronto: Upping the Anti, 2006)
uppingtheanti@gmaiI.com http://autosoI.tao.ca .
987 Sidney B. Lindon, Commissioner, The Ipperwash Inquiry http://www.ipperwashinquiry.ca
(5/15/2006). I have not checked the Inquiry records to verify whether it included evidence that
George was shot by two guns.
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In effect, the issues that are important for the Indigenous people tend to be
sidelined by standard institutional processing even after the mobilization of
publicity far beyond the capacity of those involved in most problems involving
relations with the colonizing regime. As Dudley's brother Sam stated at the close of
the Ipperwash Inquiry, he thought the main issue was all about healing but:
"Before any healing can take place you must go back
to what's causing the sore to fester. ..once the land is
returned, (then we) will start to heal".988
This concept of "justice" as "healing" was completely irrelevant to the issues as
framed in R. v. Deane. It challenges some of the basic assumptions and analogies
that have traditionally governed Canadian judicial thinking and suggests that a
whole different range of questions must be asked if we are to devise means of
respecting Indigenous concepts of justice and social order. As the restorative justice
movement suggests, substantial reform may be required in order to reach the
Court's goal of accommodating Indigenous preferences.989
5.5.8 Conclusions
The Court aims to function as a neutral arbiter and it has explicitly
articulated the principle that Indigenous perspectives must be taken into account.
This represents a significant departure from the legality of the early twentieth
century that was based on the Indian Act's legal exclusion of "Indians" from the
definition of a "person". However, the issues the Court considered were framed
predominantly by the Crown, by members of the colonizing society or by the Court
988 Gregory Bonnell, "Harris' desire to end Ipperwash standoff influenced police: George lawyer",
Rogers Communications Inc. (21 Aug. 2006) http://www.680news.com
989 See ego McCaslin, Justice as Healing.
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itself. Because this study focused exclusively on judgments and the Court did not
provide systematic accounts of the pleadings of the parties and interveners it is not
possible to determine whose frames of reference prevailed. The high rate of
Indigenous convictions does, however, suggests a bias in favour of Crown
perspectives which do not necessarily correspond to those of the Canadian public.
Moreover, characterization of Indigenous interests as sui generis served to help the
Court evade the aberrant nature of colonial legality and the rigorous application of
universal legal standards, while the Van der Peel methodology reaffirmed the
colonial cultural habit of imposing externally defined concepts and definitions
instead of respecting the jurisdictional authority of Indigenous peoples and requiring
the colonizing society to negotiate mutually agreeable terms of co-existence.
6.
Trends and Conclusions
"The world has changed and with it the culture and
expectations of the aboriginal peoples have changed,
as they have for the rest of us." 990
Binnie, 1. 2006
McDiarmid Lumber v. Gods Lake First Nation
"No one Elder knows the complete story" 991
Sharon Venne, 1997
"Understanding Treaty 6"
The role of the colonial phenomenon in changing the "culture and
expectations" of Indigenous peoples seems obvious. However, the Court's
reasoning is just beginning to come to terms with a set of circumstances that, to put
it bluntly, violated modern legal norms. Its stated goal in interpreting s.35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 has been to reconcile the assertion of British sovereignty to
which Canada is heir with the fact that the land was originally occupied by other
peoples. 992 Yet the Court, like the rest of Canadian society, has barely begun to
excavate the fact that these people are still here today, trying to live their lives in
spite of it all.
Conditioned as we are to believe in the honour and integrity of the Canadian
state and of the immigration and refugee processes through which our ancestors
990 McDiarmid Lumber Ltd. v. Gods Lake First Nation. at [2].
991 Sharon Venne "Understanding Treaty 6" at 176.
992 R. v. Van der Peet at [32].
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settled here, it is tempting for members of the dominant society to ignore a problem
of which we were once unaware and which, from an internal cultural perspective,
has been created by a change in legal sensibilities. The Court's attempts to mediate
on-going cultural differences that have persisted despite centuries of assimilative
effort and that continue to underlie inter-cultural relations have been exacerbated by
profound changes that have occurred over time in concepts of "law" and
"sovereignty" as Canada emerged from the colonial setting. Though full exploration
of the ways in which such concepts have evolved over the past five hundred years is
beyond the scope of this work, it is worth noting that these changes sometimes seem
more apparent to Indigenous peoples than they do to the general Canadian public.
Many Indigenous peoples still have strong cultural memories of the treaties
signed with Queen Victoria or of their struggles to prove that they were "allies, not
subjects of Britain". By contrast, the re-writing of history that has accompanied
Canada's establishment as an independent state has induced younger generations of
Canadians and recent immigrants to ignore the country's British imperial ties.993 It
is frequently assumed that independent Canadian statehood began with
Confederation in 1867.994 This makes it difficult for them to understand Indigenous
perspectives on the inter-cultural relationships that were negotiated in the past or to
acknowledge the historical processes through which the culturally protective role
assumed by the Crown in the Royal Proclamation, 1763 devolved into the cultural
993 According to a 2007 Ipsos-Reid survey only eight percent of Canadians knew Queen Elizabeth II
was the head of state. Reuters, "We don't know us: Most would flunk citizenship test", The
[Montreal] Gazette (30 June, 2007) A12.
994 The presumption that Canada was established by Confederation in 1867 can be seen ego in Will
Kymlicka, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Don Mills, Ontario:
Oxford University Press Canada, 1998 at 1.
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appropriation represented by the Supreme Court of Canada's Van der Peet
methodology.
In reflecting on his relations with the Ojibway, Rupert Ross observed that:
"My own cultural eyes have often tricked me into
seeing things that Aboriginal people did not - or
completely missing things they thought too obvious to
point out.".995
The same perceptual mis-match colours judicial reasoning concerning the
recognition of "existing aboriginal and treaty rights" in the Constitution Act, 1982.
From the Court's perspective, Anglo-Canadian sovereignty defined in modem
territorial terms is unquestionable. The problem it confronts is that this was not a
terra nullius. The Indigenous peoples were here first. However, the bottom line, as
Lamer stated in Delgamuukw is that: "We are here to stay".996
From Indigenous perspectives, by contrast, Anglo-Canadian sovereignty of
whatever form is an unwelcome imposition and the problem is that we are still here.
The society to which we belong has appropriated all of the resources, it has
destroyed the environment and traditional knowledge, it interferes constantly with
their lives, it refuses to respect the original treaties and it attack them with externally
imposed laws instead of engaging in rational egalitarian discussions so we can live
in harmony and protect the environment for the generations to come. Yet we are
also part of nature and we also want meaningful participation in the decisions that
shape our lives. Most of us belong to a mongrelized mob of people and our
adherence to the dominant culture is often something of a compromise in which we
too feel powerless. Our ancestors came from many lands, yet our ties with them
995 Ross, Returning to the Teachings at 52.
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have been cut. We do not understand long term relationships. Many of us have
never even visited the disparate territories of our ancestors. And we cannot tum
back time. We were born, socialized and culturally blended here. We are made of
the same earth as the Indigenous peoples, but we have lost all sense of tradition and
we have no experience of any form of government other than American bombast
and the dregs of British colonialism currently in place.
When the basic concepts used to structure judicial reasoning are considered,
it becomes apparent that the Court's self-defined task of dealing equitably with the
confusion we have all inherited is not as simple it might seem at first glance. The
vocabulary of "sovereignty", "law", "history", "land title" and "government" all
import the culturally specific norms and expectations of the colonizing culture that
designed the Court in the first place. The preliminary investigations of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and the research of a growing number of
postcolonial scholars make it obvious that the conceptual categories used by the
Court to frame and construct knowledge differ, not only from those used by
Indigenous peoples, but also from those used within the in-migrating culture at the
time when Europeans relations began with the original peoples of the land known
by the Court as "Canada". We have all changed. We continue to change. Yet old
habits of thought remain deeply entrenched and unless we learn about alternatives
we cannot make the informed choices that are required to establish and maintain the
respectful egalitarian relations that characterize postcolonial legality.
It is almost a century since European anthropologists recognized one of the
messages of the Two Row Wampum: Different cultures use different institutions to
996 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia at [186].
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structure their existence.997 More recently, Kuhn and the cognitive theorists have
demonstrated some of the ways in which the metaphors, paradigms and conceptual
categories that define knowledge are both culturally specific and idiosyncratic. The
mental frames of reference that we use affect our perceptual capacities precluding
the pristine objectivity to which the Court has traditionally aspired. Yet it is
impossible to think: without these cognitive tools. Old models can and must
continue in use until new ones emerge and because of this, colonizing
ethnocentrisms are inclined to persist despite the Court's best intentions.
None of the judgments considered for this study referred to enough
information about the Indigenous societies concerned to provide much insight into
their norms or terms of reference. This prohibits any fair assessment of the Court's
successes or failures at inter-cultural reconciliation and it should be born in mind
that, even though the analysis presented here is based on international norms, these
were formulated without Indigenous participation. Over all, the first quarter century
of Supreme Court interpretation of the Aboriginal and treaty rights protected by
s.35(l) of the Constitution Act, 1982 seems to have evicerated the power of this
provision by validating external interpretations of the rights concerned.998 Since the
Court's concept of legality focuses on enforcement, this in itself binds Canadian
legality to the colonial paradigm, inhibiting development of the consensual mind
set that marks egalitarian practice.
It is here that the ghosts of Wounded Knee reside. Over two thousand years
ago, there was a famous exchange that began when Mencius asked King Hui of
Liang:
997 Bell, Asch, "Challenging Assumptions" at 64-5.
998 See ego Guerin v. The Queen; St. Mary's Indian Band v. Cranbrook etc.
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"Is there any difference between killing a man with a
stick or with a sword?"
The King acknowledged that there was not and his moment of insight came with the
next question:
"Is there any difference between killing with a sword
and killing with government?,,999
By the same token, those functioning in institutions of the in-migrating
governmental culture like the Supreme Court of Canada may want to consider
whether there is any real difference between the colonization effected through the
crazed slaughter committed by adolescent soldiers at Wounded Knee a century ago
and the sedate suffocation of Indigenous physical and cultural habitats by the
mountains of verbiage that may be generated through the use or abuse of judicial
processes today. The ongoing persistence of severe social problems, including
evidence suggesting that the community with the highest suicide rate in the world is
an Indigenous reserve in Ontario, suggests that there may not be. 1000
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court of Canada is seeking to do its
share to counteract this situation by defining a postcolonial role for itself. Many of
the ideals it expressed in the cases considered for this study correlate strongly with
the postcolonial norms defined in international law. The judges have repeatedly
reiterated their intention to respect Indigenous points of view and, most recently,
Bastarache writing for the full Court in R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray stated that it would
be a mistake:
999 See Legge, The Works of Mencius. This translation is based on Charles Muller
http://www2.gol.com/users/acmuller/cantao/mencius.htm (1711211997).
1000 On the Pikangikum Reserve in Ontario, 7 of Juliette Turtle's 12 children have committed suicide.
Steve Lambert, "An Unlikely Place for Hope" The [Montreal]Gazette, (8 Jan. 2007) All.
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" ... to fall into the trap of reducing an entire people's
culture to specific anthropological curiosities and,
potentially, racialized aboriginal stereotypes."IOOI
Yet, as Kuhn and the cognitive theorists have demonstrated, the very cognitive tools
we use to shape our thoughts predispose us to the type of blindness that induces the
misperception of black hearts slipped into a seemingly familiar deck of cards.
The only reliable means of ensuring that the resolution of any particular
issue does not violate either Indigenous or postcolonial norms is to reach consensual
accords with the people concerned or to at least exercise discretion and refrain from
encroaching when accords have not been not reached. The problem presented by
postcolonial methodology is that it is often difficult to see when our behaviour
represents an encroachment on others, particularly when engaged in a movement
into their ancestral homelands. The polishing of the Covenant Chains of Iroquoian
tradition once provided a mechanism for developing this level of understanding but,
as Mark Walters has demonstrated, the old diplomacy was abandoned by the in-
migrating culture in the course of the colonization process that established our
current understanding of "Canada".IO02
Rupert Ross, like others concerned with restorative justice, has pointed out
that the Court's adjudicative function conflicts with the balancing, mediative norms
of Indigenous legality.lOo3 Moreover, from a Haudenosaunee perspective, and
perhaps even from the perspective of all Indigenous peoples, the Court's legitimate
function is confined to regulating matters that are internal to the Anglo-Canadian
1001 R. v. Sappier/Gray at [46].
1002 Walters, "The "Golden Thread" of Continuity".
1003 See ego Ross, Returning to the Teachings at 56.
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boat in the Two Row Wampum analogyl004. Yet this does not mean that it has no role
to play in the decolonization process. The Court's judgments may be crucial to
reviving the inter-cultural respect found in the old treaties as well as in the Royal
Proclamation, 1763. The colonizing aspects of its function may be reduced or
eliminated if it prioritizes the postcolonial values that are already entrenched in
Canadian law and confines its reasoning to defending the honour of the Crown by
ensuring that "existing aboriginal and treaty rights" as understood by the Indigenous
peoples are respected.
This concluding chapter reviews the Court's function from this perspective.
It begins by assessing its current vision of Aboriginal and treaty rights as
summarized in three cases released in December, 2006 that were not included in the
list considered for the core analysis. It then provides an overview of the Court's
strengths and weaknesses as measured against the indicia of colonialism and
postcolonialism that were used to assess the judgments produced during the first
quarter century since Canada's constitutional recognition of "aboriginal and treaty
rights". In conclusion, it considers how the Court and legal practitioners may be
able to ensure continued progress towards realization of the postcolonial ideals to
which Canada has ascribed both at the international level and in the Constitution
Act, 1982.
1004 See ego Deskaheh, The Redman's Appealfor Justice (Brantford: D. Wilson Moore Ltd, 1924)
reproduced in Appendix C13, Woo, Canada v. The Haudenosaunee.
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6.1 The Court's December 2006 Vision
" ...once it has achieved the status of paradigm, a
scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternate
candidate is available to take its place...
.. .anomaly does not always induce crisis."
Thomas Kuhn,
The Structure ofScientific Revolutions lO05
The three judgments released in December 2006 suggest that legal reasoning
functions according to the same pattern as scientific theory. The Supreme Court of
Canada has settled into an approach that resembles "normal" research as defined by
Kuhn. Although each case resulted in two judgments, there was a high degree of
consensus among the members of the Court concerning the norms and conceptual
procedure that should be applied. By current standards, these cases are unlikely to
become important precedents with the stature of Nowegijick, Guerin, Sioui,
Sparrow, Van der Peet or Delgamuukw. They serve instead as refinements of a
conceptual model that has already become established. However, they also contain
the seeds of what may eventually result in a substantial redefinition of the Court's
role.
6.1.1 "Aboriginal Rights" in R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray
R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray concerned New Brunswick charges against
Maliseets Dale Sappier and Clark Po1chies and Mi'kmaq Darrell Joseph Gray for
harvesting timber on "Crown land".lO06 The case illustrates some of the on-going
1005 Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions, 77, 81.
1006 R. v. Sappier/Gray.
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problems faced by Indigenous peoples as well as the Court's capacity to both
facilite and restrain the paradigmatic transition from colonial to postcolonial
legality.
As the genesis of the issues presented to the Court demonstrates, the simple
enactment of new norms, as happened in 1982 with the Constitutional recognition
accorded to Aboriginal and treaty rights, is not sufficient to prevent on-going
belligerence against Indigenous peoples on the part of Canadian and provincial
officials. Nor is the affirmation of these rights by the Supreme Court of Canada any
guarantee of respect. In 1984, Guerin's interpretation of "aboriginal rights" found
that the relationship of the Crown with "the Indians" was fiduciarylO07 and in 1990
Sparrow found that it was "trust-like, rather than adversarial".IO08 The Court has
consistently reiterated this position over the years, yet both Sappier and Gray began
with the laying of penal charges and proceeded through repeated Crown appeals of
the acquittals granted by lower courts.
The antagonistic character of this form of inter-cultural relations was
perpetuated by Crown counsel at the Supreme Court level where it most certainly
did not act as a fiduciary to the Indigenous defendants. Some of the arguments put
forward concerned frivolous technicalities. Thus, objections were made concerning
the appeal court's use of findings of fact in Bernard as well as its reference to an
academic paper that was not entered in evidence though it was offered and
mentioned in testimony by the Crown's own witness. Success on such grounds
1007 Guerin v.The Queen at 376.
1008 R. v. Sparrow at 1108.
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could only have prolonged procedure without changing eventual conclusions
concerning either the facts or the law.
Crown counsel also argued that that New Brunswick legislation passed in
1840 and 1862 was evidence of the Crown's intention to extinguish any Aboriginal
right to harvest wood. Hostile arguments of this kind that assert a colonial model of
legality that Canada has renounced at the international level seem to have been
encouraged by ambiguous aspects of the Court's reasoning. To date, the Court has
not provided a clear definition or rejection of colonialism per se. In this instance,
Bastarache's insistence that "the Crown bears the burden of proving
extinguishment"lO09 was consistent with the fiduciary role of government. His
resistance to might-makes-right legality is consistent with postcolonial norms and
his application of the rule of law principle to the Crown reaffirmed the aspects of
English tradition that correspond to postcolonial norms. However, a colonial
undertow was created, by his support for Delgamuukw 's affirmation of the power to
extinguish Aboriginal rights, narrow though it was. Despite his support for
postcolonial values, his assertion that this could only be done by the Imperial Crown
seems simultaneously to condone externally imposed legality. As long as the Court
continues to accept the legitimacy of rules imposed without the consent of the
people concerned, the door will remain open to further forays against Indigenous
peoples founded on a morality that plainly violates both modem standards and those
of the early contact era.
According to Kuhn, contradictions of the kind seen in this part of the
judgment are characteristic of periods of paradigmatic change. Similar confusion is
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also reflected in the discordant approaches taken by the various New Brunswick
courts to the question of whether Indigenous peoples could cut trees on the land
used by their ancestors since time immemorial. There seems generally to have been
agreement that such actions should be permissible, although judicial theories
concerning why varied considerably. In Provincial Court, Sappier and Polchies
were told that they did not have "an aboriginal right to harvest timber for personal
use" because their culture "would not have been fundamentally altered had wood
not been available" and
"any human society living on the same lands would
have used wood and wood products for the same
purposes."lOlO
However, the judge found that their actions were protected by a valid treaty right.
The Crown's appeal was dismissed by the Court of Queen's Bench, then the Court
ofAppeal told them that they had both an Aboriginal right and a treaty right.
By contrast, Darrell Gray was told in Provincial Court that he had an
Aboriginal right, but not a treaty right. The Court of Queen's Bench allowed the
Crown's appeal, then the Court of Appeal restored his acquittal. As if their lives
had not been held in suspense long enough, the Crown appealed both acquittals to
the Supreme Court of Canada. Given the fiduciary role ascribed to the Crown by
the Court, one can only wonder why the Crown continued to jeopardize the
individuals who had become ensnared in this situation instead of formulating a
reference to clarify the evident confusion in Canadian law. An even more
postcolonial solution would have involved negotiations with the Mi'kmaq and
1009 R. v. Sappier/Grayat [57].
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Maliseet to develop a co-operative plan, not just for using, but also for managing the
resource concerned.
The Court can only deal with pleadings as presented and it does not seem to
have been completely blind to what was happening. Despite his seeming
ambivalence on the question of extinction, Bastarache's response was framed by
postcolonial concerns. Drawing on the Van der Peet dissents of L'Heureux-Dub6
and McLachlin he reiterated that:
"different people may entertain different ideas about
what is distinctive"
He insisted that:
" .. .it would be a mistake to reduce the entire pre-
contact distinctive Maliseet culture to canoe-building
and basket-making".lOll
acknowledging that:
" ...the term "culture" as it is used in the English
language may not find a perfect parallel in certain
aboriginal languages."1012
However, his basic approach maintained the colonizing aspects of Lamer's Van der
Peet methodology. He applied an external evaluation and defined the right
concerned very narrowly saying:
"the purpose of this exercise is to understand the way
of life of the particular aboriginal society, pre-contact,
and to determine how the claimed right relates to
it."10 13
1010 Ibid. at [57].
1011 Ibid. at [46].
1012 Ibid, at [44].
1013 Ibid. at [40].
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In so doing, Bastarache not only ignored the effect of this prolonged and costly
litigation on the lives of the accused but also implicitly denied their capacity to
"understand" their own way of life. Like other judges in previous cases, he applied
a unilaterally determined adjudicative methodology to intercultural relations that
were initially negotiated by treaty, presuming that "understanding" was an exclusive
prerogative of one party's court. There was, accordingly, no balancing against a
comparable analysis of the colonizing society as might have been expected had the
dispute been considered by a neutral international court. Yet the Court was placed
in a difficult position, for it is more or less constrained to deal with the questions
before it as represented by the pleadings at hand.
As various commentators have noted, this ethnocentric approach appears to
have closed the door on the Indigenous right to self-government. 1014 In so doing, it
has created a rupture between the Court's reasoning and the principles enshrined in
the international treaties that Canada has signed stating, for example, that:
"All peoples have the right to self-determination.,,1015
Because of this, the impact of Bastarache's acknowledgment of the fact of cultural
difference was neutralized. He failed to assimilate the implications of this principle
and his reasoning continued to reflect the colonial cultural conditioning that shaped
the twentieth century. In his words, the Van der Peet test states that:
"In order to be an aboriginal right, an activity must be
an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to
1014 See ego Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice: Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia
(Saskatoon: Native Law Centre,University of Saskatchewan, 2001), 85; Bradford W. Morse,
"Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Government and the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Pamajewon"
(1997) 42 McGill L. J. 1011.
1015 See ego The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights s.l.
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the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming
the right,,1016
It might be noted that although this interpretation of s.35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982 was not instituted with the free and informed consent of the people concerned,
it is not in itself colonizing in character. It could be read simply as a restatement of
s.35(1). The colonial aspects of the Court's reasoning entered through the
ethnocentric way in which it applied this test. In effect, despite asserting a desire to
protect traditional means of survival and avoid racialized stereotyping10I7, the Court
failed to adopt the stance of a neutral arbiter when considering the relative rights of
the Indigenous and in-migrating cultures.
To begin with, Bastarache's reasoning provided virtually no insight into how
the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet themselves perceive their cultures and traditions. We do
not even know much about what their pleadings were. This defect may be
attributable, in part, to the problems associated with being forced by virtue of the
charges to function in an alien cultural medium on the advice of lawyers who belong
to the colonizing culture. Regardless of its origin, the result was an implicit denial of
the Indigenous capacity to think, to reason or to define their own social rules. This
can be seen in Bastarache's assertion that the accused's claim to the right to harvest
wood for personal uses was "too general" and his insistence on redefining it as "a
right to harvest wood for domestic uses as a member ofthe aboriginal community".
In effect, instead of looking at the defendant's view of their rights and the
Crown's view, then considering the difficulties involved in reconciling the two
cultural approaches, Bastarache imposed his own definition of the issue, confining
1016 R. v. Sappier/Gray at [20] citing R. v. Van der Peel at [46].
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his consideration of "actual practice" to the externally observable. Thus "culture"
was not considered in a broad sense that incorporates the full range of social
function including the capacity to develop a society and rules of conduct.
Bastarache, with the full Court's support, focused on whether the accused's
ancestors actually used wood. This made it possible to avoid fundamental questions
related to how the in-migrating culture claims to have gained jurisdiction over the
Indigenous peoples and ownership of the land to begin with or how dual standards
of legality could apply so as to deny the Indigenous peoples the right to self-
determination or even representation in the law making process.
Bastarache's reasoning also followed the Court's tradition of assuming that
there is only one objective standard of reality: its own. Because of this, he and his
supporters demonstrated no consciousness of the extent to which their point of view
was culturally framed. He repeatedly described the Maliseet and Mi'kmaq as
"migratory,,1018 even though their actions took place within the territory that has
always been used by their ancestors whereas the laws applied were derived from a
culture that had migrated from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Similarly, the
defining moment for "aboriginal rights" was the time of contact, but the Crown was
not required to meet the same standard by proving its rights at the same point in
time. 1019 If such an egalitarian approach had been taken, the fact that the Crown had
no law-making rights on the land concerned in the pre-contact period would have
become patently obvious.
1017 Ibid. at [38, 46]
1018 Ibid at [2, 24, 26].
1019 Ibid. at [24].
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Binnie's dissenting comment suffers from the same defect. He objected to
the majority's exclusion of the right to "barter (and, its modem equivalent, sale)
within the reserve or other local aboriginal community".1020 As he, himself, pointed
out, trade is a natural and efficient use of human resources. His stipulation that this
should be allowed might seem to be more liberal at first glance. Yet, how did he
gain the right to tell the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet whether or not they could trade and
with whom? The existence of this right was not even in issue in this case; however,
he agreed with the majority that "trade, barter or sale" outside the reserve or even
with another "local aboriginal community" should be excluded from the shred of an
Aboriginal right that the Court was prepared to affirm. Though all of his comments
in this regard would be considered obiter or collateral opinion that is not binding
according to English tradition, their effect is to condone racially tainted constraints
that fly in the face of the international free trade movement.
Sappier/Gray illustrates the ivory tower isolation of a Court that has not
benefited from Indigenous participation of the kind enjoyed by the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. This has created areas of blindness that have
prevented well meaning judges from noticing that if a Van der Peet analysis had
been applied to define Mi'kmaq trading practices at contact it would become
obvious that they most certainly did barter with strangers. As the evidence
discussed in Marshall suggests, that appears to have been the very essence of their
relations with Europeans during the first couple of centuries following contact.102l
Without the capacity to barter, the Indigenous peoples would not even have been
1020 Ibid at [74].
1021 Marshall I at [38].
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able to make the treaties that are now being so extravagantly interpreted by the heirs
of the colonizers.
Areas of conceptual blindness of this kind cloud the effect of the Court's
dismissal of the Crown's appeals so seriously that Sappier/Gray can hardly be
considered a victory for the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet. The Court retained the right to
impose its view of the world and its definition of legality. In so doing, it failed to
interpret s.35(1) in a way that protects a jurisdictional sphere broad enough to allow
any culture to live and breathe. Indeed, the Mi 'kmaq and Maliseet right to use the
resource was defined so narrowly that Indigenous peoples remain at risk from on-
going attempts by Crown agents to micro-manage their lives. At the same time, the
need to develop cooperative policies on resource management was completely
ignored, leaving both parties in a condition of vulnerability as far as protection of
the shared environment is concerned.
6.1.2 "Treaty Rights" in R. v. Morris
The same kind of problems can be seen in R. v. Morris. This case arose
when Ivan Morris and Carl Olsen, who were members of the Tsartlip Band of the
Saanich Nation, were charged with violating British Columbia's Wild Life Act after
they shot at a decoy set up to trap illegal hunters. 1022 The majority of the Court
upheld their treaty rights so they were acquitted, yet the judicial willingness to
ignore treaty etiquette and to persist in using colonial models of reasoning is a cause
for serious concern from a postcolonial perspective.
1022 R. v. Morris.
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This was the first judgment concernmg Aboriginal rights written by
Deschamps and Abella. They may have introduced a new approach in that the facts
of the case, as they presented them, demonstrate both the fragility of postcolonial
legality in the current Canadian cultural climate and its viability in the context of the
institutions that are already in place. According to their account, in 1852, when the
Saanich Nation signed a treaty with James Douglas, the Governor of the British
colony on Vancouver Island, they were assured that they would be "at liberty to
hunt over the unoccupied lands...as formerly". At that time there were at most
1,000 settlers among a population of 30,000 "Indians" on Vancouver Island. 1023 In
the pre-contact era, it had been the custom of the Tsartlip to hunt at night with
lights. In more recent times, when the population dynamics had reversed, the
British Columbia Minister of Forests, David Zirnhelt made a commitment to ensure
that there would be no prosecutions for the exercise of their treaty rights. The
Tsartlip were accordingly able to negotiate an agreement with Doug Turner, the
region's chief conservation enforcement officer, to ensure that he would be called if
any member of their nation was arrested for night hunting. Those involved were
released once their identity was confirmed. 1024 By this simple method, the treaty
was respected, unnecessary court procedures were avoided, the Tsartlip were
allowed to determine who their members were and relations were conducted in
accord with the egalitarian, negotiated norms of postcolonial legality.
When Mr. Turner retired, colonial legality reappeared with a vengeance.
After a meeting at a "rod and gun" club where complaints were expressed about
1023 Ibid. at [21] citing R. v. White, (1964), 50 D.L.R. 2d 613 at 657.
1024 Ibid. at [7]
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night hunting by "Indians", a conservation officer organized a decoy operation to
trap night hunters. The existence of the treaty was ignored. There was no discussion
whatsoever with the Tsartlip about this change in procedure or about any concerns
that may have been raised by other hunters. 1025 Though there was no evidence of a
single accident caused by Aboriginal night hunting, it was simply assumed that the
practice was dangerous and that this entrapment procedure was an acceptable means
fd 1· . h h . . 1026o ea mg WIt t e SItuatIOn.
Thomas Kuhn, the cognitive theorists and Rupert Ross have all observed that
people fail to see evidence that does not accord with their operative paradigms. The
very fact that Deschamps and Abella saw the value of reporting the elements of
postcolonial legality in the pre-charge setting suggests their capacity to reason in
postcolonial terms. Even though they failed to comment on the legality represented
by the pre-charge mode of inter-cultural co-operation, they emphasized the
consensual nature of treaty rights l027 and confirmed the most postcolonial elements
of the Court's prior formulations. For example, they cited McLachlin's dissent in
Marshall I for her statement that:
"[t]he goal of treaty interpretation is to choose from
among the various possible interpretations of common
intention the one which best reconciles the interests of
both parties at the time the treaty was signed".1028
Though they did not cite Nowegijick, they repeated McLachlin's assertions in
Marshall I that words:
1025 Ibid. at [8]
1026 Ibid. at [5].
1027 Ibid at [37].
1028 Ibid. at [18] citing R. v. Marshall I at [78].
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" must be given the sense which they would naturally
have held for the parties at the time"
and
"[t]treaties should be liberally construed and
ambiguities or doubtful expressions should be resolved
in favour of the aboriginal signatories.,,1029
They also confirmed the idea that oral promises are part of the treaty. I 030
Yet, even though Deschamps and Abella ultimately acquitted the accused
because of the express terms of the treaty, their judgment exhibited nine out of ten
characteristics of colonial legality. They accepted the legitimacy of non-consensual
regulation. They assumed that the Tsartlip had "agreed to relinquish control over
their lands on Vancouver Island" without offering any evidence to suggest that the
Tsartlip themselves had ever accepted such a broad interpretation of their
agreement. 103 I They applied a Canadian constitutional division of powers analysis
and presumed that Canada's federal government had "jurisdiction over Indians"
without providing any evidence to suggest that the Tsartlip had ever agreed to be
assimilated into Canada.1032 They also accepted the idea that "insignificant"
infringements of treaty rights were legal on the basis of unilateral declarations to
this effect by institutions of the colonizing society.1033 The discordance of this last
position with accepted international etiquette might be easier to understand if we
consider how Canadians would feel if American agents started crossing the border
to make arrests or hand out tickets for the violation of perfectly reasonably safety
1029 Ibid.
1030 Ibid. citing R. v.Marshall I at [12].
1031 Ibid.at [25].
1032 Ibid.at [42].
1033 Ibid at [50].
403
laws passed by the states of Washington or Vermont. In summary, the declaratory
approach adopted by the majority judgment contradicted the very essence of
negotiation required to maintain treaty legality.
The judges were set up to fail in this regard by the way in which the case
came to Court. The presumption that Indigenous sovereignty and treaties can be
ignored and that inter-cultural disagreements may properly be addressed by laying
penal charges is a remnant of practices that developed during the colonial era.
Normally problems with treaty interpretation are resolved through negotiations
between the signatories. If the parties fail to reach agreement, they may appoint a
mutually agreed upon arbiter or appeal to an international court established by an
organization to which both belong. This is the kind of approach applied when Sir
William Johnson was the Superintendent of Indian Affairs following the
establishment of the Department of Indian Affair in 1755. However, relations
changed over time and the establishment of the League of Nations served to
formalize the exclusion of Indigenous peoples from equal membership in the major
organizations that have developed to address international concerns. 1034 This has
changed the character of relations with Indigenous peoples even though some
people, like David Zirnhelt, have demonstrated the ongoing viability of the old
negotiated practices.
In Canada the power imbalance between the Indigenous peoples and the
colonial governments has become so extreme that normal treaty protocols are now
habitually ignored. Though the term "sui generis" was not mentioned in Morris, the
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tendency to forget about the methodology normally associated with treaty relations
was everywhere apparent. Because this cultural habit has become entrenched,
Indigenous people have, to date, found no easily accessible venue where they can
bring complaints concerning treaty or jurisdictional violations by Canadian officials.
One consequence of the practice of laying penal charges against the
Indigenous hunters to address questions concerning inter-cultural hunting regulation
is that the Court's attention focused on their conduct, leaving that of the
conservation officers completely unexamined. Since a treaty defense was raised,
and the existence the treaty was not in issue, the focus might more properly have
shifted to examining the conduct of Canada's administrative agents. They are the
ones who represented Canada with regard to the treaty. They are the ones who
responded in an aggressive manner that violated international norms and they are
the ones over whom Canadian courts might normally be expected to exercise
jurisdiction. The use of unilaterally determined adjudication to redefine the terms of
a treaty violates the very essence of treaty legality. The matter should more
properly have been turned over to the original signers of the treaty or their
successors so that a solution could be negotiated by the proper parties. If this failed,
it might then be turned over to a mutually determined arbiter for adjudication. This
is what treaty legality suggests. Yet, the Court presumed instead that it had the
capacity to resolve the matter based on its own determination of what was in the
minds of the Tartlip both when they signed the treaty and when they interpreted it in
the modem context.
1034 See ego Woo, "Canada's Forgotten Founders". Though the United Nations has now instituted a
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues where Indigenous peoples are represented, this is not the
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The effect of this presumption was particularly apparent in the dissent
written by McLachlin and Fish. Though theirs was the opinion of a minority of
three judges as opposed to the majority of four, it remains significant first because a
full court of nine judges could swing a future decision in the other direction and
second because the majority relied on McLachlin's explanation of treaty rights in
Marshall 1. There was no evidence to suggest that the Tsartlip would disagree with
Mclachlin and Fish's fmding that the treaty right to hunt "excludes dangerous
hunting". 1035 There is also nothing controversial about McLachlin's general
description of the principles of treaty interpretation. However, there was no
description of the Tsartlip's concept of the treaty and issues that might have arisen
during proper treaty negotiations were not raised. It is, for example possible, that
the danger that concerned McLachlin and Fish was a product of an exaggerated
interpretation of any settlement rights that may have been implicit or actually agreed
to under the treaty that was negotiated at a time when there were less that 1,000
settlers in a land inhabited by 30,000 Indigenous people.
Another problem with the minority reasoning in Morris concerns its reliance
on principles such as Cory's statement in R. v. Nikal that:
"The government must ultimately be able to determine
and direct the way in which these rights should
interact. ,,1036
This formulation ignored the fact that the government in question did not and does
not represent the Indigenous peoples concerned. Nikal was not even about treaty
rights. The presumption made by McLachlin and Fish that the laws of one party to
same as having a vote in the General Assembly. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/
1035 R. v. Morris at [64].
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a treaty may be unilaterally imposed without even consulting the other follows the
colonial model of forced political incorporation.
The fact that the Tsartlip hunters' rights were determined solely on the basis
of who the majority of the Court happened to be also modelled the might-makes-
right legality that typifies colonial practice. None of the Court's reasoning served to
support or reinstate the political recognition and negotiated accommodation that was
in place before the old conservation officer retired. Neither judgement commented
on the probable need for re-negotiation because of the massive in-migration that has
reversed the population dynamics during the past century and a half, creating a
situation that may not have been in the reasonable contemplation of the Tsartlip at
the time of the original agreement. On top of this, the members of the rod and gun
club were left with no venue for resolving their safety concerns that were legitimate
according to three members of the Court. Thus, despite ostensible support by the
majority for the Tsartlip's treaty rights, the overall effect of this case was to affirm
colonial legality and to undermine or deny the sovereignty that is implicit in the
capacity to negotiate a treaty.
It is unlikely that any of the judges on the Court saw their reasoning in this
light. As Kuhn and the cognitive theorists have pointed out, one of the major
difficulties associated with paradigm change is the tendency to revert to established
habits of thought, especially when they are supported by institutionalized
procedures. The fact that the Court has expressed treaty rights in postcolonial terms
and is beginning to see the elements required to constitute postcolonial legality
leaves room for some hope. Yet Morris ultimately violated treaty protocols. Instead
1036 Ibid at [123] citing R. v. Nikal.
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of focusing on the issue of how to ensure that Canadian officials respect Canada's
treaty obligations, the Court imposed a unilaterally determined interpretation on
members of the other polity. This serves to reinforce the Indigenous people's
continued vulnerability to prosecution based on vagaries of Canadian policies that
remain shielded from legal scrutiny and that may continue to fluctuate according to
who is hired and who retires.
6.1.3 Gods Lake First Nation
The Court was confronted with yet another manifestation of Canada's
ambiguous colonial legacy in McDiarmid Lumber Ltd. v. Gods Lake First Nation,
the third judgment released in December, 2006. 1037 This case concerned a lumber
company's right to garnish funds deposited in an off-reserve bank account and
provided by the Canadian government to pay for health, education and welfare on
an impoverished northern reserve. McLachlin for a majority of six found that the
funds were not protected from garnishment, while Binnie, with Fish and Abella
concurring, found that the Comprehensive Funding Arrangement (CFA) that
supplied the money in the account should be considered a treaty, making the funds
exempt from garnishment under s.90(1O)(b) of the Indian Act.
Because it applied a treaty model, the minority reasons scored higher on the
postcolonial scale than the majority judgment, which relied heavily on Canadian
legislation and judicial precedents with its statement that:
1037 McDiarmid Lumber Ltd. v. Gods Lake First Nation.
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"It is not the practice of this Court to reverse its
previous decisions in the absence of compelling
reasons to do SO.,,1038
McLachlin accepted at face value the 1938 declaration of a Minister of Mines and
Resources who, in keeping with the self-serving rhetoric of his day, declared that
there was a "need to develop a spirit of self-reliance and independence in our Indian
wards" so they could "in the course of time become absorbed into the ordinary
citizenship of the country".1039 Because of this, she failed to comment on the
contradiction between the claimed desire to promote self-reliance in a previously
independent people and the ultimate goal ofcolonial absorption.
Binnie took what might be considered a more realistic approach. He pointed
out that God's Lake had no road or rail link to the rest of the province. The reserve
was entirely funded by the federal government through the CFA. Only 10% of the
houses had sewers and, with a population of less than 1,300, the community
provided 10% of the tuberculosis cases in Manitoba. 1040 The hard reality, as Binnie
pointed out, is that:
"bands like God's Lake have no access to the
commercial mainstream, and no realistic prospect of
ever obtaining it". 1041
Though he did not comment on the relationship between Canada's commercial
aspirations and the expropriation of resources that served to confine Indigenous
peoples to reserves, he concluded his reasoning by pointing out that:
"If the garnishee is successful there will not be enough
money to pay for essential public services, This means
1038 Ibid.
1039 Ibid at [52] citing Canada, House ofCommons Debates, 30 May, 1938 at 3349-50.
1040 Ibid at [82-84].
1041 Ibid at [107].
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either band members will live in the "third world
conditions" described by RCAP or the federal
government will step in at some stage to fund the
delivery of the essential services it had already funded
under the CFA but which funds were diverted to other
priorities determined by the band council. The first
alternative is to perpetuate what RCAP calls a national
embarrassment. The other alternative is for the public
to pay twice." 1042
Therein lies one of the paradoxes of this case. It was not really about
Aboriginal rights at all. Though acknowledged, the existence of Treaty No.5,
which formally defined relations between the British Crown and the people of
God's Lake lay buried in the background of the reasoning. This case was actually
about Canadian public administration and it illustrates just how little voice in their
affairs some Indigenous peoples have. The 150 paragraphs in the judgments gave us
no insight into how the debt that resulted in the order for garnishment arose in the
first place. Moreover, by allowing garnishment from off-reserve accounts, the
majority judgment may encourage the use of on-reserve banks creating some
industry for a few reserves, at least. Thus, despite its higher colonial rating, it may
ultimately have given Indigenous peoples in general more financial power. With no
understanding of the real concerns of the Indigenous people involved, the reader of
these judgments can only guess about their import and potential impact.
6.1.4 Summary
It is evident that the current members of the Court are aware of some of the
dilemmas presented by the Indigenous presence and by the colonial character of
Canada's historical heritage. Though Binnie's reasoning in God's Lake was only
1042 Ibid at, [149].
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supported by the minority, McLachlin has written some staunchly postcolonial
arguments in the past and the full Court would likely agree with his statement that:
"The history of the Indian peoples in North America
has generally been one of dispossession, including
dispossession of their pre-European sovereignty, of
their traditional lands, and of distinctive elements of
their cultures. Of course, arrival of new settlers also
brought considerable benefits....Yet... at some point
the dispossession has to stop.,,1043
The problem is that the Court's functioning can play only a small part in reversing
the colonial dynamic. It was not designed to perform this role. Its very institutional
structure is the product of a colonizing concept of legality and this creates a
predisposition to ethno-centric results despite the incorporation of postcolonial
norms in the Canadian constitution.
As demonstrated by the December 2006 cases, the judges support
postcolonial principles at the theoretical level. However, they ultimately defined all
of the Aboriginal rights concerned by applying externally imposed systems of
categorization. Their procedural methodology led them to ignore the need for a
consensual basis for legality and they relied, instead, on precedents that the Court
itself had created in its previous reasoning. This made their approach more colonial
in character than that applied by Sir William Johnson in the era of the Royal
Proclamation, 1763. Instead of protecting Indigenous jurisdictions they ignored
them. They violated treaty protocols and the initial nation to nation relationship to
exclude Indigenous peoples from the process of negotiating modem interpretations
of formal agreements that had been made with the in-migrating culture. They also
1043 Ibid. at [106].
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deviated from the British model of legality that requires the monarch to defend the
laws and customs of the land.
The pleadings submitted by the parties were not examined for this study and
they were not summarized in the judgments so it is not possible to determine what
alternatives were presented to the Court. However, the disjunction between the
Court's stated ideals and its effective practice seems to confirm Kuhn's theory that
old paradigms will not be abandoned unless acceptable replacements have emerged.
The Court's approach also seems to illustrate Lackoffs theory that the categories
we use to form our thoughts are based on immediate experience. As products of a
colonial culture, none of the members of the Court have lived in a place where their
ancestors were indigenous. Instruments like the Cabot Charter, the Colonial Laws
Validity Act1044 and even the "patriation" process used to institute the Constitution
Act, 1982 demonstrate that the British colony of Canada has always functioned on
the basis of a legality whose legitimacy is founded, at least ceremonially, on the
command of a distant monarch. Canada still has a Governor General and, despite
the formal law-making functions of the federal parliament and the provincial
legislatures, the citizens of this country have not experienced the kind of locally
derived legality enjoyed by Lord Denning's cricketers. 1045 In Canada's case, the
majority of the population has no local custom to which a monarch, as the notional
representative of the people, can refer. The Court's tendency to apply a command
model of legality based on the norms of a distant land from which only part of the
1044 Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, U.K. 28 & 29 Viet. e.63.
1045 Miller v. Jackson [1977] Q.B. 966.
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people came IS accordingly consistent with the lived experience of the judges
themselves.
The profile presented by the December 2006 judgments is only very
marginally less colonizing in character than the collective profile presented by all of
the cases considered for this study. The indicia of the colonial and postcolonial
paradigms identified in Sappier/Gray registered 7.5/6 suggesting a decline of
colonial characteristics in conjunction with an increase in postcolonial attributes
compared to Nowegijick, the first case in the study which measured 9/5. (See
Appendix 4) However, the majority judgments in McDairmid Lumber v. God's
Lake First Nation and R. v. Morris measured 9/3.5 and 9/6 respectively and the
dichotomy between legal ideals and judicial practice that marked Nowegijick is as
evident as ever suggesting that the Court has yet to find an effective way to
implement the new paradigm that it has, none the less, endorsed at the idealized
level.
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6.2 Apparitions of Colonial and Postcolonial Paradigms
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a
rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to
mean - neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
words mean so many different things".
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to
be master - that's all
Alice Through the Looking-Glass, Chapter 6
as quoted by Lord Atkin,
Liversidge v. Anderson (1942)1046
This study has been based on the premise that the constitutional
entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights in Canada is part of a process of
profound paradigmatic change. The legitimacy of the might-makes-right legality
that dominated during the colonial era that produced Canada has been displaced by
a focus on human equality and consensual norms. Yet, many state practices
concerned with Indigenous peoples remain rooted in the authoritarian habits and
coercive customs ofthe colonial age.
Paradigm change is, however, a complex process that may normally require
a few generations to complete. According to embodied theory, this may be due in
part to the way experienced models become embedded in the very neural circuitry
that generates our thoughts and expectations. At the beginning of the twentieth
century universal suffrage was still a live issue. American women who wore
1046 Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206 at 245.
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"knickerbocker suits" had the capacity to shock1047 and Aristide Briand objected to
the idea of an external tribunal where "a subject might plead against his
" 1048 H· . d h h d b d . I .government . IS mm may never ave c ange, ut to ay unlversa votmg
rights are taken for granted, most women wear pants and many have become heads
of state. As the implications of the principle of human equality percolate slowly
through generations and through cultures, the source of legality is defined
increasingly in terms of multi-lateral treaties, many of which have established
international tribunals with authority to question state practices. These are now seen
as supports rather than threats to state integrity.
Kuhn and the cognitive theorists have demonstrated that those functioning
according to one paradigm may not be able to see the evidence that supports an
alternate mode of understanding. Yet the knowledge that other models can and do
exist is crucial to the establishment of egalitarian legality. As discussed above,
educators like Nelson and Mitchell have found that students pass through several
stages before they are able to make reasoned choices concerning which paradigm to
apply.1049 It is normal for people to respond to unusual events by applying familiar
frames of reference or by making moderate adaptations to the models already
established in their minds. When an accumulation of anomalies makes this difficult,
a variety of alternate theories may emerge and it is only with some difficulty that
people learn to function at an expert level by making reasoned decisions based on a
/047 Nancy Mitford, Zelda (New York: Avon Books reprint of Harper and Row, 1970) at 100.
1048 Veatch, Canada and the League ofNations at 112.
1049 Nelson, "On the Persistence of Unicorns" at 177; Mitchell, "Current Theories on Expert and
Novice Thinking" at 275.
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clear understanding of the available options and the values represented by their
choices.
In terms of paradigm theory, the Supreme Court of Canada might be seen as
an institution that encourages the development of expert models for social and
governmental decision making. It provides a venue where behaviour considered
anomalous by some parties may be evaluated in relation to both established and
alternate paradigms. The eventual judgment seeks to demonstrate how the frames of
reference chosen correspond to the values found in legislation that, theoretically at
least, represents society as a whole. When norms change, as they have in Canada
through the Constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights, the Court's
role is to define the changes instituted by the legislature and facilitate an orderly
transition. Paradigm theory predicts the persistence and reassertion of established
frames of reference, though it also predicts that the ability to see in terms of a new
paradigm may occur instantaneously like the shifting ability to perceive differing
figures in Gestalt images.
This study has attempted to measure the Court's effectiveness at facilitating
the decolonization required by s.35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. It has done so
by defining colonialism and postcolonialism in terms of specific indicia suggested
by legal history, academic discussion and international law. However, the
application of these measures to the Supreme Court's judgments concerning
Aboriginal and treaty rights relied ultimately on my own perceptions and my own
identification and decoding of the elemental concepts used by the Court to structure
its reasoning. I am necessarily subject to the same propensity for bias,
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misperception and cognitive blindness as anyone else. Just as the Court has been
shackled by a lack of Indigenous members on the panel of judges, I have been
shackled by the isolation that characterizes unpublished academic research. Other
readers will certainly notice words, phrases or perceptions that I missed and that
might tip the scale for any particular judgement in a somewhat different direction.
Although Chapters 5 explains the basis for some of the assessments made,
and Appendix 4 provides a schematic overview, this study would become
excessively long if the ratings given to all aspects of all cases were explained in full
detail or if the Court's understanding of basic concepts like "law", "history" and
"sovereignty" were deconstructed. In considering the evaluations provided for
individual cases, it should also be remembered that the impact of particular indicia
may be extremely variable for they are impossible to categorize with the concrete
regularity suggested by the use of numeric attributions. Like the fundamental
constitutional principles identified by the Court in the Secession Reference, the
indicia of colonialism and postcolonialism work together in a symbiotic fashion.
Moreover, conflicting characteristics may be woven into the same idea. For
example, the Nowegijick reliance on "Indian", which is an externally imposed
identity, camouflages internal concepts of identity that may be important to an
Indigenous party. This is an example of the "othering" that Said identified as a
characteristic of colonial society. However, the principle that respect must be
accorded to "Indian" perspectives is certainly postcolonial in spirit. It is impossible
to measure the impact of these intermeshed indicia separately, particularly when the
Court frequently stated but, failed to apply, this principle.
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Despite the necessarily approximate character of the assessments that can be
made, they do create a general picture. As detailed in Appendix 4, the 62 cases
included in the original sample produced 94 judgments concerning Indigenous
parties with an average rating of about 8 on the colonial scale and 5 on the
postcolonial scale. By contrast, the sixteen assessments concerning non-Indigenous
parties averaged 4 on the colonial scale and 9 on the scale of postcolonial indicia.
This suggests that the Court's reasoning is significantly more colonial in character
when dealing with the rights of Indigenous parties.
The Court's tendency to support the colonizing society's perspective rather
than playing a neutral role would appear to be confirmed by the fact that 70 of the
99 individuals charged in the cases considered were convicted, while only 14 were
acquitted and 15 were sent for further trial.(See Appendix 5) The robbery of the
pizza parlour in Williams and the manslaughter in Gladue might be considered
crimes by anyone's standards. However, most of the "criminality" involved treaty
interpretation and culturally defined differences concerning resource use and
attribution that, from a postcolonial perspective, should more properly have been
resolved through nation to nation negotiations.
A more accurate picture of the Court's function and capacity to promote a
postcolonial approach to the protection of Indigenous rights in Canada emerges
when the indicia of each paradigm are considered separately:
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Table 5. Over-view for Indigenous Parties
Colonial % Postcolonial %
1. Judge Alien decision-maker 98 Peer decision 2
2. Parties Imposed identity 98 Self-determined 24
3. Venue Foreign language/culture 99 Own language/culture 7
4. Issues Imposed 95 Mutually determined 26
5. Procedure In camera/biased 26 Public/interveners/equal 100
6. Evidence Assumptions 70 Supported by proof 80
7. Concept of Law Imposed 94 Consensual 38
8. Reasoning Declaratory 74 Principled explanation 89
9. Values Authoritarian 85 Egalitarian Respect 54
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric 83 Place for others 66
Total 82 49
Table 6. Over-view for Non-Indigenous Parties
Colonial % Postcolonial %
1. Judge Alien decision-maker 13 Peer decision 91
2. Parties Imposed identity 16 Self-determined 91
3. Venue Foreign language/culture 6 Own language/culture 100
4. Issues Imposed 38 Mutually determined 95
5. Procedure In camera/biased 19 Public/interveners/equal 100
6. Evidence Assumptions 44 Supported by proof 100
7. Concept of Law Imposed 69 Consensual 63
8. Reasoning Declaratory 50 Principled explanation 100
9. Values Authoritarian 75 Egalitarian 81
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric 63 Respect/place for others 100
Total 39 92
As the overview that follows suggests, some of the colonizing aspects of the
judgments are built into the structure of the Court and traditional Canadian legal
practice. On the other hand, the judgments consistently rated high on the
postcolonial side for indicia that correspond to the postcolonial aspects of Anglo-
Norman legal custom. There was also a tendency to deviate from this traditional
pattern of reasoning when the result would conflict with the concept of Canada that
had been established by the judges' direct experience within a society that was
established by a colonial process that ignored the rights of Indigenous peoples. The
result is a mixed and somewhat schizophrenic profile that has varied little during the
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quarter century since Canada formally recognized "existing Aboriginal and treaty
rights".
6.2.1 The Judges
Under a colonial regime, legality is imposed by an alien decision maker.
Postcolonialism, by contrast, bases legality on consensual decision making. The
very use of an adjudicative process presupposes an imposed solution. This has
colonizing implications whose effect may be counteracted if a society has chosen to
use judicial procedures either as part of a freely chosen constitution or as part of an
inherited cultural tradition that the people continue to support.
As far as Indigenous relations with Canada are concerned, there was no
evidence in any of the cases studied that any of the Indigenous peoples affected used
an institution comparable to the Supreme Court of Canada. The alien background of
the judges sitting on the Court was obvious. As discussed in section 5.3 above, all
were members of the colonizing society. Because of this, 98% of the cases
concerning Indigenous rights scored on the colonial side of the scale on this indicia.
The exceptions are, none the less, instructive. In Roberts and Wewaykum I,
opposing Indigenous parties appear to have chosen to bring their dispute to the
Canadian judicial system rather than resolving it by whatever other means may have
been available to them. This seemingly voluntary choice diminished the colonizing
effect of Canada's colonial involvement. Goodswimmer likewise, concerned council
administration under the Indian Act suggesting that those involved accepted the
Canadian regime, at least for the purposes of that particular dispute.
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By contrast, all of the judgments concerning non-Indigenous parties rated on
the postcolonial side of the scale except the assessment of the Secession Reference
for Quebec and the assessment for the fishermen in Marshall II The population
concerned in both of those instances was initially conquered. Though both came
from cultures that participated in the European ethos of conquest and
aggrandizement, this approach has theoretically been abandoned. However, the
implications of this change have not been fully assimilated and the contents of the
judgments suggest that the fishermen have been excluded from participation in the
development of sustainable fisheries policies just as the Mi'Kmaq were.
The colonial paradigm made an even stronger appearance against a non-
Indigenous party in the Secession Reference where Quebec declined to participate
but was represented by a Court appointed amicus curia. This is worth noting
because, as the reflections on neo-colonialism and internal colonialism suggest, the
problems presented by coercive modes of operation are not confined to historically
based inter-cultural relationships. As the Court pointed out in the Secession
Reference, Quebec is well represented in Canadian institutional function. Yet the
pretense that the people of Quebec could be represented by an externally appointed
amicus curia was, in the circumstances, fully colonial in character even if Maitre
Joli-Creur, the appointed representative, was a well known advocate for Quebec
independence.
As far as decolonizing the judicial dimension is concerned, it should be
noted that the judges themselves have no control over the composition of the Court.
Short of recusing themselves, there is little they can do to reduce the colonial impact
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of this factor. Though the appointment of more Indigenous judges could have a
moderating influence, the recruitment of "natives" to participate in imposed
institutions is characteristic of the colonial dynamic described by Memmi. Unless
more Indigenous peoples voluntarily choose to use the Canadian judicial system to
resolve their legal problems, the only way to fully decolonize this indicia with
regard to the determination of Indigenous rights would be to obtain the free and
informed consent of the Indigenous nations concerned.
6.2.1 The Parties
Colonial legality functions in terms of imposed identities, requiring the
colonized either to leave or to assimilate into the colonizing regime. Postcolonial
identity, by contrast, is self-determined and based on informed consent. Thus the
terms by which smaller polities became associated with or incorporated in larger
ones are easily identifiable.
The cases examined for this study generally considered the Indigenous
parties to be both Canadian citizens and "Indian", "Metis" or "aboriginal" as
defined in Anglo-Canadian legislation formulated in ways that did not meet current
international norms. The status of "Indian" was based on acts passed by parliaments
in which no Indigenous peoples were represented, as was the status of "aboriginal".
All Indigenous parties were assumed to be Canadian even though there was no
evidence that this identity was freely chosen on the basis of the fully informed
consent of those concerned. The laying of charges under provincial legislation
imposed modem Canadian definitional parameters that, in some cases, conflicted
with the identities defined by previous treaty negotiation with representatives of the
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British empIre. Because of this, 98% of the judgments concerning Indigenous
people scored on the colonial side of this indicia.
Several cases scored on both the colonial and post-colonial scales, however.
Recognition by the Court of Indigenous identities as the Indigenous parties
themselves see them would increase postcolonial scores in this field. Powley's
support for the Metis right to define themselves on the basis of self-identification,
ancestral connection and community acceptance1050 was fully post-colonial in
approach. It would seem to represent a breakthrough in this regard; however, the
Court's reasoning in Blais, which was released simultaneously, contradicted
postcolonial legality by insisting that the colonizing culture's concept of the law
would prevail. 1051
A glimmer of hope for consolidation of the Court's acceptance ofIndigenous
identities as Indigenous peoples themselves see them may be discernable in the
Court's subsequent support for the Haida Nation's right to be consulted when there
was a "credible but unproven claim" of title to the land concerned. 1052 Questions
concerning identity are difficult to disentangle from shifts over time in the concept
of sovereignty in the colonizing culture and issues related to ownership of land and
resources. They teeter on the edge of being political questions, highlighting some of
the conceptual ruptures between modern legal ideals and traditional practices. As a
consequence, the Court's future inclinations are difficult to predict. However, both
Powley and the description of the previous conservation officer's methodology in
1050 R. v. Powley at [30].
1051 R. v. Blais at [33].
1052 Haida Nation v. British Columbia at [37].
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Morris demonstrate that acceptance of self-determined identities need not result in
seismic changes in day to day practice. The creative ambiguity that is said to have
characterized 18th century inter-cultural practice in the Great Lakes region1053 may
still be a viable alternative to colonialism.
6.2.3 The Venue
Though Canadian constitutional custom sees the Court as a neutral
institution, designed to mediate conflicting social interests in a just and equitable
manner, it is clearly an institution of the colonizing society. As Rupert Ross and
many other authors have observed, the languages used by the judges and the pattern
of interaction followed reflect assumptions about the nature of social order and the
character of "truth" that conflict with those found among at least some Indigenous
peoples. 1054 The focus of this work has not been on an exploration of these
differences. However, recognition of their existence is unavoidable if one wishes to
prioritize and validate egalitarian norms. Because no spheres of autonomous
Indigenous jurisdiction were recognized, assessment of the venue scored on the
colonial side of the equation for 99% of the judgments concerning Indigenous
parties.
Like the judges and the parties, this element lies predominantly beyond the
control of the judges themselves. Judicial protests against the use of penal
procedures to define Aboriginal rights appeared in Sparrow and again in
1053 White, The Middle Ground.
1054 There is an emerging body of interdisciplinary research concerning race and inter-cultural
problems. See ego Laurence J. Kirmayer, Cecile Rousseau, Myrna Lashley, "The Place of Culture in
Forensic Psychiatry" (2007) 35 JAm Acad Psychiatry &Law, 98.
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Marshall/BernardlO55 and some cases left matters to be resolved through further
negotiations. However, none of the judgments included a discussion concerning
how to determine whether the Court was the appropriate place for determining the
issues at hand. There was no information concerning the mother tongue of any
Indigenous parties and only 7% of the judgments concerning Indigenous people
registered on the postcolonial side of the scale.
Questions related to how appropriate the venue is lie largely outside the
traditional Canadian legal paradigm which generally assumes its own validity. Thus
information that may have altered assessment of this element may not have been
included in the judgments. In Simon, however, the colonizing effect was moderated
by evidence that the Mi 'kmaq had agreed that disputes of the kind in question
should be resolved in a British COurt. 1056 Though there was little real choice of
venue in practical terms, the Musqueam ability to draft their own statement of claim
in Guerin introduced an element of choice that goes beyond whatever may be
expressed through the procedural right of reply. Musqueam v. Glass likewise
concerned a lease drafted under Canadian law and Quebec v. Canada (National
Energy Board) drew on an identity defined though the negotiations that led to the
James Bay Act.
As with the judges and the parties, the colonizing effect of the venue may
diminish or disappear when it is voluntarily chosen by those concerned. Since
Canadian identity was presumably chosen by the immigrant populationI057, the
1055 See R. v. Sparrow at 1095; R. v. Marshall/Bernard at [142].
1056 Simon at [6].
1057 There may, however, issues in this regard related to people who came as slaves, indentured
servants or refugees. See. Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the constitution o/Canada at 129.
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reverse pattern appeared in the non-Indigenous assessments with the exception of
analysis for Quebec of the Reference re Secession ofQuebec. In that case, the non-
consensual imposition of British subject status coupled with the non-consensual
participation of Quebec in the reference created a fully colonial profile. 1058
Again, as with the assessments of the judges and the parties, the colonizing
effect of this element is unlikely to change unless more Indigenous peoples agree to
use Canadian courts to resolve their legal problems. Judges may, however,
moderate the colonizing impact of the venue if they acknowledge the cultural bias
that is implicit to their function and remain attentive to the disadvantages created by
social history as well as linguistic and cultural differences.
6.2.4 The Issues
Colonial legality imposes issues that are framed according to the laws and
understanding of the dominant culture. Postcolonial legality, by contrast, seeks to
equalize human relations by focusing on the points of agreement that may be found
despite conflicting conceptual parameters. As Richard White's analysis of early
inter-cultural relations in the Great Lakes region demonstrated, it is not even
necessary for the parties to agree about what the issues are so long as they find a
mutually accepted modus operandi. 1059 Because people tend to be blind to concerns
that may be important to paradigms they neither share nor understand, Issue
definition in itself should be determined through a process of negotiation.
1058 Though the French settlers and their descendants were legally free to return to France under the
Treaty ofParis, J763, this was likely a practical impossibility for most, just as it was impossible for
my Dutch ancestors to return to Holland once they discovered that the land they had spent their life
savings to reach was not empty, while living conditions and winter weather were much harsher than
anticipated.
1059 White, The Middle Ground.
426
In the cases considered for this study, the Crown's ability to lay penal
charges allowed it to impose its own terms of reference, excluding concerns that
may have been primordial to the Indigenous peoples ensnared by webs of colonial
assumption. Moreover, the cultural belief that a neutral perspective is possible
induced judges in several cases to reframe the issues according to either personal or
cultural preferences. In Sparrow, for example, Dickson and LaForest defined the
issue narrowly so it concerned only net length, ignoring the Musqueam desire to
protect their historical ability to regulate their own fishery autonomously. Likewise,
in Mitchell v. MN.R. both judgments redefined the issues in a way that avoided
acknowledgment of the national status that was primordial from the Mohawk
perspective. For reasons that correspond to those affecting the previous three
indicia, 95% of the judgments concerning Indigenous parties rated on the colonial
side of the scale on issue definition.
A score of 27 was, none the less, reached on the postcolonial side. This was
due largely to procedures that allowed the Indigenous parties to contribute to the
framing of the issues. In Guerin, for example, the Musqueam initiated the action and
it was their decision to plead in terms of the Indian Act and the legality of the
colonizing culture. Even when a case was initiated with a penal charge, as
happened in the case of Powley, a judgment could score on the postcolonial side of
the scale if it defined the issues in a way that took Indigenous perspectives into
account instead of ignoring or discrediting them.
The consensual element in issue definition may be derived from a legislative
process in which those concerned participated. For example, it may be considered
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that people have agreed to highway traffic standards both through their access to the
legislative process and through the commitment to comply with those rules that is
implicit in licensing requirements.
Because postcolonialism aims at egalitarian social treatment, a judgment that
ignores any party's understanding of the issues can have a colonizing impact even
on members of the colonial culture itself. The effect of dealing with any legal
ambiguity through coercive measures such as the laying of a criminal charge is the
same regardless of one's ancestry. Similarly, the use of a judicial process in the
Firearms Reference supported an authoritarian methodology to resolve matters that
should have been worked out through multilateral negotiations if postcolonial norms
had been applied. In R. v. Deane, the focus on the actions of a single policeman
likewise framed the issues in a way that obstructed consideration of broader and
more pressing issues related to why armed men were sent to resolve a legal
controversy in the first place and why the Indigenous people concerned felt they had
no option for protecting their land rights other than physical occupation. Colonial
elements were accordingly found in 38% of the judgments involving non-
indigenous parties.
Though the judicial capacity to function in terms of postcolonial legality is
limited by the structure of their mandate, they can promote general understanding of
postcolonial norms by modeling respecting for the multiplicity of perspectives that
are brought before them and by addressing the issues as actually understood and
presented by the parties. In postcolonial terms, the Court might be expected to
acknowledge rather than ignore situations in which the parties' conflicting
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perspectives lead to incompatible issue definitions. If the cognitive theorists are
correct and understanding is based on lived experience, then the experience of
having their perspectives acknowledged, accepted and addressed should make it
easier for members of the colonizing society to extend the same courtesy to
Indigenous peoples.
6.2.5 The Procedure
Legality based on the command model does not require public processes.
Decision-making may take place in one person's mind or behind closed doors
among a small group on the basis of evidence that is never disclosed.
Postcolonialism, by contrast, seeks to level the playing field. Proceedings are
public, there is a right to reply to allegations, to suggest alternate interpretations, to
access legal counsel, to question witnesses and to bring new evidence. Parties who
believe their rights may be affected by the outcome may also participate by
submitting their own arguments and pleadings.
Anglo-Canadian legal tradition has a long history of defending the idea that
judicial proceedings should be open, fair and public. As a consequence, 100% of
the judgments concerning both Indigenous and non-Indigenous parties scored on the
postcolonial side for this characteristic. However, there were colonial indicia in 26%
of the judgments concerning Indigenous parties as well as in a few concerning non-
Indigenous rights. Most arose because of judgments that were based on tests that
were not devised until the Supreme Court level in the case concerned. For example,
in Van der Peet L'Heureux-DuM would have allowed a new trial to allow the
accused to address the Court's newly defined formulation; however, the majority
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judgment did not. Thus Dorothy Vander Peet and her people were never given an
opportunity to know the case they had to meet or to respond to it. A similar situation
arose when the reasoning applied relied on a judgment that was released after the
case was pleaded as happened in Pamajewon and Adams.
In Bear Island there was so little explanation of the Court's thought process
that the effect was the same as if no reasons had been given for the decision. In
Oldman River Society the issues obviously affected the Piegan, but there was no
provision for their independent representation. 1060 Similarly, the bands whose
livelihood was affected by the decision in Smokehouse were not represented in that
case. In Corbiere, once again, the decision that off-reserve band members had
voting rights had a substantial impact on the political power of all reserve residents.
Yet, the representation provided by the Supreme Court interveners was spotty to say
the least and the trial included no representation for on-reserve residents of the
Batchewana band whose situation was in issue. Though the line between political
and legal questions is often difficult to draw and a judicial analysis that sets out and
discusses basic legal principles might certainly be useful, this case concerned voting
rights and the issues it raised should surely have been discussed and determined
through a legislative process that directly involved the people affected by the
constitutional change that was ultimately implemented.
The highly political character of all of the cases dealt with in this study
might be seen in the fact that only ten had no interveners at all. The impact of the
interventions is difficult to determine because the judgments did not contain a
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systematic account of their concerns. A large number represented various aspects of
the Crown. Many represented business interests in the colonizing society and,
though a substantial number represented Aboriginal organizations, many of these
were funded by the Canadian government. Because of the expense involved in
participating in the Supreme Court process, the presence of interveners may actually
have amplified rather than rectified power imbalances. As the complaints of the
Native Women's Association suggest, this may have resulted in under-representation
of Indigenous interests that did not accord with the mind-set of the colonizing
society or that were not sufficiently funded. This avenue was not explored in this
study, though the situation does raise concern about use of the Court to circumvent
representative legislative processes.
Wewaykum II was the only case involving a direct allegation ofjudicial bias.
Both Indigenous parties objected when they learned that Binnie, who had written
the judgment in Wewaykum I, had been involved in the case as Associate Deputy
Minister of Justice fifteen years before the hearing. From the perspective of
consensual postcolonial legality, this mutual lack of confidence by both parties
should, in itself, have been enough to vitiate the first judgment. The Court's
assertion that there was no bias stretches credulity since, with the exception of
Deschamps, they were judging their own decision.
The problem is that, even if the judgment had been vacated, the only
alternative offered by established Canadian institutions was reconsideration by the
same judges, but in the absence of Binnie. Except for its failure to acknowledge and
1060 The idea of mounting an independent legal intervention may seem self-evident to those involved
with the legal analysis on a daily basis, but procedures of this kind are a mere theoretical possibility
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explicitly identify the problem, the Court seems to have done the best it could in
terms of existing institutional capacity.1061
6.2.6 The Evidence
As the reflections of Rupert Ross and Sakej Henderson suggest, the Court's
current preoccupation with evidence may well be a product of the Anglo-Canadian
paradigm that sees the world in "objective" material terms, seeking to impose an
externally defined legality through the classification of human beings as objects that
are isolated from the contextual dynamics of human society and the natural
environment. 1062 The search for accommodation and common meaning that
characterizes postcolonial practice may eventually lead people to refocus their
attention towards the development of mutually agreeable modes of co-existence.
Though the need to test and investigate conflicting understanding of how
relationships were established in the past may continue, the postcolonial emphasis
on establishing on-going accords makes it possible to avoid many of the problems
created by the hearsay quality of historical evidence.
Attention to the Court's use of evidence remains, none the less, an important
means of evaluating the character of the legality applied. Because of its
authoritarian tenets, colonialism allows the decision maker to decide which
evidence is relevant on the basis of whatever seems true or fair according to
dominant modes of thought. A judge may even take judicial notice of "facts" that
are highly debatable to one or the other of the parties. This can lead to outright
that is difficult to access for most who are outside the legal profession.
1061 A jury opinion might have been more interesting. An appeal might have been possible under the
Operational Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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errors. As Kuhn and the cognitive theorists have pointed out, people have a
tendency to ignore or misperceive evidence that does not fit their paradigms. The
use of "history" in the Reference re Secession ofQuebec is a good illustration of this
phenomenon.(See s.6.3 above). Because postcolonialism seeks to foster mutual
respect and accommodation, it retains an interest in testing presuppositions both to
unmask illusions and misconceptions and to demonstrate the viability of alternate
frames of reference.
As with other concerns that draw on concepts developed as part of traditional
Anglo-Canadian legality, most of the judgments considered in this work took a
methodical approach to the use of evidence. This resulted in a score of 80% with
regard to the provision of proof to found the facts that were relied upon in the
reasoning. However, at 70%, the score on the colonial side was almost as high.
This was due predominantly to the Court's reliance on legal fictions and culturally
determined assumptions concerning Canadian history and legality. Though the
judges acknowledged on many occasions that the Indigenous peoples were here
before Europeans arrived, no proof was offered to demonstrate exactly how the
Crown came to "own" the land and how Canadian laws came to exercise authority
over Indigenous peoples. Though Sir William Johnson may be rolling over in his
grave, a territorial conception of British sovereignty was simply assumed. Despite
the opening to Indigenous perspectives represented by Delgamuukw 's acceptance of
the evidentiary value of oral histories, previously established rules were not
observed in a consistent or even handed way. The lack of evidence concerning
Indigenous consent to participate in the Canadian polity was not even noticed and
1062 For discussion on Henderson's point see ego Ross, Returning to the Teachings at 110.
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the conspicuous absence of any indication that any Indigenous people played any
role in the legislative processes that developed the laws applied was simply ignored.
The rupture with evidence-based proof of facts that this created was
everywhere apparent. Because they continued to function according to the colonial
frames of reference in which they were educated, none of the judges seem to have
identified the need to define key categories used to structure their reasoning.
Nowegijick assumed that "Indians" were Canadian citizens. Guerin assumed that
British Columbia could legitimately transfer title to lands reserved for "Indians" to
Canada's federal government and that "Indian Bands" did not have full ownership
rights. 1063 In Canadian Pacific Limited v. Paul, the Court found that the railway had
a legal right of way even though it was unable to determine the status of the land. 1064
In Sioui, Lamer introduced his analysis with the claim that "Indians" are better
versed in negotiations today than they were at the time the original agreement was
signed. This was based on the self-interested description of inter-cultural relations
provided by the 1899 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Jones v. Meehan even though
Lamer himself recognized that this assessment was made a full century after the
events described. 1065 It did not even concern the same people or place. Sparrow
simply announced that there was no doubt concerning the sovereignty, legislative
powers and "underlying title" of the Crown, then went on to presume that colonial
legislation is an effective means of "conserving and managing" a natural resource
like the fishery.1066 Is intent proof of effectiveness? If it was, science would never
1063 Guerin v. The Queen at 349.
1064 Canadian Pacific Limited v. Paul.
1065 Sioui at {7} citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1.(1899) at 10-11.
1066 R. v. Sparrow at 1103 and 1113.
434
change and doctors would still be letting blood and using leeches to cure disease. In
Badger, Cory cited representations made in relation to Treaty 4 and Treaty 6 as
evidence of promises made in relation to Treaty 8. 1067 And so it goes. In keeping
with the English tendency to confuse myth with history discussed by
MacDougall 1068, most of the judgments exhibited an unwillingness or inability
either to distinguish legal fiction from demonstrable fact or to see the need to do so.
There was, in short, a complete collapse of otherwise stringent requirements
regarding the need to provide evidence as proof of facts especially when it came to
questions related to sovereignty and title.
6.2.7 The Concept of Law
The change in the concept of law from the command model imposed by the
state on its people during the colonial era to the postcolonial approach that founds
legality on the informed consent of those concerned lies at the very heart of this
analysis. The concept of legality applied by the Court was ambiguous as might be
expected during a period of paradigmatic change. Strong expressions of
postcolonial legality were left stranded in introductory discussions of legal
principles as the judgments proceeded to reinforce the colonial habits of thought and
expression in which the judges had been schooled. This pattern could be found, not
only in the judgments concerning Indigenous rights which scored 94% on the
colonial scale to 38% on the postcolonial side, but also in those concerned with non-
Indigenous parties which rated 69% to 63%. The differences between the two
profiles is due largely to the effect of reasoning based on legislative intent. This
1067 R. v. Badger at [56].
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approach is postcolonial when the people concerned have chosen to belong to the
polity in question and have representation in its legislature. On the other hand, it is
highly colonial when imposed on Indigenous peoples who have neither chosen to be
assimilated nor been offered representation in Canada's law-making institutions.
They are certainly not "Partners in Confederation" in the sense that Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick are.
The high score on the colonial side of this indicator for both classes of
people reflects an unquestioning perpetuation of traditions developed during the
colonial era. Reduction on the colonial side of the scale will require a systematic
rethinking of the Court's function in terms of the egalitarian democratic principles
that are already enshrined in Canada's constitution and supported in theory by the
Court. Because of the human tendency to perpetuate the paradigms in which we
have been trained, members of the Court who wish to take an egalitarian stance
when mediating the rights of the colonial and Indigenous cultures will have to guard
against a tendency to assume that Canadian law as applied internally in Canadian
culture is the only relevant law. This approach was all pervasive in the judgments
concerning Indigenous rights as manifested in the presumption that the Indigenous
individuals concerned were all Canadian citizens subject to Canadian legality. One
consequence of this presumption was that haphazardly chosen people were placed in
a position where they were required to defend Indigenous rights even though there
was no evidence that any had been properly designated by their people to do so.
Even Chief Mitchell in Mitchell v. MNR. was acting in his personal capacity and
1068 MacDougall, Racial Myth in English History.
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not as a representative of his people despite his election as a member of the
colonially imposed Indian Act Council. 1069
The Court took a diametrically different approach with regard to the
representative capacity of individual Canadians, even when they had been formally
engaged to act as agents of the Canadian government. For example, in Ross River
Dene Council Band the issue, as phrased by Lebel for the majority, concerned how
Indian Act reserves were created in a non-treaty context. 1070 The band understood
actions and statements made by employees of the Department of Indian Affairs as
representations of the opinion of the Canadian government. However the Court
found that the agents of the Crown that the Dene actually met did not have sufficient
authority to bind the Crown and that something comparable to an Order in Council
was required. It thus established a dual standard. The pleadings led by whichever
Indigenous individuals happened to be charged with a penal violation could affect
the rights of their nation or of Indigenous peoples in general regardless of their
authority to do so according to their internal laws and customs. On the other hand,
representations made by Indian Agents acting on behalf of the Canadian
government were not sufficient to demonstrate that a particular piece of land was
accepted as a reserve by the Canadian administration.
Inequities of this kind only become apparent if one adopts a paradigm that
considers the Indigenous right to consensual legality on a level of parity with that of
the colonizing society. Paradigmatic change in this area might seem to require a
seIsmIc reordering of conventional legal reasoning notwithstanding the
1069 Mohawk national identity is expressed through membership in their traditional council of which
he was not a member, so this was the only approach open to him.
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entrenchment of egalitarian principles in the Canadian constitution, contract law and
international relations. However fears in this regard may be exaggerated. The fact
that the Ross River Dene and Indian Affairs agents were able reach mutual accords
until recently suggests that the effects might be somewhat less than catastrophic on
the level of practical co-existence. The same dynamic can be seen in the negotiated
legality that prevailed before the change in conservation officer described by
Deschamps and Abella in Morris. Indeed, support for egalitarian legal principles
runs in filigree throughout the judgments suggesting that the problem is not so much
one of philosophy as of focus. As awareness of the viability of postcolonial legality
increases, and as Indigenous rights in this regard become more widely known and
accepted by members of the public, the judges sitting on the Court and the lawyers
who address them may find more effective means of translating their egalitarian
ideals into practice.
6.2.8 The Reasoning
Unlike postcolonial legality, which is based on informed consent, colonial
law's reliance on command and the use of force to obtain obedience has no need for
reasoned explanations. Yet a strong tradition of reasoned analysis can be found in
the English tradition that requires judges to "find" the law in the customary
practices of the people, in judicial precedent and in the wording of statutes passed
by elected legislatures. Fully 89% of the judgments concerning Indigenous parties
and 100% of those concerning the non-Indigenous provided principled explanations
for the decisions rendered. The exceptions were due largely to reliance on culturally
1070 Ross River Dena Council Band v. Canada at [11].
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entrenched generalizations that failed to take account of Indigenous reality as
happened in the Secession Reference which considered history without taking
accound to Indigenous experience.
The Supreme Court's power to make decisions within the parameters of the
Constitution that are not subject to review except by Parliament resulted, none the
less, in relatively high scores on the colonial side of the scale. Legal rules, principles
and assessments of fact were simply declared in many instances without
demonstrating any connection to law, to evidence or to the customs of the people
concerned. Incidents of this kind averaged 74% for judgments concerning
Indigenous parties and 50% for those involving non-Indigenous parties. Sometimes
judges relied on a simple "I think". Sometimes they relied on precedent without
identifying any legal principle to justify or explain the choice. Sometimes those
precedents were their own previous decisions which is tantamount to saying: "This
is the law because I say so and because I said so before.".
Just as the characteristics of the Canadian constitution are tightly woven and
interrelated, so too are the characteristics of colonial and postcolonial legality. Many
of the incidents of declaratory reasoning were related to affirmations of culturally
defined conceptions of Canada that ignored Indigenous experience. They were thus
related to evidentiary problems and the challenge presented by everyone's tendency
to understand the world from their own ethnocentric perspective. The inclination to
avoid going through the steps required for expert level reasoning in such instances
thus relects the black heart phenomenon noted by Kuhn where people made
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assumptions based on established habit and failed to take account of the colour they
actually saw.
Habits of thought related to reliance on authority that became entrenched
during the colonial age may also have resulted in a tendency to seek refuge in any
authority without considering whether or not it was appropriate in the
circumstances. Examples of this can be found in the literal approach that has been
taken to the 19th century Marshall decisions from the United States Supreme Court
or in Binnie's uncritical acceptance of Vattel's declaratory concept of legality in
MitcheU1071 as well as in his claim that Aboriginal people are full participants in a
shared Canadian sovereignty because the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
said SO.I072 Chief Justice Marshall, Vattel and the Royal Commission are valuable
sources of information concerning the social contexts that have prevailed at various
times and places in the past. However, their views are all opinion. If "law" is
defined by democratic standards, they are not sources of Canadian law and they
cannot supplant the need for proof of informed consent. Yet the drive to maintain
the patterns established by lived experience is so strong that even those with the
highest level of expertise at legal reasoning may experience moments of blindness
when entrenched paradigms are challenged.
6.2.9 The Values
Reasoning can be principled without being egalitarian and it can be based on
statutes, evidence and public procedures without respecting democratic norms. I073
1071 Mitchell v. MN.R. at [163].
1072 Ibid at [135].
1073 Consider, ego Stevenson in Friends ofthe Old Man River Society v. Canada.
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Colonial law is authoritarian. In extreme forms, it founds legitimacy on status in an
externally imposed social hierarchy. In this sense it is completely incompatible with
the fundamental requirement for equality that characterizes postcolonial legality.
The right to equality is entrenched in s.15 of Canada's Constitution Act,
1982 and the principle of "equality before the law" is deeply embedded in Anglo-
Canadian legal tradition. One might accordingly expect the judgments analyzed for
this study to demonstrate strong performance on the postcolonial side of the scale
for this characteristic. However s.15 of the Constitution Act, 1982 was rarely
mentioned and the judicial analyses of Indigenous rights scored 86% with regard to
manifestations of authoritarian values and only 54% on the egalitarian side. Even
the judgments concerning non-Indigenous parties, which had an 81 % egalitarian
rating, registered a score of75% for authoritarian belief.
This profile may have been due in part to the penal character of the processes
that brought many of the issues to the Court. Despite the early complaint mentioned
in this regard in Sparrow, and its more strident reiteration in Lebel's minority
reasons in Marshall/Bernard, the Court generally accepted power relations as they
had developed during the colonial era. Most judgements proceeded from a
perspective reflecting the kind of belief in authoritarian legality found in McLachlin
and L'Heureux DuM's minority reasons in Nikal which declared:
"The trial judge, the majority of the Court of Appeal,
and this Court unanimously have ruled that the state
does have the right to require him to obtain a
licence."I074
1074 R. v. Nikal at [CXXV].
441
The crucial question, from a postcolonial perspective, is not the social status of
those who have the opinion, but rather the procedure by which the legality in
question was defined. If the Courts mentioned had found that the requirement for a
fishing licence was included in a law passed by a legislature in which Nikal and his
people had representation, this approach would not have been problematic.
However, Nikal was not a guest on a territory with whose laws he had implicitly
agreed to abide. He had not left the land of his ancestors. McLachlin and
L'Heureux DuM proposed to ignore the rules that had been passed by his band
council and convict him on the basis of laws that had been externally imposed
without the consent of his people.
The authoritarian character of the Court's concept of legality could also be
seen in its acceptance of the idea that the Crown could extinguish rights in certain
circumstances. This is inconsistent with the English concept of legality which
focuses on the Crown's protective mandate and considers the monarch to be subject
to the laws and customs of the land. For example, in Ross River, it interpreted the
Crown's prerogative power as absolute, subject only to clear and express statutory
limitation. 1075 The Court generally seems to have taken the position that it was
required to "grant a certain level of deference" to "government".1076 Though any
legal system must have a method for adapting to unanticipated circumstances, the
Court's approach failed to make a clear distinction between "government" as a
representative of the will of the people expressed in legislative instruments and the
interpretation of the Crown's authority adopted by unelected administrative officers.
1075 Ross River Dena Dena Council Band v. Canada at [4].
1076 See ego Lamer in R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 at [83].
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Though Guerin found the Crown liable, there was little recognition of the
need to hold people in administrative positions accountable. Wilson's minority
reasons in that case even went so far as to suggest that though there had been
"concealment amounting to equitable fraud", officials in the Department of Indian
Affairs were not liable because it was the result of their "paternalistic attitude"
rather than an intent to harm. Ion Similar liberties were granted by Iacobucci,
writing for the Court in Lovelace, where he seems to have presumed that the
Canadian government has an option to withhold the right to self-government from
Indigenous peoples. Ion Such presumptions of colonial authority contrast sharply
with Lord Denning's concept of the poor man's humble cottage where the wind
could enter but the King could not. 1079
Generally the Court failed to discuss the application of egalitarian
democratic norms to "government" or Indigenous rights. Despite its idealized
function as a neutral institution, most of the judgments also failed to take the steps
required to demonstrate neutrality in mediating the parties' conflicting
interpretations of the law. The Court's hierarchical conceptualization of legality was
reflected in the way the judgments all began with a ritual summary of the reasoning
in "the courts below" treating law as a question of expert analysis in which the
interpretations of the governed were of little or no significance. A more postcolonial
approach was adopted by the Bennell case in Australia which took the trouble to put
1077 Guerin v. The Queen at 356.
1078 Lovelace v. Ontario at [78].
1079 Southam v. Smout at 320.
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the perspectives of the parties on record before finding that "native title" had
survived colonization in the city ofPerth.1080
The seeds of a similar methodology might be seen in the few cases that set
out the parties arguments or pleadings at trial. 1081 Ross River also included a
summary of the interveners' arguments and Delgamuukw took a definate step in this
direction with its acceptance of oral histories. However, the Court's reasoning
generally failed to take a systematic approach to the problem of presenting
Indigenous points of view, offering only sporadic flashes of insight even into
whatever might have been pleaded. Unlike Bennell's recognition of a sphere within
which the Indigenous people themselves had authority to mediate their rights, this
was acompanied by the colonizing presumption that the Supreme Court of Canada
was competent to interpret the complex traditions of other cultures. Binnie's well-
meaning concept of "merged sovereignty" in Mitchell went so far as to propose a
novel and somewhat bizarre reinterpretation of the Two Row Wampum analogy that
violated the basic principle of separate jurisdictional authorities that this symbolism
is commonly understood to represent. 1082
According Kuhn's theory, this may have happened because people are often
unable to see evidence or questions that do not relate to their own paradigms. This
may explain why, despite the precedent set by Sioui, the Court rarely explored
Indigenous perspectives before embarking on its goal of inter-cultural conciliation.
Many members of the Court demonstrated a nascent capacity to identify concerns
1080 Bennell v. State ofWestern Australia [2006] FCA 1243.
1081 See ego Quebec v. Canada (N.E.B.); L'Herueux-Dube in Corbiere v. Canada at [106-109],
Lovelace V. Ontario; Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada at [31-41]; R. v.Blais at [36-40]
1082 Mitchell v. MN.R. at, [130].
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that are of central importance to Indigenous cultures. One notable example of this is
found in McLachlin's minority judgment in Opetchesaht where she recognized the
need for future generations to retain the right to manage their land. Yet, with the
exception of a few cases that supported negotiations, the conceptual frameworks
applied were usually unilaterally defined in keeping with the authority traditionally
accorded to judges in Anglo-Canadian tradition.
In general, the Court's authoritarian concept of legality functioned through
an unquestioning acceptance of the legal and constitutional perspective imposed by
the colonial historical process. This could be found even in Binnie's minority
reasons in Mitchell that recognized that Mohawks and Canada each have their "own
framework of legal rights and responsibilities".1083 The Court exhibited little
awareness of Canada's failure to meet international norms in its relations with
Indigenous peoples and it was also not unusual for a case to be determined on the
basis of conceptual structures devised by the judges and previously known to neither
party giving neither a right to reply. 1084
Despite the authoritarian character of the Court's basic approach to legality,
egalitarian principles fluttered through the reasoning from the very beginning,
starting with Nowegijick's concern for the way things were understood by the
"Indians". Guerin's confirmation of the Indigenous need to be able to consent to
the terms of a contract like everyone else was phrased in terms of a sui generis right
founded in a fiduciary obligation on the part of the Crown. The effect of this
recognition rippled out to the rest of Canada through Sopinka's suggestion in Lac
1083 Ibid
1084 Note ego R. v. Van der Peet; Blueberry RiverIndian Bandv. Canada..
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Minerals that dependency or vulnerability was the basis for fiduciary obligation in
general. 1085 This suggests a revival of understanding concerning the limited but
protective role set out for the Crown according to English constitutional tradition.
Sioui also rested on an egalitarian foundation, emphasizing the importance of
the common understanding of the parties when interpreting treaties and recognizing
that the document written by British officials were only a partial record of an oral
agreement. This principle seems to have been violated or contradicted, however, by
the practice of allowing the courts of one party to assume interpretative authority.
This resulted in several cases that supported the idea that treaty rights could be
curtailed by unilateral regulation on the part of only one of the signatories. 1086
Nevertheless, Lamer's reasoning in Delgamuukw opened the door to Indigenous
perspectives a crack by finding that oral histories were admissible in evidence and
by demonstrating a desire to found the concept of "title" on the perspectives of both
cultures. 1087
As can be seen in Delgamuukw, the Court appears to be developing an
increasing awareness of its ability to delegate decision making to the parties so that
they can reach negotiated agreements once the parameters of the law have been
defined. Movement in this direction was supported by the Court's insistence that
Canadian officials need to found their reasoning on consultation at least. In
Blueberry River both Gonthier and McLachlin founded legitimacy on the
postcolonial international standard of "full, free and informed consent"I088
lOgS Lac Minerals Ltd v. International Corona Resources Ltd at {19}.
IOg6 See ego R. V. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R.393 at [45].
IOg7 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia at [1113].
IOgg Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada at [4] and [85].
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McLachlin's confirmation in Haida Nation that the governmental duty to consult is
legal, not just a moral also supports this methodology. Though her judgment in the
Taku River Tlingit First Nation's case found that there was no requirement to reach
agreement, the full Court supported Binnie's assertion in Mikisew Cree First Nation
that:
"Consultation that excludes from the outset any form
of accommodation would be meaningless". 1089
In short, the Court has not yet escaped the ambivalence apparent in Canada's
"democratic" reliance on an imposed imperial constitution or in the way the
Secession Reference procedure contradicted its assertion of the principle that the
consent of the governed is basic to the understanding of a free and democratic
society.1090 It is, however, becoming increasingly aware and supportive of the
components of postcolonial legality.
6.2.10 The Perspective
Like the novices in Nelson's study of the ways in which college students
develop reasoning skills, the colonial perspective presumes that there is only one
correct way of looking at things. 1091 Postcolonialism, by contrast, relies on the
application of expert reasoning skills. It requires a capacity to identify different
models of understanding, an awareness of the values involved and reasoned choice
based on the principle of human equality. The colonial perspective is thus ego
centric or ethnocentric, while the postcolonial perspective is concerned with
respecting alternate perceptual frameworks.
1089 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada at [54].
1090 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [67]
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In order to perform their role, judges require expert reasoning ability so it is
not surprising to find that 100% of the judgments concerning non-Indigenous parties
scored on the postcolonial side of this indicator. However, the Court had a 63%
score on the colonial side and the profile of the judgments concerning Indigenous
parties was 83% colonial to 66% postcolonial. For the assessments concerned with
non-Indigenous interests the high score on the colonial side was attributable in part
to the Court's custom of reasoning as if there is ideally only one standard of
correctness. This may be one of the reasons why the pleadings and rationale of the
parties were not set out. The Reference Re Secession of Quebec ignored the
colonizing character of the conquest as well as the history of Canada as experienced
by minorities that have suffered unequal and unjust treatment including Chinese,
Japanese and East Indians. Marshall II seemed blind, both to the fears of the non-
Indigenous fishermen and to their professional expertise, while the Firearms
Reference failed to appreciate that farmers and those who support their families by
hunting have an experience of both guns and cars that differs from that of urban
judges. Meanwhile Deane demonstrated no insight into the conceptual trap created
when police officers armed with guns were ordered to remove Indigenous people
instead of protecting their right to have their concerns addressed through systematic
processes that allowed both parties to present their legal position.
The ethnocentric character of the Court's approach was much more marked
when it came to the Indigenous cases. A few aspects of this situation were discussed
in detail in section 5 above though a more comprehensive analysis could be made of
the Court's assumptions concerning the nature oflaw, history, sovereignty, land title
1091 Nelson, "On the Persistence ofUnicoms" at 177.
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and other concepts used to structure its reasoning. According to the cognitive
theorists, rationality is impossible unless a basic prototypical structure has been
established. Because of this, we must all start from egocentric and ethnocentric
perspectives. The key to postcolonial legality lies in our ability to recognize and
respect other people's frames of reference. Because of this, the Court's scores on
the postcolonial side of this factor are the most interesting. Indeed, almost every
case included at least some indication of insight in this regard, even if it played a
very minor role in the eventual outcome.
Many judgments acknowledged, either explicitly or implicitly, that
Indigenous world views are different. Nowegijick, Guerin and Sioui established
principles of cross cultural respect that were cited in many subsequent cases. The
approaches they took were consistent with the approach taken in some cases
concerning non-Indigenous people. For example, Sopinka in Lac Minerals found
that usages should be established by those who were familiar with them, not by
"experts,,1092 while La Forest favoured a combined approach recognizing, with
regard to the definition of custom based on practice since time immemorial, that:
"Canadian law being largely of imported origin will
rarely, if ever, evince that sort ofcustom."1093
In practice, however, the Court often failed to apply the principles it set out.
The judgments contained little if any indication of how situations were viewed by
Indigenous elders and experts. 1094 The celebrated judgment in Delgamuukw did not
use the Indigenous evidence presented to affirm any rights. It merely found that oral
1092 Lac Mineral Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. at {23}.
1093 Ibid. at [58].
1094 Authors who interviewed Indigenous elders were cited in R. v.Horseman.
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histories were admissible in evidence when attempting to defend those rights. The
deference traditionally accorded to trial court findings of fact, which was replicated
by validating the discretion of the Royal Commission into the Marshall
P . 1095 d dId' I d' . .rosecutlOn was not exten e to n Igenous venues. n Igenous mterpretatIOns
of their rights were not relied upon by the Court and assertions that s.35(l)
protected an Indigenous jurisdiction of one kind or another such as can be found in
Sparrow1096, c.P. v. Matsqu/ o97, Pamajewon lO98 or Mitchell v. MNR. 1099 were
barely acknowledged let alone discussed. Was this deliberate? Or was the Court
simply incapable of entering such a discussion because it could see no paradigm for
inter-cultural co-existence other than that provided by British sovereignty? Even
when Indigenous peoples used institutions defined by Canadian legislation, the
Court seemed to discount their jurisdictional roles. 1100
Dickson seems to have anticipated this problem in Mitchell v. Peguis when
he observed that it might not be easy for the Court to see things as seen by the
"Indians". 1101 The Secession Reference claim that the Constitutional protection of
Aboriginal peoples was considered "important" seems open to question given the
Court's assertion in the same case that their interests would only be "taken into
account" in constitutional negotiations between Canada and Quebecy02 This
1095 Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Nova Scotia (Royal Commission into Marshall Prosecution),
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 788.
1096 R. v. Sparrow at 1100.
1097 C. P. v. Matsqui.
1098 R. v. Pamajewon at [13,14].
1099 Mitchell v. MN.R., [125 et seq.]
1100 See ego C. P. v. Matsqui; R. V. Nikal; R. V. Lewis.
1101 Mitchell v. Peguis at II.
1102 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [82 and 139].
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suggests that "important" did not amount to recognition of political parity or equal
negotiating power.
There were, however, many signs of willingness to accommodate Indigenous
points of view. Gladue emphasized respect for Indigenous concepts of restorative
justice. lI03 In Corbiere, L'Heureux-DuM's minority reasons included a perfectly
postcolonial definition of the "reasonable person" stating:
"I would emphasize that the "reasonable person"
considered by the subjective-objective perspective
understands and recognizes not only the
circumstances of those like him or her, but also
appreciates the situation of others,,1104
Binnie stated for the majority in Marshall I that:
"there can be no limitation on the method, timing and
extent of Indian hunting rights under Treaty, apart, I
might add, from a treaty limitation to that effect,,1105
The decision in Deane amounted to a firm assertion that unarmed "Indians" can no
longer be shot and there was Iacobucci's declaration for the majority in Osoyoos
that the Court would not "give legal effect to an unauthorized act of the state". 1106
Despite the Court's apparent difficulty in this regard, a few of the more
recent cases seem to be developing some willingness to support modest measures of
autonomy. Powley determined that a Metis community could self-identify who its
members were (though still subject to Canadian court control). Haida Nation, which
began by setting out the problem from a Haida perspective, allowed them to seek
the remedy they wanted instead of reformulating the proceedings according to
judicial preference. Though the Court has not gone so far as to defend the
1103 R. v. Gladue at [70].
1104 Corbiere v. Canada at [65].
1105 R. v.Marshall I at [65].
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international standard of prior informed consent, Mikisew Cree First Nation, at least
found that:
"The Crown's duty to consult imposes on it a positive
obligation to reasonably ensure that [representations
of] aboriginal peoples... are seriously considered and,
wherever possible, demonstrably integrated into the
proposed plan of action". 1107
This falls short of the traditional British ideal of protecting a legality based in the
custom of the people; however, it does represent a substantial reorientation from
colonial habit of simply ignoring Indigenous peoples and their social rules.
1106 Osoyoos Indian Bandv. Oliver at [69].
1107 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada at [64].
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6.3. Towards a "Postcolonial" Role for the Court
"The Ghost Dance is natural reason and transmotion;
that is, the resurrection dance is a visionary motion of
sovereignty.,,1108
Gerald Vizenor
Postindian Conversations, 1999.
"Instead of focusing on what was done in the past, the
Ojibway concentrate on healing the personal or
interpersonal dysfunctions that caused the problem in
the first place." 1109
Rupert Ross,
Dancing with a Ghost, 1992.
As Thomas Kuhn pointed out, the perceptual shift that creates the ability to
see in terms of a new paradigm may occur instantaneously like the switch in our
perception of Gestalt images. The cognitive ability to change what was background
into foreground and vice versa can turn the opaque image of a chalice into two
lovers or reveal a cup that has always been there though it passed unobserved.
Institutional habit may reinforce perceptual modes that bind us to the past and it
often takes a generation or more for a paradigm change to become institutionalized.
This raises the question of where we are right now in relation to the transition from
colonial to postcolonial concepts of legality.
The Supreme Court of Canada has already accepted the basic elements of
postcolonial legality at the idealized level. It has recognized that the mere physical
ability do do something does not make it "legal".l1l0 It has firmly endorsed the
llOS Vizenor, Post Indian Conversations at 166.
1109 Ross, Dancing with a Ghost at 46.
IllO Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [106].
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concept of human equality. It has recognized that Indigenous peoples have different
points of view. It has supported the use of negotiation and consultative processes
and it has recognized that the Constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and treaty
rights in s.35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 signifies a need for change. However,
it remains bound to the colonial past both by the form of its institutional structure
and by culturally entrenched customs and habits of thought.
Despite the best of apparent intentions, the Court has shown little
consciousness of the depth to which its reasoning is entangled with ethnocentric
concerns and assumptions that conflict both with Indigenous concepts of social
order and with the principles that the Court itself seeks to uphold. As the tenor of
the three decisions released in December 2006 suggests, this means that the door has
not yet opened to a reconciliation between Indigenous and settler concepts of
legality that might return relations to the relatively egalitarian and cooperative mode
of operation that the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples found during the first
centuries after contact. The Court seems to have settled, instead, into a pattern that
affirms the primacy of the colonizing culture's needs and priorities. That is to say, it
has maintained the power of Canadian administrators to interfere with the lives of
Indigenous peoples and to make declarations concerning the character of the law
without regard for democratic procedural norms or the consent of those concerned.
Though the Court's capacity to move in a postcolonial direction has been
hampered both by the legal tradition it has inherited and by the preemptive quality
of the issues it has been asked to consider, it does have a capacity to model
postcolonial behaviour and facilitate change. The hierarchically authoritarian
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character of the judicial role and court procedures makes it difficult for judges to
escape their personal frames of reference. However, as the analysis of the ten
individual indicia of colonial and postcolonial legality suggests, the members of the
Supreme Court of Canada already have the expertise required to reason in
postcolonial terms. They may accordingly reduce the differences between their
handling of Indigenous rights and their treatment of the rights of Canadians in
general by applying their skills in a more methodical way.
They might, for example, routinely set out and address the issues as
understood by each of the parties instead of skipping this step to reframe them
according to their own preferences. They might take care to ensure that all
assertions of fact are founded on evidence instead of assuming the validity of
culturally determined truisms. They might pause to consider whether the laws they
seek to uphold were the product of a legislature that represented the people to whom
they are being applied. Then, if they do, the Court could assert a vision of legality
that views the interpretations of administrative agents and officials in parity with
those of ordinary citizens instead of according them deferential, quasi-oligarchic
respect.
That is to say, if the goal is to treat everyone equally, Canadian judges could
enhance the neutrality of their office by reaffirming the traditional British
constitutional principles that subjected even kings to the rule of law. For example,
tests like that set out in Van der Peet could be considered in relation to colonial
society as well as to that of the Indigenous person whose rights have been
challenged before attempting to reconcile the perspectives before the Court. In other
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words, the honour of the Crown might be interpreted in a way that respects the
Indigenous sovereignty implicit in the fact that early relations were based on
treaties. They could also expand the support that they have already offered for
negotiated settlements by refusing to interpret treaties according to laws that have
been unilaterally imposed by one signatory. As demonstrated by the Australian
court in Bennell, Indigenous rights can be legally recognized without causing a
collapse of the institutional structures imposed through colonialism. It is possible,
for example, to support the right of Indigenous jurisdictions to settle matters that are
of internal concern. It is also possible to recognize conflicting concepts like "title"
without resolving all of the issues this may raise or disturbing the barbecues in
everyone's back yard. The challenge is to make a legal space within which
Indigenous cultural rights can be exercised in peace. As the accommodation that
prevailed before R. v. Morris arose suggests, non-intrusive approaches have already
proven functional in Canada. Their affirmation and maintenance may simply be a
matter of ensuring that administrative officials and members of the Canadian public
are educated to recognize and respect Indigenous rights. The Court has a valuable
role to play in this regard.
One of the greatest challenges, as the judges themselves have recognized, is
to see things as Indigenous people see them. This is particularly difficult given the
current composition of the Court and education of its members. However, another
challenge suggested by Kuhn's theory is related to the need for a new paradigm to
replace the concept of sovereignty and constitutional relations inherited from the
colonial era. As the Court itself suggested in the Secession Reference, inspiration to
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this end might be found in the precedents provided by Anglo-Canadian history. The
Court might, for example, reaffirm the deference to popular legality that ideally
characterized British constitutional mores so as to revive the creative
accommodation that, as documented by White and by the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, prevailed during the early colonial. The Court, and the lawyers
who plead before it, might also pay greater attention to the principles articulated in
the international conventions and accords that Canada has already signed, or even to
those represented in the constitutional models provided by the Indigenous peoples
themselves. There are many ways to validate the equality that founds postcolonial
legality, especially since it is already entrenched in Canada's Constitution.
The capacity to repeat established patterns is in us all, for better and for
worse. So too is the capacity to change. When reflecting on what the traditions of
her people would have to say about the way she, in 2006, had unwittingly mimicked
her grandmother's 1957 complaint about noisy music and youthful exuberance,
Maria Campbell applied a philosophy that, according to Rupert Ross, is part of a
collection of principles known as The Sacred Tree and shared by Indigenous
A .. 1 1111 • f' h d'mencans In genera. It IS also part 0 the phIlosop y that governe classIcal
China. 1112 She said:
"All things change. There are two kinds of change.
The coming together of things and the coming apart of
things. Both kinds of change are necessary and are
always connected to each other.
llll Ross, Returning to the Teachings at 68.
1112 See ego Richard Wilhelm, Cary F. Baynes trans. The I Ching or Book of Changes (Princeton
Uniersity Press, 1950); Woo, "Repairing the Dome of Heaven".
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It would be good I think for each of us in this new year
to pick up a child, sit with down with them in a quiet
place discuss the inheritance we are leaving them.
They should know why we are doing this.,,!!!3
We are all inhabited by ghosts of many origins and contradictory
persuasions, but with knowledge comes choice. Canada's history is awkward and
embarrassing. It includes many violations of basic human rights principles. Yet
there is no need to follow the cavalry into the nineteenth century. We can, to use
Brian Slattery's analogy, excavate our assumptionsy!4 In so doing, we may find
not only hidden constitutions, but also forgotten treaties like the Covenant Chain. If
we listen carefully, we may begin to understand what Indigenous peoples have been
saying all along. We may yet learn how to let others help clean our ears so we can
hear, our eyes so we can see and our throats so our word ring true. When delusions
and obstructions are swept from our minds, we may yet develop the ability to
participate in the kinds of negotiations that will help open new paths towards the
postcolonial legality that we have already endorsed. The Court can make a space
for this process to begin.
1113 Maria Campbell, "Reflections: Could that really be kokum in the mirror?", 10.1 Eagle Feather
News (January 2007) 5.
11I4 Brian Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar. Rev. 727.
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Hon. William Ian Corneil Binnie McGill B.A. 27 Int. Ct of Justice Osgoode Hall 59
Cambridge G.B. Legal counsel S.C.C.
LLB,LLM 28 Tanzania
U ofT LLB ant Assoc. Dep.
36 Min. Justice
Yk. McCarthy
Montreal Tetreault
Hon. Louise Arbour B.A., LL.L 24 Law Clerk SCC Osgoode Hall 40
UdeM Que Law Reform York ant.
30 Commission H.C.
ant. Women's prison
inquiry;
Montreal Prosecuter Int.
Ct
vJudge Education Age Practice Age
at At
Birth Place call Bench
Hon. Louis LeBel College des 23 Quebec firm U of Ottawa 45
Jesuits RA. Laval Que.
Laval LL.L C.A.
U ofTLLM
Quebec City DES Laval
Hon. Marie Deschamps U de MLL.L 23 Montreal firms 38
Repentigny McGillLL.M Que.
S.C.
Hon. Morris Fish McGill RA. 26 Montreal Star McGill 50
BCL Que Journalist U. of Ottawa Que.
Universite de 30 Montreal firm U. of Toronto C.A.
Paris PEl Cliche
36 commission
Montreal Alta
Hon. Rosalie Silberman Abella U ofTBA, 26 Litigation U of Toronto 30
LLB ant. Toronto ant.
Stuttgart, Marshall Inquiry Family
to Toronto at 4 Ct.
Hon. Louise Charron Carleton RA. 26 Ontario firms U.ofOttawa 37
U ofO. LLR ant. Asst. Crown ant.
Sturgeon Falls, ant. Atty C.A.
Hon. Marshall Rothstein U Man. RCom, 26 Quebec firms U. de Montreal 49
Winnipeg LL.R Man F.C.
Average Age 26 47
Appendix 3 :JUDICIAL REASONING PROFILES
A3.1 Decisions re Indigenous Rights
VI
Judge * appointed Chief Justice Appoint. Retired No.of Colonial Post
-written judgments in bold decisions Colonial
Hon. Rolland Almon Ritchie 05-05-1959 31-10-1984 1 9 5
Hon. Robert George Brian Dickson* 26-03-1973 30-06-1990 12 8 5.6
*18-04-1984 4 8.5 6
Hon.Jean Beetz 01-01-1974 10-11-1988 9 8.2 4.9
2 9 3.3
Hon. Willard Zebedee Estey 29-09-1977 22-04-1988 7 8.9 4.8
1 9.5 6.8
Hon. William Rogers McIntyre 01-01-1979 15-02-1989 8 8.7 4.3
Hon. Julien Chouinard 24-09-1979 06-02-1987 5 8.6 5.1
Hon. Antonio Lamer* 28-03-1980 06-01-2000 36 8.6 4.6
*01-07-1990 11 8.8 4.5
Hon. Bertha Wilson 04-03-1982 04-01-1991 11 7.6 5.8
4 6.8 7.2
Hon. Gerald Eric Le Dain 29-05-1984 30-11-1988 4 8.8 4.1
Hon. Gerard V. La Forest 16-01-1985 30-09-1997 26 8.5 4.4
7 8.4 4.8
Hon. Claire L'Heureux-Dube 15-04-1987 01-07-2002 41 8 4.8
7 8.9 4.8
Hon. John Sopinka 24-05-1988 24-11-1997 23 8.5 4.5
3 7.8 5.4
Hon. Charles Doherty Gonthier 01-02-1989 31-07-2003 27 7.9 5.2
2 6.5 6.8
Hon. Peter deCarteret Cory 01-02-1989 01-06-1999 29 8.4 4.5
5 8.8 4.4
Hon. Beverley McLachlin* 30-03-1989 44 8 4.8
*07-01-2000 15 7.8 5.1
Hon. William Stevenson 17-09-1990 05-06-1992 4 8.5 3.5
2 9.5 2.5
Hon. Frank Iacobucci 07-01-1991 30-06-2004 38 8.4 4.7
6 7.6 5.8
Hon. John C. Maior 13-11-1992 25-12-2005 36 8.3 4.7
2 8.5 4
Hon. Michel Bastarache 30-09-1997 21 7.7 5.3
4 7.8 6
Hon. William Ian Comeil Binnie 08-01-1998 21 7.6 5.4
4 7.5 6.3
Hon. Louise Arbour 15-09-1999 30-06-2004 14 8 5.2
Hon. Louis LeBel 07-01-2000 17 7.7 5.2
2 9.5 3.2
Hon. Marie Deschamps 07-08-2002 7 7.4 5.4
Hon. Morris Fish 05-08-2003 4 7.1 5.1
Hon. Rosalie Silberman Abella 30-08-2004 2 6.5 4.4
Hon. Louise Charron 30-08-2004 2 6.5 4.4
Male average: (alljudgments) 8.2 4.8
Female averal.!e : 7.4 5
Total judgment average: 8 4.9
A3.2 Decisions reo Non-Indigenous rights
vii
Judge * appointed Chief Justice Appoint. Retired No. of Colonial Post
decisions Colonial
Hon. William Rogers McIntyre 01-01-1979 15-02-1989 I 1.5 10
Hon. Antonion Lamer* 28-03-1980 06-01-2000 6 4.5 8.9
Hon. Bertha Wilson 04-03-1982 04-01-1991 2 2 9.8
Hon. Gerard V. La Forest 16-01-1985 30-09-1997 4 3.8 9.1
Hon. Claire L'Heureux-Dube 15-04-1987 01-07-2002 8 4.6 9
Hon. John Sopinka 24-05-1988 24-11-1997 3 4.2 9
Hon. Charles Doherty Gonthier 01-02-1989 31-07-2003 8 4.8 4.8
Hon. Peter deCarteret Cory 01-02-1989 01-06-1999 4 4.9 9.1
Hon. Beverley McLachlin* 30-03-1989 8 4.6 9
Hon. William Stevenson 17-09-1990 05-06-1992 I 4 7.5
Hon. Frank Iacobucci 07-01-1991 30-06-2004 7 5.3 8.6
Hon. John C. Major 13-11-1992 25-12-2005 5 4.8 8.7
Hon. Michel Bastarache 30-09-1997 4 4.3 9.1
Hon. William Ian Comeil Binnie 08-01-1998 5 4.8 8.7
Hon. Louise Arbour 15-09-1999 30-06-2004 3 4.7 8.8
Hon. Louis LeBel 07-01-2000 3 4 8.8
Male average: (all iudgments) 4.2 8.5
Female average: 4 9.2
Total judgment average: 4.2 8.7
viii
Appendix 4 : ASSESSMENT OF REASONING
-See Chapter 4.4 for selection criteria.
-The 62 court cases included in the basic study included 96 judgments. For these, a particular judge
or judges was identified as the author of 88. Three decisions released in December 2006 were
included for some purposes, raising the number of cases assessed to 65 and of assessments to 100.
-Some judgments were assessed separately for non-Indigenous parties. Lac Minerals had no
Indigenous parties. The Secession Reference was assessed separately for Quebec and Canada because
of significant differences in historical experience.
-No evaluation is considered conclusive or authoritative. As discussed in the text, all are necessarily
subjective and incomplete.
A4.1 Summary
A4.1.1 Summary for Non-Indigenous Parties:
Case Judl!:e Year Colonial Postcolonial
1 10. Lac Minerals Sopinka 1989 1.5 10
2 La Forest .5 10
3 11. N.S.(A.G.) v. N.s. (Marshall) La Forest 1989 3 9.5
4 18. Oldman River Society La Forest 1991 4 10
5 Stevenson 4 7.5
6 30. Smokehouse Lamer 1996 7 7
7 L'Heureux-Dube 3 7
8 Mclachlin 3 9
9 39. Secession Reference reo Canada COURT 1998 5 10
10 Re. Quebec COURT 10 8
11 44. Marshall II reo Fishermen COURT 1999 7 7
12 45. Firearms Reference reo Alberta COURT 2000 6 6.5
13 48. Musqueam v. Glass re, renters McLachlin 2 10
14 Gonthier 0 10
15 Bastarache 0 10
16 49. Deane reo Deane McLachlin 2001 6 10
Averal!:e: 3.9 8.7
A4.1.2 Summary for Indigenous Parties
ix
Case Judge Year Colonial Postcolonial
1 I. Nowef!:ijick v. The Queen Dickson 1983 9 5
2 2. Guerin v. The Queen Wilson 1984 7.5 6.8
3 Dickson 8 6.3
4 Estey 9.5 6.8
5 3. Jack and Charlie Beetz 1985 10 3.5
6 4. Dick v. The Queen Beetz 8 3
7 5. Simon Dickson 8 7.5
8 6. Horse Estey 1988 9 1.3
9 7. Francis La Forest 9 2
10 8. Canadian Pacific v. Paul COURT 9 5.5
11 9. Roberts Wilson 1989 4 10
12 11.N.S.(A.G.) v. N.s. (Marshall) La Forest 6 6
13 12.Horseman Wilson 1990 7 6.5
14 Cory 9 4
15 13. Sioui Lamer 6.5 7.5
16 14. Sparrow Dickson and 9 5
La Forest
17 15. Mitchell v. Pef!:uis Indian Band Dickson 8 6.5
18 Wilson 8.5 5.5
19 La Forest 8.5 5.5
20 16. Bear Island Foundation COURT 1991 10 2.3
21 17. Jones Stevenson 9 2
22 18. Oldman River Society Piegan La Forest 10 3
23 Stevenson 10 3
24 19. Williams v. Canada Gonthier 1992 5 6.5
25 20. Quebec v. Canada (NE.B.) Iacobucci 1994 7 5.5
26 21. Howard Gonthier 9 4
27 22. Native Women's Association Sopinka 8 6.5
28 L'Heureux-Dube 8 8
29 McLachlin 9 6.5
30 23. c.P. v. Matsqui Indian Band Lamer 1995 8 4
31 La Forest 9 3.4
32 Major 8 4
33 Sopinka 5.5 6.5
34 24. Blueberry River Indian Band Gonthier 7.5 6
35 McLachlin 5.5 6.5
36 25. Badf!:er Sopinka 1996 10 3.25
37 Cory 10 3.5
38 26. Nikal Cory 10 3.5
39 McLachlin 10 3.5
40 27. Lewis Iacobucci 10 3
41 28. Van der Peet Lamer 10 2.5
42 L'Heureux-Dube 9 5
43 McLachlin 6.5 6
44 29. Gladstone Lamer 9 4
45 La Forest 9 3
46 L'Heureux-Dube 8.5 5
47 Mclachlin 9 4.5
48 30. Smokehouse Lamer 1996 10 3
49 L'Heureux-Dube 7 4
50 Mclachlin 7 4
xtP f~ I d'summary or n tgenous ar tes con.
Case Judge Year Colonial Postcolonial
51 31. Pamajewon Lamer 10 2
52 L'Heureux-Dube 10 2
53 32..Adams Lamer 10 4
54 L'Heureux-Dube 10 4
55 33. Cote Lamer 10 2.5
56 34. Goodswimmer (F.C.A.) Stone lA. 1997 3 10
57 35.0petchesaht Major 9 4
58 McLachlin 6.5 6.5
59 36. St. Mary's Indian Band Lamer 10 3
60 37. Delgamuukw Lamer 9 3
61 La Forest 9 3
62 38. Williams McLachlin 1998 6 7
63 39. Secession Reference COURT 9 2
64 40. Sundown Cory 1999 8 4
65 41. Gladue Cory 7 7
andIacobucci
66 42. Corbiere McLachlin and 10 5.5
Bastarache
67 L'Heureux-Dube 10 5.5
68 43. Marshall Binnie 9 6
69 McLachlin 9 3.5
70 44. Marshall II COURT 9 4.3
71 45. Firearms Reference COURT 10 1
72 46. Catcheway Iacobucci 2000 4 7
73 47. Lovelace Iacobucci 9 6
74 48. Musqueam v. Glass McLachlin 4 9
75 Gonthier 4 9
76 Bastarache 4 9
77 49. Deane (ON.C.A.) reo George McLachlin 2001 9 4
78 50. Mitchell v. MN.R. Mc Lachlin 10 3
79 Binnie 10 4.5
80 51.0soyoos Iacobucci 8 6
81 Gonthier 9 4.5
82 52. Kitkatla Lebel 2002 9 3
83 53. Ross River Dena Bastarache 10 3.3
84 Lebel 10 3.3
85 54. Wewaykum Binnie 7 9
86 55. R. v. Powley COURT 2003 7.3 8
87 56. R. v. Blais COURT 8 4.5
88 57. Wewaykum II ALL 8 10 2.5
89 58. Paul Bastarache 7 6
90 59. Haida Nation McLachlin 2004 6.5 8
91 60. Taku River Tlingit McLachlin 9 3
92 61.Marshall/Bernard McLachlin 2005 9 2.75
93 LeBel 9 3.75
94 62. Mikisew Cree Binnie 4 6
Average: 8 4.9
xi
A4.2 Indicia of Colonialism and Postcolonialism
As explained in the text, the numerical evaluations produced by this methodology are necessarily
subjective and should be interpreted with discretion.
(yes) * = 1 (some) s = 1/2 (little) 1= 1/3
Left of cell = Colonial indicia. Right of cell = Postcolonial indicia
P fI dOA421P til ~ N0 o ° ro Ie or on- n Igenous ar les
Judl!e Parties Venue Issues Procedure
1 Lac Minerals Sopinka * * * * *
2 La Forest * * * * *
3 NS(A.G.) v. NS La Forest * s * * *
(Marshall)
4 Oldman River Soc. La Forest * * * * *
5 Stevenson * * * * *
6 Smokehouse Lamer * * * * * * *
7 L'Heureux- * * * * * *
Dube
8 Mclachlin * * * * * *
9 Secession Reference COURT * * * * *
reo Canada
10 COURT * * * * * * * *
reo Quebec
11 Marshall II COURT * * * * * *
Fishermen
12 Firearms Reference COURT s * * * * *
reo Alberta
13 Musqueam v. Glass McLachlin * * * * * *
reo renters
14 Gonthier * * * * *
15 Bastarache * * * * *
16 Deane McLachlin * * * * * *
reo Deane
Totals: 2 / 14.5 2.5 / 15 1 / 16 6 / 15 3 / 16
Percent: 13 / 91 16 / 94 6 /100 38 / 95 19 /100
Evidence Law Reasoning Values Perspective
1 Lac Minerals Sopinka * * * * * s *
2 La Forest * * * * s *
3 NS (A. G.) v. NS La Forest * * * * * * * *
(Marshall)
4 Oldman River Soc. La Forest * * * * * * * * *
5 Stevenson * * * * * * s
6 Smokehouse Lamer * * * * * * *
7 L'Heureux- * * * * * *
Dube
8 Mclachlin * * * * * *
9 Secession Reference COURT * * * * * * * * * *
reo Canada
10 COURT * * * * * * * * * *
reo Quebec
xii
11 Marshall II COURT * * * * * * * *
Fishermen
12 Firearms Reference COURT * * * * * * *
reo Alberta
13 Musqueam V. Glass McLachlin * * * * * *
reo renters
14 Gonthier * * * * *
15 . Bastarache * * * * *
16 Deane McLachlin * * * * * * * * * *
reo Deane
Totals: 7 / 16 11 / 10 8 / 16 12 / 13 10 / 12.5
percent: 44 /100 69/ 63 50/100 75 /81 63/100
fiA4.2.2 Pro de for Indieenous Parties
Judges Parties Venue Issues Procedure
1 Nowef!iiick Dickson * * * * *
2 Guerin Wilson * * I * s s *
3 Dickson * * I * s s *
4 Estev * * I * * s s *
5 Jack and Charlie Beetz * * * * * *
6 Dick Beetz * * * * *
7 Simon Dickson * * * * * * *
8 Horse Estev * * * * *
9 Francis La Forest * * * * *
10 C. P. V. Paul COURT * * * * *
11 Roberts Wilson * * * * * *
12 N.s. (A. G.) V. N.s. La Forest * * * * *
13 Horseman Wilson * * * * s *
14 COry * * * * s *
15 Sioui Lamer * * * * * s *
16 Sparrow Dickson / * * * * s *
La Forest
17 Mitchell V. Peguis Dickson * * * * s *
Indian Band
18 Wilson * * * * s *
19 La Forest * * * * s *
20 Bear Island COURT * * * * * * *
21 Jones Stevenson * * * * s s
22 Oldman River Soc. La Forest * * * * * *
23 Stevenson * * * * * *
24 Williams V. Can. Gonthier * * * * s *
25 Que. V. Can. (NEB) Iacobucci * * s * * *
26 Howard Gonthier * * * * s *
27 Native Women's Sopinka * * * * * * *
Assn
28 L'Heureux- * * * * * * *
Dube
29 McLachlin * * * * * * *
30 c.P. V. Matsaui Lamer * * * * * *
31 La Forest * * * * * s *
32 Maior * * * * * s *
33 Sopinka * * * * * s *
34 Blueberry River Gonthier * * * * s *
xiii
35 McLachlin * * * * *s
36 BadRer Sooinka * * * * * *
37 COry * * * * * *
38 Nikal Cory * * * * * *
39 McLachlin * * * * * *
40 Lewis Iacobucci * * * * s * *
41 Van der Peet Lamer * * * * * *
42 L'Heureux- * * * * *
DuM
43 McLachlin * * * * *
44 Gladstone Lamer * * * * *
45 La Forest * * * * *
46 L'Heureux- * * s * * s *
DuM
47 Mclachlin * * * * *
48 Smokehouse Lamer * * * * * *
49 L'Heureux- * * * * *
DuM
50 Mclachlin * * * * *
51 Pamajewon Lamer * * * * * *
52 L'Heureux- * * * * * *
DuM
53 Adams Lamer * * * * * *
54 L'Heureux- * * * * * *
DuM
55 Cote Lamer * * * * * *
56 Goodswimmer Stone 1.A. * * * * *
(F.C.A.)
57 Opetchesaht Maior * * * * *
58 McLachlin * * * * s *
59 St. Mary's Lamer * * * * * *
60 DelRamuukw Lamer * * * * *
61 La Forest * * * * *
62 Williams McLachlin * * * * *
63 Secession Ref COURT * * * * *
64 Sundown Cory * * * * *
65 Gladue Coryl * * * * * *
Iacobucci
66 Corbiere McLachlin/ * * * * * *
Bastarache
67 L'Heureux- * * * * * *
DuM
68 Marshall Binnie * * * * *
69 McLachlin * * * * *
70 Marshall II COURT * * * * *
71 Firearms COURT * * * * * *
Reference
72 Catcheway Iacobucci * * * * *
73 Lovelace Iacobucci * * * * *
74 Musqueam v. McLachlin * * * * * * * *
Glass
75 Gonthier * * * * * * * *
76 Bastarache * * * * * * * *
77 Deane (ON.C.A.) McLachlin * * * * *
xiv
78 Mitchell v. MNR. Mc Lachlin * * * * * *
79 Binnie * * * * * *
80 Osovoos Iacobucci * * * * *
81 Gonthier * * * * *
82 Kitkatla Lebel * * * * *
83 Ross River Dena Bastarache * * * * * *
84 Lebel * * * * * *
85 Wewaykum Binnie * * * * * * ? *
86 R. v. Powley COURT * * * * * * *
87 R. v. Blais COURT * * * * s *
88 Wewavkum II ALL 8 * * * * * *
89 Paul Bastarache * * * * * *
90 Haida Nation McLachlin * * * * * * *
91 Taku River Tlinf!it McLachlin * * * * *
92 Marshall/Bernard McLachlin * * * * *
93 LeBel * * * * *
94 Mikisew Cree Binnie * * * * *
95 Sappier/Gray Bastarache * * * * * s *
96 Binnie * * * * * *
97 McDairmid McLachlin * * * * * *
Lumber
98 Binnie * * * * * *
99 Morris Deschamps * * * * * *
/Abella
100 McLachlin/ * * * * * *
Fish
Totals: 98 / 2 98 / 24 99 / 7 95 / 26 26 / 100
Evidence Law Reasoninl! Values Perspective
1 NoweRijick Dickson * * * * * * * * *
2 Guerin Wilson s * * * s * * * * *
3 Dickson * * * s * * s * * *
4 Estey s * * * * * * * * *
5 Jack and Charlie Beetz * * * * * * * s
6 Dick Beetz * * * * * *
7 Simon Dickson * * s * * * * * *
8 Horse Estey * * * I * *
9 Francis La Forest * * * * * *
10 C. P. v. Paul COURT * s * * * * * s * s
11 Roberts Wilson * * * * * * * *
12 NS.(A.G.) v. NS. La Forest * * * * * * *
13 Horseman Wilson * * * * * * * *
14 COry * * * * * * * s
15 Sioui Lamer s * * * s * * s *
16 Sparrow Dickson / * * * s * * * s * *
La Forest
17 Mitchell v. Peguis Dickson * * * * * * * * *
Indian Band
18 Wilson * s * s s * * * * *
19 La Forest * s * s s * * * * *
20 Bear Island COURT * * * I * *
21 Jones Stevenson * * * * s * s
xv
22 Oldman River Soc. La Forest * * * * * * *
23 Stevenson * * * * * * *
24 Williams v. Gonthier * * * * * *
Canada
25 Quebec v. Canada Iacobucci * * * * * * *(NE.B.)
26 Howard Gonthier * * * s * * * *
27 Native Women's Sopinka * * * * * * * s
Assn
28 L'Heureux- * * * * * * * * *
Dube
29 McLachlin * * * * * * * * s
30 c.P. v. Matsqui Lamer * * * * s * s
31 La Forest * * * * * s
32 Maior * * * * * * s
33 Sooinka * * * * * s *
34 Blueberry River Gonthier * s s * * * s * s *
35 McLachlin * s * s * * s *
36 Badf!er Sooinka * s * 1 * * * * s
37 Cory * s * 1 * * * 1 * s
38 Nikal COry * * * * * * 1 *
39 McLachlin * * * * * * 1 *
40 Lewis Iacobucci * * s * * * *
41 Van der Peet Lamer * * * * s * *
42 L'Heureux- * * * * * * * * *
Dube
43 McLachlin s * * * * s * s *
44 Gladstone Lamer * * * * * * s * s
45 La Forest * * * * * * *
46 L'Heureux- * * * * * * s s s
Dube
47 Mclachlin * * * * * * s * *
48 Smokehouse Lamer * * * * * * *
49 L'Heureux- * * * * * *
Dube
50 Mclachlin * * * * * *
51 Pama;ewon Lamer * s * * s * *
52 L'Heureux- * s * * s * *
Dube
53 Adams Lamer * * * * * * * *
54 L'Heureux- * * * * * * * *
Dube
55 Cote Lamer * s * * s * * s
56 Goodswimmer Stone I.A. * * * * * * * *
FCA.
57 Opetchesaht Maior * s * s * * * s * s
58 McLachlin s * * * s * s * *
59 St. Mary's Indian Lamer * * * ? * s * *
Band
60 Delf!amuukw Lamer * s * * s * s * s
61 La Forest * s * * s * s * s
62 Williams McLachlin * * * * * * *
63 Secession Ref COURT * * s * * * s
64 Sundown COry * * * * * * *
xvi
65 Gladue Coryl * * * * * * * *
Iacobucci
66 Corbiere McLachlin/ * s * * * * * * * *
Bastarache
67 L'Heureux- * s * * * * * * * *
Dube
68 Marshall Binnie * * * * * * * * * *
69 McLachlin * * * * * * * s
70 Marshall II COURT * * * ? * * * * * I
71 Firearms Ref COURT * * * * *
72 Catchewav Iacobucci * * * * *
73 Lovelace Iacobucci * * * s * s * * * *
74 Musqueamv. McLachlin * * * * *
Glass
75 Gonthier * * * * *
76 Bastarache * * * * *
77 Deane (ON.C.A.) McLachlin * * * * * * * *
reo George
78 Mitchell v. MNR. Mc Lachlin * * * * * * *
79 Binnie * * * * * * s * *
80 Osoyoos Iacobucci * * * * * * * *
81 Gonthier * * * * * * * s
82 Kitkatla Lebel * s * * * * * s
83 Ross River Dena Bastarache * * * * * * * I
84 Lebel * * * * * * * I
85 Wewaykum Binnie * * * * * * * * *
86 R. V. Powley COURT * * * * * * * I *
87 R. v. Blais COURT * * * * * * *
88 Wewavkum II ALL 8 * s * * * * *
89 Paul Bastarache * * * * * * *
90 Haida Nation McLachlin * * * * s * * *
91 Taku River Tlinf!it McLachlin * * * * s * * s
92 Marshall/Bernard McLachlin * * * * s * I * I
93 LeBel * * * * s * I * *
94 Mikisew Cree Binnie * * * * *
95 Savvier/Gray Bastarache s * * * * s * *
96 Binnie s * * * * * s * *
97 McDairmid McLachlin * s * * * * *
Lumber *
98 Binnie * * * * * *
99 Morris Deschamps * * * * * * * * *
IAbella
100 McLachlin/ * * * * * * s
Fish
Totals : nearest % 70 I 80 94 I 38 74 I 89 85 154 83 I 66
A.4.3 Assessments of December 2006 Reasons
A.4.3.1 Summary
XVll
Case Judge Colonial Postcolonial
63 Savvier/Gray Bastarache 7.5 6
Binnie 7.5 6
64 McDairmid Lumber McLachlin 9 3.5
Binnie 5 7
65 Morris Deschamps/Abella 9 6
McLachlin/Fish 9 3.5
Average: 7.8 5.3
xviii
A.4.3.2 Judicial Profiles
Judges Parties Venue Issues Procedure
95 Sappier/Gray Bastarache * * * * * s *
96 Binnie * * * * * s *
97 McDairmid McLachlin * * * * * *
Lumber
98 Binnie * * * * * *
99 Morris Deschamps * * * * * *
/Abella
100 McLachIinl * * * * * *
Fish
Dec 2006 Totals 6 / 0 6 / 6 6 / 0 6 / 1 0 / 6
Dec 2006 in % 100 / 0 100/100 100 / 0 100 / 17 0 / 100
Evidence Law Reasoning Values Perspective
95 Sappier/Gray Bastarache s * * * * s * *
96 Binnie s * * * * s * *
97 McDairmid McLachlin * s * * * * *
Lumber
98 Binnie * * * * * *
99 Morris Deschamps * * * * * *
/Abella
100 McLachIinl * * * * * * s
Fish
Dec 2006 Totals 4 / 3.5 6 / 2 5 / 3 5 / 2 3 / 5.5
Dec 2006 in % 67 / 58 100 / 33 83 / 50 83/17 50 / 92
A4.4 Case Profiles
Caveat: - Interpretations are subjective.
-Notes supporting each evaluation do not represent all ofthe evidence that might be used to illustrate
each indicia.
-Focus is on isues related to Indigenous rights, not internal Canadian administration.
xix
1. Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, 1983 Canlii 18 (S.C.c.).
DICKSON J. (Ritchie, Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard, Lamer 11.)
Main Points: "treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful
expressions resolved in favour of the Indians".(36).
-"income" is personal property.
-s.87 of the Indian Act exempts both property and person on a reserve from taxation.
1. Judge - Alien/Peer -No Indigenous input
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Imposed: "Mr. Nowegijick is an Indian within the meaning of the Indian Acf'.(31)
"Indians are citizens"-(36) presumed inclusion in Canadian polity.
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own -language & Indigenous identity not on record
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined -Tax assessment imposed.
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal: Public process, many interveners
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: eg.Canadian citizenship assumed.
Proof: Basic facts of case agreed by both parties
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual No evidence of consent to the regulatory scheme. No
Indigenous participation in the enactment of the laws applied
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: "Indians are citizens".(36) "the overwhelming weight of authority holds"(38)
Principled: "exemptions to tax laws should be clearly expressed"(36) -principles from case law
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian The sentiment that "Indians are citizens" is egalitarian
but it is simply declared without proffering any proof to this effect.
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect Case confirms respect for Indigenous
difference but the framework of the protection offered is highly ethnocentric. The possibility of
equal national respect is not even considered.
Assessing Judicial Decision-making:
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 9 5
xx
2.1 Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.c.R. 335.
WILSON J. (Ritchie, McIntyre 11.)
Main Points: The Crown has a fiduciary obligation re Indian reserves rooted, not in s. 18 of the
Indian Act, but in aboriginal title. p.348-8 Measure of damages for breach of this duty is actual loss.
p.357.
Note: -strong support for Musqueam right to consent to decisions affecting their well-being.
-"paternalistic attitude" allowed to excuse conduct of Indian Affairs officials
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
imposed identity: as "indians" under the Indian Act, not challenged by Musqueam
-identified in Indian affairs terms as band - own ID (see their web cite) not explained
Self-determined: to the extent that they drafted their own statement of claim
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own Foreign: Note colonial frame of reference p.331-40
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed: Issues addressed in analysis are products ofjudge's constitutional conception.
Mutually negotiated: Action initiated by Musqueam
-Their decision not to question Indian Act & phrase issues in colonizers terms p.340
-Initiation ofaction asserts personhood of "Indians"
Procedure - in camera/biased/public intervenors equal
Egalitarian/participatory: -interveners present; strong censure for Crown use of political trust
doctrine which was not pleaded & was withdrawn according to public statements of ministry
when discovery on issue requested. p.353
Evidence - assumptions/ supported by proof
Assumptions: Assumed B.C. had jurisdiction over reserves to pass to Canada in 1938. p.349
Proof:-oral evidence accepted- Musqueam witnesses alive & cross examined
-Musqueam assertions corroborated by Indian affairs documentation
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: -accepted imposed character of constitution (though not contested by Musqueam)
-accepted "paternalistic attitude" of Indian Affairs as defense against deceit & tort damages.
Consensual: based fiduciary obligation on Aborigial title & right to consent. p.349.
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory - Crown sovereignty assumed. "I think" rights based on "historic reality" p.349
-Accepted trial damages despite setting out evidence that reduction in value was ill founded
because "I do not think it is the function of the court to interfere". Did not acknowledge the
denial of instutional responsibility this represented.
Principled: Careful to set our principles relied on at most points. "This discretionary power must
be exercised on proper principles and not in an arbitrary fashion" p.350
Values - Authoritarian-Egalitarian
Authoritarian -acceptance of imposed constitutional framework
Egalitarian - "the Crown... does hold the lands subject to a fiduciary obligation to protect and
preserve the Band's interest from invasion or destruction"p.350
10. Perspective - Ethno/ego centric - Respect for others
Ethnocentric: Constitutional understanding ignores the fact of colonialism
R t Str fi· t fi t & It f 346 7esoec: ong su mort or reqUiremen or consen consu a IOn p -
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Little
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Some Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Some Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Some Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Yes
Total 7.5 6.8
xxi
2.2 Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.c.R. 335,
DICKSON J. (Beetz, Chouinard, Lamer JJ.)
Main Points" The equitable obligation that founds the Crown's liablity is not a trust, but a fiduciary
duty rooted in the fact that Indian title is inalienable except to the Crown.
-Wilson emphasized prior occupation as the core of aboriginal title and consent to disposition.
Dickson focused on the colonially imposed inalienability except to the Crown.
-Dickson also made sweeping unsubstantiated statements about English legal history.
1. Judge - AlienlPeer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
6. Evidence - assumptions/ supported by proof
Assumptions -no proof to support view that "Crown first took" fiduciary responsibility in Royal
Proclamation 1763. (Slightly different wording would alleviate the problem)
- no evidence to support claim that "..the Crown's original purpose in declaring the Indian's
interest to be inalienable otherwise than to the Crown was to facilitate the Crown's ability to
represent the Indian's dealings with third parties" p.383 (34)
-"The concept of fiduciary obligation originated long ago in the notion of breach of confidence,
one of the original heads ofjurisdiction in Chancery"; "the purpose of the surrender...etc.p.38
(35)
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed - relies entirely on B.C.'s 1938 transfer ofIndian reserves to Canada p.380 (33)
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
-Hybrid re Indian Title - based on prior occupation, but justified with Canadian precedent rather
than consensual legality.
-Declaratory - -reliance on inaccurate/questionable characterizations ofSt. Catherine's Milling
& Amodu Tijani p.377-9 -not based on need for consent by Musqueam for constitutional
participation.
Principled - recognized categorization problems characteristic of paradigm change but did not
identify cause. Noted problem of applying "inappropriate terminology drawn from general
property law" p.382
9. Values - Authoritarian-Egalitarian
10. Perspective - Ethno/ego centric - Respect for others
Ethnocentric - accepted colonial analysis by Marshall. Used a cite that clearly explains the
impairment created by colonization, but accepted it without question rather than repudiating it.
p.378.
-accepted view that title to Indian reserves was transferred by BC to Canada in 1938.
Respect -upheld prior occupation of land as source of Indian Title as recognized in Calder
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Little
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Some Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual Some
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Some Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Yes
Total 8 6.3
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2.3 Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.c.R. 335,
ESTEY J.
Main Points: Because Indians have been constrained by statute to act through the agency of the
Crown & the Crown has a duty to act within the mandate assigned to them by the Indians. If it
breaches this duty it will be liable for the actual losses caused.
-Well meaning, but unaware of basic facts ofIndigenous existence.
- Tried to be egalitarian by applying law ofagency to "Indian Agent" as if this official was agent of"
"Indians" rather than agent of colonizing government. The result is logical inconsistency.
-This reasoning was not pleaded so it was not well researched. Inconsistent with agency law. 1115
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed: Law ofAgency not raised by the parties.
Mutually negotiated: as per other judgments
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public intervenors equal
Irregular: Issue ofagency introduced though no evidence it was argued by the parties.
6. Evidence - assumptions/ supported by proof
Assumptions: Adopted same colonial views as Wilson and Dickson.
-No evidence that Musqueam voluntarily chose Indian Affairs to seek a lease or act as agents
Supported by Proof: Adoped same proof as Wilson, Dickson & trial judge.
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Accepted imposed constitution & Indian Act.
Consensual: Law ofagency is based on consensual principles
8. Ratio - Authoritarian-Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Imposed an analysis not argued by the Musqueam. Assumed validity of Indian
Act despite lack of Musqueam participation in Canadian political insitutions
Egalitarian: Dealt with fact that "surrender" was not a release in the sense of terms in general
law
-attempt to be egalitarian in ascribing same meaning to law ofagency
9. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: adopted Trial judges' unprincipled approach to damages. Neither party pleaded
agency.
Principled: -attempted to find a principled basis for the decision.p.394
10. Perspective- Ethno/ego centric - Respect for others
Ethno-centric - Like the others, presumed validity of the Canadian constitution and Indian Act.
-They reflect "a strong sense ofawareness of the community interest in protecting the rights of
the native population" !!! p.392 -Relied on "agency as prescribed by Parliament" without noting
that Musqueam did not participate voluntarily & had no right to vote at the time lease was
signed.
RD' f h fiesnect: - eSlre to reason III terms 0 agency s ows support or consensua processes.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Little
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Some Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Some Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Yes
Total 9.5 6.8
1115 James 1. Reynolds, "A Breach of Duty: Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2005) at 81.
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3. Jack and Charlie v. The Queen, [1985J 2 S.C.R. 332; 1985 CanLII 8 (S.C.C.),
REETZ J. (Dickson C.J. Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard)
Main Point: Provincial regulation of deer hunting doesn't interfere with Indigenous religious
motives.
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined Indians under Indian Act
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined Charged
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal-open court, pleadings
Case decided on the basis that there was no evidence to refute an argument that was not raised until
the Supreme Court level.
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual No participation in making the laws imposed
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: own world view imposed
PI F t th t Id' d'ff! t kn 1 d db t t d t dace: ac a wor view was 1 eren was ac owe Ige u no accommo a e
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Some
Total 10 3.5
4. Dick v. The Queen, [1985J 2 S.C.R. 309; 1985 CanLII 80 (S.C.C.).
REETZ J. (Dickson C.J., Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard)
Main Point: A provincial law that does not single our Indians for special treatment or discriminate
against them is a law ofgeneral application within the meaning ofs.88 of the Indian Act and applies
even ifit regulates an Indian qua Indian.[35-6, 45]]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled Declaratory source oflaw
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian -accepts law alien to accused
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total 8 3
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5. Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, 1985 CanLlll1 (S.C.C.).
DICKSON c.J. (Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard, Wilson, LeDain 11.)
Main Points: "the right to hunt to be effective must embody those activities reasonably incidental to
the act of hunting itself'[31]
-under s.88 of the Indian Act provincial legislation cannot restrict native treaty rights.
-"It should be noted that the language used by Patterson J... reflects the biases and prejudices of
another era in our history. Such language is no longer acceptable in Canadian law and indeed is
inconsistent with a growing sensitivity to native rights in Canada." [21]
-"Given the serious and far-reaching consequences ofa finding that a treaty right has been
extinguished, it seems appropriate to demand strict proof of the fact of extinguishment in each case
where the issue arrises."[38]
Judges - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Indian Act identity is imposed, Micmac treaty identity is chosen/negotiated
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Micmac agreed disputes should be tried in British courts 1752 treaty s.8 [6]
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
RCMP charge
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Proof: required for argument concerning commercial hunting[30] treaty termination [34] hunting on
highway[39, 41] (Blood relationship need not be shown- political relationship sufficient [42-5])
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: s.88 governs rights but treaty respected. "Under s.88 of the Indian Act, when the terms of a
treaty come into conflict with federal legislation, the latter prevails, subject to whatever may be the
effect of s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982".
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled -principled reliance on precedents
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authority of Canadian laws over "Indians" assumed, but treaty respected. Tendency to rely on case
precedent rather than articulated principle. Eg. Re treaty [50-51]
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Authority of Canadian laws over "Indians" assumed, but treaty respected.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Some
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 8 7.5
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6. R. v. Horse, [1984] 2 S.c.R. 335; 1988 CanLII 91 (S.c.c.)
ESTEY J. (Beetz, McIntyre, Lamer, Wilson, Le Dain, L'Heureus-Dube)
Main Point: Extrinsic evidence is not to be used to interpret a treaty unless there is ambiguity. (12)
Treaty 6 did not give "Indians" a right to hunt on private lands.
Issues - Imposed - mutually negotiated - charge
Procedure - in camera/biased/public intervenors equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: ultimate objective of Treaty (9)
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed -UK parliament source of legality for Canada (5)
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory -reliance on precedents without identifying principle (8, 11)
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: unilateral interpretation of Treaty 6
-only considered internal Euro-Canadian law
-presumes "Indians" have no rights unless requested from the British(para47)
NB Th h h . d . . I h d'd I h U f 'd I b' d
- ougl e cite pnnClpJ es, e I not apPlY tern. se 0 eVI ence was extremely lase.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Little
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10, Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others
Total 9 1.3
7. R. v. Francis, [1988] 1 S.c.R. 1025; 1988 CanLII 31 (S.c.c.).
LA FOREST J. (Dickson C.l Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Lamer, Wilson, LeDain L'Heureux-Dube)
Main Point: Unless the federal government expresses explicit intent to cover a field completely,
federal and provincial legislation that does not conflict can exist side by side and apply on a reserve.
"Enclave theory" (not explained) already rejected in Cardinal v. AG Alberta [1974] S.C.R. 695. [4]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total 9 2
xxvi
8. Canadian Pacific Limited v. Paul [1988] 2 S.c.R. 654; 1988 IIJCan 104 (C.S.c.)
(Dickson C.J. Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Lamer, Wilson, Le Dain)
Main Principle: Railway rights over property must be founded on laws and documents? A railway
may be granted a permanent injunction against a property owner over whose land it has a right of
way.
(Comment in Delgamuukw: aboriginal title is "more than the right to enjoyment and occupancy"1116)
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: Status ofland undetermined but right ofway found. Validity of"servitude" not
considered. Only previous case supports claim that inalienability was intended to protect Indians.(17)
Proof: facts related to documentation (30)
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Decided based on preference.(23) Ignored lack ofIndigenous political rights.
Consensual: consideration oflegislative law making
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Found CP had a right of way, though couldn't tell who had title.(para 19)
Did not explain why permanent injunction was appropriate.(41-42)
Principled: Quest for legal rules ego Ellensborough Park (though superficial in this area)
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Acceptance oforders.
Egalitarian: Attempt to apply principles consistently to both parties.
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Considered entirely according to Anglo-Canadian paradigm. ego Ellensborough Park.
Why did the Malecite block the crossing? No consciousness of others perspective.
Respect: Tried to uphold Guerin principle of fiduciary respect. (17)
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Some
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Some
Total 9 5.5
1116 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia at [119].
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9. Roberts v. Canada, [1989]1 S.C.R. 322; 189 CanLII 122 (S.c.c.)
WILSON J. (Dickson C,J., Beetz, Lamer, Le Dain)(Le Dain took no part in the judgment)
Main Point: The law of aboriginal title is Federal common law.
Both parties relied on the Canadian legislative scheme to assert rights to a reserve both claim. This
apparent acceptance of the imposed colonial regime alters the character of the assessment
significantly.
Judge - AlienlPeer - judge neutral between parties who accept the system
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined -parties accept Indian Act regime
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own -parties appear to have adopted a foreign culture
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined -issues not externally imposed
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal-public process
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof -evidence ofcase law supplied
Concept of law - imposed / consensual- imposed by act in which parties had virtually no say
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled -principles explained -relies on statutory grant
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian -relies on statutory dictate
10. Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect - not in issue as both adopt Indian
Act
& Canadian legislative scheme.
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective EtOOo/ego centric Respect/place for others Yes
Total 4 10
XXVlll
10.1 Lac Minerals Lts. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2. S.C.R. 574, 1989 CanLII
34.
SOPINKA J. (dissenting in part) McIntyre concurring.
Main Principle: "Not all obligations existing between the parties to a well-recognized fiduciary
relationship will be fiduciary in nature". 1117
1. Judge - AlienlPeer
Peer: member of same culture
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Self-determined: through incorporation
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Own Language & Culture:
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Mutually Negotiatied: on the basis of pleadings
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public intervenors equal
Public: normal due process
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Findings supported by proof
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Consensual: based on contract & equity. All agree on use of this legal system to resolve their
dispute re legal interpretation & on test for Breach of confidence (La Forest (43)
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Principled
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Egalitarian - dependency or vulnerability as basis of fiduciary obligation [PC] 19
-reasonable person test
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Respect for others
Ethno-centric: relevant parties determined purely on basis of colonial perspective
-narrowly defined with no consideration of Indigneous rights that may be involved.
Respect: usages to be established by those familiar with them, not experts
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric .5 Respect for others Yes
Total 1.5 10
1117 Lac Minerals Lts. v. International Corona Resources Ltd at 597. (Sopinka J. see also La Forest
(49)
XXIX
10.2 Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2. S.C.R. 574, 1989 CanLII
34.
LA FOREST J. (Wilson, Lamer JJ.)
Main Principle: Damages can be payable for the misuse of information gained in confidence.
Most categories as per Sopinka. Sopinka might be given one point under values on the colonial side.
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Egalitarian
-remedy allows parties to obtain a reference if they cannot agree on evaluation of adjustments.
11. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Respect for others
Ego centric: Failure to articulate Lac's point of view.
Respect: Custom should be defined by parties & experts. Legal significance by courts.
-"custom" a rule with the force oflaw existing since time immemorial- not in issue here
"Canadian law being largely of imported origin will rarely, if ever, evince that sort of
custom" IllS
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Some Respect for others Yes
Total .5 10
illS Lac Minerals Lts. v. International Corona Resources Ltd at 58. (La Forest)
xxx
11. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Nova Scotia (Royal Commission into Marchall
Prosecution), [1989] 2 S.c.R. 788; 1989 CanLII 39 (S.C.C.).
LA FOREST J (Lamer, Wilson, L'Heureux-DuM. Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin J1.)
Main Principle: The scope of a Commission's powers is defined by the terms of reference in the
order by which it was established.
1. Judge - Alien/Peer Alien for MarshalI, peer for others.
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
For Marshall, imposed Canadian citizenship. For the Commission imposed by order, but self-
determined in the sense of being a product of their society.
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own Foreign for Marshall. Own for A.G.
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined. Both contributed.
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal -fair.
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof Supported
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual -
Imposed: reasoned on the basis of the Commission's authority under the "Order in council" that
set it up, rather than on the basis of accountability to the people under democratic procedure.(5)
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled - principled
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: The Commission - to protect cabinet members from public scrutiny
[belief that security is served by secrecy - League of Nations did not agree!!]
Egalitarian: The Commission -justified its order on the basis of public interest
-excluded questions re individual views because hearing from all required to set record straight.
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Respect for others
Ethnocentric: reliance on order, no reference to Marshall's cultural parameters.
R S C 'd·· d II . d fi ·tesoect: upports ommlSSlOn s IscretlOn an a ows It to e me I s own terms.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Some Self-determined Some
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Cross-cultural Yes
respect/recognition
Total re Commission 3.5 9.5
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Cross-cultural
respect/recognition
Total re MarshalI 6 6
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12. 1 R. v. Horseman, [1990J 1 S.c.R. 901; 1990 CanLII 96 (S.c.c.).
WILSON J. (with Dickson C.J. & L'Heureux-DuM n. dissenting)
Main Principle: Canadian and provincial legislation should be interpreted in a way that respects the
terms of the treaty that was signed.
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed: by a charge
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions - no proof to support agreement that Canada could regulate
-no evidence regulations necessary for species preservation
Proof- much support for her historical findings
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed - supports expanded interpretation without suggesting renegotiation of treaty to protect
conservation interests
Consensual - strong support for treaty terms
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Egalitarian: "it seems to me somewhat disingenuous to attempt to justify any unilateral "cutting
down of hunting rights" by the use of terminology connoting a reciprocal process in which the
contracting parties engage in mutual exchanges ofpromises."(l5)
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Respect for others
Ethnocentric - allows examination in each case to determine purpose of hunting or fishing
Respect - Authors cited include reports of interviews with elders.
-liberal construction, as understood by Indians (5)
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Yes
Total 7 6.5
XXXll
12.2 R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.c.R. 901; 1990 CanLII 96 (S.C.C.).
CORY J. (with Lamer, La Forest & Gonthier JJ.)
Main Principle: Parliament of the colonizing party can unilaterally extinguish treaty rights.
Heavily influenced by need to conserve Grizzly bears. [Hard cases make bad law. He could see no
alternative paradigm for bear protection. Claimed bears relied on man for protection(25) when they
would actually do better if there were less humans!!!]
Found Horseman "acted in good faith" (26) but upheld conviction because he thought others would
not.(25).
Ignored lack of Indigenous political rights.
On extinguishment issue, began by setting out 2 legal principles(20) but he did not apply them. He
looked only at how the words of the transfer agreement itself and how they were viewed by Dickson
J and previous courts (21-22) giving no evidence to show how it was interpreted by native people.
This case itself suggests that they saw it as having no effect on their rights because they argued that a
treaty could not be unilaterally changed.(22)
1. Judge - AlienlPeer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions - no evidence of discussion with "Indians" reo imposition of government regulation
Proof - reference to Ray's work on existence of treaty - lacking on extinction
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: "Federal government" can unilaterally alter treaty rights (24)
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory- tends to rely on authority of precedents rather than on the principles they contain
Principles -identifies some principles at the beginning re treaty
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian:
10. Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Respect for others
Ethnocentric: assumes his concepts of "government" and "province" are the only one applicable
-believes that settler legislation protects bears without questioning the effect of habitat
reduction
Respect - Authors cited include reports of interviews with elders.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Some
Total 9 4
xxxiii
13. R. v. Sioui,[1990] 1 S.c.R. 1075; http://www.texum.umontreaI.ca
LAMER J. (Dickson C.J. Wilson, La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Com McLachlin
JJ.)
Main point: Capacity ofIndigenous nations to enter treaties recognized. "It is up to the Crown to
prove that its occupancy of the territory cannot be accommodated to reasonable exercise of the
Hurons' right" 1119 Treaties should be interpreted according to the common intent of the parties.
Judge - Alien/Peer Alien - members of colonizing culture
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Imposed: "Indians" under Canada's Indian Act. Self Determined: Huron identity acknowledged
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed: charge, framed by Quebec officers. Mutually determined: through right to defence
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: Indians are better versed in negotiations today(7)
- assumption that jurisdiction is territorially defined;
that purpose of English & French was to control territory by force (8)
-assumed that past constitutional conceptions conformed to modem ones
Proof: primary documents used to support many findings
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed - "The treaty gives the Hurons the freedom to carry on their customs and their religion"
(22) [These rights existed pre-contact]
Consensual-consent needed to extinguish treaty (20)
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory -claim that Indians "not on a par with a sovereign state"
Principled- interpret on the basis of historical context & perception of the parties (97)
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Egalitarian: emphasis on common understanding of the parties; respects "Indian" perspective (7)
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Respect for others
Ethnocentric - texts & authorities used are unicultural
-anachronistic imposition of modem, unilaterally determined legislative framework
-accepted derogatory racist characterizations (7, 9)
- characterization of British practice as "exploration & settlement"
-examination of document as "a treaty under the Indian Act" (anachronistic) (11)
-only considers Crown's reasons for treaty commitment (11)
-subordination ofIndigneous rights to recreational practices
Respect - recognizes differing viewpoints but doesn't consider capacity of signing "chiefs"
(16)
-must examine from different point of view depending on group
-considers Indigenous ceremonies as evidence of a treaty
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Some Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Some Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Some Respect for others Yes
Total 6.5 7.5
1119 R. v. Sioui,[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca at {25 of25}
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14. R. v. Sparrow, [1990]1 S.C.R. 1075; www.lexum.umontreaI.ca
DICKSON C.J. & LA FOREST J. (McIntyre, Lamer, Wilson, L'Heureux-DuM, Sopinka JJ.)
Main Principle: S.35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 is meant to ensure aboriginal rights are taken
seriously. "Aboriginal and treaty rights may be overridden if the government is able to justify the
infringement" 1120
[Theory is post-colonial- method of reasoning & practice advocated is colonial]
1. Judge - AlienlPeer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Mutual -issues raised by both parties
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public intervenors equal
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions -no evidence to prove the regulations function to conserve the resource(1113)
-"never any doubt that sovereignty" legislative power & underlying title in Crown(1103)
Proof -use of anthropologist, regulatory history
-supports 1973 change in policy with document (1104)
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed -sovereign may extinguish an aboriginal right with clear & plain intent.(1 099)
Consensual-Constitution is a statement of the will of the people (1106)
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory -did not explain why extinguished rights can't be revived. Just list of similar
cases.(1 091) Declared conservation uncontroversial(1113) & consisitent with aboriginal
practice(1114) Guidelines pulled from a hat (1115)
Principled: - Nowejick etc (1107)
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: concept of Canadian "sovereign power" (1109)
-imposition of British rule on Musqueam ignored throughout; dictated guidelines(1115)
Egalitarian: Reasoned response to both parties
10. Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric - aboriginal rights are sui generis [takes self as standard] (1112)
-ignored Aboriginal perspective in favour of internal analyses such as Slattery(1109-1O)
Respect -penal trial not best venue for determining Aboriginal right (1095)
-need to be sensitive to sui generis nature of aboriginal rights, aboriginal perspectives (1112)
-"for the Musqueam, fishery an integral part of their culture (1099)
-details of allocation left to those with expertise (1116)
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Some
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Some
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Yes
Total 9 5.5
1120 R. v. Badger [1996] 1 S.C.R. [74].
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15.1 Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85; 1990 CanLII 117 (S.C.C.)
DICKSON C.J. (different reasons)
Main Principle: 'Her Majesty" in the Indian Act refers to both the federal and provincial Crowns.
The Indian Act prevents money owed to a band by the province from being garnished.
[note reliance on "social purposes of the Indian Act" rather than representations made at time of
Treaty]
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Cite: "as long as Indians not affected qua Indians ... " (18)
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed -garnishment order
Mutually determined -able to raise argument within the parameters of the proceedings
Procedure - in camera/biased/public intervenors equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Consensual: Nowegijick principle primordial.
Imposed: Canada's ability to impose its laws unquestioned.
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Principled:eg set out & explained Nowegijick principle (II)
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Egalitarian: understands by analogy to treaty & use ofNowegijick
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: effect ofCrown actions can be overestimated (18)
Respect: may not be easy to see as seen by Indians.( II)
-explained arguments of both parties (12) -for different perspectives (13)
-understanding of sui generis (17-8),
"H". ." fN h A I d & E C I (18)- Istonc occupiers 0 ort mencan an s uropean o omzers
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Yes
Total 8 6.5
15.2 Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 85; 1990 CanLII 117 (S.C.C.)
WILSON J (Lamer, L'Heureux-Dube)
Main Principle: Fundamental questions about the relationship between the courts and government
should be resolved by the legislature.
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Consensual: for legislature to reform law ofgarnishment
Imposed: Unquestioned reliance on Blackstone & old cases. Note Blackstone's defn.
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Principled: Emphasised need to explain why Garnishment Act did not apply (22)
[evaluation as for La Forest]
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15.3 MitcJlellv. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85; 1990 CanLII 117 (S.c.c.)
LA FOREST J. (for majority - with La Forest, Sopinka. Gonthier 11. Wilson's reasons concur)
Main Principle: Provincial Garnishment Act should not be interpreted in a way that is inconsistent
with the broad social purpose of tax exemption in the Indian Act.
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public intervenors equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: no evidence to support claim native peoples accepted British sovereignty (31)
-ignores wealth given by natives to Canada & only sees the reverse. (31-32)
-no evidence re motivation for requirement for Minister's consent -assumes protection(38)
-no evidence to support rejection ofIndian perception of Crown as indivisible entity.(40)
Proof: Treaty 8 cited (35)
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: -ignores non-participation of "Indians" in the development of the legislation
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian" Parliamentary intent for statute prevails over Indian understanding (40)
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: view of history - no doubt re Indigenous acceptance of sovereignty
Respect: explanation ofNowegijick principle
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Some
8. Reasoning Declaratory Some Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Yes
Total 8.5 5.5
XXXVII
16. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Bear Island Foundation, [1991]2 S.C.R. 579; 1991 CanLII 75
(S.C.C.)
THE COURT (Lamer c.l., La Forest, Gonthier, McLachlin, Stevenson JJ.)
Main Principle: Aboriginal title was extinguished by the Robinson-Huron Treaty & subsequent
arrangements.
"An appellate court should not reverse the trial judge in the absence of palpable and overriding error
which affected his or her assessment of the facts"
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Indigenous attempt to wrestle with the foreign legality that had been imposed.
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
So little explanation of their thought processes that the result has an in camera effect far in excess of
declaratory law. The Court refused to subject the issues raised to a public analytical process so the
reader cannot tell which "arrangements" subsequent to the Robinson-Huron Treaty constituted
surrender of the right in the Court's opinion.
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Evidence was not used to demonstrate the legal findings
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Presumption that Anglo-Canadian law is the only relevant consideration
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: no explanation of how the facts support their finding that there had been an aboriginal
right to the land or how it was surrendered or extinguished by arrangements subsequent to the
Robinson-Huron Treaty. No explanation of the grounds for declaring that Ontario had a better claim
to the land than the Temagami.
Principled: standard grounds for overturning trial fmdings of fact mentioned,
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: basically declares a state of affairs
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
-declaration that the issues were purely factual, though applying their own frames of reference.
-acceptance of small treaty annuities and reserves as adequate compensation for huge tract of land.
-patronizing pretense at liberality through rejection of the trial fmding that there was no aboriginal
right at the time of the treaty followed by a refusal to define that right because it had been
extinguished by unspecified "arrangements". Presumption colonial culture has full managerial
power. 1121
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-detennined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually detennined Yes
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Yes PubIic/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Little
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others
Total 10 2.3
1121 See Biber, "BeingINothing".
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17. R. v. Jones, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 110; 1991 CanLII 31 (S.C.C.).
STEVENSON J. (La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci 11.)
Main Point: The belief that Canadian law is inoperative on reserves is a mistake of law, not a
mistake of fact.
[Accused were in over their heads and did not make strong arguments. The Court missed an
opportunity to set out egalitarian principles and relied on institutional force. Post colonial reasoning
could have pointed out that the procedures used by the Band council did not make it possible for
them to demonstrate that they had the support of the majority of the community for what was, in
effect, a constitutional change.]
Judge - Alien/Peer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Unequal: 5 governmental interveners supporting Ontario against a small band.
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: No evidence to support the regulatory scheme applied.
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Ignored evidence showing that the Band did not consent to application of Canadian
law
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: no explanation offered to distinguish mistake of fact from mistake of law.
Contradictory character of Council's actions not commented upon ego partial renunciation of
Canadian authority. Insufficiency of a Band Council Resolution for renouncing jurisdiction not
explained. ie method used did not meet International Standards per Western Sahara.
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Relied on Canadian state power, rather than explaining the principles that
legitimate state power.
Egalitarian: Assuming the Band wished to be considered Canadian, they were treated the same?
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Court did not give an articulate response to an obvious bid for self-government
Respect: accepted request not to make statements adversely affecting Indian self-government,
though this provided the court with an easy escape.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Some
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Some
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Some
Total 9 2
XXXIX
18.1 (a) Friends ofthe Old Man River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992)1 S.C.R.
3; 1992 CanLII 110 (S.C.c.).
LA FOREST J. (Lamer C.l., L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci 11.)
Main Point~ A private party may compel a government ministry to comply with guidelines put in
place by the legislature.
-Principle of case is decolonizing. Effect for Piegan in this particular case was not. Indigenous
opinion was completely ignored and we do not even know what they wanted though their rights were
affected by the dam.
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined Society created its own legal identity
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed: No evidence that the Piegan were represented either by the environmental plaintiff or
the governments concerned.
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Biased: In a matter that obviously affected the Piegan, there was no provision for their
representation.
Public- Equal: Indigneous organizations allowed to participate as interveners
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: Perspective on what was relevant determined uniquely by colonial society.
Proof: Facts considered proven by documentation
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Court imposed its concept of the :correct" interpretation oflaws and guidelines
without considering Indigenous or public opportunities to express or withhold consent.
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Though principles relied upon, there was obviously a wide range of opinion concerning how
they applied
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Some deference to the intention of the legislature, but Piegan opinion was completely ignored.
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Piegan & Indigenous perspectives completely ignored.
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others
Total re Piegan 10 3
xl
18.1 (b) LA FOREST J. -Evalutation re the Oldman River Society
Friends ofthe Old Man River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport)
Social order voluntarily accepted by members of the majority society.
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Highest court imposed its interpretation
Consensual: Citizens have a right to challenge officials & lower courts.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure Incameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Yes
Total re Society 4 10
18.2 Friends ofthe Old Man River Society v. Canada (Minister ofTransport)
STEVENSON J.
Main Point: The Crown is not bound to follow a law unless expressly required to do so or violation
would frustrate the purpose of the act. The trial judge's discretion should be supported and those
undertaking litigation should be prepared to accept some responsibility for the costs.
His evaluation re the Piegan would be the same.
For the Oldman River Society his broader interpretation of Crown Immunity, his insensitivity to the
obstacles faced by any group of citizens that tries to question state action and his objection to the
award of solicitor-client costs suggest that his reasoning might be considered more authoritarian and
I I . Iess postco Ollia .
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Some
Total re Society 4 7.5
xli
19. Williams v. Canada, [1992]1 S.CR. 877, 1992 CanLII 98 (S.CC)
GONTHIER J. (La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin, Stevenson J1.)
Main Principle: The situs ofUI benefits is the same as that ofthe employment that generated them.
The situs of intangible property is determined on the basis ofconnecting factors.
Judge - Alien/Peer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Imposed: No treaty adherence to Anglo-Canadian regime
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public intervenors equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Consensual: Band & Williams participated in VI program
Imposed: reasons on the basis of paternalistic protection rather than contractual term for tax
exemption
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Egalitarian: looks for consistency and predictability in the law
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Respect: Situs must be interpreted in relation to the purposes ofthe Indian Act & the Income Tax
Act, not the conflict oflaws rules.(ll)
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Respect for others Yes
Total 5 6.5
xlii
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (National Energy Board, [1994]1 S.C.R. 159,1994 CanLII
113 S.C.C.).
IACOBUCCI J. (Lamer C.J. La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin,
Major 11.)
Main Points: When deciding whether to grant an export licence it is appropriate for the Board to
consider the environmental impact and to require further studies when the impact is knowable.
-Case is difficult to rate because the status of James Bay and Northern Quebec Native Claims
Settlement Act S.C. 1976-77, c.32 is not clear.
-Does this case suggest that Canadian governments can avoid fiduciary obligations by delegating
decisions to boards?
-Though the decision appears to be very fair regarding the issues before it, the Cree appear to have
been completely excluded from the decision making processes concerning developments that
profoundly affect them. The project is relying on the power of the state to proceed over their
objections.
1. Judges - AlienlPeer No evidence of Cree on Board whose decision was upheld.
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined Meaning of James Bay Act is unclear & in
dispute.
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own Disagreement between Cree & Canadians over the
Act.
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determine. Project to export electricity seems to be Canadian
initiative protested by Cree.
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual The Cree obviously do not consent to the project
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled Principles for founding the decision are explained.
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian Cree values seem to take a back seat here. Their reasons
for objecting to the licence are camouflaged by the process & the shaping of the issues.
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect.
Ethnocentric: presumption that Canadian procedures are acceptable even though the agreement that
founds Canadian authority is being litigated.
Respect: Cree arguments seem to be explained. The requirements for environmental & cultural
review were reinstated.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Some
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 7 5.5
xliii
21. R. v. Howard, [1994] 2 S.CR. 299; 1994 CanLII 86 (S.CC)
GONTHIER J. (Lamer C.J., La Forest, Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci)
Main Principle: Bear Island reliance on trial findings of fact reiterated.
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
NO PROOF: relied on 1923 treaty. Presumably this was part of the Court record but, unlike Sioui,
text was not provided so the reader cannot verify the Court's account of it. (Justice must not only be
done, it must be seen to be done). Reliance on opinion ofa man with no legal training that 2 signers
were legally educated. ALSO "mandate" of commissioners not reproduced though it was the basis
for a defence argument.
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Did not consider whether the people relinquished "all privileges" with informed consent
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Little or no attention to principles like Nowegijick 'perception' & Sioui express words
needed to extinguish.
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Did not consider whether the members of the band gave their informed consent to
giving up their rights
Perspective - EntnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethno/ego centric: Prefer's trial judge's understanding of treaty to that of accused. Completely
unaware of the tensions between traditionalists and assimilationists. If! had been the judge, I would
have sent it back for retrial so that missing facts could be supplied. Dismissed Indigneous perceptions
of difference.
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Some
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others
Total 9 4
xliv
22.1 Native Women's Assn. OjCanada v. Canada, [1994] 3 S.c.R. 627; 1994 CanLII 27 (S.c.c.)
SOPINKA J. (Lamer C.J. La Forest, Gonthier. Cory, Iacobucci, Major)
Main point: There was no evidence to show that the organizations selected by Canada to represent
Indigenous peoples were male dominated.
[From a postcolonial perspective, the real problem with the funded organizations is that they were
selected by Canada. Funding NWAC would not solve this problem. The Catch-22 is that it is
unlikely that an unorganized entity could carry an argument against the colonial character of the
Canadian practice.]
Judge - Alien/Peer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Self-determined: membership in organization
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed: "Walsh J. framed the issues" . Huge state funding.
Mutually determined: Brought action based on own analysis.
Procedure - in camera/biased/public intervenors equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: Canadian organizational format is able to represent Indigenous women.
No examination ofIndigenous organizational concepts.[fault in pleadings?]
Evidence: Looked at the structure & policies of the organizations involved (though superficial)
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Sees "government" as holding wide discretion. No consideration of those not represented
in organizations.
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Government has no duty to consult anyone, let alone everyone, by referendum
(XLVII)
Egalitarian: Government obligation to listen to particular class is same as for public at large. (LII)
Perspective - Etho/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: "the Aboriginal community of Canada" [Said's othering]
Minister of Constitutional Affairs says organizations chosen represent men & women[external
opinion] Only Euro-Canadian organizational concepts considered. Opinion of minister is relevant to
determining how representative the chosen organizations are.
Respect: Considered interveners's positions though counterbalanced by strong support for state
prerogative.
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Some
Total 8 6.5
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22.2 Native Women's Assn. OjCanada v. Canada, [1994] 3 S.c.R. 627; 1994 CanLII 27 (S.C.C.).
L'HEUREUX-DUBE J.
Main Point: A government may be held to a positive obligation to provide a platform for expression
in some instances.
She supported Sopinka's reasons except for his interpretation of her reasons in Haig so the result is
the same except she makes a strong place for other points of view which supports a consensual
concept of government.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Yes
Total 8 8
22.3 Native Women's Assn. OjCanada v. Canada, [1994] 3 S.c.R. 627; 1994 CanLII 27 (S.c.c.).
McLACHLIN J.
Main Point: A government may choose and fund its advisors without regard for the Charter.
She supported Sopinka's reasons but found consultations of the kind considered in this case differ
from the electoral issue in Haig. It was not necessary to consider evidence of Charter violation.
The only proofprovided to support the legality of this principle in Canada was an American case!
This approach is declaratory and deprived of the egalitarian considerations canvassed by Sopinka.
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others some
Total 9 6.5
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23.1 Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 S.c.R. 3; 1995 CanLII 145
(S.C.C.).LAMER C.J. (Cory)
Main Point: A tribunal must be legally structured so its members are reasonably independent of
those who appoint them.
[Does not understand the interrelated nature of life in a small community.
One gets the feeling that some excuse will be found to invalidate the proceeding.]
Judge - Alien/Peer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Imposed under the Indian Act, self-determined acceptance of a colonial legal regime.
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed: Case decided on argument not in pleadings or made in argument at trial. [I I I]
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Bias: Issue of bias raised in oral argument and not part of the originating notice ofmotion
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: A reserve where everyone may be related can function like a large impersonal state.
Proof: Textual references, comparison to municipal regimes under provinces but decided here
without a concrete example ofhow the tribunal would function in practice.
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: presumption that federal or provincial appointment solves the problem of bias for someone
external to the culture
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: presumes neutral standard is possible. Despite appeal to the principles of natural
justice, they were violated by relying on an argument that was not properly raised in prior courts
denying the Bands a proper right to reply.
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: based entirely on analysis of Canadian law, Parliament's intent, Indian Act etc.
-assumption bands have no "governmental experience" unless using Anglo-Canadian institutions[43]
-doesn't see neutrality principle proposed not followed by Canada when adjudicating Indigenous
rights.[95]
-assumption that federal appointment to tribunal would solve problem of "independence" &
"security of tenure" may solve problem of influence on a reserve that may be cash strapped with few
employment opportunities. Would there be enough tax assessment cases on a reserve to merit
permanent appointments? Analysis seems out of touch with reality. [I 0 I] Does not grasp the
interconnectedness oflife in a small community.
Respect: Parliament's objective was to facilitate development ofAboriginal self-government[18]
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Some
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/Place for others Some
Total 8 4
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23.2 Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995J 1 S.c.R. 3; 1995 CanLII 145
(S.c.c.).
LA FORESTJ.
Main Point: Technical legal issues should be determined by a tribunal with the required expertise.
Agrees with Lamer & Major: Dismiss the appeal with costs.
Declaratory/Authoritarian - no explanation of why he thinks the band lacks the required expertise.
Ehn' h . fhd' I' h I tht ocentnc: presumes t e perspectIve 0 t e ommant cu ture IS t e Only one at counts
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes SeIf-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In cameralbiased PubIic/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes RespectIPlace for others Some
Total 9 3.5
23.3 Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995J 1 S.c.R. 3; 1995 CanLII 145 (S.C.C.).
MAJOR J. (McLachlin)
Main Point: "When a fundamental issue of lack ofjurisdiction is raised as the only issue, the
respondent should not be compelled to proceed needlessly to the appeal tribunal"[140] [150]
[No account taken of the major difference between Indigenous situation & that in the precedent
used.]
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: Board has no expertise on property law - composition of tribunal is unknown as is the
potential decision.
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Colonial legality interpreted in a way that denied a forum for Indigenous interpretation.
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Principled: Principles applied carefully set out.
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Parliaments intent to grant jurisdcition
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ehn . A f B dh .t ocentnc: ssumpuon oar as no expertIse on property aw
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes RespectIPlace for others Some
Total 8 5
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23.4 Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 S.c.R. 3; 1995 CanLII 145 (S.c.c.).
SOPINKA J. (L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Iacobucci n.)
Main Points: An appellate tribunal can only reverse the Trial judge's exercise of discretion ifno
weight or insufficient weight was given to relevant considerations.
Without knowledge of the operational reality of a tribunal's by-laws a reasonable person
cannot be informed about how they function.
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Though colonial legality applied, support for the Band tribunal created a forum for their ideas
Consensual-party must have fair chance to answer, but tribunal independence not pleaded or
argued.
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: entirely Anglo-Canadian approach
Respect: self-government policy is relevant to the entire exercise ofjudicial discretion. [114]
-noted decision made on an argument not before the Bands.
-Application ofNowegijick principles
-provisions aimed at maintaining Indian rights should be interpreted in a broad manner. [1 14]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Some Respect for others Yes
Total 5.5 7.5
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24.1 Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department ofIndian Affairs and Northern
Development)
GONTHIER J. (La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka)
Main Points: Indian title in reserves is sui generis so common law principles of property are not
helpful. The intention of the parties should not be frustrated.
-note application of limitation period
-"full & informed consent' standard
1. Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed legal conceptual framework, but able to file pleadings within those terms of reference.
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: Presumed Indigenous intent could be determined from words of the surrender and the
record prepared by the Indian Agent.[9, 10] Trial judge did not find the band gave "full, free and
informed consent to the surrender of the mineral rights"[85]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: accepted Indian Act regime
Consensual: "intention-based approach" [7] based on "full and informed consent" [4]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Principles underlying most reasoning set out but the conceptual framework applied was declared.
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: imposed a conceptual structure that was not pleaded by either party giving no right to
answer
Egalitarian: legitimacy based on "full and informed consent" [4]
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Presumed surrender drafted by Indian Affairs represented "Indian" intent.
Respect/place: Focus on "Indian" intent.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Some Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Some Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Some Respect/place for others Yes
Total 7.5 6
24.2 Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department ofIndian Affairs and Northern
Development)
McLACHLIN J. (Cory & Major JJ)
Main Points: -A deliberately executed and statutorily authorized surrender should not be overturned
on the basis of no evidence.
-The surrender provisions of the Indian Act are intended to ensure that the intention of the
Indian bands with respect to their interests in their reserves will be honoured.
Note: her interpretation of the Indian Act as protection to ensure that the Band's intent is honoured is
postcolonial in spirit. It is not supported by proof that this was the actual intent when the measures
were implemented.
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Proof: Insists on proof of band's intent & on revocation of 1940 surrender [81-5]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: No evidence to show that purpose ofIndian Act is to honour band intent.
Principled: very
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Egalitarian: "full, free and informed consent" standard [85]
-insistence on compliance with statutory scheme, objection to unilateral changes by the Crown[88]
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: deference to statutory scheme band did not participate in forming
Respect/place: Indian Act interpreted to protect Band's right to consent to actions taken [83]
-Distinguished "a legal finding based on his reading of the wording" from evidence of Band's
intent. [86]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Some Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Some Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Some Respect for others Yes
Total 5.5 6.5
25.1 R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.CR. 771; 1996 CanLII 236 (S.CC)
SOPINKA J. (Lamer C.J.)
Main Point: Treaty 8 was merged in the NRTA. The enactment of new constitutional provisions
does not imply the amendment of earlier provisions.
Note contradiction: says ambiguities should be resolved in favour of the Indians & the integrity of
the Crown should be upheld, but does not attempt to see Indigenous points of view.
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Biased: Crown given new trial to meet analytical scheme. Badger & Kiyawasew were not.
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: Conservation legislation passed before the treaty so "clearly understood" that rights
under the treaty were subject to legislation. No evidence offered to show actual understanding.[ll]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Belief that treaty can be unilaterally altered by the legislation of one party.
Consensual; to the extent that Cory's explanation ofa treaty adopted
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: eg use of Horseman to say NRTA extinguished right to hunt on Crown land [29]
Principled: quest for principles in precedents.
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Validated the harassment represented by use of penal charges to define treaty rights.
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: presumption that legality belongs only to settler society
Place for other: attempt to see NRTA as continuing treaty
Ii
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Some
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual Little
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Some
Total 10 3.25
lii
25.2 R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.CR. 771; 1996 CanLII 236 (S.CC)
CORY J. (La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Iacobucci)
Main Point: The hunting rights confirmed by Treaty No.8 were modified by para. 12 of the NRTA
though the right to hunt for food on unoccupied land continued. Legislation can limit a treaty right if
justified according to the test set out in Sparrow.
**Despite highly colonial profile, articulated attempt to see what "the Indians understood".
Representations re Treaty 4 & Treaty 6 cited as evidence of promises re Treaty 8 [56]
Relied on the authority of his own past judgment in Horseman.
Judson's categorization of "Aboriginal rights" and "treaty rights" unevenly applied.
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Biased: Crown given new trial to meet analytical scheme. Badger & Kiyawasew were not.
4. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption; "as before" limits right to hunt for food.
Representations re Treaty 4 & Treaty 6 cited as evidence of promises re Treaty 8 [56]
Cree & Dene assumed to know of government regulations in 1899- no evidence given to this
effect[70]
Evidence: reference to experts & to evidence of promises made and conditions at time.
5. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Law by government in which "Indians" had no representation altered treaty
Consensual: cited Judson's explanation of a treaty [Did he understand it?]
6. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Cites self in Horseman, rather than any principles, for limitations imposed on treaty
Principled: [me principles stated [41] but not applied
7. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Belief that conservation must be imposed [70] Validated use of penal charges to
define legal ambiguities.
Egalitarian: Mentioned Aboriginal peoples should be consulted or at least informed re conservation
8. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: purpose of treaty to facilitate settlement of West [& for the "Indians"?]
-limitations v. hunting "as before"
-treaty rights may be unilaterally reduced by colonizing state's NRTA
Respect/Place for others: principles of interpretation [52] "To the Indians, it was an essential
element[82]
-right to hunt for food "as it is understood by the Indians"[93]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Little
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Little
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect for others Some
Total 10 3.5
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26.1 R. v. Nikal, [1996]1 S.c.R. 1013; 1996 CanLII 245 (S.c.c.).
CORY J. (Lamer C.J. , La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major JJ.)
Main Point: "[T]he federal government may validly require aboriginal people to obtain a fishery
licence" under provincial regulation....An invalid act or regulation cannot create an offence".[CXII]
-Appellant argued Crown was "given authority to bind the Crown & assign fishing rights" XXXVIII
-Appellant's conviction overturned, but federal right to regulate affirmed & the band's right denied.
-Consideration of"the understanding of the Indians" mysteriously missing though used in Badger
written by the same Judge & released just three weeks earlier. No explanation for this offered.
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined -charge
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public intervenors equal
Biased: reliance on decision of"Law Officers of the Crown" instead of neutral tribunal XLIII
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: representations of personal opinion to prove Crown policy[XXIX-XXX, XXXIV]
-claim re English law since the Magna Carta with 1973 cite.[XXXII]
-claim right to fish would become meaningless w/ogvt regulation[XCVI] control by central
authority[CI]
Proof. Government provided no evidence to justify licence [CXI]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: unquestioningly accepted declaration of government official as law[XXXV]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Over-arching assumption that only Canada had law. Principled: many set out & used
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian; ignored requirements for democratic legality
Egalitarian; some lip-service to the idea that consultation required re conservation [CX]
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect-place for others
Ethnocentric: assumed fishing right can be "granted" by the colonizing culture, XXV, XXXVII
PI L d b I . & h [XCII] b d . db d' . . d' .ace: ecture on a ancmg sensItivity to ot ers ut eme an sJuns IctlOn
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Little
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total 10 3.5
26.2 R. v. Nikal, [1996]1 S.c.R. 1013; 1996 CanLII 245 (S.C.C.).
McLACHIN J. (L'Heureux-Dube J.)
Main Point: "[T]he state is entitled to impose a licensing scheme on the aboriginal fishing"[CXXII]
"The unconstitutionality of a condition of a licence does not. .. absolve the appellant from the need to
obtain a licence."[CXXIII]
Authoritarian: "The trial judge, the majority of the Court ofAppeal, and this Court unanimously have
ruled that the state does have the right to require him to obtain a licence" [CXXV] [source of
authority not explained]
liv
27 R. v. Lewis [1996]1 S.c.R. 921; 1996 CanLII 243 (S.c.c.)
IACOBUCCI J. (Lamer C.J. LaForest, L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka,_Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin,
Major)
Main Point: Band by-laws regulating fisheries on a reserve do not extend to an adjacent river.
-issues surrounding establishment of colonial jurisdiction ignored.
-fine included optional 5 days in prison - but no requirement to prove law beyond a reasonable
doubt. The fact that judges at various levels disagreed about what the law was, & that the by-law
was approved by Indian Affairs surely demonstrates that some doubt was reasonable.
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: of valid Canadian jurisdiction. No evidence of parties practice during century between
establishment of the reserve & the charges.
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: No consideration of importance of band anticipation in fisheries regulation
Consensual: some defference to Parliament, but band representation ignored.
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: ego Crown met fiduciary obligation
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: No consideration of the need to enhance democratic processes. No consideration of
need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt when incarceration involved.
Egalitarian; NOT when asserting equal access to fisheries for original inhabitants & settlers!!!
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: only "Parliament's objective" [77] and Canadian legal principles & processes
considered.
-How would the judges respond if someone came along and ruled that others could have equal access
to their homes?
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure Incamera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Some
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total 10 3
Iv
28.1 Van der Peel v. The Queen, [1996]2 S.c.R. 507; 1996 CanLII 216 (S.c.c.)
LAMER c.J. (La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci, Major JJ)
Main Points: The rights protected by s.35(1) "lie in the practices, customs and traditions integral to
the distinctive cultures of aboriginal peoples"[48] that existed prior to contact.[60]
-lip-service to Indigenous perspective but not applied. See L'Heureux- Dube [149]
-Van der Peet lost because she did not correctly anticipate the test she had to meet. No wonder! I
was decided until the case reached the S.C.C.
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed: charge plus new issues developped at both appeal and SCC levels
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public intervenors equal
No retrial now that case to meet is known.
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: Appellant given no chance to seek evidence as required by the new "legal" test
Proof: reliance on trial judges findings of fact
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Worcester v. Georgia "power, war, conquest" concept accepted.[37]
Lamer made up his own test then said she did not meet it.
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: requirements for test [68 -74] no principle, no source, no example.
The "prior to contact" requirement was simply stated based on his own reasoning. McLachlin
agrees.[247]
Principled: ego use ofMabo
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: presumption that judge can make law with no reference to the community concerned
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Indigenous rights must be reconciled with "Crown sovereignty" [31] [62]
-Canadian-Aboriginal relations seen as relationship between two cultures [42]
-presumed exchange between kin was not really "trade" [87]
-mentioned principle of considering "aboriginal perspective" [49] and looking at the particular
community [69] but did not apply it. Relied entirely on professors and "experts" from his own
society.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Some
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes RespectIPlace for others
Total 10 2.5
lvi
28.2 Van der Peel v. The Queen, [1996) 2 S.CR. 507; 1996 CanLII 216 (S.CC)
L'HEUREUX-DUBE J.
Main Point: Definition of the nature and extent of aboriginal rights must be addressed in the broader
historical context of aboriginal reality. [106]
[some genuine consideration of native perspective [166] but still imposes external analysis.
[would send back on extinguishment & justification. Problem with recently devised judge-made law
- none of the parties know the case to meet!!!]
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public intervenors equal
Would allow retrial.
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: No evidence to support historical claims ego Bering bridge theory [106] Except
Marshall decisions which are opinion only as he was not a direct witness.[107]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed - "government" must be able to direct rights for natives & the rest of Canadian society
[122]
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: ego time requirement 20-50 years based on Slattery not consensual democratic
process.[177]
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Sees law as an exercise in external analysis
Egalitarian: strong emphasis on perspective ofAboriginal peoples
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Saw colonization as an "opportunity to share in the advances of modern
civilization"[188]
Respect: "significance of these activities to natives" [157]
-" taking British sovereignty as turning point" exaggerates importance from Indigenous
perspective[166]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/Place for others Yes
Total 9 5
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28.3 Van der Peel v. The Queen, [1996] 2 S.c.R. 507; 1996 CanLII 216 (S.c.c.)
MCLACHLIN J.
Main Points: Aboriginal rights should be defined by "looking at what the law has historically
accepted as fundamental aboriginal rights" [227] British law accepted Aboriginal rights as
fundamental. [254]
-The Crown cannot transfer rights to non-Aboriginal people without Aboriginal consent, without
treaty and without compensation. [31 0]
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: direct sale of land to settlers was prohibited to ensure a fair exchange [270]
No evidence aboriginal people engaged in "sport fishing"[279]
Proof: British common law respected aboriginal law [267-70]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Assumed legitimacy ofcolonially imposed system, & judicial assessment of Native law.
Consensual: Crown should not be permitted to transfer rights without aboriginal consent[31 0]
-emphasis on treaty process & negotiation [313]
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Principles: detailed explanations of all points - principles sought
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: accepts legitimacy ofcolonially imposed law [264]
Egalitarian: "Aboriginal peoples, like other peoples... "[251]
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: view of history [232] treaties sought to provide aboriginal peoples with a land
base[271]
Respect/Place: Walters quote re need to accommodate both legal cultures [232]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Some Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Some Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Some Respect/Place for others Yes
Total 6.5 6
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29.1 R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.c.R. 723; http://www.lexum.umontreaI.ca. (S.c.c.)
LAMER c.J. (Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci, Major)
Main Points: If an Aboriginal right has no internal limit on its exercise, it may be justifiable for the
government to impose a limit.[McLachlin in Van der Peet [259]
In order to do this, there must be evidence concerning how and why resource allocations were made,
the nature and extent ofany Aboriginal right involved and the extent of consultation with Aboriginal
groups concerned.
[Though the case supports Aboriginal consultation & concern for HOW decisions were made, it
ultimately supports the colonization ofa previously uncolonized Indigenous resource]
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: "Since the time of the Magna Carta" [67] jurisdiction [73]
-conservation seen as an important goal based only on Sparrow's presumption - no supporting
evidence [74]
Evidence: eg re fishery [49,50]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Does not question Canadian capacity to govern Indigenous resource
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Does not explain WHY Anglo-Canadian law should be given priority eg.[66, 7]
Principled?: reasoning is based more on procedural precedent eg Sparrow than principles
-analogy to Charter analysis - must look at purposes [71]
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: "governments" must make decisions to allocate rights [65]
Egalitarian: Considered consultation, though standard only "cognizant of the views" [84]
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: "primitive time & setting" [26] "Since the time of the Magna Carta" [67]
Respect/Place : minimal impairment Oakes test. [63]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Some
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/Place for others Some
Total 9 4.
29.2 R. v. Gladstolle, 11996) 2 S.c.R. 723; http://www.lexum.umontl.eal.ca. (S.c.c.)
LA FORESTJ.
Main Point: When applying Lamer's test for Aboriginal rights, a qualitative approach should be
taken that accounts for the character of traditional practices.
-couldn't see similarity between traditional trade practices & offer to trade with the Japanese.
-note the court's tacit support for racist trade restraints - [all judges]
-placed great emphasis on the perspective of the aboriginal people, but did not notice he had no
evidence on which to base his decision. - applied an external judgment. {p.44}
-he would equate regulations and an OIC - which have little or no democratic control, with a
constitutional provision - all be it that the NRTA in Horseman & Badger was an act of the British
parliament.
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: Says "perspective of the aboriginal people" must be relied on but made a decision
without any evidence of that perspective re defining the character ofthe accused's actions ego a
Heiltsuk jury
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: OIC or regulation can extinguish Aboriginal right [ 31, 32]
-assumed complete regulatory authority [82]
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory; supports OIC & regulations over parliamentary process
Principled: Understanding of principles is superficial & culturally specific.
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Belief Crown should have power to extinguish Aboriginal rights {p.49, para 25}
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Implicit assumption Aboriginal nations did not have law or commerce.
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Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/Place for others
Total 9 3
Ix
29.3 R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; http://www.Iexum.umontreaI.ca.
(S.C.C.)L'HEUREUX-DUBE J.
Main Point: The native perspective must be taken into account when defining an Aboriginal right.
She would follow Lamer's analysis and disposition, but her emphasis on the importance of the
"native perspective" and on the accused's definition of the issue makes her approach less colonizing
in character, though she is content to maintain an external assessment of the "native perspective".
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Some
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Some
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Some Respect/Place for others Some
Total 8.5 5
29.4 R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; http://www.Iexum.umontreal.ca. (S.C.c.)
MCLACHLIN J.
Main Point: When the aboriginal right is to secure the modem equivalent of basic sustenance,
evidence must be entered to demonstrate what the sustenance needs are.
-By postcolonial standards, no source provided for declaration that the Indigenous right is limited to
the modem equivalent ofthe standard of living at contact. This is an externally imposed issue.
No mention made by ANY of the judges of the need to negotiate with the Heiltsuk re management of
a resource they evidently controlled at one time.
Her request for evidence to show the modem equivalent of a sustenance livelihood does help make a
place
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Some
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/Place for others Yes
Total 9 4.5
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30.1 R. v. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.c.R. 672; http://www.Iexum.umontreaI.ca. (S.c.c.).
LAMER c.J. (La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci, Major n.)
Main Point: When the factual findings at trial are not appealed for palpable or overriding error they
must be accepted, though the determination is an issue of law & fact.
Note: Case had the effect of penalizing those who conduct business with Indigenous communities.
Judge - AlienJPeer Alien to Indigenous people
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined Co. determined its own identity.
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own. Foreign for Indigenous, chosen for company.
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined - a charge
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal -case to meet not known in advance
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: The only way to see things is according to colonial categories
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: no evidence that the Indigenous people participated in forming the law
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Required to meet Van der Peet test, released simultaneous with SCC judgment
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: No chance for company of bands to participate in making conservation regulations
Perspective - EthnoJEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
bn' . h b"l'h bdfidb fh'lEt ocentnc: assumptIOn t at a ongma ng! ts must e e me y customs 0 t e co oma cu ture
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Etbno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total:Indigenous 10 3
11Ab .. 1fi thA ssessment or e non- ongma appe ant:
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Etbno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total: Smokehouse 7 7
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30.2 R. v. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.c.R. 672; http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca. (S.c.c.).
L'HEUREUX-DUBE J.
Main Point: Aboriginal rights must be construed on the basis of evidence concerning the history,
culture and perspective of the particular native society concerned.
NB**First judgment to look seriously at the way the Indigenous culture concerned was structured
and to note that the system of social classification was significantly different.
-still accepts imposed legality. -
-NB**people concerned not represented in case concerned with their rights
11Abfi h
Judge - AlienlPeer member of Smokehouse Ltd's culture
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined Smokehouse incorporated
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined Charge - bands involved not even intervenors
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: rights may be extinguished through series of legislative acts[76]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian willing to consider other culture on equal basis
P Eh /E C I I
A
erspectIve - t no ;go centnc- ross-cu tura res ~ect
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes SeIf-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Respect/place for others Yes
Total: Indieenous 7 4
ssessment or t e
..
non- ongma appe ant:
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Respect/place for others Yes
Total: Smokehouse 3 9
30.3 R. v. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.c.R. 672; http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca. (S.c.c.).
MCLACHLIN J.
Main Point: It is not necessary to prove that the wayan aboriginal right was exercised in the past
was identical to the way it is exercised today.
-Similar chart to L'Heureux-Dube by a more tersely worded method.
31.1 R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.c.R. 821; http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca. (S.C.C.).
.LAMER C.J. (La Forest, Sopinka. Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major II.
Main Point: The rights protected by s.35(1) must be looked at in the light of the specific
circumstances of each case, including the history and culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the
right. They do not include "a broad right to the use of their reserve land".
N.B. Stated the right to self-government was not considered, yet it was obviously avoided.
(colonizing!)
What happened to "generous, broad liberal" interpretation and the "perspective of the Aboriginal
people themselves"? Supposedly incorporated by reference to Van der Peet - but is this enough?
Note: reliance on unilaterally designed legal instruments eg Royal Proclamation.
Refusal to answer the defense raised: That the bands had "a broad right to manage the use of their
reserve lands".
Judge - Alien/Peer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Biased: Decision in February, but reasons rely on Van derPeet released Aug. 21 st.
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: No evidence to support the assertion ofgovernmental authority over bands
Proof: Reference to expert's evidence-
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Indigenous perception of rights is "at a level of excessive generality".
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
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Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Some
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes .Respect/place for others
Total 10 2
31.2 R v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.c.R. 821; http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca. (S.C.C.).
L'HEUREUX-DUBE
Main Points: The proper inquiry focuses broadly upon the activity itself and, on the purpose for
which it was undertaken, not on the specific manner in which it has been manifested.
-The Canadian Parliament and, to a certain extent, provincial legislatures have a general legislative
authority over the activities of aboriginal people.
Same profile as the majority judgment.
[Would she really accept an American inquiry into the purpose for which Canadians exercised
jurisdiction?]
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32.1 R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; 1996 CanLII 169 (S.C.C.).
LAMER C. J. (La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major J.J.)
Main Points: -Aboriginal rights are not dependant on Aboriginal title.
- "Parliament may not simply adopt an unstructured discretionary administrative regime which risks
infringing aboriginal rights in a substantial number of applications in the absence of some explicit
guidance" [54]
Judge - Alien/Peer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture / own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Bias: Case argued before Van der Peet which structured the decision.
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: minimizing the effect of contact on a culture [46]
-assumes academic experts know the culture better than the people.
Proof- reliance on trial evidence of experts & Chief.
Concept of law - imposed / consensual -
Imposed - no ref to need for Indigenous consent to regulation
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Reliance on the Court's constricted view of rights in Van der Peet.[34] [47]
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian -authoritarian
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Respect: rejected argument that only rights recognized by the French regime were protected [33]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 10 4
32.2 R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; 1996 CanLII 169 (S.C.C.).
L'HEUREUX -DUBE J.
Main point: Aboriginal rights are protected by s.35(1) if they have been "an integral part of the
distinctive aboriginal culture for a substantial continuous period of time." [66]
33.1 R. v. Cote [1996] 3 S.c.R. 139; 1996 CanLII 170 (S.C.C.).
LAMER c.J. (Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major)
Main Point: Aboriginal rights can exist independently of Aboriginal title.
Recognition by French colonial law is not required to prove the existence of an Aboriginal right.
lxv
-Perspective of the "Indians" not mentioned.
-Serious claim to exclusive title here as no evidence that French went there & evidence that they
recognized Algonquins as allies, not subjects. Looks generous because he was acquitted of fishing
charge, but it was actually a serious loss. How could the European claim be greater than Algonquin
claim iftime of contact is the point of assessment?
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Bias: case to meet not known. Case argued at all levels on theory that proof of title was necessary
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: boundaries & limits ofNew France never defined but jurisdiction assumed.
Canada has legal jurisdiction.
Proof: reliance on experts
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: means of identifying rights decided by the Court itself.
"clear & plain intent" accepted to extinguish [52]
-boundaries of s.88 Indian act topic of future court discussion[87]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian -declared law of Van der Peet, Sparrow accepted
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: "Outaouais region ofQuebec"[2]
Lack of consciousness of how own conceptual frameworks imposed. Especially in view that the
procedure did not prejudice the appellants.
Place: Conscious ofdifferent frameworks & dealt well with historical difficulties [40-49]
Emphasis on Algonquin practice
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Some
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes RespectIPlace for others Some
Total 10 2.5
33.2 La Forest agreed, subject to his comparison of the right to a "servitude".
33.3 L'Heureux-Dube agreed subject to her reasons in Adams.
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34. Goodswimmer v. Canada, [1997J 1 S.C.R. 309; 1997 CanLII 371 (S.C.C.)
LAMER C.J. (La Forest, L'Heuruex-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major
JJ.)
-Case not heard as appellant withdrew on grounds it was moot. (The non-band member who had
been elected Chief no longer held office)
-Assessment based on quality of the Federal Court of Appeal decision.
-Both parties are Indigenous and both have been "absorbed into the body politic" of Canada through
their acceptance of the Indian Act regime & Canadian institutions.
STONE J.A. (Strayer, McDonald JJ.A)
Goodswimmer v. Canada, [1995J 2 F.C. 389, 1995 CanLII 3580 (F.C.A.)
Main Point: The fact that a legislative provision gives rise to absurd results is not sufficient to
declare it ambiguous and then embark on a broad-ranging interpretative analysis.[19]
Judge - AlienlPeer -Though not a peer, is a fellow member of the polity whose laws are used to
determine the parties rights. Position is neutral in relation to both parties.
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Both appear to accept Indian Act identity.
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Though the language & culture is foreign, both appear to have adopted it.
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined Mutually determined issue re statute interpretation
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal -public
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof -relied on contents of statutes & legislative history
Concept of law - imposed / consensual- relied choice of chief by electoral majority according to a
system that both parties agree to.
Imposed: as legislated by parliament & interpreted by Court, majority rule.
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled Principles from case law explained, though source is in
declaration of British law.
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian. Egalitarian vote, authoritarian process, analysis
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect. Ethnocentricity does not arise as a
problem as both parties are functioning within the same legislative culture.
Dispute resolved by appeal to mutually agreed authority (the court) rather than by the use of
force.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Respect/place for others Yes
Total 3 10
lxvii
35.1 Opetchesaht Indian Band v. Canada, [1997] 2 S.CR. 119; 1997 CanLII 244 (S.CC).
MAJOR J. (Lamer C.J. La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Iacobucci 11.)
Main point: Limited, indeterminable rights in reserve land may be granted under s.28(2) ofthe
Indian Act.
Note: Cultural foundation is similar to that ofMcLachlin's dissent. It favours postcolonial values by
relying on the capacity ofthe Opetchesaht to consent. However, McLachlin's analysis demonstrates
its weakness and accords much more strongly with egalitarian Indigneous values that emphasize the
rights of future generations.
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof [N.B. this is 18A application]
Assumption: Canadian approval to alienate land meant to protect native land base [52](discuss)
BCR represented opinion of the people
Proof: ego record confirms protracted negotiations. [56] unproven factual assertions to be dealt with
at trial[58]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: reliance on an imposed regulatory scheme [56]
Consensual: reliance on Band council consent, no claim for unfairness or uneven bargaining power
[56]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
-did not dig as deeply as McLachlin
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: accepted authority ofCouncil with limited temporal mandate to make perpetual
alienation.
Refused to lift the institutional veil
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Paid no heed to the argument of the Indigenous intervener
Respect: Accepted BCR but took it at face value & left future generations subject to colonial
intrusion
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Some
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Some
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Some
Total 9 4
lxviii
35.2 Opetchesaht Indian Band v. Canada, [1997] 2 S.c.R. 119; 1997 CanLII 244 (S.c.c.).
MCLACHLIN J. (Cory 1.)
Main points:
-Consent of the entire band membership is required to dispose of interests in land for many
generations.
-The "Plain" meaning of words in a statute must be understood in the context of the legislative
purpose.
-S28(2) of the Indian Act only applies to commitments shorter than the 2 year Band council
mandate.[92]
Values applied correspond to international postcolonial norms.
Judge - Alien/Peer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined -Indigenous arguments used
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: 1) Indigenous land could be legally alienated & 2) proclamation of 1763 "created" a
process for doing it [though more likely it replicated practice with commons in England.]
Proof: assertions well illustrated by examples
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: discussed in terms of parliament's or Crown's intent rather than people's
Consensual: importance of consent for long-term commitments
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: founds "Indian" rights on colonial declaration (proclamation) [82]
Principled: good at finding principle that binds enactment [eg. Pt. IV]
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: founds rights on declaratory elements of Canadian law rather than egalitarian principle
Egalitarian: concern for band & future generations' right to manage their land
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Respect: strong support for people's capacity to consent to long-term alienations.
-sets out Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs' argument.[96]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Some Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Some Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Some Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Respect/place for others Yes
Total 6.5 6.5
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36. St. Mary's Indian Band. v. Cranbrook (City) [1997] 2 S.CR. 657; 1997 CanLII 364 (S.CC)
LAMER CJ. (La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major
U.)
[What happened to the Nowegijick principles? Since the trial judge decided for the band and the
appeal court against, there were obviously ambiguities. Why didn't McLachlin & Cory reconcile
with Opetchesaht? Serious problem here as the case began with a question of law and was resolved
on an interpretation of fact: the true purpose of the dealings & the intention of the parties [15] Yet
the surrounding facts surrounding were not investigated. It would have been better to send back for
re-trial. I doubt that the band was looking to sell its land. It is more likely that Cranbrook wanted an
airport and since it is in the mountains there weren't many options.]
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
The Court refused to consider unnamed issues raised by the parties.[29]
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Case instituted to determine a legal question: Do the words "cease to be used for public purposes"
make the surrender "otherwise than absolute"? Decision claimed to be determined on the basis of the
intention of the parties which is a question of fact. [surely it should have been sent to re-trial]
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: no evidence offered to support statements of fact in [18] No evidence to tell us whether
the airport was an indigenous initiative or an external idea brought for their approval or how "fair
market value" was determined.
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Question of the consent of present or future members of the band raised by McLachlin in
dissent in Opetchesaht not considered.
Consensual: Claims to rely on the intention of the parties but ignored the need to investigate the
intent of the band members beyond the wording of documents from the colonizing society
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: " "Absolute" and "conditional" are not mutually exclusive terms -either conceptually or
under the scheme of the Indian Act. [19]
:The "other issues raised by the parties" are dismissed without even being set out.[29]
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: as under above points - affirms the "Indian Act reality"[38]
10. Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: presumption that documents, presumably drawn up by Indian Affairs, represent the
intent of the band. The claim to respect others [15] is contradicted by the obvious disagreement of
the band that brought the action.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual ?
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Some
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total 10 3
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37.1 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3. S.c.R. 1010; http://www.lexum.umontreaI.ca.
LAMER c.J. (Cory, Major J.J.)
Main Points: -Oral histories should be accepted on an equal footing with historical documents[87]
-aboriginal title it must be understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal
perspectives."1122
-It is a right in land that "confers the right to use the land for a variety of activities, not all of which
need be aspects of practices, customs and traditions which are integral to the distinctive cultures of
aboriginal societiesallows it to be used for certain activities."[III]
-for a use that aboriginal title does not permit (eg strip mining) the land must be surrendered.[131]
-so 35(1) provides a constitutional basis for negotiation -"We are all here to stay" [186]
[note -weakness of trial - all that evidence & only I judge to assess it - confused assessment
-detailed accounts of prior reasoning but not ofpleadings of parties or interveners]
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: -colonial era provided solid foundation for modern legality ego use ofSt. Catherines
[175]
-federal government functioned to protect aboriginal rights and land [176]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Reliance on Crown's assertion of sovereignty. Nowegijick not mentioned.
Belief that he can dictate. "I laid down in Gladstone"[167]
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: many "principles" based on his own previous reasoning [140,141] [148] [165]
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian; acceptance that assertion of sovereignty is a valid foundation for legality [145]
Egalitarian: desire to apply the same common law standard to Indigenous people [though the essence
of that common law standard is ignored] Title to be founded on both culture's perspectives[113]
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethno-centric: insistence that aboriginal land rights are sui generis [112=113]
-definition ofright in terms of Indian Act & Canadian decisions [120-121]
-reliance on academic opinion within his culture [145]
-common law as source of aboriginal title [147]
-application of Canadian constitutional principles when Indigenous peoples did not participate in the
formation of the constitution[177-8]
Respect: importance of oral histories recognized and supported.
-aboriginal perspective, including aboriginal law, to be considered as source oftitle[147][149]
-strong support for negotiations & inclusion ofall people affected [186]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Some
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Some
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Some
Total 9 3
1122 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia at [113].
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37.2 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3. S.CR. 1010; http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca.
LA FOREST J. (L'Heuruex-Dube) (McLachlin J.)
Main Points: If aboriginal people continue to occupy & use land then it is necessarily of central
significance to them
-"in developing vast tracts of land, the government is expected to consider the economic well being
ofillLCanadians. But aboriginal peoples must not be forgotten in this equation.,,1123
37.3 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3. S.CR. 1010; http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca.
MCLACHLIN J.
Agreed with both Lamer & La Forest's judgments.
38. R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.CR. 1128; 1998 CanLII 782 (S.CC)
MCLACHLIN J. (Lamer C.J.,L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache,
Binnie JJ.)
Main Point: The expectation that jurors will behave in accordance with their oaths does not obviate
the need for challenges when it is established that the community suffers from widespread prejudice
against people of the accused's race.[25]
1. Judge - Alien/Peer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined Accused is "aboriginal"
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined Though charged, issue was raised by accused.
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof Reference to studies to support findings
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed; legitimacy of use ofCriminal code & Canadian legality taken for granted
Consensual: reliance on Parliamentary intent
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled -principles enunciated
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian -aim to equalize position before the law
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: belief that judicial & juror impartiality can be achieved
I h h ld fi 11· .. f .Respect: ow t res 0 or a owmg questlOnmg 0 Jurors
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 6 7
1123 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia at [204].
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39 (a) Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, [1998) 2 S.C.R. 217; http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca
(S.C
Lamer C.J. L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache,
Binnie JJ.
Main Point" "The corollory of a legitimate attempt by one participant in Confederation to seek an
amendment to the Constitution is an obligation on all parties to come to the negotiating table"1124
Ifnot negotiated in accord with constitutional principles, secession would not have the legitimacy
needed for recognition by the international community.1125
Strong postcolonial initiative muddied by perpetuation ofcolonial historical perspectives &
methodologies.
Judge - Alien/Peer
Peer: Judges members of culture ofbirth or choice
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Self-Detennined: birth identity or chosen by immigration
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Own: Imposed by conquest, or chosen by immigration
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined -set by elected representative
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: status ofIndigenous peoples is irrelevant to the fonnation of the Canadian state.
All Canadians supported what the dominant actors did. [Almost no primary sources cited]
Proof: references to events & procedures [33-46]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Accepts British proclamatory authority [39]
Consensual: charted participation of colonies; confederation to "work together" [43]
-requirement for negotiation under the constitution to effect legitimate secession[ I04]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Principles declared on the basis of subjective analysis
Principled: Principles identified and applied. Principle of"effectivity" rejected [106]
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Constitution established by Imperial Parliament
Egalitarian: Canada established so different races can work together [43]
Consent of the governed is basic to understanding offree and democratic society.[67]
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: constitution established to ensure "continuity, stability and legal order."[33]
Democracy emerged in the colonial era.[63]
Resnect; federalism to reconcile diversity with unity[43]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-detennined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Mutually detennined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total: Canada 5 10
1124 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [88].
1125 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec at [96].
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39(b) Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998) 2 S.C.R. 217; http://www.Iexum.llmontreal.ca
(S.c.c.)
Lamer C.J., L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache,
Binnie JJ.
For Quebec: The fact that the Constitution considered was imposed by conquest was not
considered.
1. Judge - Alien/Peer - Chief Justice and two judges from Quebec[I35], but with allegiance to
Canada
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined - province of Canada
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Foreign: Legal system imposed by conquest, but
Own: Formally participated in formulation of constitution, French is an official language.
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed; Quebec did not agree to participate. Amicus curiae appointed but supported case against
secession[I35] but procedure was public with some interveners from Quebec.
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal.
Bias: Amicus curiae supported case against secession[135]
Open: Many intervenors
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: judicial notice of an Anglo-Canadian version of history
Proof: Data concerning Quebec participation in Canada
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Quebec bound by a constitution it did not consent to [47]
Consensual: Negotiation required if a clear majority votes on a clear question
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory source of principles. (Based on judicial opinion concerning a tautologically selective
account of history)
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: The legitimacy of the Imperial foundation of the state assumed.
Egalitarian: Support for minority rights & popular voice through vote
10. Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: ignored conquest of Quebec
Respect: French official language, participation in Confederation.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total: Quebec 10 8
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39 (c) Reference Re Secession ofQuebec 2 S.C.R. 217; http://www.Iexum.umontreaI.ca (S.c.c.)
Lamer C.J., L'Heureux-DuM, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache,
BinnieJJ.
Aboriginal interests were specifically represented by 4 of the 13 interveners. The court referred to
"aboriginal peoples" to defend its claim that Canada has a "long tradition of respect for
minorities"[82] and to cast doubt on the undecided question of whether or not Quebec represented a
"people".[138-139]
Yet its version of history and account of the effect of international law completely ignored the
ambiguity raised when Indigenous experiences are considered and it declined to consider "the
concerns of the aboriginal peoples".[125], [139].
Judge - Alien/Peer -No Indigenous judges
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined generic "aboriginal peoples" seen as minorities.[96]
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Foreign: imposed system, foreign languages
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined: set by representative of colonial governments
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal- Indigenous interveners.
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: No evidence to support claim of protection for aboriginal rights [46]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual Need for Indigenous consent ignored [139]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Principles declared on the basis of subjective analysis
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Despite presence of many Indigenous interveners, the legitimacy of the colonial
assumption of sovereignty was assumed.
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: included "races" do not include Indigenous peoples[43] Indigenous languages ignored.
Subjection of Metis represented by Riel not mentioned.[45] Treaties with Indigenous nations
ignored.
Right of colonial peoples to self-determination declared "irrelevant to this Reference."[132]
Respect: Constitutional protection for Aboriginal peoples considered "important"[82] but would
only be "taken into account" in constitutional negotiations between Canada and Quebec.[139].
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Some
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Some
Total: Indigenous 9 2
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40. R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.CR.393; 1999 CanlII 673 (S.CC)
CORY J. (Lamer C.J., L'Heureux-DuM, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie JJ.)
Main Point: The accused's acquittal was confirmed in circumstances similar to Sioui, but with
"properly drafted regulations", the Crown could reasonably limit the hunting rights of Treaty No.6
adherents. [46]
Note:- Poor communication. Fact someone else cut the trees not dealt with until third court
hearing.[19]
-treaty seen as "sacred". Consensual nature of "agreement" not commented upon.[24]
-Nowegijigk translated into Badger & repeated like a mantra, lacking nuanced insight
-Secession Reference duty to negotiate not mentioned.
-no awareness of the way the procedures used interfere with recognizing a "sphere of
autonomy"
-Cory claimed that it was not necessary to decide whether the regulations applied to Sundown
because "the appeal was resolved without reference to the Constitution Act, 1982 but, by his own
account, the acquittal he affirm"ed was based on the "constitutionally right to hunt".
1. Judge - AlienlPeer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: "virgin Forest" pre-colonization??[43]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: honour of Crown understood as unilateral treaty interpretation[24]
Crown could legislate to limit hunting rights [46]
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled Badger principles applied
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian Advocated curtailing treaty right through regulation[45]
Relied on precedential authority without considering consensual spirit of treaty procedure
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethno centric: concept of legality
Respect: Expeditionary hunting
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 8 4
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41. R. v. Gladue, {1999]1 S.c.R. 688; 1999 CanLII 679 (S.c.c.).
CORY & IACOBUCCI JJ. (Lamer C.J., L'Heureux-Dube, Bastarache, Binnie JJ.)
Main Point: Whether or not an aboriginal offender lives on a reserve, sentencing should take
account of their particular situation, including the systemic disadvantages experienced by aboriginal
people.
-"sad and pressing social problem" [64]represented by the "tragic overrepresentation of aboriginal
people in prisons[87] discussed without acknowledging role of colonialism or residential schools.
-example of how a problem can be characterized in a way that avoids confronting its source.
-charges related to political incidents such as Riel "uprising" or more recently Oka, Gustaffsen Lake,
Burnt Church, Ipperwash & Kanesatake policing not mentioned in broad discussion of the context.
1. Judge - Alien/Peer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Imposed concept of "aboriginal" but accused self-identified as "Cree".
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof -Articles, RCAP considered.
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Colonial legal framework not questioned
Consensual: Indigenous concepts from RCAP accommodated
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Judge declares sentence
Egalitarian(?) restorative justice -goal of restitution & reintegration in community
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: failure to consider colonialism & residential schools as root cause of pervasive
problems
-Canadian culture called "traditional"[77] Failure to recognize political objection or jurisdictional
disputes in list of causes of convictions [per Oka, Kanesatake etc or treaty interpretation cases] [80]
Respect: recognition of importance of restorative justice[70]
-recognition that aboriginal opinions vary [72] -rejection of assumptions [78]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 7 7
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42.1 Corbiere v. Canada (Minister ofIndian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.c.R. 203; 1999
CanLII 687 (S.C.C.).
MCLACHLIN & BASTARACHE JJ. (Lamer C.J., Cory, Major JJ.)
Main Points: -"Aboriginality-residence" is an analogous ground under s.15 because it is an
immutable "personal characteristic essential to an Aboriginal band member's personal identity"[14]
-"it is not the ground that varies from case to case, but the determination of whether a distinction... is
discriminatory". [9]
-"conflation of the second and third stages of the Law framework is to be avoided." [12]
-same profile as majority decision
[-State they believe that "this case can be solved on simpler grounds" than those offered by
L'Heureux-Dube, then launch into a discussion of analogous and enumerated grounds that is
incomprehensible to anyone not versed in the esoteric lore of Supreme Court of Canada reasoning.]
1. Judge - AlienlPeer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed: "Batchewana Band took no part in the trial"[32]
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: -said RCAP stressed "fundamental importance of retaining and enhancing their
cultural identity while living in urban areas" but there was no evidence showing distance voting was
part of the cultural heritage ... or that voting in band council elections facilitates access to community
and elders.[17]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Lesser Slave Lake submissions re consultative process ignored, like majority.
Consensual: absolute denial of political rights decried [19]
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Egalitarian: purpose ofs.15 [5]
10. Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ego/ethnocentirc: claim that Aboriginal residence decisions not comparable to those of other
Canadians. Failure to acknowledge rootedness of some Canadians; fact that some reserves are not
Indigenous homelands & that some places of off-reserve residence are. EG. Batchewana - much off-
reserve residence was on initial reserve allocation.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 10 5.5
Ixxviii
42.2 Corhiere v. Canada (Minister ofIndian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.c.R. 203; 1999
CanLII 687 (S.c.c.).
L'HEUREUX-DUBE (gonthier, Iacobucci, Binnie)
Main Points: "though it would be legitimate for Parliament to create different voting rights for
reserve residents and people living off-reserve, ... it is not legitimate for Parliament to completely
exclude [non-residents] from voting rights."[114]
-finding is postcolonial in recognition of political rights of non-residents but colonizing in its view
that the solution can be dictated by a Parliament in which those concerned have no effective voice.
-completely ignores the well documented goal of assimilation that prevailed at the time the basic
form of the Indian Act was set.
-remedy with only 18 month suspension completely ignored the complexity of consultation required
making the required expertise very thin on the ground & making everyone prioritize their issue.
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Case directly affected the rights of on-reserve' Indians" but there was no representation of any at
trial, not even of the Batchewana band.[32] and the absense ofevidence concerning their situation
was a factor in the reasoning [69].
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: broadening issue & notifying only provincial AG's is notice to all "those who have a
stake in the outcome"[49] No evidence to support findings re factors determining who lived on or
offreserve[62]
Intention of the legislature in limiting voting to on-reserve "Indians" not considered.
-No evidence to support finding re "Parliament's objective" for the legislation[99]
Proof: some evidence re situation ofBatchewana band - though it was ignored in the reasoning.
Evidence supporting material assumptions was weak.
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: legality based on own prior reasoning.[97] dictatorial remedy ignored band realities
[118]
Principled: common-law methodology used [110]
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: ignored fact the Batchewana Band did not participate in formulation of the Indian Act.
Egalitarian: listed arguments made by all present at trial [106-109] democracy respects
minorities[116]
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Off-reserve band members described as "a discrete and insular minority" [62]though
over 62% of Batchewana band lived offreserve.[27] [Canadian rather than Batchewana perspective]
Context is "Canadian society".[63] Failed to see concerns raised by C-3linflux though mentioned by
intervener.[109]
Respect: "reasonable person" defined in perfect accord with post-colonial requirements [65].
In remedies, listed proposals of parties & most interveners. [106-1091 respect for minorities[ 117]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 10 5.5
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43.1 R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.CR. 456; http://www.Iexum.umontreaI.ca(S.CC)
BINNIE J. (Lamer C.J. L'Heureux-Dube, Cory, Iacobucci, Binnie)
Main Point: Extrinsic evidence concerning the historical and social context in which a treaty was
negotiated can be taken into account when interpreting the common intent of the parties.
-The trial judge's findings offact must be respected, but failure to give adequate weight to the
concerns and perspectives of one of the parties is an error oflaw.
1. Judge - Alien/Peer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: "In my view, the treaty rights are limited to securing "necessaries". [7]
[note unsubstantiated acceptance by expert & Binnie that treaty rights were "subject to regulation"
[38]
Proof: careful consideration of the documentary sources. Reference to Dr. Patterson's evidence[37]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: dependent of British recognition of Mi'kmaq rights [19]
Unilaterally imposed regulations can be enforced without violating treaty rights [62]
Consensual: no limitation on treaty right unless included in the treaty[65]
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: reliance on precedent [9-14-
Principled: many explained
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Imposed own category and threatened Marshall for violation. [8]
Egalitarian: "A deal is a deal. The same rules of interpretations should apply."[21]
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: legality founded on British recognition[[19] Treaty interpreted as unilateral granting of
rights rather than inter-cultural or international agreement[54]
-Respect: trial judge erred by failing to give adequate weight to the concerns of the Mi'kmaq.[19]
"there can be no limitation on the method, timing and extent of Indian hunting under Treaty", apart, I
would add, from a treaty limitation to that effect".[65]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 9 6
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43.2 R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.c.R. 456; http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca (S.c.c.)
MCLACHLIN J. (Gonthier J.)
Main Point: A general treaty right to trade cannot be founded on an expired exclusive trade
covenant.
-"A claimant seeking to rely on a treaty right to defeat a charge of violating Canadian law must first
establish a treaty right that protects, expressly or by inference, the activities in question." [110]
-A treaty right must be defmed so that the government can know how far it may justifiably trench on
the right in the collective interest of Canadians. [I 12]
-"generous" interpretative principles stated [110] but not applied.
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined assumed Mi'kmaq were British subjects
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: -that the Mi'kmak were British subjects & acknowledged British jurisdiction over N.S
[86]
Proof: -used to support finding of mutual understanding[89]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: presumption that British law applied to Mi'kmaq as to British though the treaty only
included agreement that inter-cultural conflict would be solved by British law.
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritatian: precedents, not reasons found principle of interpreting in historical/cultural
context[81]
-Assumed British had the right to dictate who could and could not trade[86]
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Assumption that there is no right unless it is "granted" by treaty[108]
Respect: each treaty to be interpreted in its historical and cultural context[8 I]
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Some
Total 9 3.5
lxxxi
44 (a) R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.c.R. 533; 1999 CanLII 666 (S.c.c.).
THE COURT (Lamer C.J. L'Heureux-DuM, Gonthier, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Binnie)
Main Point: The majority judgment in R. v. Marshall was misunderstood.[2]
-"The Court did not hold that the Mi'Kmaq treaty right cannot be regulated". [2] "It is up to the
Crown to decide whether or not it wishes to support the applicability of government regulations"[2].
-" ... the merits of the government's justification [for regulation] may vary from resource to resource,
species to species, community to community and time to time."[22]
[-effect of the judgment was to place very narrow limits on the right that seemed to be affIrmed in the
majority reasons in the initial judgment.
Judge - Alien/Peer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: Britain had a right to impose its laws on Indigenous people in "Nova Scotia".
Proof: Careful documentation of its explanation of its own past pronouncements
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: implicit requirement that Mi'kmaq get approval from Canada to do anything with
resources[20]
Crown can decide whether or not to impose regulations and whether or not to enforce them. [2]
Consensual: support for negotiated solutions [22] though firm support for "Government" discretion
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: "The exercise of treaty rights may be regulated"[35] (no ref to intemationallaw)
Principled: Some principles better enunciated here than in Marshall 1. ego
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: "the government's regulatory power is clearly affIrmed"[25]
presumption that only Canada has a right to impose regulation of resource use.[20-21]
Government may define treaty right "in terms that can be ... understood by the Mi'kmaq
community"[37]
Egalitarian: entitled to immediate acquittal like any other accused found not-guilty.[8] right to know
the case to meet.[15] Intention of both parties to a treaty to be considered. [1 9] "equitable
sharing"[3 8]
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Presumption that one party's conception of the import of the treaties prevails and that
no legal solution is possible other than that generated by Canadian legal culture.
- Indigenous conceptions are invisible ego "Gaspegewich = "the end of the land".
Respect: (Less) Agreements negotiated with Britain varied from community to community.[17]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes SeIf-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual ?
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Less
Total: for Mi'kmaq 9 4.3
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44 (b) R. v. Marshall [1999]3 S.c.R. 533; 1999 CanLII 666 (S.c.c.).
THE COURT (Lamer C.J. L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Binnie)
Main Point: The majority judgment in R. v. Marshall was misunderstood. [2]
-"The Court did not hold that the Mi'Kmaq treaty right cannot be regulated". [2] "It is up to the
Crown to decide whether or not it wishes to support the applicability ofgovernment regulations"[2].
-" ... the merits of the government's justification [for regulation] may vary from resource to resource,
species to species, community to community and time to time."[22]
[Obvious social & cultural differences between the members of the Court and the fishermen's
coalition suggest that the case had a colonizing effect on them as well.]
Judge - AlienlPeer -social experience & culture radically different from fishermen
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined-
Imposed: the people ofNova Scotia did not consent to join Confederation. Secession Reference [48]
Self-Determined: Represented through 2 separate provinces, members of Parliament &
municipalities
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own -Canadian institutional venue
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined -The motion considered was filed by the Coalition.
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal-public, interveners, arguments reviewed
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof - as for Mi'kmaq
Concept of law - imposed / consensual-Imposed by Court interpretation. Enforcement of
regulations is at the unfettered discretion of "the Government".[2]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled -as for Mi'kmaq
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian - as for Mi'kmaq
-high level of government regulatory discretion equally applied to all
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect -blind to the fishermen's fears &
rt'expe Ise
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total: Settler 7 6
Ixxxiii
45. Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 S.c.R. 783; 2000 SCC 32 (CanLII).
THE COURT
( McLachlin C.J.L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel)
Main Point: Act's purpose is to protect public safety. Parliament may control indirectly[40]
1. Judge-AlienJPeer Are judges peers to farmers & hunters?
6.Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: relied on study saying deaths "may" increase in jurisdictions with fewest restriction
without evidence re actual effect.[21] Comparison ofguns to cars based purely on subjective
experience.[43]. Proof: citing Hansard[20]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual Imposed: Parliament's purpose conflated with
bureaucratic interpretation [20] Consultation not needed[56]
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled Declaratory: Rand J. in Margerine Reference cited
without explanation re ends served by criminallaw[32]
"prohibitions and penalties are not regulatory in nature"[38]
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect:
Ethnocentric: Concept of guns, cars [43-45] What did interveners argue? Analysis of the perspectives
ff: & h . b' b0 armers untrers conspIcuous )y ItS a sence.
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision ?
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total: re Alberta 6 6.5
Main Point: Consultation with "rural aboriginal Canadians" has no bearing on division of powers
analysis.[56] [ Issues may be characterized to completely exclude Indigenous concerns.]
Procedure -in camera/biased/public interveners equal Most Indigenous peoples not represented
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof -Assumption: People who would have trouble
accessing the registration scheme would be able to argue their case in court.[56]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual Consultation not required to ensure legality.,[56]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled -principles externally applied.
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian -no inclusion in formation of regulatory scheme
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: "Firearms are often used as weapons in violent crime"[43] "Guns cannot be divided
into two categories"[45] Indigenous concerns are irrelevant to questions related to division of
[56] "G I' d' d I T' [54]powers. un contro IS Irecte at a mora eVI
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total: Aboriginal 10 1
Ixxxiv
46. R. v. Catcheway, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 838; 2000 SCC 33 (CanLII).
IACOBUCCI J.
(McLachlin C.J. L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel 11.)
Main Point: When there has been a reasonable apprehension of bias a new trial is warranted
[Note - Court of Appeal had dismissed without giving reasons]
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined - charge but defence raised the issue at hand
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Concept of law - imposed / consensual Crown agreed - evidence showed bias
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled -prior involvement raises reasonable apprehension of bias
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian -standard rules of procedural fairness applied
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect -New trial ordered -chance to present
case in a neutral tribunal
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes SeIf-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Respect/place for others Yes
Total 4 7
Ixxxv
47. Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.c.R. 950; 2000 SCC 37 (CanLII).
IACOBUCCI J.
( L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Arbour, J1.)
Main Points: The equality guarantee in s.15 of the Charter are not violated by a scheme designed to
benefit a disadvantaged group to the exclusion of an equally disadvantaged group.
-At this point, s.15(2) appears to serve as an aid to interpreting the rights protected by s.15(1).
-The casino program did not affect the core of federal jurisdiction under the Constitution Act, J867
s.91(24)
[The reasoning in the case seems bizarre & twisted. Argument turned on Indian Act status leaving the
issues totally colonized. The context is fundamentally troubling. Should the right to self-government
for anyone depend on a casino operation? Should a government promote and exploit addictions on
the pretence that this will make it possible to realize an inherent right?]
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Imposed: Identity of all parties defined in relation to Canada's Indian Act[79]
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed: Parties status defined by the Indian Act.
Mutually Determined: Parties defined the issues brought to court
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: a casino operation can be used to promote equality
Proof: the background and development of the scheme
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: judicial precedent used to dictate the interpretation of the Charter [93-108]
-Constitution Act, 1867 used to define jurisdiction [109-111]
Consensual-reliance on the partnership quality of the casino venture[82]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: approach relies heavily on the subjective interpretation of the judiciary
Principled: Serious search for guiding principles though contact with reality lost in esoteric
legalisms.
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: presumption Canada has government which may persist in withholding self-
government[78]
Egalitarian: arguments of all parties seem to be explained with unusual care
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: "reasonable person, in the circumstances of the claimant"[55] applied to find, in
essence, that the claimants were unreasonable to raise their concerns[90]
Respect: each community has its own history & relations with government[lO]
- s.15(1) concerned with personal autonomy and self-determination-"human dignity" definition. [54]
" bl t' fth I' t" [55]- reasona e perspec lve 0 e Caiman
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Some
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Some
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 9 6
lxxxvi
48. Musqueam Indian Band v. Glass, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 633; 2000 SCC 52 (CanLII).
MCLACHLIN C.J. (L'Heureux-Dube, Iacobucci, Arbour JJ.) (dissent)
Main Points: "Current land value" means the actual value of similar land held in fee simple and it
should not be reduced by 50% because it is situated on a reserve.
-The Band could sell so "The reserve character ofthe land.. .is not a legal restriction" [14]
-"Except where the parties expressly provide for a different method of valuation, it is plain meaning
and common practice that should provide the default." [18]
GONTHIER J. (Major, Binnie, LeBel JJ.)
Main Points: The actual state ofthe land, including the fact that it is part ofthe reserve, should be
used to calculate "current land value".
BASTARACHE J.
Main Point: Land evaluation must respect legal restrictions, including reserve status.
Note: There was no conflict with the Crown in this case. The Musqueam chose to lease their land
and did so by invoking Canadian legal paradigms.
Judge - Alien/Peer - Judges are alien to Musqueam culture
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined Chose to lease under Canadian law
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own Chose to lease under Canadian law
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined Imposed by the renters but according to lease terms
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions/supported by proof *Except McLachlin omission re Salish Park[ 13.26]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual-eoncem with intent of the parties
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
*Declaratory: (McLachlin only) Evidence regarding Salish Park was ignored without explanation
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian Applied same rules to all regardless of status.
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
R dthM It lh· thl·
- especte e usqueam cu ura c Olce re e easmg.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Respect/place for others Yes
Total 4 9
MusQueam
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased 1* Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions 1* Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Respect/place for others Yes
Total Renters * McLachlin decision only 2* 10
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49. R. v.Deane, [2001)1 S.c.R. 279; 2001 SCC5 (CanLII).
MCLACHLIN C. J.(L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour,
LeBel JJ.)
R. v. Deane, (2000), 143 c.c.c. (3d) 84,129 O.A.C. 335; 2000 CanLII 17047 (ON.C.A.).
Main Point: Procedural error does not merit a retrial unless it could produce a different outcome.
The fundamental issues concerning relations between Canada and the Indigenous nations was
avoided. The policeman with his finger on the trigger was found guilty of criminal negligence, not
the federal bureaucracy that created the problem or the provincial officials who sent him there with a
gun in his hands.
1. Judge - Alien/Peer - same basic socialization for Deane/ foreign for George
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined Canadian citizen/alien designation as "aboriginal"
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own -own culture/colonially imposed culture
Issues - Imposed /mutually determined -protocols & legal code Deane professionally supported
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal -public
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: deceptive basis for the police action against the protesters ignored
Proof: evidence concerning Deane's actions closely considered
Concept of law - imposed / consensual Imposed command model: Deane consented through
parliament to the standards ofhis culture/ not George
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory as the explanation had to be deduced from the Criminal Code
Principled for Deane's concerns principles used in the analysis were set out/George's unaddressed
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian command model of legality implemented & supported
Egalitarian equality before and under the law imposed
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: No insight into the conceptual trap created for Deane inducing him a lie/imagined rifle
flash; George's perspective assumed to be irrelevant to the issues
R F' . th d "I d'" I b hesnect: Im1 assertIOn at unarme n lans can no onger e s ot.
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Peer decision Yes
2. Parties Imposed identity Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total reo Deane 6 10
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total reo Geofl~e 9 4
lxxxviii
50. 1 Mitchell v. MN.R., [2001]1 S.c.R. 911; 2001 SCC 33 (CanLII).
MCLACHLIN c.J. (Gonthier, Iacobucci, Arbour, LeBel JJ.)
Main Point: "claims must be proven on the basis ofcogent evidence establishing their validity on
the balance ofprobabilities."[5l]
[technique used was to redefine the issues then to claim that the new definition was not met]
[according to Binnie, there was much debate on sovereignty at trial & at the SCC [69] but McLachlin
avoided this issue which is actually central to the case[64] - or at least it seems to have been from the
perspectives of both Mitchell and the Crown.
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Biased: case to meet defined in territorial terms at the SCC then used to exclude on the basis that
even "Chief Mitchell did not discuss Mohawk trading activity north of the St. Lawrence River." [25,
48,55]
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: Characterizations ofAdams, and Gladstone ignore their acknowledged evidentiary
limits[52]
Little evidence to show Mohawks did not carry goods north of river (but main problem is
categorization)
Role of Mohawks in modem state formation ignored.
Evidence: much close analysis though ego she misread Richter.
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: The Court asserted the right to characterise the right claimed based on Van der Peet[I 5]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Conceptual requirements - of time & space [55]
Assertion of the doctrine ofcontinuity not founded in "prior informed consent" or anything else [62]
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Mohawk cultural conceptions ignored. Equal access to law making function not
considered.
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Ignored symbolic nature of MitcheWs action though evidence was before the
court.[85-89].
Imposed own definition of the issues.[25]
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total 10 3
lxxxix
50.2 Mitchell v. MN.R., [2001] 1 S.c.R. 911; 2001 SCC 33 (CanLII).
BINNIE J. (Major J.)
Main Points: Control over the mobility of persons and goods into the country is a fundamental
attribute of sovereignty[ 160] Aboriginal people are themselves part ofCanadian sovereignty. [164]
Indigenous mobility rights across the Canada-Us Boundary are incompatible with European (now
Canadian) sovereignty and never came into existence. [172-3]
-adopted McLachlin's reasons, so most of the same indicia apply. Additional considerations:
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined Set out Mitchell's arguments but answered own
conception of the issues
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: Canada's international obligations depend on instruments it has not ratified [81-83]
-advantage from intercultural (cross-border) role is not Indigenous[92] [v. Richter]
-the People of the Longhouse go back 10,000 years.[131]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: audacious reinterpretation of the Two Row ignored the need for consent to agreements
[130]
-ignored need for consent to found a"confederal relationship"[150]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Claim Canada tried to minimize the disruption caused by the border [84]
-RCAP sees Aboriginals as full participants in a shared Canadian sovereignty so they are part of
it.[135]
-accepted that sovereignty could simply be declared by 1783 Treaty ofParis[157]
- Vattel's declaratory concept oflegality uncritically accepted. [163]
-asserted a right to impose an external assessment of what defmes Mohawk culture [164]
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Egalitarian: Mohawks Canada each have "own framework of legal rights and responsibilities.[131]
[So blind to meaning of Two Row & need for sharing that it detracts from shared sovereignty
concept]
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: 1906 Privy council concepts uncritically accepted.[108] "The Constitution was
patriated and all aspects of our sovereignty became firmly located within our borders" [129]
-Sees longhouse as "spiritual" rather than governmental practice.[117]
Respect: Mohawk problems & wish to reunite community divided by imposed boundary
described.[77, 90]"From the respondent's point of view, the aboriginal right flows from Mohawk
sovereignty." [117]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian some
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 10 4.5
xc
51.1 Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town), [2001)3 S.c.R. 746; 2001 SCC 85 (CanLII).
IACOBUCCI J. ( McLachlin C..J., Binnie, Arbour, LeBel JJ.)
Main Points: -"this Court is not required to give legal effect to an unauthorized act of the state" [69]
-the band's exercise of regulatory powers is limited and must be consistent with other
regulations[77}
-when ambiguity makes two interpretations possible, the one favourable to Indian interests
prevails[68]
[The authority under which the canal was taken was not explained.[39] Case is.a product of colonial
modes of operation which were not directly repudiated by the Court. Drawing on Lambert's
reasoning in the BCCA, the Court, none the less, endorsed a decoIonizing approach.]
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined laws imposed but band decided to tax.
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Noted the problem of insufficient evidence on significant aspects of the case[38-40]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Crown may remove land from reserve if intent is clear and plain.[47]
Governor in Council is the grantor of the interest.[80] need for consent not considered
-Indigneous rights emphatically subordinated to Crown sovereignty[166-7]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled many principles based on own reasoning
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: non-consultative expropriation process validated [57]
Egalitarian: rejection of idea that "Indians" suffer from "incapacity".[44].
-instead of trumping Indian interest, public interest must be reconciled with it[57]
-limits both Governor in council[69] and band[77]
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Crown wanted to ensure "Indians are not dispossessed of their entitlements"[46]
Respect: acknowledgement that expropriation of reserve land is different because of the "sui
generis" nature of the aboriginal interest".[45]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 8 6
xci
51.2 Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town), [2001] 3 S.c.R. 746; 2001 SCC 85 (CanLII).
GONTHIER J. (L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Major, Bastarache, JJ.)
Main Points: "Whereas a treaty is the product of bargaining between two contracting parties,
statutes relating to Indians are an expression of the will ofParliament ... "[and] must be read "with a
view to elucidating what it was that Parliament wished to effect."[124]
-"a bare interest in reserve land which is not also the object ofaboriginal title, treaty rights or such
other aboriginal rights cannot be considered to be an "aboriginal right" that is protected under s.35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982".[169]
The case did not attack the expropriation ofthe land, the amount ofland taken or the adequacy of the
compensation.[156] "Once it is ascertained that s.35 of the Indian Act allows the expropriation ofa
fee, the possibility ofthe removal ofland from a reserve by expropriation can only be impeached by
attacking the constitutionality of s.35 of the Indian Act, or suggesting that somehow a particular
instance ofgovernment consent, or indeed all consent to the expropriation of full ownership, is a
breach of the Crown's fiduciary obligation."[157]
1. Judge - Alien/Peer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Band decided to tax canal lands in context of imposed laws
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumed the appropriation of the land the canal was on was valid.
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: distinction between consensual sale and non-consensual expropriation irrelevant [138]
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: reliance on the court's own past findings[138] Law of expropriation [149]
Principles: Those relied on are explained
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: understanding ofIndians irrelevant to expropriation of their land [124]
Governor in Council may impose terms as he sees fit.[131]
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Reliance on debate in a parliament where Indians had no vote or representation[151]
Place: Interpret statute broadly to maintain rights & narrowly to limit rights [125]
Open to constitutional challenge re validity of s.35 of the Indian Act?[142]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Some
Total 9 4.5
xcii
52. Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister ofSmall Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002]
2 S.c.R. 146; 2002 SCC 31 (CanLII).
LEBEL J .. (McLachlin C.J. Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel n.)
Main Points: "the Court should be particularly cautious about invalidating a provincial law when
the federal government does not contest its validity".[72]
-The British Columbia Heritage Conservation Act considers First Nations' culture as part of the
heritage of all residents of British Columbia [44]. Though the "overwhelming prevalence" of objects
that the act applies to are aboriginal, its pith and substance is property, so it is intra vires the
province.
-The "need to exploit the province's natural resources ... in order to maintain a viable economy that
can sustain the province's population" must be balanced with "the need to preserve all types of
cultural and heritage objects".[76]
[If decolonization had been in issue, the fact that permits to cut culturally modified trees (CMT's)
required the Minister's consent, not the Indigenous people's consent, would have been determinative.
-This is a case that cannot see the Forest for the trees!! Court did not consider that the Forest itself
might be part ofKitkatia cultural heritage.]
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own equated with all people in B.C. [69]
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined Need to prove aboriginal right, not established that "the
essential and distinctive core values ofIndianness" were affected.[76]
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: no evidence to prove that logging the area including the CMT's was a "goal deemed by
society to be of greater value" & not just a profit-making venture for the logging companies. [62]
-no evidence to show respect for Indigenous rights would prohibit a viable economy[76]
-assumption the province's population needs to be maintained when in-migration is actually
encouraged
Proof: related to ss. of act, past case law.
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Considered exclusively according to Canadian constitutional parameters
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled as per usual case law analysis
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian Minister's consent required, not the peoples' .s.13(4)
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethno-centric: Purpose of legislation narrowly defined- extrinsic evidence is only seen as being
"Hansard or the minutes of parliamentary committees"[53] Concept of shared sovereignty includes
no Indigneous sphere (contrary to Binnie's supplemental reflections in Mitchell). No consciousness
of the way "exploitation ofnatural resources today" rather than preservation of the environment for
future generations is a culturally specific purpose.[65]
Respect: sets out positions of the parties[3 1-41 ] "Native concerns must be weighed at most steps of
the administrative process"[44]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Some
Total 9 3
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53.1 Ross River Dena Council Band v. Canada, [2002] 2 S.c.R. 816; 2002 SCC 54 (CanLII).
BASTARACHE J. (McLachlin c..J. L'Heureux-Dube) (minority reasons)
Main Points: : "the Crown is still free to deal with its land in any other manner it wishes"[7]
-S.18(d) of the Territorial Lands Act only concerned use of vacant land for agriculture and did not
limit the Crown's prerogative re reserve creation.[8]
-a reserve may be created by many formal procedures, provided the Crown intends to create a
reserve.[IO]
[supporting reasons - Score as per LeBel's reasons]
6.Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: The land where the Dena live belongs to the Crown [7]
Proof: disagreement between officials in contact with Indigenous people and Ottawa [72-75]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
If the Dena are part ofCanada, no consideration of the terms of their joining.
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: requirements for reserve creation set out, but source not explained [1, 6]
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: "the Crown is still free to deal with its land in any other manner it wishes"[7]
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethno-centric: No sense that the concept of "royal prerogative" may have changed over time or that
it is alien to Dena culture. No consideration of the principle that ambiguities should be decided in
favour of the Indigenous nation.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Little
Total 10 3.3
xciv
53.2 Ross River Dena Council Band v. Canada, [2002] 2 S.c.R. 816; 2002 SCC 54 (CanLII).
LEBEL J. (Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Binnie, Arbour)
Main Points: To create a reserve the Crown agent must "have represented [the Crown] in very
important authoritative functions"[66] and must have intended to create a reserve.
1. Judge - AlienlPeer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
In camera: Case to meet not known in advance - decided on the basis ofSioui test and the implicit
claim that the Dena could not reasonably have perceived the Canadian officials as being sufficiently
authorative to bind the Crown.[As in Bear Island effect goes beyond declaratory reasoning]
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: Ross River Dena would perceive differences in interests recorded in the Yukon Land
Registry & perceive that registry of their land was not important enough to be a reserve[66]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: issue of Indigneous consent to arrangements with Canada not considered
Consensual: end comment supporting the negotiation process for the Umbrella agreement, but the
Dena who had not participated, [19]were left in the air.
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
-the "reasonably seen by the First Nation" test was identified [64,69] but not really applied.
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: without a treaty, "the Governor-in-Council is free to designate any Crown land the
Crown chooses as a reserve for a particular band". [62] General presumption is that Canada
determines what the law is without Indigenous participation.
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Without a treaty, Governor in Council is under no obligation to set aside land for a
band[62]
Presumption that Ross River Dena perceive importance of Crown agents in the same sense they
do[66]
Respect - detailed account of all parties pleadings; "Indians' point of view" from Sioui[64]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning; Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Little
Total 10 3.3
xcv
54. Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.c.R. 245; 2002 SCC 79 (CanLIij.
BINNIE J.
(McLachlin C..J.L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel
JJ.)
Main Points: Both bands had agreed to the existing use of the reserves so no substantive wrong was
done.
Discretionary control is "a basic ingredient in a fiduciary relationship". [80]
"The fiduciary duty imposed on the Crown does not exist at large but in relation to specific Indian
interests.[81] Outside the Constitution Act, 1982 s.35, the S.C.C. has only recognized fiduciary duty
in relation to land[81]???
-Note reliance of bands on authoritarian "black letter law" to create "legislative entitlement" through
ditto mark error [52] used to claim equitable remedy.
-Consider why fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown is considered sui generis in the colonial
context
Judge - Alien-Peer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined Indian Act incorporated chosen designation
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own Kwakwala language[9]
Foreign:Trial judge held Cape Mudge Indians could understand English directly or with interpreter in
1907.
Own:The venue was chosen by the Indigenous parties
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined Decided own issues
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal?
Bias? Binnie, the judge who wrote the reasons, was Crown counsel in early stages(Wewaykum II)
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Proof: detailed bureaucratic paper trial [10]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: OIC procedure "transferred administration and control" of reserve land to federal
Crown[51]
Consensual:_"wishes of the Indians" sought & respected. [6, 24, 37] The Court should not "allow the
true intention of the parties to be frustrated by "technical" rules embodied in the common law.[43]
-negotiated ditto marks distinguished from these[54]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory assertion of the political trust doctring [73]
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: reliance on Anglo-Canadian legality
Egalitarian: Crown conceived as neutral arbiter in accord whith the character of the application[96]
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: assertion of the Anglo-Canadian legal canon [73-75] assertion of British sovereignty
seen as a "necessity".[79] Assumed, no Aboriginal obligations[95]
R f h . [31 41]
*Most colomal mdlcla occur m the diSCUSSIOn of"sui generis fiduCIary duty" that IS not essential
[after 72] Case assessed without consideration of issues raised by Wewaycum II.
esoect: sets out posItions 0 t e parties -
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture Yes
4. Issues Imposed Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased ? Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes* Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes* Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes* Respect/place for others Yes
Total 7 9
..
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55. R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.c.R. 207; 2003 SCC 43 (CanLII).
THE COURT (McLachlin C..J. Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel,
Deschamps 11.)
Main Points: Aboriginal rights are communal rights [24]
-Metis identity can be determined on the basis of self-identification, ancestral connection and
community acceptance.[30] [though remaining under the control of Canadian courts]
- The Van der Peet test can be applied to determine Metis rights that were distinctive and integral to
the pre-control Metis community.[38]
1. Judges - AlienlPeer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined Imposed minority status, but self-identified
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined charge countered by self-determined argument
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Pre-control test not identified until the SCC level so Powley could not know the case to meet. If
convicted a retrial should have been ordered.
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof -evidence reviewed
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Consensual: self identification & aqcceptance of community determines identity [31-3]
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled ego purpose of s.35 protection a declared principle [13]
Van der Peet principles declared applicable
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: imposition of European legality equated with control [39]
Egalitarian: Personal identity & community opinion crucial for determining Metis identity[31-3]
-Metis to be treated by analogy as Inuit and Indians[37]
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: "Riel rebellions" [26] depersonalized references to "Indian band".[35]
Respect: Community allowed to self-identify members
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Little Respect/place for others Yes
Total 7.3 8
xcvii
56. R. v. Blais, [2003] 2 S.c.R. 236; 2003 SCC 44 (CanLII).
(McLachlin C..J. Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel, Deschamps 11.)
THE COURT
Main Points: Metis are not entitled to benefit from the protection for "Indians" under the N.R.T.A.
-Metis and 'Indians" were separate and distinguishable groups at the time of the NRTA.
-A requirement for continuity of language should not be imposed on the constitution as a whole.
-only Crown's view of the law considered [33]
-colonizing effect of case derives from foundation on an imposed legality. Metis arguments (as
reresented by the Court) did not disturb this.
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
-imposed by charge. Issues determined by Blais' pleadings [13] but legal framework (NRTA) is
imposed.
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof Agreed facts re basic charge. Noted how
evidence supported trial fmdings[20] MacDonald quote [22] Census data [27]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
"rightly or wrongly, this view did not extend to the Metis"[33]
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principles explained, but based on Crown's imposed legality
[note some seeming illogical arguments of Metis ego [36]
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
10. Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Observation that Metis did not seek Crown protection[20] is strange given public
knowledge of military conquest of Riel & Metis.
Respect: Crown & Metis perspectives referred to [20] Metis arguments set out & addressed [36-40]
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Some
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 8 4.5
xcviii
57. Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259; 2003 SCC 45 (CanLII).
INDIVIDUALLY NAMED COURT
(McLachlin C..l. Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Arbour, LeBel, Deschamps 11.)
Main Points: -"no reasonable person informed of the decision-making process of the Court, and
viewing it realistically, could conclude that it was likely that the eight other judges were biased, or
somehow tainted, by the apprehended bias affecting the ninthjudge."[92]
1. Judges - AlienlPeer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined Crown filed motion [22], Court invited submissions [24]
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
-Except for Deschamps, they judged their own decision.[92]
-Heavy reliance on Wilson J.'s article about court procedure. Was it shown to the Indigenous
parties?
Given the hierarchical character ofthe judicial system, it might be impossible to fmd a trier for this
case who is neutral in the sense of not being implicated -short ajury trial or external (international)
assessment.
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: no evidence to support the clam that anyone can be impartial (eg. psychological studies)
No opportunity to cross-examine on their assessment of their own procedure - which was critical to
the outcome.
Proof: Memos related to Binnie examined in detail & his statement included.
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: both indigenous parties wanted the judgment vacated but it was upheld.[24,25]
The Crown filed a motion [22] after Campbell River sent an information request[15] The Court
asked for submissions from the parties[24] and left them to pay the costs of this [94].
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: assessment founded on their own conviction.[90]
Principled: eg re bias & need for justice to be seen to be done
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
The fully informed "reasonable person" test seems egalitarian, but as applied by the Court none of
the Indigenous parties or interveners qualified as "reasonable".
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Egocentric "alleged reasonable apprehension ofbias"[I] use of themselves as the standard for the
reasonable person....failure to deal with the short-comings associated with the fact that they were
judging their own proceedings
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Yes Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total 10 2Y2
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58. Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] 2 S.c.R. 585; 2003 SCC 55
(CanLII).
BASTARACHE J.
(McLachlin C,J. Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel, Deschamps J1.)
Main Points: Adjudication is distinct from legislation so a province can enable a commission that
may be required to consider defences based on aboriginal rights.[34]
"the procedural right to raise at first instance a defence ofaboriginal rights in a superior court, as
opposed to before a provincially constituted tribunal" has not been shown to go to the core of
Indianness. [33]
-If an administrative tribunal has the power to interpret questions of law, it may apply valid laws
only to the extent that they do not run afoul of s.35 rights.[39]
1. Judges - AlienlPeer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined -charge
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: discussion concerns what is "allowed" or "Permissible" (not "agreed")[25]
Egalitarian: concept of equality before the law implicit in considering effect of right to appeal[22]
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Aboriginal rights have been identified as "collective rights", but Paul's nationality is
not identified. He is just "a registered Indian".[l] Totally absorbed in legal arguments so esoteric that
the understanding of those with enough legal expertise to sit on the B.c.c.A. was called
"fundamentally wrong". [1 8] Expertise of specialized tribunals recognized [30], but not the expertise
of Indigenous peoples in their own cultures.
Respect: The judgment has the effect of requiring all tribunals to take account of Aboriginal rights,
making them more accessible to those without the means to pursue their rights to higher courts.
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes* Mutually determined Yes*
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 7 6
* The.very technIcal procedural arguments addressed In thIS case dId not anse from the charge.
However, they may not have been raised by Paul either. They may have been the initiative of the
lawyer required because of the charge. Ifso, the burden of this case, whose cost surely exceeded the
price of the deck Paul wanted to build, is even more onerous.
59. Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister ofForests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511
MCLACHLIN C.J. (Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish. n.)
Main Points: "Knowledge of a credible but unproven claim suffices to trigger a duty to consult and
accommodate."[37]
-"the duty to consult and accommodate... flows from the Crown's assumption of sovereignty over
lands and resources formerly held by the Aboriginal group."[53]
-"The honour of the Crown cannot be delegated" to third parties.[53]
[In this case the Court is caught at the crossroads between colonial and postcolonial legality. In
keeping with the colonial establishment of British Columbia, the province assumed it had legal title
to Haida Gwaii and issued Weyerhaeuser a licence to cut trees there. However, under postcolonial
rules "aboriginal title" must be recognized so the Court was faced with two claims whose validity
depended on which legality prevailed.]
1. Judges - AlienlPeer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined Haida identity accepted - as Aboriginal in
Canada
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined Imposed by incursion of logging; Haida determined
issues
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Crown assumption of"discretionary control"accepted. [18]
Consensual: Haida may choose what remedy to seek.[13]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: decision-making remains in "the government" despite "deep consultation"[44]
Egalitarian: emphasis on consultation as "talking together for mutual understanding"[43]
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: presumption that only Canada has capacity to recognize legality [1]
"The government holds legal title to the land"[6] Haida must prove rights to Canada but Canada not
required to prove rights to Haida.[18, 36] "the duty to consult and accommodate... flows from the
Crown's assumption of sovereignty over lands and resources formerly held by the Aboriginal
group."[53]
Respect: Begins by setting out the problem from the Haida perspective.[l]
Haida allowed to seek the remedy they wanted[13]
c
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined Yes
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Some Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 6.5 8
ci
Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3
S.c.R. 550.
MCLACHLIN c.J. (Major, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish. JJ.)
Main point: If an Aboriginal nation with a primafacie claim is consulted during the certification of
a project in their claim area and if their concerns are accommodated in the view ofthe Minister, the
project may proceed over the nations' objections.[45]
Note the contrast between the nuanced description ofHaida Gwaii in Haida Nation and the
depersonalizing use of "TRTFN" here, especially when the mine in question is described by its full
culturally appropriating name of"Tulsequah Chief Mine", as if the foreign mine had more
Indigenous identity than the people themselves.
1. Judges - AlienlPeer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined very! "TRTFN"[l]
3. Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Foreign: "the TRTFN... whiched to have its concerns addressed on a broader scale than that which is
provided for under the Act".[36]
4. Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
5. Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: Staples' addendum was able to adequately express Taku River concerns[13] Content
of the Tlingit concerns in the supplementary report not reviewed.
Proof: supports finding B.C. had knowledge ofTaku River's title & rights claim[26]
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Tlingit concept ofrequirements rejected in favour of those in provinces legislation.[43-4]
Consent clearly not required here.
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Tlingit concerns declared accommodated with no specification of what they were &
only hazy general reference to them.[44]
Principled: Haida Nation principles referred to but not fully applied.
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: preference for Project Director's assessment over Taku River's - duty is only to
consult, not to obtain consent and Indigenous opinion is ultimately irrelevant as an external
assessment of their opinion is relied upon. [41]
10. Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethno/ego centric: Trial judges directions for reconsideration of the Project Approval Certificate not
set out & Appeal court's reasons not detailed so reader cannot assess the reasonableness of other
judicial approaches [19,20] Blind to the province's role as a party to the colonization of the
Tlingit.[42]
R I I' f h Tl' d [46]esoect: nc USlOn 0 t e mglt m on gomg consu tatIons expecte .
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept ofLaw Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Some
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Some
Total 9 3
cii
61.1 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, 2005 SCC 43 (CanLII).
MCLACHLIN c.J. (Major, Bastarache, Abella, Charron. J1.)
Main points: "what the treaty protects is not the right to harvest and dispose of particular
commodities, but the right to practice a traditional 1760 trading activity in the modem context".[26]
-"To say that title flows from occasional entry and use is inconsistent with these cases and the
approach to aboriginal title which this Court has consistently maintained."[59]
-Trial Bernard: "according to the evidence of Chief Augustine, the Mi'kmaq had neither the intent
nor the desire to exercise exclusive control, which in my opinion, is fatal to the claim for Aboriginal
title". [81]
-British authority to grant Mi'kmaq land never questioned or explained.
-repeated assertion that "aboriginal perspectives... must be considered" but this principle was not
applied and an externally determined analytical framework was applied.
-presumed nothing "dishonourable" about taking over the whole of someone else's environment.
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined -presumed to be under British rule
6. Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: the right to a catch & sell fish depends on treaties with the British.[13]
-"commercial logging" as conducted by the accused was "a European activity" [34][where?]
-common law right to title has always meant exclusionary control. [77] [no evidence to support]
Proof: discussion of Royal Proclamation & Belcher's Proclamation
7. Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: treaty interpretation is a unilateral process[13] title= exclusionary control[77]
Imperial authority of "his Majesty" presumed to defme legality [97-105]
8. Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: Source of authority is own previous reasoning [13]
"Thus the truck house clause was concerned with traditionally traded products". [1 9] though there
was no evidence that this superimposed limitation was in the contemplation ofthe parties in 1760-
61.
9. Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Reliance on the Court's own previous interpretation of 1760-61treaties in Marshall,
which found they "conferred" a right to fish and presumption that the Court rather than the
signatories of the treaty had authority to define the scope of the agreement.[13]
Egalitarian: both aboriginal & European perspectives must be considered [46] BUT presumes to have
the expertise to assess what fits the Aboriginal perspective without reciprocating.
10. Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethno/Ego centric: Conclusion that there is no ground for concluding that "commercial logging" was
a "logical evolution of traditional Mi'kmaq trading activity."[35] Applied only Anglo-Canadian law
despite claiming Aboriginal perspectives had to be considered. Insisted that the "group's relationship
to the land is paramount" but failed to look at the British relationship with the land in 1760.[136]
Respect: "both aboriginal and European common law perspectives must be considered" [45]
"The mere fact that the group travelled within its territory and did not cultivate the land should not
take away from its title claim."rI361
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Some
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian ?
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Little
Total 9 2.75
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61.2 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bemard, 2005 SCC 43 (CanLII).
LEBEL J. (Fish J.)
Main Points: "The treaty protects both a right to trade and a right of access to resources" [113]
-"The right of trade and the right of access to resources for trade must bear some relation to the
traditional use of resources in the lifestyle and economy of the Mi'kmaq people in 1760."[125]
-"The patterns and nature of aboriginal occupation of land should inform the standard necessary to
prove aboriginal title."
-A fmal determination of aboriginal title should only be made when there is adequate evidence.
[rambling discussion of the importance of "the aboriginal perspective" with virtually no evidence of
what it was or is. The only Aboriginal perspectives cited at any point were Chief Augustine's
mention of the environmental problems caused by British logging [122] and John Borrow's advocacy
for reconciliation of Aboriginal & Canadian law [128, 130]
-[Comparison between British & Mi'Kmaq occupation in 1760 conspicuously absent in both sets of
reasons]
1. Judges - Alien/Peer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: Mi'kmaq could not cut large logs because they lacked the necessary tools.[121]1126
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Accepted authority of Anglo-Canadian court in face of egalitarian assertions of the need to take
account of "the aboriginal perspective".eg.[139].
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Law based only on Anglo-Canadian opinion & culture.
-1760 measure re resource access applied only to Mi'kmaq, not to other Canadians. [125]
Respect: Attempt to find a place for Aboriginal perspective. Critique of the use of summary
conviction procedure.[142-4]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Yes Principled explanation Some
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian ?
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others Yes
Total 9 3.75
1126 Indigenous people felled trees using fire. William Cronon, Changes in the Land :Indians,
Colonists, and the Ecology ofNew England (New York: HilI and Wang, 1983) at 48.
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62. Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister ofCanadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69
(CanLII).
BINNIE J. (McLachlin C..J. Major, Bastarache, LeBel, Fish, Deschamps, Abella, Charron. 11.)
Main Points: The 1899 negotiations for Treaty 8 "were the first step in a long journey that is
unlikely to end any time soon."[56]. "Treaty 8 provides a framework within which to manage the
continuing changes in land use already foreseen in 1899." [63]"The crown's duty to consult imposes
on it a positive obligation to reasonably ensure that [representations ot]aboriginal peoples... are
seriously considered and, wherever possible, demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of
action". [64]
1. Judges - AlienlPeer
2. Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
-no evidence they asked to join Canada, lack of interest in reserve. [3]
-Road was an external initiative.
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions:- supported by proof
Proof: shows roads change wildlife patterns[44]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed legality rejected. Requirement for consultation does not go so far as to require consent, but
the requirement to accommodate comes close - perhaps as far as reasonable for postcolonial law.
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Principled: based on honour of the Crown
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Egalitarian: principle of looking at both perspectives actually applied throughout the reasoning.
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Respect: Information re Mikisew & Treaty 8; opinion of Chief Poitras [9], ofMikisew [15] Mikisew
submissions [35]. Sensitivity to geographic ecological variation[45] & to "significance and
practicalities" for First Nations[47]. Meaningful right to hunt based on traditional territory [48].
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Respect/place for others Yes
Total 4 6
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63.1 R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, 2006 SCC 54 (CanLII)
BASTARACHE J. (McLachlin C.J. LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein)
Main Principle: Defence of aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic purposes made out.
Judge - AlienlPeer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Canadian Citizens but Indigenous
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Defined by charge under Crown Lands Act, though could raise defence
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Proof: evidence of historian to found finding re use ofwood[28]
N.B. [there was evidence of trade though it was excluded see [30] treaty history [64]
Assumptions: Mi'kmaq & Maliseet "migratory"
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed; Van der Peet test [22] primacy to Court's recognition [23] [31], [38]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Principled; use of Van der Peettest, Adams
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Court to define scope of s.35 [22] citing Van der Peet" primacy to Court's recognition
[23] [31], [38]. Crown right to extinguish affirmed pre s. 35 [58]
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric; quest for "distinctiveness"; "harvesting wood" for "personal uses" too general!!! [24]
-definition ofMaliseet & Mi'kmaq as "migratory people" [24][46] insistence on "distinctiveness"
[34], emphasis on contact as a time frame [34]
Respect: to protect traditional means ofsurvival [38] different ideas re distinctiveness [43]
differences in different languages[44] avoid racialized stereotypes [46] Allowed to use resource in
d' . 1 . [53] C b b d f . f . hm [57]tra ltlOna terntory rown ears ur en 0 provmg ex mgUls ent
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined some
5. Procedure In cameralbiased Public/interveners/equal yes
6. Evidence Assumptions some Supported by proof yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation yes
9. Values Authoritarian yes Egalitarian some
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric yes Respect/place for others yes
Total 7.5 6
63.2 R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, 2006 SCC 54 (CanLII)
BINNIE: Main Point Barter should be permitted on the reserve, but not outside.
-Respected right ofIndigenous people to barter among themselves but ethnocentric belief Court has
authority to impose restrictions on their relations with others. [74]
cvi
64.1 McDiarmid Lumber Ltd. v. Gods Lake First Nation 2006 SCC 58 (CanLII)
MCLACHLIN c.J. (Bastarache, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein 11.)
Main Principle: Funds from a Comprehensive Funding Arrangement held in an off-reserve bank are
not protected from garnishment by the Indian Act.
-N.B. uncritical reference to assimilation policy of 1938[52]
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumptions: no evidence to support claim of Canadian policy change in 1930's & 40's [51]
Lack of information about the history ofIndigenous relations with "government" leads to distortion
suggesting the Indigenous "aspiration" to self-determination and self-government was a 20th century
development though there is plenty of historical evidence to suggest they believed they always had
these rights. Naive belief that 1938 revision marked change in attitude despite referring to the"need
to develop a spirit of self-reliance and independence in our Indian wards"[52] Speculation re
Parliament's intent [61]
-Claims her interpretation fosters self-reliance, self-government & economic development with no
supporting study
Concept of law - imposed I consensual
Imposed: laws of colonizing society imposed (Indian Act, Trust & Loan Companies Act, case law,
Parliament's wish[20]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: Should not disturb parliament's distinction [
Perspective - EthnolEgo centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: application ofParliament's wish [20] Adoption ofassimilationist view re making
I d' [53] & d . f d' A [55]n lans cItizens a optIOn 0 new In Ian ct
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutuallv determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Yes Supported bv proof some
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratorv Yes Principled explanation I yes
9. Values Authoritarian Yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Yes Respect/place for others
Total 9 3.5
64.2 McDiarmid Lumber Ltd. v. Gods Lake First Nation 2006 SCC 58 (CanLII)
BINNIE J. (Fish, Abella JJ.)
Main Principle: CFA should be treated like a treaty and exempted from garnishment under
s.90(l )(b) of the Indian Act.
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: Indian Act standard
Consensual: reliance on treaty ideal; need for change anticipated [144]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Principled -reliance on equitable of interpretation
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: interpretation of Canadian statutes made without Indigenous input [127]
Egalitarian: treat all bands equally [121] predictability [146] avoid national embarassment [149]
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
-recognition of colonial dispossession [106] [124]
-recognition of language problem[ 125] "survival as liveable communities" [134]
-Nowegijick principles [144]
cvii
Colonial Postcolonial
I. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-detennined Yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually detennined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal Yes
6. Evidence Assumptions Supported by proof Yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed Yes Consensual Yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory Principled explanation Yes
9. Values Authoritarian Egalitarian Yes
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric Respect/place for others Yes
Total 5 7
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65.1 R. v. Morris, 2006 SCC 59 (CanLII)
DESCHAMPS & ABELLA JJ (Binnie, Charron)
Main Points: Sparrow & Badger justifications only apply when government is acting within its
constitutionally mandated powers [55]
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed: charge,_acceptance of non-consensual regulation
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: "they agreed to relinquish control over their lands on Vancouver Island"[ no evidence
offered][25]
Proof-re hunting rights - Douglas letter etc[22] night hunting [28] no evidence of accident from
night hunting[59]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: division of powers analysis-f42] -"insignificant" infringements of treaty rights OK[50]
-Sparrow defn of infringement [51]
Consensual: treaty respected
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
-declaratory (reliance on McLachlin)use of principles [29]
-"insignificant" infringements of treaty rights OK[50]
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: -"insignificant" infringements of treaty rights OK[50]
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: Division of powers analysis [29]
Respect: interpretation [29],protection for "Indianness" - right to hunt [44]
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker Yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity Yes Self-determined yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture Yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed Yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal yes
6. Evidence Assumptions yes Supported by proof yes
7. Concept of Law Imposed yes Consensual yes
8. Reasoning Declaratory yes Principled explanation yes
9. Values Authoritarian yes Egalitarian
1O. Perspective Ethno/ego centric yes Respect/place for others yes
Total 9 6
65.2 R. v. Morris, 2006 SCC 59 (CanLII)
MCLACHLIN c.J. & FISH J. (Bastarache)
cix
Main Point: treaty right to hunt is subject to an intemallimitation that excludes dangerous hunting
[64]
"treaties must be interpreted in a manner that contemplates their exercise in modem society"[115]
Judge - Alien/Peer
Parties - Imposed Identity/ Self-Determined
Venue - Foreign language & culture/ own
Issues - Imposed - mutually determined
Imposed: charge, reasoning relies on past jurisprudence in the colonial culture[85]
Procedure - in camera/biased/public interveners equal
Evidence - assumptions - supported by proof
Assumption: accused are Canadians [85] hunting at night is dangerous[ 108]
Concept of law - imposed / consensual
Imposed: analysis begins with 91(24); "province" or "government" has right to define[123,124]
Reasoning - Declaratory - Principled
Declaratory: reliance on Court's own reasoning [123]
Values - Authoritarian - Egalitarian
Authoritarian: assumes right to legislate for Indians
"preference for Singh's interpretation "We prefer" [106]
Perspective - Ethno/Ego centric- Cross-cultural respect
Ethnocentric: opinions canvassed are those ofjudges in colonizing society [105] [127] Indigenous
opinion is invisible. View that treaty "conferred" right to hunt[135]
Respect: concern for public safety
Colonial Postcolonial
1. Judge Alien decision-maker yes Peer decision
2. Parties Imposed identity yes Self-determined yes
3. Venue Foreign language/culture yes Own language/culture
4. Issues Imposed yes Mutually determined
5. Procedure In camera/biased Public/interveners/equal yes
6. Evidence Assumptions yes Supported by proof
7. Concept of Law Imposed yes Consensual
8. Reasoning Declaratory yes Principled explanation yes
9. Values Authoritarian yes Egalitarian
10. Perspective Ethno/ego centric yes Respect/place for others some
Total 9 3.5
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Appendix 5: Use of the Canadian Judicial Institution
AS! F fP. orm 0 artIclpatlOn
Formal Initiation Indigenous Settler Total
Defendant Defendant
a. Crown penal charge/assessment 30 2 32
b. Crown court suit 2 2
c. Crown inquiry/reference 1 2 3
d. Private suit 3 2 5
e. Indigenous suit 18 18
f. Crown alliance with Indigenous interest 6 6
g. Crown support for private property interest 27 27
h. Indigenous/Settler alliance 7 7
i. No Crown-Indigenous Adversity 6
Provocation
Crown: 40
j. Charge re resource use (hunting, fishing, logging) 22 22
k. Tax /customs assessment 4 4
1. Grants/permits/leases given to settlers 14 14
Indigenous: 9
m. Legal initiative 2 2
n. Claim/tax assessment 3 3
o. Blockade 2 2
p. Public refusal to comply with settler regulations 2 2
Interveners
Q. Federal Crown 22
r. Provincial Crowns 37
s. Indigenous 40
1. Private 22
u. No intervener 10
A5.2 Penalization of Indigenous Parties
cxi
Number
Charged Acquitted More trial Convicted
Nowegijick tax 1 1
Jack and Charlie hunting, ceremonial, B.C. 2 2
Dick hunting, closed season B.C. 1 1
Simon hunting, treaty, Micmac 1 1
Horse hunting, Treaty 6,NRTA 8 8
Francis traffic regs on reserve, N.B. 1 1
Horseman hunting, bear attack, Treaty 8 1 1
Sioui hunting, in park, treaty 4 4
Sparrow fishing, B.C. 1 1
Jones bingo,Ont. 2 2
Williams tax 1 1
Howard fishing, closed season, Ont. 1 1
Badger hunting, Treaty 8, NRTA 3 1 2
Nikal fishing on reserve, B.C. 1 1
Lewis fishing, by reserve, B.C. 3 3
Van der Peet fish sold, B.C. 1 1
Gladstone herring spawn on kelp, B.C. 2 2
Pamajewon gambling, Ont. 5 5
Adams fishing, Mohawk, Que. 1 1
Cote fishing, traditional, Que. 5 1* 5
Williams robbed pizza parlour 1 1
Sundown hunting cabin, Treaty 6 1 1
Gladue manslaughter 1 **
Marshall fishing eels, Miqmaq 1 1
Catcheway road block 10 10
Mitchell customs, Mohawk 1 1
Powley hunting, Metis, Ont. 2 2
Blais hunting, Metis, NRTA 1 1
Paul cut logs, B.C. 1 1
Marshall/Bernard logging, Mi'kmaq, N.S. 35 35
Totals: 99 14 15 70
* acquitted on one charge, convicted on another
** re jury selection, served sentence unchanged
